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Abstract 
 
 
Military intervention in internal conflicts represents a recurrent practice in 
international history. This thesis provides a theoretical framework for the 
study of the political and sociological processes that lead political elites to 
militarily intervene in internal conflicts. Following the renewed interest in 
political elites both in Sociology and International Relations, the thesis 
draws on Elite Theory to address the dual nature of political elites as both 
domestic and international actors. In doing so, it develops a framework for 
the study of military intervention centred on political elites that 
overcomes the limits of existing contributions on the subject. In particular, 
the thesis highlights how interventionary policies are shaped by three 
overlapping causal antecedents: elites’ contending ideological claims; 
elites’ struggle for both domestic and international power; and the 
relationship established by the intervener’s elite with elite and counter-
elite groups in the target state.  
 
The thesis tests the plausibility of the proposed framework by examining 
US decisions in three cases: US intervention in the Cuban War of 
Independence (1898-1902); US intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918-
1920); and US non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This 
analysis highlights three elements. First, ideological considerations set 
significant limits to US cooperation with leaders in the target country 
despite the strategic rationale for cooperation against common enemies. 
Second, the interplay between international and domestic political 
considerations represented a fundamental ‘push factor’, shaping the 
objectives US elites sought. Third, foreign elite groups played a crucial 
role in ‘pulling’ US interventions, both by representing local allies 
instrumental to Washington’s objectives and by directly accessing and 
influencing US decision-making processes. For the same reasons, the lack 
of these push and pull factors are key to explaining US non-intervention in 
the Spanish case.  
 
Overall, the thesis offers a twofold contribution to the study of military 
intervention. First, it explores how military intervention permits decision-
makers to affect the ‘circulation of elites’ in both their own societies and in 
other societies. Second, it indicates how military intervention affects the 
international system by altering ideological homogeneity, international 
alliances and hierarchical relations between elites. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
The Eternal Return of Intervention 
Throughout history, states have repeatedly intervened in the internal conflicts 
of other communities. From the early external involvement in the civil strife of 
the Greek poleis during the Peloponnesian War to the recent operations in 
North Africa following the so-called Arab Spring, military interventions have 
profoundly affected the course of civil wars and revolutions, favouring certain 
domestic actors instead of others, whether the democratic factions supported by 
Athens or the Libyan opposition supported by NATO in 2011. Notably, Theban 
intervention in Platea in support of a local faction represented the very opening 
scene of the Peloponnesian War: while the former intervened to secure an ally, 
the latter used external intervention to secure power for itself: 
A Theban force…made an army entry into Plataea,…an ally of Athens. 
They came at the invitation of a Plataean party…who opened the gates 
for them. The aim of this party was to gain power for themselves by 
getting rid of their own political opponents and bringing Plataea over 
into the Theban alliance. The plan had been arranged with…Thebes. For, 
realizing that war was certain to come, the Thebans were anxious to get 
control of Plataea first.1  
In the prosecution of the conflict, Athens and Sparta repeatedly intervened in 
the internal conflicts of the neighbouring cities to secure existing alliances.2 
Similar practices characterise different historical periods and geographical 
contexts. The pattern of external interference and domestic strife characterised: 
the rivalry between the Empire and the Papacy during the Middle Ages and the 
overlapping conflict between Guelfs and Ghibellines in the Italian cities;3 the 
French wars of religion, the English support for the Dutch rebels during the 
                                                
1 Thucydides 1972: II.2. 
2 Vincent 1974: 11; MacFarlane 2002: 20. 
3 Waley 1988: 145-156. 
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Eight Years War, and the Hapsburg efforts to counter Reformation in Bohemia 
igniting the Thirty Years’ War;4 as well as the counterrevolutionary 
interventions of the Concert of Europe during the 19th Century. In the East 
Asian context, interventions shaped the military and political balance of the 
region, including Qin’s internal meddling into other Chinese warring states of 
the 4th Century BC and Chinese interventions within its tributary states during 
the 18th and 19th Century, such as Vietnam and Korea.5 US interventions in the 
Caribbean were key to the emergence and maintenance of American hegemony 
over the Western Hemisphere; during the Cold War, they were an integral part 
of the global competition with the Soviet Union.6  
In all these instances, military intervention responded to the interests of the 
intervener but also profoundly affected the interests and domestic position of 
local factions.7 Even in the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, Western 
operations favoured certain political actors instead of others.8 In more general 
terms, interventions and discourses on intervention include local groups and 
leaders that are preferred over others. Despite the humanitarian intentions 
behind Western intervention in Libya in 2011, military operations favoured the 
opposition and stopped only with the removal of Muhammar Qaddafi. In short, 
the interests of the intervener cannot be disentangled from the question of who 
rules the target state. Recently, this link between external interests and local 
leaders explicitly emerged in former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
remarks on the ongoing civil war in Syria: 
…these are struggles in which our own interests, quite apart from the 
humanitarian aspect, are dramatically engaged. And I still think, in 
respect of Iraq and Afghanistan, once those conflicts got beyond the 
regime change stage – Saddam was toppled, the Taliban driven out of 
Afghanistan – and they then change into these deep-seated sectarian 
conflicts, we have an interest in ensuring that the sensible people win 
those conflicts.9 
                                                
4 Krasner 1995: 235; MacFarlane 2002: 21-22; Nexon 2009a. 
5 Wohlforth et al. 2007: 69; Westad 2012: 91, 95-103. 
6 Westad 2005. 
7 Ibid.; Grow 2008. 
8 On how humanitarian interventions also encompass a decision over the groups the 
intervener decides to support, see Betts 1994: 21. 
9 Blair 2013. 
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Despite the unfavourable economic conditions in which Western states operate 
and despite the costs incurred in recent and ongoing interventions, notably Iraq 
and Afghanistan, military intervention remains on the agenda of major 
international actors.    
 
 
The Research Question and its Relevance 
This link between the intervener’s interests in an internal conflict and in 
supporting one of the factions involved represents the central theme of this 
study. The thesis examines the causes of military intervention in internal 
conflicts. Why do foreign actors decide to fight for others? In particular, this 
study addresses three interrelated research questions: first, why do states 
militarily intervene in some domestic conflicts and not others? Second, why do 
states intervene in support of a particular foreign actor instead of other actors 
involved in the conflict? Third, why do states opt for a particular mode of 
military intervention (direct overt intervention) instead of other forms of 
influence or intervention available to them? In developing a theoretical 
framework to address these questions, the thesis sheds light on the constant 
political and sociological processes leading states to intervene to support a 
foreign actor’s internal struggle – it is these processes that make intervention a 
recurrent practice in history.  
In empirical terms, this project examines the causes not only of a recurrent, but 
also of a consequential, practice for both international and domestic politics. As 
stressed in the examples above, military intervention represents a recurrent 
practice in international affairs widely recognised in the field of International 
Relations (IR).10 It has been defined as ‘une pratique courante, constante et 
universelle’;11 a practice more common than war itself;12 an ‘ubiquitous’, 
‘inherent feature’ of the international itself.13 These observations have been 
                                                
10 Young 1968: 178. 
11 Trolliet 1940: 14. 
12 Wight 1978: 191. 
13 Bull 1984a: 2. See also Guelke 1974: 122. 
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supported by more recent empirical surveys underscoring how military 
interventions have been historically frequent not only during the 20th Century 
but also in previous centuries.14  For instance, J.H. Leurdijk identifies 45 cases of 
interventions between 1815-1975 aimed at the domestic institutions of a foreign 
state. From a broader historical perspective, John Owen lists 198 cases of foreign 
imposed institutions and related interventions between 1555 and 2000.15 
Shedding light on the causal mechanisms leading states to intervene in internal 
conflicts is useful to clarify this historical recurrence of intervention. At the 
same time, it helps to define a more accurate theoretical framework to examine 
both recent cases of intervention as well as the possibility of foreign 
intervention in ongoing internal conflicts. Intervention in internal conflicts 
remains consequential for today’s international relations. First, intervention 
represents the most direct way, together with outright occupation, through 
which the international affects domestic politics.16 Furthermore, not only actual 
interventions but also the expectations of foreign interventions alter the political 
and strategic calculus of domestic actors, for instance by creating moral hazard 
that facilitates rebellion.17  
Second, the assumption that international security is linked to domestic security 
and affected by the increasing instability of foreign societies permeates the 
current debate. There is no consensus either on whether the number of civil 
wars are on the rise or not;18 or whether current civil conflicts are qualitatively 
different from ‘old’ ones or not.19 Nonetheless, civil wars, as exemplified by the 
ongoing conflict in Syria, represent major international security issues with 
profound regional and international implications. In more general terms, civil 
wars and revolutions have shaped the domestic as much as the international 
                                                
14 Calvert 1984: 172; Tilly 1991: 22; Regan 2000; Owen 2002: 375; Balch-Lindsay et al. 
2008: 348. 
15 Leurdijk 1986; Owen 2002: 376; 2010a. 
16 Gourevitch 1978: 883. 
17 Kuperman 2008: 49-50. On this point, see also Rowlands and Carment 1998; Cetinyan 
2002; Jenne 2004. 
18 For a view on the rise of civil wars, see Kaplan 2000; for a contending view, see 
Regan 2000. 
19 Kaldor 1999; Kalyvas 2001. 
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politics of the 20th Century and before.20 Today, the transnational dimension of 
radical religious ideologies such as Islamism, the critique of Liberal tenets 
following the conflict in Iraq in 2003 and of its Neoliberal political economy 
following the financial crisis, the alleged rise of authoritarianism, and the 
weakness of state structures in the Third World – all indicate the opening of 
new spaces of contestation and the possibility of radical change in 
contemporary politics.21 Examining which political pressures states will be 
subjected to in case of domestic conflict or revolutionary change abroad is 
therefore of particular importance to better understand not only past 
interventions, but also current and future ones. 
In theoretical terms, this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate on the practice 
and causes of military intervention. First, the thesis draws on the renewed 
interest in the discipline on the practice of military intervention, which has 
followed major Western operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, and, more 
recently, in Libya and Mali. The literature initially focused on two issues of 
major relevance for both the academic and policy debate: the key normative 
issues concerning intervention raised by humanitarian intervention;22 and, the 
linked question of the imposition of democratic institutions via forces, 
particularly following US regime change operation in Iraq in 2003.23 In 
particular, the thesis follows more recent attempts in the discipline that have 
examined military intervention on its own without confining its study to either 
the normative or policy dimension of intervention. In doing so, recent works 
have underscored the historical roots of intervention and its evolution as a 
practice in international relations. Notably, in their efforts to historicise 
intervention, these works have argued against the presentism of past works on 
                                                
20 Hobsbawn 1994: 54. 
21 On the alleged authoritarian revival, see Gat 2007. 
22 Humanitarian interventions are defined by Holzgrefe (2003: 18) as ‘aimed at 
preventing or ending widespread and grave violation of the fundamental human 
rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without permission of the state within 
whose territory force is applied’. On the evolution of humanitarism, see Finnemore 
2003; Bass 2008; Barnett 2011; Simms and Trim 2011. On the normative issues 
concerning humanitarian intervention, see Wheeler 2000. On the Responsibility to 
Protect and its partial adoption by the international community, see International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 2001; Weiss 2007: 177; Hehir 
2012. 
23 On the link between intervention and democratisation, see Bueno de Mesquita and 
Downs 2006; Downs and Monten 2013. 
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humanitarian intervention.24 At the same time, they have underscored how 
states recurrently intervene, exploring the causal mechanisms leading to waves 
of military interventions.25 A greater awareness of the international and 
transnational dimension of civil conflicts, which took shape first during the 
Cold War, still underlies current analyses.26 In more general terms, intervention 
rests at the intersection of international actors’ attempts to order these domestic 
and transnational phenomena.27   
Second, this study aims to systematise and develop the insights offered by 
recent works drawing attention to the link between intervention and political 
elites. As Martha Finnemore points out, despite changing historical and 
normative contexts, ‘[s]tates continue to care deeply about who governs other 
states’ and use military force in this regard.28 As a result, throughout history, 
state rulers have repeatedly authorised interventions to either change or secure 
the political leadership of other polities.29 Further, various contributions have 
connected the decision to intervene to the key role played by political elites, 
specifically: (i) elites’ interest in maintaining their position to explain the use of 
force in the pursuit of irredentist objectives in the presence of transnational 
ethnic ties, particularly within democratic regimes;30 (ii) the competition among 
advocacy groups formed by elites and their ability to gain the support of the 
public;31 (iii) and, political leaders’ definition of the national interest in response 
to systemic pressures and domestic constraints.32 Recently, Owen has stressed 
how the interplay between state rulers’ pursuit of both external (state) and 
internal (regime) security within periods of ‘transnational ideological struggle’ 
triggers waves of interventions throughout history.33 Finally, Elizabeth 
                                                
24 Finnemore 2003; Simms and Trim 2011; Lawson et al. 2013. 
25 Owen 2010a. 
26 Gleditisch 2007. On precedents, see Deutsch 1964; Modelski 1964; Brown 1996. 
27 MacMillan 2013. 
28 Finnemore 2003: 108. 
29 Owen 2010a; Sullivan and Koch 2009. 
30 Saideman 1997, 2001; Koga 2011. 
31 Western 2005. 
32 Dueck 2009. 
33 Owen 2010a. 
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Saunders has highlighted the role played by executive leaders’ causal beliefs in 
shaping interventionary policies.34   
However, this rather rich literature has omitted important cases and issues. For 
instance, Owen’s analysis does not address cases of intervention taking place in 
ideologically non-polarised contexts, for example American interventions in 
Latin America before the Cold War.35 At the same time, Saunders’ analysis 
discards the role played by leaders in the target state on the intervener’s 
decision.36 The latter is of particular relevance as various works have shown 
how intervention constitutes a specific form of both confrontation and 
cooperation between an intervening political elite and elite/counter-elite 
groups in the target country.37 In other words, although recent works have 
convincingly shown that rulers’ interests and ideas are central to the decision to 
intervene, these results have yet to be systematised under a consistent and 
comprehensive theoretical framework clarifying how and in what ways causal 
processes involving state rulers matter in shaping interventionary policies.  
 
 
The Argument and its Contribution 
This thesis provides a theoretical framework for the study of the political and 
sociological processes that lead political elites to militarily intervene in internal 
conflicts. Despite a more general ‘return to elites’ taking place not only in the 
study of intervention but also in Sociology and IR, scholars have not looked in 
any depth at the concept of ‘elite’ itself.38 As such, there is considerable scope 
for building on the renewed interests on political elites and for linking the study 
                                                
34 Saunders 2011. 
35 Owen 2010a: 32. 
36 Saunders 2011: 47. 
37 This point is highlighted not only by Owen (2010a: 49) but also by other major 
historical and theoretical work, including: Westad 2005; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 
2008; Grow 2008; Salehyan et al. 2011. 
38 The most recent example within the sociological literature is represented by Higley 
and Burton 2006. See also the special issues of Comparative Sociology: Sasaki 2007; Best 
and Higley 2009. Some of the key works in IR beyond the study of intervention putting 
leaders and elites back at the centre of their analyses, include: Byman and Pollack 2001; 
Schweller 2006; Trubowitz 2011; Jervis 2013.  
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of intervention to an elite theory of the state centred on Classic Elite Theory 
(CET) as well as from some of its more recent contributions to elite theory.39 In 
particular, the thesis draws on elite theory to address the dual nature of 
political elites as both domestic and international actors. In doing so, it develops 
a framework for the study of military intervention based on a Realist theory of 
the state centred on political elites that overcomes the limits of existing 
Neorealist and Neoclassical Realist contributions on the subject.  
As I will argue, political elite dynamics are central to explaining military 
interventions, with political elites acting as both the main actors and key targets 
of military interventions. Specifically, three elite dynamics – elites’ contending 
ideological claims; elites’ struggle for both domestic and international power; 
and the relationship established by the intervener’s elite with elite and counter-
elite groups in the target state – shape the defining causal mechanisms leading 
to the decision to intervention, respectively: the pattern of cooperation with 
elite groups in the target country; the push factors driving intervention; and the 
pull factors shaping intervention.40  
Bringing the study of elites into IR offers a threefold contribution. First, it offers 
the possibility of placing the study of elites on more systematic bases and of 
contributing to ongoing efforts within the discipline aimed at examining 
leaders’ role by clarifying the political and sociological contexts in which 
political leaders operate. Therefore, an elite theory helps clarify the relatively 
stable political and sociological dynamics that subsume specific instances of 
intervention and enable these interventions to take place over time. In 
particular, it provides a compelling theoretical toolbox for the study of how 
elites’ competition for power both at the domestic and international level 
shapes the decision to intervene. 
Second, it explores how military intervention permits decision-makers to affect 
the ‘circulation of elites’ in both their own societies and in other societies. In 
doing so, it indicates how military intervention affects the international system 
by altering ideological homogeneity, international alliances and hierarchical 
                                                
39 CET encompasses the works of Mosca 1923; Michels 1915; Pareto 1935. 
40 On intervention as resulting from both push factors (originating in the intervening 
country) and pull factors (originating in the target country), see Little 1975; Wight 1978; 
Jentleson et al. 1992. 
                     19 
relations between elites. As such, it provides a means of examining the 
international consequences of domestic elite circulation, i.e. the effects of elite 
change on international society in terms of increased or decreased levels of 
homogeneity.41 Thus intervention operates simultaneously as a tool for the 
imposition of specific political elites alongside seeing military intervention as a 
‘homogenising instrument’ of international relations.  
Third, it contributes to ongoing efforts to better define Realist theories of the 
state.42 Interestingly, Neoclassical Realism has drawn on the ‘return to the state’ 
begun within sociology during the 1970s to define its intervening variables, yet 
it has so far failed to fully engage with the elite tradition underpinning the 
statist approach.43 In bringing elites in, the thesis offers the possibility to 
overcome a twofold limit in the study of intervention: the limited 
conceptualisations of the state that have hampered the study of intervention; 
and, the rigid distinction between international and domestic that has 
hampered the development of a Realist contribution to the study of 
intervention.44 Notably, this project seeks to open a constructive dialogue 
between Realism and Political Sociology over the role of elites in foreign-policy 
making and over intervention. For this purpose, I will first define the key terms 
used in this study as well as the scope of the research here conducted.  
 
 
Defining Intervention 
Disagreements over the definition of intervention have set significant obstacles 
in the past for research on the subject.45 Definitional problems arise from the 
vague boundaries of the concept, itself the result of two issues: the complexity 
of the phenomenon in terms of its multiple causes and forms; and, its being a 
                                                
41 Aron 1966a. 
42 Lobell et al. 2009. 
43 This is particularly evident in Zakaria 1998. On the return to the state, see Evans et al. 
1985. 
44 Little 1975, 1987; Rosenberg 1994. On Realism’s neglect of intervention, see Krasner 
1995: 232. 
45 Holsti 1972: 278. 
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‘twilight area’ standing at the intersection of power, morals, interests, and legal 
considerations.46 Because of this ambiguity, the concept of intervention has been 
stretched to include any type of interference by an external actor.47A definition 
of intervention is therefore necessary in order to restrict the scope of inquiry to 
manageable limits.48  Defining intervention equates mainly to the identification 
of ‘criteria for inclusion and exclusion’ needed to formulate a  ‘nominal’ – i.e. 
stipulative – definition that can be held relatively constant over time and across 
the debates surrounding the issue.49 At the same time, in order to avoid the 
arbitrary imposition of a definition over the meaning attached to it by 
practitioners, the proposed definition needs to identify a consistent set of 
activities while being related to the historical use of the term.50 
Definitions of intervention can be clustered in two main groups. A first group 
of definitions broadens the concept of intervention to equate it either to any use 
of military force or to any foreign policy decision. On the one hand, 
intervention is defined in such a way to include any military operation, thus 
becoming a synonym of war or of the decision to use force in the international 
sphere.51 In this sense, the term ‘intervention’ is used instead of ‘war’ simply to 
underscore a higher degree of freedom in the choice to participate in the 
conflict.52 Following the same logic, the term intervention has been used to 
define military interference in the ongoing wars of two or more states, e.g. 
American intervention in the First World War.53 As a consequence, 
interventions in the domestic affairs or intra-state conflicts of other polities are 
not distinguished from interventions in others’ inter-state conflicts.54 On the 
                                                
46 Schwarz 1969: 30; Pearson 1974: 268. 
47 Paquin and Saideman 2010. 
48 Hoffmann 1984: 9. On the question of the definition of humanitarian intervention, see 
Lang 2003. 
49 Young 1968: 177. 
50 Weber 1992: 206. 
51 For instance, Tillema (1973: 3; 1989: 181, 187) defines military intervention as any 
regular military operation conducted in another country. Sullivan and Koch (2009: 709) 
define intervention ‘as a use of armed force that involves the official deployment of at 
least 500 regular military personnel (ground, air, or naval) to attain immediate-term 
political objectives through action against a foreign adversary’. Similarly, see Millar 
1980; Taliaferro 2004; Dueck 2009.  
52 Wight 1978: 192. 
53 Winfield 1923: 131. 
54 Saunders 2009: 122-123.  
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other hand, other authors define interventions as any act of interference in both 
the internal and the external affairs of other states. Max Beloff, for instance, 
defines intervention as ‘the attempt by one state to affect the internal structure 
and external behaviour of other states through various degrees of coercion’.55  
However, accepting such a broad definition of intervention presents two 
problems. First, starting from the early 1800s, the term intervention has 
acquired a peculiar meaning denoting the ‘use of force by one state in the 
internal affairs of another’ and in this sense it was clearly distinguished from 
war in both politico-diplomatic circle and academic debate.56 Second, 
broadening the concept of intervention to include interference in both the 
domestic and external affairs of other states would ultimately equate 
intervention to any foreign policy activity. As a result, every foreign policy 
decision could be constructed as an instance of intervention, thus making the 
analytical category of intervention pointless.57  
Rejecting the conceptual ambiguity inherent in the previous usage of the term, a 
second group of definitions limits the use of the term intervention to any 
interference in the domestic affairs of other states. For instance, Stanley 
Hoffman defines intervention as those ‘acts which try to affect not the external 
activities, but the domestic affairs of the state’.58  Similarly, Deen Chatterjee and 
Don Scheid note that intervention ‘in the context of international affairs, usually 
means a coercive action of some kind by an outside party (or parties) that takes 
place within a sovereign state’. In more specific terms, drawing mainly on Lassa 
Oppenheim, various authors define intervention in terms of its violation of the 
domestic jurisdiction of other states. For instance, Hedley Bull defines 
intervention as ‘dictatorial or coercive interference, by an outside party or 
parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state, or more broadly of an 
independent political community’. Similarly Robert Jackson defines 
                                                
55 Beloff 1968: 198. Similarly, see Schraeder 1989: 2; Otte 1995: 10. 
56 Bullen 1979: 54. In this sense, the use of the term intervention is a recent 
development. Previously, both Grotius and Vattel and the more general practice before 
the 18th Century did not distinguish a separate category of intervention from war. See 
Winfield 1923: 135-136; Trolliet 1940: 14; Finnemore 2003: 10, 96; Keene 2013. 
57 This point is raised by a variety of authors, including: Schwarz 1970: 84; Younger 
1971: 12; Hoffmann 1984: 7-8; Little 1987: 49; Finnemore 2003. 
58 The definitions are taken from Hoffmann 1984: 9; and, Chatterjee and Scheid 2003: 1. 
See also Mitchell 1970: 167-168; Bullen 1979: 54. 
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intervention as ‘interference…, involving the threat or use of force or some 
other means of duress, in the domestic jurisdiction of an independent state 
against the will or wishes of its government’.59 However, domestic jurisdiction 
may include a vast array of sovereign rights, such as defence policy, arms build-
up, right to conclude alliances, trade policy that have immediate international 
effects.60 Once again, considering interference on these policies as an act of 
intervention entails the risk of broadening the concept of intervention to 
untenable limits.  
In order to overcome these problems and avoid possible confusion among the 
terms used in this study vis-à-vis the abovementioned definitions, I will first 
distinguish between three categories of activity: influence, interference, and 
intervention with influence and intervention resting at the extremes of a 
continuum.61 At the most general level, we can identify the overall influence 
states exert over each other affecting their status, identity, material resources, 
internal and external policies. This is the least problematic level since it includes 
the very interactions that manifest the existence of a system at the international 
level whereby state actions reverberate on others’ decisions, a level at which no 
significant issue of legitimacy is raised.62 Interference refers to the forms of 
influence and interactions in the domestic jurisdiction and affairs of other 
independent political communities that exclude inter-state wars but include 
those areas and policies that independent political actors consider to be part of 
their sovereign domains and that change over time, which may include forms 
of influence over other states’ fiscal policy.63  
Finally, intervention represents a most obtrusive form of interference.64 It results 
from an actor’s purposeful attempt to shape the internal structures of another 
community. It represents a conscious response to specific pressures (incentives 
                                                
59 Bull 1984a: 1; Jackson 2000: 250. For the original definition, see Oppenheim 1905. 
60 Trachtenberg 1993. 
61 Lyons and Mastanduno 1995: 10. 
62 Aron 1966a; Bull 1977; Waltz 1979; Brown 2002: 79. 
63 Higgins 1984: 31. 
64 Defined in these broad terms without reference to its exact forms and objectives, the 
term intervention as used here is similar to what Mitchell (1970: 169, fn.3) defined as 
‘involvement’, ‘which can concern both political authorities and socio-economic 
groupings’.  
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or threats) emanating from other communities. As John MacMillan has recently 
argued, intervention manifests a ‘will to order’, i.e. the attempt to regulate 
tensions emerging from the interplay between ‘bounded political entities’ and 
‘transnational social forces ‘ broadly defined.65 It is first and foremost an 
exercise in control over another community that leaders of the intervening actor 
consider to be affecting the latter.  
As intervention responds to different exigencies and forces, it can take different 
forms. As Richard Little notes, imposing a definition of intervention that 
restricts intervention solely to military interventions excludes a priori other 
forms of intervention that are relevant in international relations.66 Intervention 
can be either coercive or non-coercive.67 In particular, drawing on Amitai 
Etzioni, we can distinguish different forms of intervention in terms of the 
source of power employed and the immediate objective affected by the external 
actor.68 Intervention can take three forms: economic, ideological, and military. 
Economic interventions denote the use of economic tools to affect the economic 
structures and policies of a foreign country.69 Ideological interventions (or 
intervention on opinion) refer to the use of cultural, media and propaganda 
tools aimed at shaping the structure of the public opinion and discourse of the 
target.70 Finally, coercive or military interventions refer to the use of military force 
to affect the political authority of the target and its relationship with its society 
or segments thereof. Specifically, I will define military intervention as the 
coercive and organised interference by one or more external actors aimed at 
either the preservation or alteration of the existing political order of the target 
community.  
                                                
65 MacMillan 2013.  
66 Little 1987: 52. For instances of use of the term intervention to purely military 
interventions, see Saunders 2009: 122; Owens 2002. 
67 Gurr 1974: 71. 
68 Etzioni (1965: 37) identifies three forms of intervention: coercive (military), utilitarian 
(economic) and identitive (propaganda). See also Little 1975: 9; Krasner 2013. 
69 See, for instance, the European Recovery Program (ERP). As in the case of the ERP, 
economic interventions may serve broader political goals. The distinction simply 
serves to highlight the immediate type of domestic structures affected by external 
action. On the political objectives of the ERP, see Cox and Kennedy-Pipe 2005. 
70 See, for instance, the US ‘Scare Campaign’ during the 1964 presidential elections in 
Chile, and Qatar’s use of al-Jazeera. On the latter, see Halliday 2009. 
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The proposed definition underscores four important aspects. First, military 
intervention represents an attempt to safeguard or impose a specific political 
order in an independent political community. 71 If intervention expresses a will 
to order, military intervention expresses a will to order the political space of the 
target. Intervention in this sense can be used either as a preventive tool, that is 
to impose a new political authority over a society not affected by domestic 
disputes, or as a reactive tool, interfering with ongoing internal conflicts. In 
both cases ‘the notion of intervention includes the idea of change – that 
outsiders are responding to or anticipating events within another country’.72 In 
more specific terms, as Oran Young argues, military interventions are 
characterised by the use of military force to affect the ‘political authority 
structures’ in charge of another community.73 Specifically, military intervention 
targets ‘the identity of those who make the decisions that are binding for the 
entire society and/or...the processes through which such decisions are made’.74 
At minimum, military interventions affect the identity and composition of the 
political personnel of the target; at maximum, they result in regime change 
operations, targeting both the political personnel of the target and the political 
institutions through which political leaders are selected. Interventions aimed at 
regime change need to be examined as a particular case of coercive intervention 
in which the intervener does not limit its action to the political leadership of the 
target but explicitly aims at favouring a political reordering of the domestic 
institutions of the latter.75 In both cases, however, political leaders represent the 
key target of military intervention.  
Second, whilst influence and interference may take place accidentally and 
unintentionally, military intervention is an organised activity on the part of the 
                                                
71 Bull 1984a: 1. 
72 Paquin and Saideman 2010. 
73 Young 1968: 178. See also Gurr 1974: 71; Vincent 1974: 13; Calvert 1984: 165; Jentleson 
and Levite 1992: 5-7. Thus, military interventions as defined in this study refer to the 
subsets of interventions recently surveyed by Sullivan and Koch (2009), including 
military operations aimed both at preserving and altering existing regimes and 
excluding operations aimed at imposing foreign policy change or directly annexing 
territory.  
74 Rosenau 1968: 169. 
75 By doing so, external interventions have historically favoured the reproduction of the 
sovereign state model beyond Europe. See Chong 2012 and, for a broader treatment, 
Lawson et al. 2013. 
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intervener. It is organised in the sense that it results from a clear decision made 
by the political leaders of the intervener, thus it does not refer to acts of 
intervention conducted without the authorisation or the support of the former.76 
Interventions, as any decision to use force, are ultimately high-risk and high-
level decisions, taken by political leaders. In other terms, ‘military intervention 
does not just happen. …Statesmen define the kind of events that warrant the 
dispatch of armed forces’.77 In this sense, political leaders represent both the key 
target of intervention and its key decision-makers.  
Third, it is coercive in terms of the tools it uses, whether by intervening directly 
or by supporting one of the military groups involved in a domestic conflict, yet 
it does not by definition entail the lack of consent on the part of the target. As 
Stephen Krasner notes, ‘[d]omestic authority structures can be infiltrated 
through both coercive and voluntary actions, through intervention and 
invitation’.78 Thus, intervention is not necessarily ‘dictatorial’ in forcing a 
decision over the existing and legitimate authorities of the target country.79 It is 
coercive only as far as it uses coercive forms of intervention to affect the 
political authority of another country. In fact, military interventions can take 
place with the consent and the invitation of the incumbent authorities, as in the 
case of Russian intervention against the Hungarian Revolution in 1849.80  
Fourth, in line with the theoretical framework adopted in this study, the 
definition of military intervention is not limited to operations conducted by 
states. Military interventions may be conducted by both supra-national 
organisations and sub-state actors. In particular, military intervention refers to 
any act of intervention conducted by an international actor, with the latter 
defined as a political elite, that is a political group and its leadership controlling 
a state, or a counter-elite involved in a conflict for the control of the state and 
                                                
76 In this sense, the adopted definition follows the use made in empirical studies and 
datasets that underscore the ‘purposeful, not accidental’ nature of intervention. For 
example, the dispatch of volunteers represents a case of military intervention only 
when authorised and/or favoured by the political leaders of the intervener. See 
Kisingani and Pickering 2008.  
77 Van Wingen and Tillema 1980: 295.  
78 Krasner 1999: 20. 
79 Vincent 1974: 8; Wight 1978: 192; Bull 1984a: 1. 
80 Bullen 1979: 54; Krasner 1999: 20. 
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controlling key sources of social power, whether political, military, economic or 
ideological.81 
 
The modality of military intervention 
Military intervention can take different forms. A first distinction can be drawn 
between unilateral and multilateral interventions, depending on the number of 
the intervening actors. Unilateral interventions often reveal contexts of 
hierarchical power relations where other actors are not willing or capable of 
interfering. For instance, Bull associates intervention with instances of either 
dominance (e.g. US interventions in Central America and Caribbean countries 
before 1933) or hegemony (Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe and US 
intervention in Central and Caribbean countries in the Cold War).82 
Nevertheless, this distinction between unilateral and multilateral intervention 
does not necessarily indicate the effect of different causal mechanisms, as 
unilateral intervention are also influenced by actual or possible interventions by 
other states.83 First, states’ decisions concerning unilateral interventions 
inevitably take into account both the possible competing interventions of other 
states and the support they may or not receive from other states.84 Second, 
unilateral interventions may be conducted in order to counter others’ 
interference or pre-empt their interventions in the first place. For instance, US 
intervention in Haiti in 1915 was influenced by both actual and perceived 
French and German interference over the island’s economy and politics.85  
Interaction and strategic considerations between actual and potential 
interventions are thus important in unilateral interventions. As a result, 
unilateral interventions tend to be rare. According to a recent estimate, three-
                                                
81 On the role of international organizations, see Hoffmann 1984: 9. On interventions 
conducted by sub-state actors and their impact, see for instance the case of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) role in the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) 
or, more recently, Hezbollah’s intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Both represent 
international actors as they control significant military power and put forth a claim 
over their communities and states. 
82 Bull 1977: 213-219. 
83 Duner 1985: 7. 
84 As I will indicate in Chapter 4, the possibility of European intervention in Cuba 
affected US calculations.  
85 Schmidt 1995: 34-35, 52-56. 
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fifths of the interventions conducted after 1945 were multilateral.86 This is due 
primarily to the fact that also unilateral decisions tend to drag other states to 
intervene in order to check possible unilateral interventions.87   
A more useful analytical distinction can be drawn with regard to the different 
coercive tools interveners can use that highlight the inherent ‘polimorphy of 
intervention’.88 While military intervention is usually associated with the direct 
dispatch of military units, relevant cases of intervention have entailed instances 
of indirect or covert military intervention. In this regard, interventions can use a 
vast array of tools: they can involve the dispatch of military troops, the 
provision of military aid, be conducted clandestinely, etc.89 To simplify, military 
interventions can be distinguished according to two categorisations: the 
involvement or absence of combat troops of the intervener; and, the degree of 
publicity that characterises the military intervention. The resulting typology is 
presented in Fig.1.  
 
Figure 1 - Types of Military Intervention 
 Direct Indirect 
Overt Overt Direct Overt Indirect 
Covert Covert Direct Covert Indirect 
 
First, interventions can be either direct or indirect. Direct military interventions 
involve ‘the movement of regular troops or forces (airborne, seaborne, shelling, 
etc) of one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or 
                                                
86 Findley and Teo 2006: 829. See also Saideman 2002. 
87 Wight 1978: 196. For example, British interventions in the Iberian Peninsula and in 
the Greek Revolution in the first half of the 19th Century were conducted in part to 
forestall unilateral French and Russian interventions. See Anderson 1979; Sked 1979a; 
Bullen 1979: 66-67, 73. 
88 Duner 1985: 61. See also Hoffmann 1984: 9-10; Schraeder 1989. 
89 Bull 1984a: 1. See also Rosenau 1964; Calvert 1984: 165-166, 176; Hoffmann 1984: 9. 
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dispute’, e.g. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.90 Indirect military interventions 
refer to the provision of military aid to groups in the target involved in an 
internal conflict. Military aid includes the ‘provision of arms, bases, financial 
aid or credits for arms purchase, [and] instructors...’ as well as the provision of 
intelligence, e.g. the support provided by outside actors to both the Syrian 
regime and the opposition in the ongoing civil war.91  
Second, interventions can be either overt or covert. Direct or indirect 
intervention are overt when they entail the public dispatch of regular troops or 
the public provision of military aid as per official agreements and declarations, 
as in the case of American interventions in Vietnam. Covert intervention is when 
political leaders do not officially acknowledge the presence of the intervener’s 
troops in the target or the provision of military aid to one of the sides in an 
internal conflict. Indirect covert interventions involve the undeclared dispatch 
of military aid, such as the covert military aid provided by the US to UNITA 
and FLNA during the Angolan Civil War.92 Covert direct forms of intervention, 
albeit rarer, include: the dispatch of irregular units, such as mercenaries under 
intervening state’s general or operational command;93 the recruitment and/or 
dispatch of volunteers organised by state authorities, e.g. the use of volunteers 
by Italy in the Spanish Civil War;94 granting permissions for the draft of the 
intervener’s citizens to foreign states, e.g. the British and French decision to 
allow Spain to recruit soldiers in Great Britain and France during the Carlist 
revolt;95 and, the use of unmarked military units drawn from regular forces 
operating within a foreign army for combat purposes, e.g. the dispatch of 
unmarked American pilots to operate Laotian fighters during the civil war in 
Laos.96   
                                                
90 Pearson and Baumann 1993: 1; see also Pearson 1974: 261; Calvert 1984: 165. In this 
sense, I would not limit direct interventions to the deployment solely of ground troops 
as this would unnecessarily and arbitrarily exclude air, naval and artillery operations 
from the category of direct intervention despite the relevance of the latter in both past 
and recent cases of Western intervention. Cf. Saunders 2009: 122-123. 
91 Mitchell 1970: 169. See also Vincent 1974: 9.  
92 Gleijeses 2002: 293-296, 334. 
93 Duner 1985: 17. 
94 Coverdale 1975. 
95 Bullen 1977: 388; 1979: 74. 
96 Castle 1993: 34-35. 
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Different tools of intervention can be used at the same time, usually with direct 
intervention coupled with the provision of indirect support. Far from being 
static forms of interventions, states often shift from one form of intervention to 
another due to changing conditions. For instance, escalatory processes lead 
states to shift towards more direct/overt forms of intervention, as exemplified 
by the expanding US involvement in Vietnam.97  
 
What is non-intervention? 
Having defined intervention and its modalities, what constitutes non-
intervention? The question of non-intervention raises two orders of problems, 
an empirical and a normative one. While I will address the normative aspect in 
greater detail in the following chapter, the question of non-intervention raises 
an important and often overlooked empirical issue. The main problem stems 
from treating non-intervention exclusively in normative terms. In history, non-
intervention has been used to define a vast array of categories, not purely a 
norm. Hence, the term non-intervention has been used to define: a foreign 
policy doctrine, most notably British foreign policy in the 19th Century and 
more recently Chinese foreign policy towards Africa and Myanmar;98 a 
principle of conduct enshrined in the UN Charter and in regional agreements 
and treaties such as the Helsinki Final Document (1975), the Charter of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) (1948) and the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976).99 What is often left aside is the analysis of 
non-intervention either as a policy outcome or as a form of intervention in its 
own right.  
First and foremost, non-intervention should be examined as a policy outcome 
resulting from two non-mutually exclusive dynamics. On the one hand, non-
intervention may mirror not simply a state’s adherence to the norm of non-
intervention and long-standing principles of foreign policy but also the 
                                                
97 Little 1975: 9. 
98 On British non-intervention policy, see Stapleton 1866; Vincent 1974: 74-90; Bartlett 
1979: 150; Hefner 1980. On Chinese non-interventionism, see Cohen 1974; Alden 2005; 
Li and Zheng 2009. 
99 The principle of non-intervention was reiterated within the UN system both by the 
UN General Assembly and by the International Court of Justice. See Wheatley 1993. 
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conscious policy adopted to pursue specific interests.100 On the other hand, non-
intervention may represent the unintended result of failed efforts to intervene 
along certain preferred modalities. For instance, American military non-
intervention in Nicaragua in 1978-79 resulted from the failure of US attempts to 
organise a multilateral intervention under the OAS flag willing to impose the 
US preferred political solution rather than from a principled non-
interventionary policy on the part of the US.101  
Second, as already underscored by Hoffmann, ‘even non-acts constitute 
intervention’.102 In this regard, non-intervention represents a way to favour the 
stronger party involved in any exchange.103 Examples or accusations of biased 
non-interventions abound: British non-intervention in 1860 vis-à-vis Giuseppe 
Garibaldi’s actions in Sicily, favouring Italian unification; non-intervention on 
the part of Western democracies in the Spanish Civil War in 1936-39, favouring 
the Nationalist forces of Francisco Franco; France’s non-interventions allowing 
the removal of Fulbert Youlou in Congo-Brazzaville and Hamani-Diou in 
Niger.104 It is exactly this ambiguous nature of non-intervention that led to 
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand’s famous remark that non-intervention is ‘a 
term of political metaphysics signifying almost the same thing as 
intervention’.105 
What this set of empirical qualifications indicates is the necessity to approach 
non-intervention primarily in empirical terms to evaluate what conditions and 
factors led a particular actor to opt for non-intervention instead of military 
intervention. For this reason, any theoretical framework aimed at shedding 
light on the causal mechanisms leading to intervention needs to be able to 
clarify also the causal mechanisms leading to the decision not to intervene. 
                                                
100 In the case of US non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War addressed in Chapter 6, 
as I will indicate, non-intervention was a choice resulting from wider specific political 
and elite dynamics. 
101 Dumbrell 1993: 152-157; Goodwin 2001: 188. 
102 Hoffmann 1984: 8.  
103 Modelski 1964. 
104 On British non-intervention, see Wight 1978: 199. On Spain, see Falk 1959: 169; 
Cohen 1974: 355; Little 1985; Anievas 2011. On French non-intervention in Africa, see 
Moisi 1984: 73. 
105 Wight 1978: 199. On the context of Talleyrand’s remarks, see Swain 1938: 41. 
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Defining the Scope and Limits of the Research 
The primary object of study of this thesis will be the causal mechanisms driving 
political elite members to opt for overt-direct military interventions in internal 
conflicts.106 In particular, I will try to highlight the processes through which 
leaders decide either to overcome two possible alternatives – a non-
interventionary position and indirect/covert forms of intervention – or opt for 
one of the latter instead of authorising the dispatch of military units in ongoing 
internal conflicts.  
First, the choice of focusing on direct-overt interventions stems from two 
considerations. The decision to dispatch armed forces in a foreign country 
represents not only a decision that questions the norm of non-intervention but 
also a particularly revealing political choice about the intervener and what the 
leaders consider worth the use of force.107 Further, such choices are revealing of 
power asymmetries and patterns of hierarchy in the international sphere. Direct 
military intervention, more than all other forms of intervention, is made 
possible by a condition of power asymmetry between the intervener and the 
target. For this reason, great powers have represented the ‘great intervening 
parties of modern history’.108 Focusing on direct intervention allows first and 
foremost the examination of a practice that is characteristic of great powers’ 
action in international affairs, a point that is of primary concern for the Realist 
framework adopted in this thesis. Yet, selecting direct intervention as the 
primary focus of this study does not limit the utility of the proposed framework 
only to great powers. Power asymmetries exist between all states and actors, 
thus allowing regional or lesser powers to intervene in weaker states. Cases 
such as Egypt’s intervention in Yemen (1962), Syrian intervention in Lebanon 
                                                
106 Hence, the use of the term intervention in this study, when not qualified otherwise, 
will refer to this modality of military intervention. 
107 Finnemore 2003: 2. 
108 Bull 1984a: 1. See also Wight 1978: 194; Patman 1990: 7; Aron 1966b: 487; Owen 2002: 
376. On the link that emerged during the 19th Century between great powers’ status 
and the practice of intervention, see Lawson and Tardelli 2013. On the limits of great 
powers’ interference and intervention, see Berry 1973. 
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(1976), Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia (1978), Tanzania’s intervention in 
Uganda (1979) as well as the intervention in Bahrain in 2011 organised by the 
Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) indicate that intervention is not the 
exclusive practice of great powers.109  
Second, this study will focus on cases of intervention in ongoing internal 
conflicts for both empirical and theoretical reasons. Interventions in cases of 
internal conflicts represent the most common form of intervention, representing 
‘the rule rather than the exception’.110 According to Patrick Regan, nearly two-
thirds of all domestic conflicts after 1945 were characterised by outside 
intervention; as he notes, ‘with some regularity decision-makers around the 
globe are contemplating an intervention in a civil conflict’.111 In addition, 
internal conflicts can create temporary conditions of power asymmetry 
unfavourable to great powers. Revolutions and full-fledged civil wars have 
often created windows of opportunity for external intervention by lesser 
powers in the internal affairs of other states, including great powers, as 
exemplified by multiple interventions in the Russian Civil War.112 Finally, 
linking the study of intervention to internal conflicts allows drawing on the 
literature addressing the international dimension of civil conflicts and specific 
forms thereof (e.g. revolutions, ethnic conflicts, secessionist conflicts). Reference 
to this literature is necessary for the present study since, as Little points out, 
dealing with intervention in domestic conflicts requires a preliminary and 
acceptable definition of civil conflict able to take into account the vast array of 
phenomena and forms it subsumes.113   
For the purpose of this study, internal conflicts will be defined by three 
elements. First, internal conflicts take place within a formerly united and 
independent polity, such as city-states, nation-states, and empires. Second, they 
emerge when the domestic scene is characterised by ‘multiple sovereignty’, 
                                                
109 This point has been underscored by numerous authors, including: Tillema and Van 
Wingen 1982; Duner 1985: 67-69; Pearson et al. 1994; Khosla 1999; Regan 2002. Major 
studies on the examples mentioned in the text include: Weinberger 1986; Quinn-Judge 
2006; Ferris 2012.  
110 Wippman 1998: 8. See also Mitchell 1970: 167; Rosenau 1974: 132; Hoffmann 1984: 21. 
111 Regan 2000: 1. See also Forman 1972; Eckhardt and Azar 1978; Kende 1978; Duner 
1985: 2; Owen 2002. 
112 Owen 2002: 375; Walt 1996. 
113 Little 1987; Kalyvas and Kenny 2010. 
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whereby ‘at least two distinct blocs of contenders make incompatible claims to 
control the state, and some significant portion of the population subject to the 
state’s jurisdiction acquiesces in the claims of each bloc’, with ‘both or all of 
which may posses significant means of coercion’.114 Third, internal conflict 
results when these blocs take part in acts of ‘organised violence…directed 
against people or property’.115  
These three elements define internal conflicts in broad terms to include internal 
revolutionary conflicts, ethnic strife, wars of independence and decolonisation. 
To simplify, I will distinguish only two broad categories: revolutionary internal 
conflicts, when at least two blocs fight for the control of the state;116 and a 
secessionist conflict involving the ‘creation of a new State upon territory 
previously forming part of, or being a colonial entity of, an existing state’.117 
Despite the difference existing between these two categories of internal conflict, 
ultimately all types of internal conflicts will determine ‘who rules when the 
fighting stops…’.118 Whereas in revolutions and other forms of civil conflicts the 
blocs of contenders make incompatible claims for the state, in secessionist 
conflicts one bloc – a nationalist, secessionist movement, or ethnic group – 
makes a claim to a separate state within the existing territory and polity. As 
Susan Woodward argues, ‘the essence of civil war, regardless of substantive 
goals, is a contest for power – over who rules, who gets to define policies for 
their group or goals, and above all, the very rules over who rules’.119 In all these 
cases, domestic actors struggle for state power, more specifically they either 
fight for the state or fight for a state.120 
                                                
114 Tilly 1993: 8-10; 1978: 191. On internal conflicts as entailing the ‘bifurcation’ of 
formerly united polities, see Little 1975. 
115 Mitchell 1970: 171, fn.5; Gurr 1974: 70. 
116 Although controlling the state is not the sole goal of revolutionaries, it is a necessary 
condition for their success. See Goodwin 2001: 40-43. 
117 Radan 2008: 18. 
118 Betts 1994: 21. 
119 Woodward 2007: 159. 
120 Furthermore, the two categories cannot always be distinguished. In the case of the 
Cuban War of Independence addressed in Chapter 4, the Cuban actors fighting for 
independence from Spain were driven by nationalist, secessionist, and also 
revolutionary intentions.  
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In this regard, the causal mechanisms leading to military intervention need to 
be examined vis-à-vis the political and military conditions in the target country 
shaped by revolutionary and secessionist dynamics. The existing literature has 
extensively examined the international dimension of domestic conflict and the 
role played by foreign interventions.121 Recent works have particularly focused 
on the impact of military interventions on the duration and the levels of 
violence of domestic conflicts.122 Similarly, the way interventions affect the 
outcome of civil conflicts as well as the possibility of a negotiated settlement has 
been addressed.123 Although this set of works offers an essential analysis of the 
patterns of third-party interventions in civil conflicts, on the conditions 
favouring it and on the likely impact of outside actors, its reliance on large-n 
analyses inevitably eschews an in-depth examination of the political processes 
and interests underlying specific instances or types of interventions. An 
important complementary contribution in this sense is provided by the 
literature addressing the international dimension of revolutions and 
secessionist conflicts, which brings into the analysis a more sociological 
approach as well as an appreciation of the political conditions and interests 
behind interventionary policies in revolutions and secessionist conflicts.124 
Therefore, military intervention in internal conflicts can be rephrased as an 
attempt to favour one political order over others when the original political 
order has collapsed and is contested by different internal actors. In this sense, 
military intervention in civil conflicts includes ‘any military action...which is 
calculated to affect favourably the situation of one or the other faction...’ 
involved in domestic strife.125 Through intervention external actors can alter the 
balance of forces between the parties in order to favour the authority claim of 
one of the parties involved and/or deny the authority claim of other parties.126 
As a result, intervention is always for someone as it either directly supports one 
                                                
121 Rosenau 1964; Young 1968, 1974; Deutsch 1974; Calvert 1984; Brown 1996; 
Lahneman 2004. 
122 Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Elbadawy and Sambanis 2000; Regan 2002; 
Hironaka 2005; Cunningham 2006; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008. 
123 Rosenau 1964; Zartmann 1993; Holbrook 1998; Luttwak 1999; Mason et al. 1999; 
Regan 2000, 2002; Balch-Lindsay et al. 2008. 
124 Kim 1970; Mayer 1971; Skocpol 1979; Armstrong 1993; Walt 1996; Halliday 1999; 
Bisley 2004: 50-54; Lawson 2005; Fabry 2011. 
125 Mitchell 1970: 169, fn.3. 
126 Regan 2000: 10. See also Duner 1985: 14. 
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of the factions or prevents another to reach its goals. The eventual neutrality of 
foreign intervention, already contested by Richard Betts, needs to be evaluated 
vis-à-vis the actual military support provided by an external actor to one of the 
factions in its attempts to secure state power.127  
Consequently, military interventions act as externally imposed political 
revolutions so far as they influence the selection of the political elite of the 
target and, by doing so, help bring about together with domestic constituencies 
a rapid, forceful, and systemic reconstruction of the ‘system of political 
authority, rule and coercion’ of the target.128 In the case of secessionist conflicts, 
foreign military intervention affects the existing political authority over a 
specific portion of territory and population while acting to empower (or avoid 
the empowerment) of an alternative political authority over that territory. 
Similarly, humanitarian interventions can be conceptualised as a peculiar form 
of military intervention, conducted without the consent of the political 
authorities of the target, that directly questions the sovereign authority of the 
target’s political leadership by claiming for the intervener the responsibility and 
right to safeguard the target’s polity or parts thereof.129 Furthermore, 
humanitarian interventions target local political authorities by identifying the 
source of violations of human rights in specific, non-democratic or non-Liberal 
forms of governments, and in seeking an alteration of such structures, such as 
in Libya in 2011.130 Once again, despite their differences, military interventions 
target either explicitly or implicitly the political authorities of the target. 
 
 
                                                
127 Betts 1994. 
128 Lawson 2005. 
129 On humanitarian intervention as an exercise of authority within the jurisdiction of 
another state, see Nardin 2006: 1. On humanitarian intervention and the question of the 
target’s consent, see Wheeler 1992; Dunne et al. 2001; Bellamy 2003a: 5; Wheeler and 
Bellamy 2005; Sarkin 2009: 5. On intervention as responsibility, see ICISS 2001. 
130 On the link between humanitarian intervention and regime change, see for instance 
Rawls 1999: 81; Finnemore 2003: 137; Teson 2003; Bellamy 2004a: 131-132. 
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Chapter Outline 
The thesis is divided in two parts. In Part I, I develop the theoretical framework 
that will inform the empirical analysis offered in Part II. In particular, Chapter 1 
explores not only the emerging trends pointed out in this introduction but also 
the persistent gaps that affect the existing literature on military intervention in 
IR. In doing so, Chapter 1 highlights both contemporary Realism’s silence on 
the subject and the broad defining features of a reformulated Realist theory of 
military intervention. In Chapter 2, I present the basics of the theory of the state 
and of state action that will inform the subsequent analysis. This includes 
defining the term ‘elite’ and highlighting the political and sociological 
mechanisms on which a more explicit theory of intervention could draw. The 
chapter addresses how elite politics create the incentives political leaders face 
when confronted with an internal conflict and how intervention responds to 
such incentives.  Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework for the study of 
the causal mechanisms leading political elites to intervene. As I will argue, three 
dynamics operating at the elite level represent the causal antecedents of the 
decision to intervene: elites’ political ideology (formula), elites’ twofold struggle 
for power, and elites’ relations between the intervening and target country.  
In Part II, three empirical chapters provide a plausibility probe of the proposed 
framework by examining cases of US military intervention in three different 
types of internal conflicts. Chapter 4 examines US policy towards the Cuban 
War of Independence (1895-1898) and the decision to intervene resulting in the 
so-called Spanish-American War. As I show, rephrasing the conflict as a case of 
intervention is not only more accurate given the historical record but also 
allows a more thorough examination of the key role played by Cuban elite 
actors in shaping the American decision to intervene. In Chapter 5, I examine 
US policy towards the two-stage Russian Revolution in 1917 and the resulting 
decision to intervene in 1918. This case tests the proposed framework vis-à-vis 
the antithetic challenge posed by the Bolshevik elite and how intervention 
allowed the US to influence the political trajectory of the Russian Revolution. In 
Chapter 6, I test the proposed framework on a negative case, that is US non-
intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Often overlooked within the 
discipline of IR, the Spanish conflict represented a major international issue at 
the time, led multiple countries to intervene and sparked tremendous interest 
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within European and American societies. As I indicate, US policy, usually 
explained through the lenses of appeasement and isolationism, is better 
explained when taking into account both the domestic political ramifications of 
US policy towards Spain and the lack of feasible interlocutors in Spain from 
Washington’s perspective.  
In the concluding chapter of the thesis, I draw on the results obtained to show 
how the proposed framework could be applied to more recent periods, 
including the Cold War, the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s, and recent 
cases of intervention in North Africa and the Middle East. 
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Part I 
 
Intervention and Elite Politics 
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Chapter 1 
Emerging Trends, Persistent Gaps: Towards a Realist Theory of 
Intervention 
 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to outline a theoretical framework that 
explains the causal mechanisms leading to the decision to military intervene in 
internal conflicts. For this purpose, in the following chapter, I will first situate 
this study within the broader waves of research on military intervention. 
Second, I will examine the contributions offered by the major approaches in IR 
on the causes of military intervention in order to illustrate two elements: the 
recurrent issues highlighted by recent works on the subject, primarily the 
central role played by political elites; and, the persisting gaps existing in the 
literature. Third, I will argue that there is considerable scope for a Realist 
framework drawing on existing Realist insights on the subject in order to 
overcome the limits of both Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism on the subject 
and address the role played by political elites in shaping military intervention. 
 
 
The Study of Intervention in International Relations 
This thesis on military intervention needs to be contextualised within the 
emerging fifth wave of research on the subject. The first wave of reflections on 
the practice of intervention emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution. 
Whereas the practice of intervention itself predates the 19th Century, it is only 
with the French Revolution and the emerging nationalist principles that the 
practice of intervention becomes contested. Debates on intervention were 
fuelled by the subsequent revolutions of the 19th Century, particularly among 
Liberal authors such as Thomas Paine, Edmund Burke, Richard Cobden, John 
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Stuart Mill and Giuseppe Mazzini discussing the traditionalist monarchies’ 
interventions to suppress Liberal movements in Europe, the possibility of 
intervention in support of the latter, and the merits of the British policy of non-
intervention.1  
At the beginning of the 20th Century, interest in the subject of intervention 
crystallises within a second set of works primarily within International Law. 
This body of literature provided a first systematic attempt to define the 
conditions for justified intervention as well as a first look at the actual practice 
and political dimension of intervention.2 The development of this literature was 
driven primarily by contemporary cases of intervention: the allied intervention 
in China to suppress the Boxer rebellion (1900); the numerous US interventions 
in Latin America; and, Western interventions aimed at debt collection.3 
A third wave of works followed the numerous American and Soviet direct 
interventions during the Cold War, such as in the Korean Civil War (1950), East 
Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), Lebanon (1958), Vietnam (1960s), Dominican 
Republic (1965), Czechoslovakia (1968), and eventually Afghanistan (1979) and 
Grenada (1983).4 Key works on the subject published in this period represent 
the core of the existing theoretical efforts on intervention. Attention was 
devoted to definitions of intervention;5 the systemic determinants of 
intervention;6 the interplay of systemic and sub-systemic conditions favouring 
intervention;7 the relationship between interveners and target countries;8 and, 
the interplay between normative, political, and ideological considerations in an 
                                                
1 Paine [1791] 1993; Burke 1989, 1991; Cobden [1835] 1903; Mill [1859] 1984; Stapleton 
1866. On Mazzini and intervention, see Recchia and Urbinati 2009; Keene 2013. 
2 Oppenheim 1905; Stowell 1921; Mosler 1937. On the early works underscoring the 
political dimension of intervention, see Lingelbach 1900; Hodges 1915; Cavaglieri 1928; 
Trolliet 1940.  
3 Lingelbach 1900; Hershey 1907; Martin 1921; Beman 1928; Strupp 1928. 
4 Among the most important works on the subject, Rosenau 1964, 1968; Morgenthau 
1967; Moore 1974; Vincent 1974; Little 1975; Bull 1984a; Hoffmann 1984. 
5 Beloff 1968; Rosenau 1968; Young 1968. 
6 Modelski 1964; Rosenau 1964; Young 1968; Pearson 1974; Piotrowski 1989. 
7 MacFarlane 1985. 
8 Mitchell 1970; Eley 1972. 
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effort to address the practice of intervention within broader theoretical and 
historical perspective.9  
Overall, as pointed out by Little, two approaches emerged within this third 
wave: a behaviouralist approach and a traditional approach.10 Behaviouralist 
studies, exemplified by James Rosenau’s work, focused on the empirical 
regularities of the practice of intervention, attempting to analyse the 
‘behavioural characteristics’ of intervention without taking into account actors’ 
motivations.11 This approach has been supported by an extensive set of 
empirical studies providing an examination of: the peculiarities of 
superpowers’ interventions in a nuclear and bipolar context;12 superpowers’ 
intervention in the Third World;13 and, interventions by second-rank powers 
such as Britain and France.14 On the contrary, the traditionalist approach 
studied intervention as an ‘evolving political idea’, adopting a ‘normative 
perspective’ that could address the meaning given by the practitioners to the 
practice of intervention and the constraining effects of the norm of non-
intervention.15  
With the end of the Cold War, empirical, ideological and normative 
considerations become strictly entwined thus making the 
behaviouralist/traditionalist divide less relevant. A fourth wave of works 
emerged driven by the issues raised by the increasing number of Western 
interventions. First, the practice of humanitarian intervention and its critique 
took central stage in the debate, with related questions on the implications of it 
for state sovereignty and the alleged move beyond state sovereignty.16 Second, 
the ‘unipolar moment’ and its Liberal character led analyses towards the 
                                                
9 Morgenthau 1967; Vincent 1974; Bull 1984a. 
10 Little 1987: 50. 
11 Ibid.: 51. 
12 Windsor 1984; Tillema 1989. 
13 Weede 1978; Barnet 1980; Girling 1980; Klare 1981; Matheson 1982; Bull 1984b; Falk 
1984; Schmid 1985; Schraeder 1989; Patman 1990; Feste 1992. Later works include 
Westad 2005; Grow 2008. 
14 Van Wingen and Tillema 1980; Wyllie 1984; Moisi 1984; Weinberger 1986; Levite et al. 
1992. 
15 Little 1987: 50, 53-54. See, for example, Thomas 1985; Weber 1995. 
16 Teson 1997; Wippman 1998; Wheeler 2000; Lang 2003; Bellamy 2003a, 2004a. On the 
issue of intervention and sovereignty, see Donnelly 1995; Onuf 1995; Rosenau 1995; 
Krasner 1999. 
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specificity of US interventions.17 Particular attention has been given to the 
American policy of democracy promotion and the relationship between 
democracy and intervention both before and after the US intervention in Iraq in 
2003.18  
The impact of Western interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and, more 
recently, in Libya have renewed academic interest in the practice of 
intervention. The limits of both humanitarian interventions and US efforts at 
democracy promotion have led to normative reconsiderations and policy 
reformulations, notably the promotion of the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to 
Protect’ and the rejection of the Bush Doctrine in the US under the Obama 
administration. More importantly, the debate around US interventions from 
Kosovo to Iraq has demanded further theoretical work to examine the causes of 
intervention and its function in international relations. In particular, US 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have interrupted the normative fixation 
characterising the fourth wave, raising once again the curtain over the role 
played by power and ideological dynamics in shaping intervention. 
As a result, a significant and growing body of literature within a fifth wave of 
research has focused on the recurrent factors favouring and affecting third-
party interventions or, specifically, US interventions. Particular attention has 
been given to the assessment of the causal impact played by factors 
characterising the target state and internal conflict, such as its regime type or 
the intensity of the conflict.19 At the same time, a number of authors have 
examined the practice of intervention in broader theoretical and historical 
terms. In doing so, they have both historicised the practice of intervention and 
identified the causal dynamics shaping policymakers’ interests vis-à-vis internal 
conflicts and intervention. Thus, the behaviouralist/traditionalist divide 
becomes even more blurred within more recent works due to their efforts to 
situate and analyse the practice of intervention within a broader historical and 
conceptual perspective, in which the analysis of political, strategic and material 
                                                
17 Scott 1996; Yoon 1997. On the unipolar moment, see Krauthammer 1990. 
18 Peceny 1995, 1999; Kegley and Hermann 1996; Cox et al. 2000; Hermann and Kegley 
2001; Bellin 2004; Quinn and Cox 2007; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Pickering 
and Peceny 2006; Downs and Monten 2013. 
19 Aubone 2013: 281-282.  
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factors shaping interventionary policies does not preclude an evaluation of the 
changing normative and ideological factors affecting them.20  
A more relevant distinction today is the one delineated by Findley and Teo 
between phenomenon-centric and actor-centric approaches, depending on whether 
the analytical focus of the study is on the phenomenon of intervention itself, 
whether in empirical or normative terms, or on the actors’ decisions, 
interactions and conceptualisations of their interventions.21 This thesis relates to 
these two approaches in different ways. On the one hand, it draws on the 
insights offered by phenomenon-centric studies on the function and role played 
by intervention both historically and conceptually for its general definition of 
intervention.22 On the other hand, it follows primarily an actor-centric approach 
drawing on recent works focusing on political actors’ role in shaping 
interventionary policies as well as on the relations between the intervening 
actors and the actors in target states.23 
In this regard, the thesis draws on the theoretical works and the emerging 
trends that have characterised this fifth wave in order to contribute to its further 
development by sketching a Realist theory of intervention. It does so by 
addressing some of the gaps that characterise the major contributions offered 
within IR to the study of intervention. Therefore, the contributions reviewed in 
the following section will be drawn mainly from the last two waves of research 
as they provide both the main theoretical background of the present study and 
the main contending explanations offered within the discipline to the Realist 
framework I will outline in the next two chapters. 
 
 
                                                
20 See, for instance, MacFarlane 2002; Finnemore 2003; Lahneman 2004; Westad 2005; 
Kinzer 2006; Owen 2010a; Lawson et al. 2013. 
21 Findley and Teo 2006. 
22 The most recent attempt is provided by Lawson et al. 2013. 
23 Krasner 1999; Findley and Teo 2006; Owen 2010a; Saunders 2011. Precedents of this 
approach can be identified in the increasing focus during the 1990s on the 
opportunities and motives shaping actual actors’ decisions to intervene. See Starr 1994; 
Smith 1996; Werner 1996; Regan 1998; Regan 2000; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and 
Teo 2006. 
                     44 
Intervention and IR Theories 
Recent works on the causes of military intervention can be distinguished in 
terms of the main theoretical approaches that inform their analytical 
frameworks. Four theoretical approaches, in particular, have contributed to the 
study of military intervention within IR: the English School; Marxism; 
Liberalism; and, Constructivism. In the following section, I will provide a brief 
assessment of the main works offered by each approach before addressing 
Realism’s contribution. 
 
The English School: early insights, missed opportunities 
The utility of the English School approach for this study stems from its 
treatment of intervention as a distinct practice in international relations.24 The 
rich historical and normative analysis offered by the English School on the 
subject reveals important aspects of the function of intervention and the factors 
that shape this practice. 
The English School stresses the connection existing between intervention and 
international order.25 First, this link is revealed in normative terms. The norm of 
non-intervention is examined as part of the fundamental rules protecting states’ 
sovereignty and sustaining international society.26 As John Vincent argues, the 
function of the norm of non-intervention is ‘to draw attention to and require 
respect for the principle of state sovereignty’.27 At the same time, whilst non-
intervention provides a normative guarantee to shield new states from outside 
intervention, states have intervened both to uphold the principle of self-
determination and manage the consequences of their recognition of new states, 
as exemplified by the Western intervention in Bosnia.28  
                                                
24 Early works include: Vincent 1974; Little 1975; Bull 1977: 70, 213-219; 1984a; Wight 
1978:191-199. Later works include: Watson 1992; Jackson 2000; Wheeler 2000; Little 
2007. More recently, see Lawson et al. 2013. 
25 Vincent 1974. 
26 Ibid.: 14; Bull 1977: 70. 
27 Vincent 1974: 333. 
28 Fabry 2010: 2, 10-14, 222. 
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Second, intervention results from the need for – or the ‘will to’ – order.29 
Intervention, in this sense, serves the function of ordering a socio-political space 
by managing the actual or potential consequences resulting from change in the 
target. In particular, Little argues that an ‘intervention stimulus’ arises when 
there is the potential for ‘systemic transformation’ resulting from an internal 
conflict, for instance when regime change might affect the balance of power.30 In 
this regard, intervention acts as a tool for great powers’ management. While 
great powers intervene to preserve a balance of power among them, they also 
use intervention to establish or preserve an ‘imbalance of power’ with lesser 
powers, as exemplified during the Cold War by US and Soviet interventions in 
Latin America and Eastern Europe respectively.31  
Furthermore, English School authors, particularly within its solidarist strand, 
have focused their attention on the normative underpinnings of intervention.32 
In an often explicit link with Constructivism, the English School draws 
attention to the way in which norms, rules, and discourses shape, enable, and 
constrain the practice of intervention.33 For example, Nick Bisley notes how 
revolutions disrupt international systems by questioning their underlying 
normative framework, thus igniting counter-revolutionary responses.34 In a 
compelling critique of Neorealist explanations, Little makes clear the way in 
which normative considerations trumped power calculations in the formulation 
of British non-intervention in both the American and Spanish Civil War.35 Given 
this analytical focus, the English School has occupied a central role in the debate 
on the question of humanitarian intervention.36 In particular, in his influential 
work, Nicholas Wheeler maps the emergence of a norm of humanitarian 
                                                
29 Watson 1992: 313; MacMillan 2013. 
30 Little 1975: 8. 
31 Bull 1977: 213-219; Wight 1978: 196; Watson 1992: 53. 
32 On the differences between the solidarist and the pluralist conceptions of 
international society, see Wheeler 1992, 2000; Dunne 1995; Bellamy 2004b. 
33 Dunne 1995; Jackson 2000: 254-255. 
34 Bisley 2004. 
35 Little 1975; 2007. 
36 Bellamy 2003b. 
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intervention and the way in which this norm enabled and constrained Western 
interventions during the 1990s.37  
Despite this broad contribution, the English School present three problems in 
regard to intervention. First, the main strength of the English School, that is its 
theoretical eclecticism, comes at the expense of rather ‘thin’ explanatory 
theories, failing to clarify the causal processes leading to either intervention or 
non-intervention and the way in which intervention produces balances or 
imbalances of power.38 The partial exceptions still present important 
explanatory limits. For example, Little’s analysis successfully highlights the role 
played by normative considerations in shaping London’s day-to-day policy 
towards the US during the American Civil War. Yet, as his empirical analysis 
reveals, the US threat to Canada in case of its loss of the Southern states or 
British intervention appears to have played a greater role in explaining British 
non-intervention.39 Further, the norm of non-intervention itself responded to 
British interests in Latin American, as it represented a normative guarantee 
against possible European interventions.40 Put differently, while offering a 
cogent critique of Neo-realist explanations of British non-intervention, Little’s 
explanation rests mainly on Realist factors and state interests. 
Second, the plurality of voices within the English School provides alternative 
accounts to Wheeler’s normative analysis of humanitarian intervention. 
Notably, Jackson downplays the normative change Wheeler identifies in the 
Western imposition of safe zones in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds 
(Operation Provide Comfort, 1991). Similarly, Jackson stresses the limits of 
humanitarian motivations in Somalia and the role played by prudential ethics 
both in Bosnia and Kosovo.41 From Jackson’s perspective, what the case of 
Kosovo highlights is Western willingness to remove authoritarian regimes in 
Europe and create new protectorates. In turn, this indicates a possible return to 
the establishment of new spheres of influence, hence a possible return to the 
                                                
37 Wheeler 2000. 
38 On this as a general limit of the English School, see Suganami 2004: 30-34.  
39 Little 2007. 
40 Fabry 2010. 
41 Jackson 2000: 260-288. 
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past rather than an advance towards a solidarist international society.42 Further, 
Western selectivity in the case of Operation Provide Comfort – protecting the 
Iraqi Kurdish population in the North but not the Iraqi Shia in the South – may 
not infringe Wheeler’s argument on the ground-breaking nature of Western 
decision but stresses the role played by ‘logistical and political reasons’ – to use 
Wheeler’s words – in preventing intervention in similar contexts.43 If these 
reasons make a difference between intervention and non-intervention, they 
should be examined in greater detail.  
Finally, English School authors have offered a broad set of observations 
concerning elites’ role in intervention, yet so far they have failed to link these 
observations and develop them within a general theoretical framework. 
Numerous authors within the English School have noted how rulers and elites 
more generally shape intervention, hence the need to take into account: the 
values and views of elites;44 the way in which different leaders respond to 
internal conflicts;45 and, the way in which domestic institutions and politics 
affect also humanitarian interventions.46 Which states, hence which elites, are 
granted recognition, which states should be shielded by the norm of non-
intervention, etc. – all these questions are ultimately framed and solved by state 
rulers.47 As Jackson argues, international relations are primarily relations of 
‘statespeople’ acting as the ‘organizers and managers who attend to the 
ordering and operating of the state system…to ignore them would be to 
disregard the leading actors on the stage of world politics’.48 This is of central 
importance to explain both political action and normative frameworks, as 
international ethics corresponds to the ‘distinctive ethics of the men and women 
who wield the power of states’.49  
                                                
42 Ibid.: 289-291. 
43 Wheeler 2000: 169. 
44 Watson 1992: 105, 307. 
45 Vincent 1974: 15-16. 
46 MacMillan 2012. On this issue, see also Kaufmann and Pape 1999. 
47 Vincent 1974: 15-16; Fabry 2010: 8; Jackson 2000: 9-10. 
48 Jackson 2000: 34-35. 
49 Ibid.: 85. Bull and Watson (1984) noted the commonality of values and norms 
between statesmen, not necessarily between cultures and people. 
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In addition, English School authors have noted the role played by elites in the 
target state in favouring intervention.50 For example, Martin Wight argues, the 
call for external intervention represent a ‘last resource’ political actors have to 
secure their domestic position and aims.51 Similarly, Little points out that the 
‘intervention stimulus’ emerges not only from the potential for systemic 
transformation but also from the ‘bifurcation’ of the target polity. As a result, 
intervention is conceptualised as ‘maintaining a relationship with one side of a 
bifurcated actor’.52 In this sense, intervention represents an ‘interactive’ practice, 
connecting the intervener to the politics of the target, also in cases of 
humanitarian and Liberal interventions.53 In more general terms, as noted by 
Barry Buzan, states have a ‘sustained interest’ in other countries’ internal 
affairs.54 However, the way in which this ‘sustained interest’ is formed and 
shapes the decision to intervene needs to be further examined. 
 
Marxism and economic factors 
The common element underlying Marxist theories of intervention is the link 
established between economic interests and interventionism. Intervention and 
foreign expansion are treated as the inevitable result of the need of the capitalist 
system to find new markets and new investment opportunities. Military 
interventions, from this perspective, serve primarily the interests of private 
economic actors interested in opening up new markets, ensuring access to raw 
materials, and keeping reluctant actors within a global capitalist system of 
production and consumption.55 This approach has influenced numerous 
revisionist explanations of US military interventions, particularly with regard to 
the case studies examined in this thesis.56 While the eventual applicability of 
revisionist explanations will be the subject of empirical assessment within each 
case study, from a general perspective such explanations have been subject to 
                                                
50 Wight 1978: 196-197; Watson 1992: 53; Jackson 1990; 2000: 258. 
51 Wight 1978: 196-197. 
52 Little 1975: 8. 
53 MacMillan 2012. 
54 Buzan 2007: 88. 
55 Kemp 1972: 17; O’Connor 1972; Magdoff 1974; Kinzer 2006. 
56 For instance, see Williams 1988; LaFeber 1993.  
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significant criticism. For example, Stephen Krasner underscores how US 
policymakers have repeatedly selected US foreign policy objectives concerning 
raw material markets in contrast to class or private economic interests.57  
More nuanced accounts of interventions are offered by Structuralist and neo-
Gramscian works within the Marxist literature. Such theories examine the close 
relationship between domestic and international orders, the interplay of both 
material and ideological factors in fostering patterns of domination, and the 
reproduction of social structures at both the international and domestic level. 
Particular attention is given to the role played by members of the broader 
‘transnational class’, instead of political leaders, and the way in which internal 
changes affect global capitalist circuits and vice versa.58 
Drawing on these assumptions, William Robinson has offered an important 
neo-Gramscian contribution to the study of intervention and of US democracy 
promotion.59 First, Robinson provides an analytically valuable distinction for 
the study of intervention, stressing the need to address not only the foreground 
of intervention, that is the actual policymaking process of US intervention in a 
specific instance, but also the background to such a policy, that is ‘the 
international political economy and world system…which constitutes the 
structural underpinning of policymakers’ perceptions and policies’.60 Second, 
Robinson examines the emergence of a new form of US ‘political intervention’ 
at the beginning of the 1980s. The main tool of this new policy was the 
‘promotion of democracy’. However, according to Robinson, what Washington 
really promoted was a form of ‘low-intensity democracy’, or polyarchy, 
alleviating the political and social costs produced by the exploitative global 
system in the periphery, yet conducive to the interests of transnational capital.61  
Whilst Robinson’s analytical distinction between the background and 
foreground of intervention remains heuristically valuable, a point which I will 
come back to, the centrality given to economic causal factors as well as his 
                                                
57 Krasner 1978: 24-25. 
58 Rosenberg 1994: 48-49; Van der Pijl 1998; Anievas 2011. 
59 Robinson 1996. 
60 Ibid.: 18. 
61 Ibid.: 2-4, 6. For a recent reformulation of Robinson’s position, see Sullivan 2004. 
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empirical account are less convincing. Although Robinson is correct in pointing 
out the emergence of a more formalised and active effort aimed at democracy 
promotion in the 1980s, his reconstruction runs the risk of overstating this 
historical passage, ignoring the various direct and indirect ways through which 
the US has promoted forms of ‘polyarchy’ before the 1980s, starting from its 
repeated interventions in Latin America both before and during the Cold War. 
More importantly, the harmony of interests assumed from Robinson’s Marxist 
perspective between (transnational) capital and US (state) interests is 
empirically problematic. In this regard, as already pointed out by Krasner, the 
main empirical shortcoming of Marxist theories of intervention stems from their 
denial of any substantial autonomy to the political sphere vis-à-vis capitalist 
structures or economic actors. What they do not take into account is the 
possibility of intervention where economic considerations are negligible, such 
as in the case of Western interventions in the former Yugoslavia. Even more 
difficult to explain are cases in which political leaders and economic leaders’ 
interests and opinions diverge over intervention. For instance, the cases of 
Nicaragua and Chile addressed by Robinson provide compelling evidence in 
favour of the primacy or at least the critical relevance of strategic and political 
considerations over economic considerations.62 Similar observations can be 
made for other relevant cases of US intervention. In the case of the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1920), US companies pressured President Woodrow Wilson to 
authorise an all-out military intervention to support the autocratic regime of 
Victoriano Huerta; Wilson first resisted such pressures and ultimately, through 
the limited intervention in Vera Cruz, irremediably severed Huerta’s supply 
lines and chances of military victory against the revolutionaries.63  
Recently, Peter Trubowitz and Benjamin Fordham have offered a compelling 
argument concerning the role played by economic considerations in shaping 
foreign policy. First, Trubowitz underscores the way foreign policy decisions 
entail different costs and benefits for different geographical regions and socio-
economic groups, thus arguing that the varying distributive effects of foreign 
policy over domestic groups affect the position they take in foreign policy 
                                                
62 Downes and Lilley 2010. 
63 Steigerwald 1999. 
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debates, including on the use of force.64 Second, Fordham argues in favour of a 
re-evaluation of the revisionist account of US decision to enter the First World 
War, stressing the role of economic interests in that decision. An important 
point raised by Fordham is the indirect effect of economic interests on political 
decisions: state leaders take into account threats to economic growth and trade 
insofar as they limit the resources the state can extract and endanger political 
support at home. According to this account, far from being the result of the 
pressures of bankers and arms manufacturers, the US decision to intervene in 
the First World War stemmed from an appreciation of the extensive effects of 
German submarine warfare on the American economy given the relevance of 
exports to the US GDP at the time and the consequences any slowing down of 
the related ‘export boom’ could entail in political terms for Wilson’s chances of 
re-election in 1916.65 Thus, economic factors matter in indirect terms, through 
the political repercussion they might have over political leaders’ position. 
 
Liberalism and democracy 
The centrality of intervention to the debates among Liberal thinkers such as 
Cobden, Mill, and Mazzini during the 19th Century has offered some of the first 
insights on the intervention problematique. While Classical Liberal thinkers 
focused primarily on the advisability of intervention, recent contributions in IR 
have addressed the question of intervention by taking into account primarily 
the role played by democratic regimes. First, works on intervention informed 
by a Liberal approach examine the effect that different regime types and 
particularly democracies have on the formulation of interventions. In general 
terms, regime differences seem not to explain variations of the propensity to 
intervene; all types of regimes take part in the practice of intervention.66 Yet, 
drawing from Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), Liberals stress the way in which 
democratic regimes constrain interventionary practices towards other 
democracies. While democratic states intervene against other states including 
democracies, democratic regimes are considered to be less likely to intervene 
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against other democracies and more likely to demonstrate a higher degree of 
restraint in the use of force when compared to interventions against non-
democracies.67  
However, empirical analyses present a less clear picture in this regard. For 
instance, Kegley and Hermann question the validity of the DPT when applied 
to military interventions, showing that democracies intervene frequently also 
against other democracies.68 Notably, democracies may be more likely to 
intervene in support of Liberal-democratic polities.69 In addition, democracies 
often intervene through covert modalities when operating against other 
democratic or semi-democratic regimes.70 Overall, what these empirical studies 
suggest is a complex relationship between democracy and intervention: 
democracies are recurrent interveners in international affairs, yet any shared 
democratic nature between the intervener and the target could affect the 
direction and modality of intervention.  
A related set of studies stresses the link between democracies’ interventions and 
democracy promotion. As previously noted, democracies have been found to 
intervene to support democratic states in their efforts to remain or become 
democratic.71 However, empirical results concerning the effectiveness of 
democracy promotion by Liberal states are less conclusive. For instance, 
Hermann and Kegley indicate the way in which US military intervention can 
foster liberalisation processes in the target country. Yet, both Pickering and 
Piceny, as well as Downs and Monten, do not find that interventions by Liberal 
states promote significant increases in the democratic levels of the target state. 
Furthermore, similarly to the conclusions reached by Robinson, Bueno de 
Mesquita and Downs argue that interventions conducted by democracies 
usually support only the introduction of superficial and symbolic democratic 
reforms while reducing actual democratic levels in the target country.72 The 
empirical indeterminacy of these studies point out the limit of explanations 
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based on purely institutional factors, hence the need to integrate them with the 
role played by other causal factors. For example, as noted in other works, both 
the decisions to intervene to promote democracy as well as the outcome of 
democracy promotion are influenced by two factors: first, the subjective 
construction of the target state as non-democratic by the intervener; second, the 
interplay between security interests as defined by democratic regimes and the 
need for political leaders to gain support among domestic constituencies.73  
In more general terms, whilst the observation that regime type affects the 
likelihood and modality of intervention can be subject to empirical analysis, it is 
worth noting that these works do not explain why democracies decide to 
intervene in other democratic states’ affairs in the first place. A notable 
exception in this regard is represented by Jon Western’s Liberal theory on the 
causes of US interventions.74 According to Western, the decision to intervene (or 
not) stems from the competition among advocacy groups formed by elites 
holding contending beliefs about international affairs and their ability to gain 
the support of the public. Such support depends on two factors: the kind of 
information the public receives from both the media and the elites; and ‘latent 
public opinion’, namely the general predisposition of the public.75 In this 
regard, Western treats latent public opinion together with the information 
advantages shaped by the media as the intervening variables between agents, 
elite advocacy groups, and the eventual decision to intervene.  
Western’s theoretical framework provides valuable insights on the role played 
by the competition between elite groups on the decision to intervene as well as 
the interplay between elite and public opinion. However, the relationship 
between political elites and public opinion and the causal weight of these two 
factors is not always clear. On the one hand, the actions of the elite groups seem 
to be significantly constrained by public opinion. In this regard, public opinion 
seems to represent more than a simple intervening variable. For example, in the 
case of US non-intervention in Vietnam in 1954, it is not clear whether more 
effective information campaigns on the part of Eisenhower and the hardliners 
would have succeeded in overcoming the resistance of the American public at 
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the time to another military engagement in Asia.76 On the other hand, Western 
draws attention to the information and resources advantages of political elites 
over society and the fundamental impact this has over the decisions to 
intervene. Members of the political elite are capable of framing conflicts in ways 
that favour their vision of the latter and support their preferred policy course. 
In this sense, the model of the state that emerges from Western’s analysis, while 
highlighting policymakers’ response to societal pressures, also underscores the 
asymmetric influence exerted by political elites in terms that do not fully 
coincide with the Pluralist state model that he implicitly refers to.  
 
Constructivism, norms, and ideas 
Constructivism provides some of the most comprehensive studies of the 
practice of intervention. In particular, Constructivist works on intervention 
stress the importance of two factors: norms and ideas. Norms play a role in 
constraining the possibility of intervention and in legitimising intervention in 
specific cases. Martha Finnemore has examined how normative changes have 
affected the practice of intervention across history. In particular,  
normative context…shapes conceptions of interest and gives purpose 
and meaning to action. It shapes the goals they value, the means they 
believe are effective and legitimate to obtain those goals, and the political 
costs and benefits attached to different choices.77  
For instance, expanding conceptualisations of ‘humanity’ in the West activated 
interventionary policies in the 19th Century and the related norm of 
humanitarian intervention.78 Finnemore’s approach provides a compelling 
framework to analyse how evolving norms transform the practice of 
intervention. However, normative explanations seem to be less useful in 
addressing one of the key empirical regularities that Finnemore highlights in 
her work. As Finnemore notes, throughout the historical periods examined in 
her work and despite changing normative frameworks, ‘states continue to care 
deeply about who governs other states’ and to authorise military intervention 
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in that regard.79 This represents a recurrent feature of the practice of 
intervention yet Finnemore’s focus on change precludes an analysis of the 
constant factors fuelling leaders’ interest in the identity of the political personnel 
of other states and how this leads to favour intervention. 
Two other authors operating within the Constructivist literature, Anthony Lang 
and John Owen, have addressed this issue. According to Anthony Lang, 
intervention is linked to norms in a twofold way. First, norms affect the 
decision and modality of intervention in that agents either abide to established 
norms concerning intervention or justify their intervention according to certain 
‘standards of behaviour’, for example norms such as democracy promotion.80 
Second, norms construct the identity of the agents. In this sense, intervention 
represents a form of political ‘action’ in Arendtian terms that crosses pre-
established boundaries and through which the political identity of the agent is 
revealed.81 In this regard, Lang suggests integrating a normative approach with 
the study of the politics of intervention centred on the state’s national purpose, 
in a theoretical move that connects Constructivism to Morgenthau’s Political 
Realism. As Lang argues, 
military intervention is a moment in a nation’s history when the national 
purpose becomes both extremely important and also highly contested.... 
it is particularly relevant in an intervention precisely because there is an 
attempt to create a functioning political system where all [leaders] see is 
anarchy and chaos. Thus the model of their own society and political 
system…becomes the model upon which this new system is created.82 
The link between intervention and political identity sketched by Lang is 
broadly convincing, a point to which I will come back later. However, the major 
limitation of Lang’s study stems from its reduction of political action to 
domestic and normative drives, thus leaving aside the way in which power 
relations, both between potential interveners and with political actors in the 
target, affect the decision to intervene.83 In this regard, a focus on the political 
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dimension of intervention should not come at the expenses of the international 
dimension of intervention. 
John Owen’s theoretical contribution succeeds in overcoming this limitation by 
focusing primarily on the role played by both power and ideational factors 
across the international-domestic divide.84 As Owen argues, intervention is a 
‘phenomenon in which ideas and material power interact’.85 Specifically, he 
underscores that ‘rulers seek to gain, hold, and extend their states’ power’ with 
ideas and transnational networks exerting direct effects over rulers’ struggle for 
power.86 States care about other states’ regime up to the point of using force and 
they do so for both material and ideational reasons. Elites’ decisions to promote 
regime change in other societies are driven by three broad dynamics: first, by 
the interplay of external security and internal (regime) security considerations; 
second, by the way in which regime change alters alliance portfolios; third, by 
the influence allied rulers and transnational groups exert on the intervener by 
exaggerating threats to their own regime and showing themselves as worthy 
recipients of the intervener’s support respectively.87 In particular, Owen argues, 
regime change ‘is more likely when elites across their region are highly 
polarized along an ideological axis’. This polarization occur in periods of 
‘transnational ideological struggle’ during which transnational ideological 
networks (TINs), such as the Comintern or the Muslim Brotherhood, operate to 
foster regime change in different states, thus triggering a reaction by state rulers 
opting for intervention when the latter consider TINs to have a chance of 
success. What makes them essentially transnational is the fact that their 
members ‘recognize their common interests and interdependence across states’ 
thus providing support to each other.88  
The Realist theory of intervention that I present in the following chapters 
reaches similar conclusions with regard to the interaction between ideational 
factors and power, the effects of regime change on alliances, and the role played 
by external groups. Nevertheless, there are four significant differences between 
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the approach taken in this thesis and Owen’s theory. First, Owen’s framework 
focuses on cases of ideologically radicalised and polarised international 
systems; his theory does not apply to cases of intervention taking place in 
ideologically homogenous international or regional systems, such as the 
repeated US interventions in Latin America in the early 20th Century. The 
theoretical framework presented in the following chapters offers the possibility 
of explaining intervention with reference to a single and consistent theory of the 
state that takes into account variations in terms of ideological homogeneity. 
Second, in non-ideologically polarised contexts the role played by TINs is by 
definition minimal. By Owen’s own admission, even in ideologically polarised 
contexts, TINs are neither sufficient nor necessary to cause regime change.89 It is 
therefore necessary to explore in greater detail the relationship established by 
the intervener with the leadership groups operating in the target in order to 
clarify which relations matter most and how. Third, the transnational nature of 
these networks should be carefully evaluated. The Comintern was a 
transnational tool set up by a national government and formed by the 
leaderships of national Communist parties. The various Muslim Brotherhood 
branches present significant differences among them. Rather than nodes of 
single transnational networks, these formations can be more accurately defined 
as alliances between kin national elite or counter-elite groups characterised by 
different degrees of institutionalisation and of power asymmetry among them. 
In this regard, I will argue in favour of a theoretical framework stressing the 
primarily national dimension of political elite and counter-elite groups in the 
target. Fourth, according to Owen, only elites belonging to TINs are always 
ideologically polarised. Yet, rulers do not only control the coercive apparatus of 
the state; they are also inextricably linked to specific political ideological 
principles that legitimise their power and inform their political views. As later 
chapters will discuss, all state rulers are influenced, in various degrees, by 
ideological factors. In this sense, there is no such thing as normal, non-
ideological elites as claimed by Owen.90  
Recently, Elizabeth Saunders has drawn on both Constructivist and Liberal 
elements to evaluate the role played by leaders’ beliefs in shaping both the 
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decision to intervene and its modality during the Cold War. According to 
Saunders, presidents’ beliefs of the sources of foreign states’ external behaviour 
shapes intervention in profound ways. Specifically, ‘externally focused’ leaders 
focus mainly on the foreign policy behaviour of other states, whereas ‘internally 
focused’ leaders explicitly link foreign policy behaviour to domestic 
institutional settings. Therefore, internally focused leaders are more likely to 
intervene by adopting highly transformative strategies to alter the domestic 
arrangements of the target and redress what they perceive to be the primary 
source of threatening foreign policy behaviour.91 
Saunders’ micro-level analysis of leaders’ beliefs underscores once more the 
pervasive impact of elite members’ ideas and interests when it comes to the 
decision to intervene. At the same time, there are two limits in Saunders’ 
framework. First, it is not clear what the relationship is between leaders’ belief 
systems and other factors, such as international security concerns, questions of 
credibility and commitment linked to alliance systems, domestic politics and 
ideological drivers. Top executive leaders may have a disproportionate impact 
on decision-making yet this does not automatically translate into a decisive 
impact of executive leaders’ causal beliefs on interventionary policies. In 
addition, as Saunders notes, presidents’ causal belief systems are embedded 
within broader ideological frameworks that shape their belief systems in the 
first place, hence indicating the potential causal precedence of elites’ ideology 
over leaders’ specific beliefs.92 Second, despite being centred on the impact of 
political leaders on intervention, Saunders’ framework significantly overlooks 
the role played by political leaders in two regards. On the one hand, Saunders’ 
framework does not fully address the role played by leaders in the target state 
on the intervener’s decision.93 Yet, various works examining US interventions 
during the Cold War have shown how intervention constitutes a specific form 
of both confrontation and cooperation between an intervening political elite and 
elite/counter-elite groups in the target country.94 On the other hand, if leaders 
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matter, leadership change should matter even if not accompanied by 
institutional change. Yet, by not counting leadership change as transformative if 
not accompanied by institutional change, Saunders works towards a 
paradoxical conclusion: underscoring leaders’ importance whilst overlooking 
the transformative impact leadership can have.95  
 
Realism’s silence on intervention? 
Compared to the other major theoretical approaches, Realism has been 
relatively silent on the practice of military intervention. Yet, there are two 
significant differences in this regard. First, while Realist theories have been 
relatively silent on the study of intervention, Realist authors have been vocal 
opponents of contemporary US interventions – whether in Vietnam, in Iraq and 
now in Syria.96 Second, Realism’ limited theoretical contribution characterises 
mainly contemporary Realist works, not Classical or Political Realism. Notably, 
Classical Realist authors offer valuable insights on intervention. Similarly to the 
English School authors, Classical Realists, such as Raymond Aron, Herny 
Kissinger, and Hans Morgenthau, treat intervention as a distinct practice 
alongside war and diplomacy, linking domestic and international order.97 
Further, they draw attention to the political and ideational factors shaping 
statesmen’s decisions in general and intervention in particular. Notably, Aron 
points out the way in which ideological heterogeneity blurs the distinction 
between external and internal enemy, fuelling interventionary practices.98  
On the contrary, both Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism have contributed 
little to the study of intervention. This is the result of both an unnecessary 
conceptual choice and a self-imposed theoretical straightjacket that preclude a 
detailed and comprehensive study of military intervention within 
contemporary Realist works. At the conceptual level, Neorealist and 
Neoclassical Realist authors have been reticent in addressing intervention as a 
distinct practice in international relations. Military intervention has been 
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examined within broader cases of the use of military force in international 
affairs without reference to the specificity of the practice and the definitional 
problems addressed in the introduction. Thus, intervention has been linked to 
wars ignited by domestic changes or to cases of the use of force by great powers 
in the periphery. The term ‘military intervention’ simply underscores the 
degree of choice leaders have with regard to the use of force.99  
From these conceptual lenses, intervention is treated mainly as the result of 
leaders’ own calculation of the national interest in secondary theatres, itself 
informed by ideological and domestic factors rather than relevant security and 
political interests. Consequently, Realist authors have treated major 
interventions such as in Vietnam and Iraq as a pointless or, worse, 
counterproductive exercises in power directed at non-vital interests, imperial 
adventures driven by leaders’ choices or domestic factors rather than a necessity 
resulting from state’s security or interests. While it can be easily argued that 
Realists’ concerns have been vindicated in both Vietnam and Iraq, Neorealists 
are nonetheless left in a predicament at the theoretical level. If ideological 
crusading or public opinion drive military interventions, then these factors 
must play a far greater role than Neorealist theories are willing to admit.  
At the theoretical level, this lack of attention to intervention originates from the 
particular problems that intervention poses for Neorealism. The rigid boundary 
between international and domestic politics crystallised within contemporary 
Realism poses an initial obstacle – albeit not impossible to overcome – for the 
analysis of a practice that by definition connects international military action 
with domestic political dynamics.100 Connected to this, a more challenging 
problem is represented by the unitary state that Neorealism takes as its 
principal analytical unit, which by definition leaves the study of internal 
variables out of its purview. For the same reasons, Neorealism finds it difficult 
to explain why revolutions matter for international politics up to the point that 
states are willing to use military force to address domestic change abroad.101 As 
pointed out by Owen, ‘when states incur expected costs by using force to alter 
other states regimes, they are doing something beyond the predictive power of 
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realism’.102 Attempts to apply Realist categories to civil wars, while useful, 
simply adapt Realist concepts to domestic settings but do not address 
intervention per se. 
Major examples of recent Realist works trying to overcome the theoretical 
obstacles of Neorealism to the study of intervention further underscore the 
need to overcome basic assumptions in order to better grasp the causal 
dynamics leading to intervention. Drawing on his refinement of the balance-of-
power theory, Stephen Walt explains the link between revolutions and the use 
of force with reference to the ‘windows of opportunity’ offered by revolutions 
to expansionist neighbouring states as well as to the perceptions of the offensive 
character of revolutionary states.103 Despite adopting a quintessentially 
Neorealist theoretical framework, Walt’s empirical analysis qualifies Neorealist 
expectations in two ways. First, Walt does not find extensive support for the 
Neorealist theses on the eventual socialisation of revolutionary states. 
Revolutionary states, as in the cases of the Soviet Union and Iran, continue to be 
influenced by the ideological outlook of their revolutionary elites pursuing a 
radical foreign policy despite its military and economic costs. Second, Walt is 
forced to include domestic political considerations in his empirical analysis, 
particularly the internal power struggle within the revolutionary state and the 
direct threat posed by revolutionary regimes to the legitimacy and rule of other 
political elites.104  
Recently, Neoclassical Realist works have included domestic variables within 
their theoretical constructs in order to explain specific foreign policy outcomes, 
including the decision to intervene. Within Neoclassical Realism, factors 
operating at the state and sub-state level represent a set of intervening variables 
transforming systemic pressures and incentives into policy outcomes to explain 
variations from Neorealist expectations.105 The main agent of Neoclassical 
Realism is not the state per se but its foreign policy executive (FPE) that operates 
between the international and domestic arenas, including the head of 
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government and those officials responsible for the formulation of foreign and 
security policy, and excluding other ministers, political actors such as 
parliamentarians or political party members.106  
Colin Dueck, for example, has used the Neoclassical Realist model of state 
action to examine the causes of military intervention.107 Dueck describes a two-
stage process: first, presidents define the national interest in a specific situation 
which might require military intervention; second, presidents try to implement 
their definition of the national interest given domestic constraints and 
opportunities. According to Dueck, ‘domestic politics “matters”, not as a 
primary cause of intervention, but rather as a powerful influence on its exact 
form’.108 When domestic conditions are permissive, interventions will be 
conducted according to political leaders’ conceptualisation of the national 
interest; when they are not, policymakers either give up or shape intervention 
in a way that rallies the necessary domestic support.  
Although Dueck provides a parsimonious model that links international and 
domestic factors, the relative causal weight of the two sets of factors is not 
entirely clear. Dueck argues that domestic factors cannot be considered as the 
‘ultimate cause’ of intervention. Yet, the same applies to international factors or 
leaders’ perceptions: they are not sufficient to explain either the form of 
intervention or the decision to intervene; in fact, leaders’ action regarding 
military intervention is defined as ‘semi-constrained’.109 What Dueck seems 
inadvertently to suggest is that the domestic arena ‘shapes and shoves’ policy 
outcomes more than international factors since the latter only provides the 
triggering factors, i.e. cases where military intervention may be required. 
Furthermore, Dueck discards two possibilities: first, cases where non-FPE 
members of the political elite exert significant pressure on a reluctant president 
to intervene, as exemplified by US interventions in Somalia and Bosnia during 
the 1990s;110 second, cases where the domestic context, not the international 
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context, creates powerful incentives to intervene, as exemplified by the Cuban 
case examined in Chapter 4. 
This last point highlights a more general limit within ‘orthodox’ Neoclassical 
Realist theories. The latter do not fully take into account the role of domestic 
factors and politics, which cannot be reduced purely to the issue of the 
mobilisation of public support or the issue of the modality of intervention. 
What is missing is a full appreciation of the complex relationship existing 
between the international and the domestic whereby state elites do not only use 
domestic resources to pursue international objectives but can also use foreign 
policy (and intervention) for domestic purposes.111 For instance, considerations 
connected to domestic political competition – not simply the support of the 
American public over an operation against Iraq – exerted a significant impact 
over the Bush administration’s construction of the case against Iraq in 2003.112 In 
this way, domestic political struggle can create an interest driving elites to 
intervene, not simply a constraint on leaders’ preferred policy. 
In this sense, Neoclassical Realism does not fully overcome the theoretical 
assumptions that limit Neorealism’s utility in regard to the study of 
intervention. In order to address this issue, Fordham has suggested overcoming 
the ‘additive model’ used by Neoclassical Realism – adding intervening 
domestic variable to the initial systemic pressures – as the latter necessarily 
places its entire theoretical edifice onto Neorealist assumptions about state 
motives.113 In contrast, Fordham suggests exploring the explanatory pay-offs of 
an ‘interactive’ model of the state action, inviting ‘scholarly research into the 
sources of motives and interests across states and domestic political factions’.114 
In such models, international and domestic factors do not simply add up; on the 
contrary, ‘the external and the internal events are linked and feed back on one 
another’.115 Importantly, as noted by Fordham, ‘the nature of international 
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threats is determined to a great extent by the interests of the domestic coalition 
that governs the state’.116  
In particular, both authors within the Neoclassical Realist framework and their 
critics have noted the role played by the interests of the ruling coalition in 
shaping both a state’s grand strategy and its foreign policy choices, hence the 
need to examine the domestic balance of power between various elite factions 
to explain foreign policy outcomes.117 In this regard, policymakers’ definitions 
of the national interests are not independent from domestic and political 
considerations. Importantly, as domestic and international considerations 
intertwine at the level of political elites, political elites offer a theoretical 
vantage point by which to reconcile both international and domestic factors.  
This thesis, therefore, argues in favour of a reformulated Realist framework 
based on: a reconceptualisation of intervention as a distinct practice serving 
distinct objectives and shaped by distinct casual dynamics; and, a reformulation 
of the factors shaping political elites’ decisions rooted in Realist assumptions 
about the state and politics as well as early Realist insights regarding the 
practice of military intervention. This approach provides a comprehensive 
study of military intervention by taking into account three elements highlighted 
by other theoretical approaches on the subject: first, the key role played by 
political elites; second, the interplay between international and domestic factors 
affecting elites’ decisions; third, the interplay between ideational and material 
factors in shaping elites’ interventionary policies. In regard to the latter, a 
dialogue can be established between Realism and Constructivism, by 
incorporating the role played by ideas within Realist frameworks.118  
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Towards a Realist Theory of Intervention  
The possibility of a Realist theory of intervention should not come as a surprise. 
As already noted by Little, classical authors that have informed the Realist 
tradition such as Thucydides and Niccolò Machiavelli made clear in their work 
the link existing between inter- and intra-state politics and the recurrent 
interventions states conducted in each others’ internal affairs.119  
The Realist nature of the theoretical framework defined in this section and the 
following chapters derives mainly from five elements. First, it is based on 
Realist assumptions about the drivers of human action in the public sphere, 
primarily the ‘centrality of conflict groups’, the related ‘immutability of 
tribalism’, and the centrality of power considerations driving political action.120 
Second, it looks at military intervention as a tool available to state leaders to 
pursue political and strategic interests. In particular, following Krasner, this 
thesis treats state leaders or rulers, not states, as the key international actors.121 
In more general terms, I will follow Krasner’s attempt to overcome Neorealist 
starting assumptions while maintaining Realism’s basic premises regarding 
political action, interests, and power competition.122 Third, as I indicate in 
Chapter 2, the framework underpinning the thesis is based on a Realist theory 
of the state. Fourth, it focuses on the constant mechanisms driving leaders to 
intervene in internal conflicts, despite historical, institutional and normative 
settings. Finally, the starting point of the theory is represented by the early 
insights offered by Realist authors such as Morgenthau and Krasner on the 
subject on the practice of military intervention and its normative dimension. 
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Intervention, historical practice and the balance of power 
Both Morgenthau and Krasner offer a first set of Realist considerations 
concerning the practice of intervention. In particular, alongside war and 
diplomacy, military intervention represents one of the main tools available to 
states to pursue their own interests. In this sense, Morgenthau sees the practice 
of intervention as primarily serving the interests of the state.123 Similarly, as 
Finnemore and Goldstein point out in regard to Krasner’s view of intervention: 
in an anarchical world, altering the domestic authority structures of 
other states and violating their autonomy could be more attractive 
strategies for states than war or diplomacy, the conventional tools of 
realist statecraft among sovereigns.124  
Conceptualising intervention as a distinct, yet recurrent, practice serving state 
leaders’ interests better encapsulates the struggle for power at the international 
level that is central to Realism. In this regard, military intervention is central to 
power dynamics at the international level; similarly, states care deeply about 
who governs other states, therefore, intervening in the internal affairs and 
conflicts of other states to influence the identity of the political leaders of the 
latter. 
Furthermore, intervention represents one of the tools used by great powers for 
the management of the international system. That is the case not only during 
the 19th Century and the Cold War usually associated with repeated cases of 
military interventions, but also in historical periods usually described in terms 
of rigid balance of power mechanisms. Notably, during the 18th Century, whilst 
the balance of power mechanism was silent regarding the possibility of 
intervention to redress imbalances of powers caused by internal modifications 
(dynastic successions, centralisation processes, etc.), states repeatedly 
intervened to counter such developments in the name of the balance of power 
and the stability of the European system.125 As William Lingelbach notes, 
intervention represented one of the central tools to enforce the balance of power 
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and perpetuate the state system.126 Indeed, ‘the very independence of such 
[sovereign] states depended upon the absence of a ruler who could aspire to 
such power’. Thus, whilst the balance of power system worked against the 
establishment of a universal monarchy, intervention was one of the tools 
available to rulers to avoid the emergence of a universal monarch via 
successions, alliances, and domestic reforms.127 
In particular, the numerous wars of succession and interventions that 
characterised the 18th century indicate the importance of this practice. The War 
of the Spanish Succession (1701-1713) highlights the close relationship between 
balance of power and leadership change at the time. The war resulted from 
external intervention to counter the potential unification of the Spanish and 
French crowns that could have altered the European balance of power in 
dramatic ways.128 The terms of the ensuing Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, which 
sanctioned the balance of power as the ground rule of European international 
politics, explicitly forbade any unification of the thrones of Spain and France to 
preserve the balance of power. The War of Polish Succession (1733-1738) and 
the ensuing partitions of Poland during the second half of the 18th century 
further underscores the consequences of intervention in internal conflicts, 
leading in the Polish case to a major redrawing of the political map in Europe. 
Importantly, Russia’s repeated interventions in the ongoing internal conflicts in 
Poland were vital to securing the position of pro-Russian leaders and Poland’s 
position as a subordinate ally.129 During the same period, the rivalry between 
France and England was also shaped by, and took advantage of, internal 
conflicts.  During the early 18th Century, France supported the Jacobite 
rebellions in Great Britain, recognising Prince James as the rightful heir to the 
English throne in 1701 and planning to intervene in England in 1708 in support 
of its plans.130 Subsequently, France intervened in support of the British colonies 
during the American War of Independence. France first intervened covertly and 
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indirectly via the provision of weapons, gunpowder and equipment, and 
ultimately directly in 1778.131 
Considerations of the importance of domestic factors for the balance of power 
were thus not new features in the 19th Century. Yet during the 19th Century both 
regime change and intervention acquired different meanings and importance. 
Whilst in the 18th Century intervention operated as a fortuitous mechanism of 
the balance of power whose utility and necessity arose from specific 
contingencies, in the 19th Century intervention became institutionalised within 
the Concert of Europe.132 Faced with the threat of republican revolution, 
domestic order became central to great powers’ new international order with 
intervention becoming, in turn, a central tool by which the monarchies of great 
and small powers managed and forestalled revolutionary change.133 Regime 
security and international security became explicitly linked. It is precisely due 
to the link established between domestic and international order in the 19th 
Century both by legitimist monarchies and Liberalism that the ‘problem’ of 
intervention was addressed ‘...with more conscious thoroughness than any 
before or since’.134 It was the realisation that domestic regimes represented the 
main threat to international order that lead to the constitution of intervention as 
a distinctive mode of action.135  
The interplay between international and domestic considerations during the 
19th Century also revealed how ideological links between elite and counter-elite 
groups abroad could shape foreign policy and interventionary decisions. The 
presence of Liberal groups across Europe affected external balancing 
calculations among policymakers. Liberals in Europe tended to look at Britain 
as a model, creating opportunities for increased influence (and allies) for Britain 
in case of a takeover by moderate Liberal factions abroad.136 For instance, 
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constitutional and Liberal states were considered by Lord Palmerston to be 
more ‘compatible with British interests’, ‘the natural Allies [sic]’ of Great 
Britain.137 For the same reason, following the July Revolution of 1830, French 
Liberals looked at the English Whigs for a Liberal alliance that would allow 
them to intervene in support of like-minded movements in other countries.138 In 
particular, exponents of the French parti du mouvement favoured French 
intervention in defence of oppressed nationalities in Poland, Italy and Belgium. 
The point was underscored also by Liberal thinkers of the time. John Stuart Mill 
argued that a Franco-British reaction to Russian intervention in Hungary in 
1849 could have prevented the latter and favoured the establishment of an 
independent and allied Hungary. In turn, this would have contributed to late 
wars against Russia.139 In case of aggression by reactionary powers, Mill argued, 
Britain would have had to consider every ‘popular party’ in Europe as its 
‘natural ally’; ‘the Liberals should be to it [Britain], what the Protestants of 
Europe were to the Government of Queen Elizabeth’.140  
During the Cold War, the interplay between international competition, 
domestic change and ideological factors became even more evident. 
Specifically, Morgenthau saw intervention as the result of the interplay between 
power politics and ideological competition. Ideology, according to Morgenthau, 
worked as an ‘independent motivating force’ operating across state boundaries. 
The Cold War represented a ‘revolutionary era’, in which domestic change 
entailed foreign policy change thus becoming a source of concern for the 
superpowers. Furthermore, Morgenthau noted the way in which decolonisation 
affected interventionary practices. The weaknesses of newly decolonized states 
created a need for external support. Morgenthau drew attention to the ways in 
which the provision of military and economic aid created patterns of power and 
dependency that the provider could exploit by either supplying or withdrawing 
such aid: ‘if a foreign nation supplies aid it intervenes; if it does not supply aid 
it also intervenes’.141  
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To sum up, intervention as a practice responds to power considerations that in 
turn are shaped not only by material factors but also by three other dynamics as 
highlighted by Morgenthau and the historical practice of intervention: ideology; 
the effects of domestic change in other states on the interests of political elites; 
and the relationship established between elite groups across states.  
 
Intervention, norms, and sovereignty: a Realist perspective 
Despite being a common practice in international history, the legitimacy of 
intervention had been questioned after the French Revolution, that is after the 
emergence of a new form of political order based on Liberal values and 
nationalism.142 Since then, one of the quintessential features of intervention has 
been characterised as that of being ‘convention-breaking’.143 In normative terms, 
intervention violates what is considered to be the cornerstone of international 
relations, i.e. sovereignty and the related norm of non-intervention. The 
violation of the norm of non-intervention is particularly important given the 
centrality of non-intervention to international order, representing one of the 
‘rules of coexistence’ which international society is based on.144 While other 
forms of interference may infringe non-intervention, ‘[i]t is threats and acts of 
military intervention in state sovereignty in violation of the norm of non-
intervention that is of fundamental concern to international society’.145  
Although this thesis addresses the political and empirical processes that lead to 
interventionary policies, the ‘convention-breaking’ nature of intervention raises 
important questions. On the one hand, intervention questions the norm of state 
sovereignty, whose violation is of particular importance for Realism, which sees 
states – sovereign and autonomous states – as the key units in international 
relations. On the other hand, as Krasner argues, despite the persistence of the 
norm of non-intervention and its centrality within international society, the 
norm seems to exist only to be violated as indicated by the repeated 
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interventions in history.146 It is with regard to this contradiction between the 
norm of non-intervention and the recurrent practice of intervention that ‘[...] the 
very old problem of military intervention’ emerges posing inextricable strains 
on IR theory.147 The persistence of the norm of non-intervention and its 
violation are both regular features of international politics.   
Intervening is indeed about questioning sovereignty, since it puts into question 
more than any other international action – apart from outright conquest – the 
control and authority a state exercises not simply over its own territory but over 
its ability to define its governance structures. Sovereignty, simply put, implies 
non-intervention.148 As Krasner argues, intervention violates first and foremost 
‘Westphalian sovereignty’, based on the principles of ‘territoriality and the 
exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given 
territory’.149 In this regard, sovereignty can be defined more precisely as a ‘claim 
to autonomy’ rather than the autonomy actually enjoyed by a political actor.150 
At the same time, sovereignty refers to the authority exercised within a specific 
political community rather than actual control.151 According to Jackson, 
‘[s]overeignty can be defined…as a single governing authority which is 
acknowledged to be supreme over all other authorities within a certain 
territorial jurisdiction and is independent of all foreign authorities’.152 Therefore, 
sovereignty entails both a claim to autonomy (from external authorities) and as 
well as a claim to authority (over one’s own territory and population).153 
Intervention violates both claims.  
From a Realist perspective, the persistence of the norm of non-intervention and 
its recurrent violations stem from the contending rights that originate from 
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states’ claim to autonomy and authority. On the one hand, the persistence of the 
norm of non-intervention stems primarily from the normative guarantees it 
provides on states’ claims of autonomy. In this sense, Morgenthau saw the use 
of the norm of non-intervention as serving the interests of the state.154 On the 
other hand, violations of non-intervention originate from the primacy of states’ 
interests and claims to authority. As underscored by Krasner, intervention is the 
manifestation of those violations of Westphalian sovereignty characterised by 
an international realm in which the dominant logic of consequences leads 
statespeople to violate Westphalian sovereignty whenever it is in their ‘material 
and ideational interests’.155 States – recte rulers – abide by the norms of 
international conduct for the same interests that drive them in different 
situations to violate them, hence, the ‘organized hypocrisy’ that characterises 
the international sphere.156  
In this sense, sovereignty is linked to specific limitations imposed by the 
international society states establish.157 Not surprisingly, the European system 
of international relations is based on a reduction of ‘interference to a minimum’ 
– not on the complete elimination of all forms of interference.158 International 
law, from its inception, has recognised – either implicitly or explicitly – the 
limits on sovereignty imposed by the practice of intervention and tried to 
identify cases in which the infringement of sovereignty could be considered 
legitimate. Exceptions to the norm of non-intervention have always been part of 
the norm itself. First, the norm of non-intervention originally applied only to 
European states since non-European states were not considered as fully 
sovereign.159 Second, the founders of modern international law recognised such 
exceptions. Grotius, whilst denying any right to revolt against tyrants, allowed 
the right to intervene on the behalf of these subjects. Vattel argued that 
intervention was legitimate to support the ‘just’ side in a civil conflict, i.e. 
against an unjust rule, and to redress an altered balance of power. Von Martens 
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allowed for intervention on the ‘just’ side of civil wars and for self-preservation.  
Finally, James Kent denied the existence of a right of intervention meddling 
with domestic administration and rulers-ruled relationship though 
countenanced intervention for balance of power considerations.160 
Third, international law distinguished between the different status of a 
domestic actor involved in civil wars, attaching different rights to outside actors 
in an attempt to regulate the practice of supporting insurgents in domestic 
conflicts.161 Far from being shaped by a norm proscribing any interference or 
intervention, the international legal system left – and still leaves – significant 
normative loopholes through which states can validate their sovereign rights in 
opting for the practice they consider to best serve their autonomy, 
independence, security, and identity.162 Why, when and how they choose to do 
so is a question that needs to be addressed with reference to the interests – 
whether material or ideational – shaping rulers’ decisions.163 
Both the recurrence of intervention and the exceptions characterising the norm 
of non-intervention underscore a more fundamental normative and political 
issue. Ultimately, the normative ambiguity of the norm of non-intervention – a 
cornerstone of the international system and yet violated to uphold that very 
system – stems from the contradictory rights derived from sovereignty as a 
claim to autonomy in an anarchic environment and sovereignty as a claim to 
authority. As stressed by Hoffmann, the international system based on 
sovereignty is both a system based on the ‘illegitimacy of intervention’ and on 
the ‘legitimacy of self-help’.164 It is precisely this right of self-help in anarchy 
that gives sovereign actors the right to take all necessary measures to tackle 
what they define and perceive as sources of threats to themselves and their 
sovereign authority. Whereas the norm of non-intervention acts as a safeguard 
to states’ claims to autonomy, intervention mirrors and responds to states’ 
claim to authority at the international level. 
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Importantly, this claim to authority is connected to the position and interests of 
the political elites controlling state institutions. As Morgenthau argues, the very 
‘political fact’ to which sovereignty needs to be conduced is  
the existence of a person or a group of persons who within...a given 
territory are more powerful than any other competing person or group 
of persons and whose power, institutionalized as it must be in order to 
last, manifests itself as the supreme authority to enact and enforce legal 
rules within that territory.165  
It is this group that makes a claim to authority, which in a self-help system 
leaves to the sovereign actor the right to take all necessary measures to tackle 
what is defined and perceived as sources of threats to their sovereign authority. 
As a result, intervention contains two aspects. First, intervention questions the 
claim to autonomy of the target incumbent elite while supporting the claim to 
authority of other existing or emerging elite groups. Second, intervention 
represents a claim to authority by the intervener over the targeted polity, a de 
facto expansion of the intervener’s sovereign rights, through which the 
intervening elite influences the selection of the political authorities that would 
ultimately define the identity and direction of the targeted political unit’s action 
in international affairs. In this regard, intervention is an act to politically order 
an external community by defending the existing order or by promoting an 
alternative elite. 
Therefore, intervention is a primarily political act: chosen by political actors, 
targeting political actors, revealing the contending authority claims of 
competing political elites. As such, it needs to be examined in relation to the 
interests of these political elites; the political context in which the decision to 
intervene is taken, in both the intervening and target state; and, the political 
function intervention performs. As Trachtenberg argues:  
the way we think about intervention is often too narrow and 
apolitical.  There is a common tendency to think of ‘legitimate’ 
intervention as divorced from normal political life – that a line 
has been crossed, that the normal rules no longer apply…to the 
contrary … as a rule the problem of intervention is not to be 
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treated in a political vacuum, and that broad political 
considerations are not to be ignored.166  
As such, the analysis of intervention should be connected first and foremost to 
the political context shaping elites’ interests in the struggle for power taking 
place in other polities.  
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Chapter 2 
Elite Politics 
 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, studies of military intervention have 
underscored three important elements. First, intervention represents a practice 
that connects international politics with domestic politics. In this sense, theories 
that focus exclusively on either the external or internal determinants of 
intervention are bound to provide only partial explanations.1 From a Realist 
perspective, this requires moving beyond Neorealism’s rigid distinction 
between the international and domestic realm, and internalising the causal role 
played by domestic factors. 
Second, as underscored by Realist authors such as Morgenthau and Krasner 
and supported by historical evidence, intervention is shaped by, and shapes, 
power relations in the international sphere. Yet, the decision to intervene is 
influenced not only by material and security factors but also by ideological and 
political factors that need to be taken into consideration. Related to this, the 
previous chapter also drew attention to the secondary causal impact that both 
economic and institutional factors play with regard to military intervention. 
Both institutional and economic factors matter as far as they relate to the 
political elites’ position. 
Third, political elites and elite dynamics are at the centre of the practice of 
military intervention. This focus on political leadership and the politics of 
intervention permeates not only Realist works on the subject but also most of 
the recent non-Realist contributions to the study of intervention.2 In particular, 
political elites represent both the key decision-makers and the principal targets 
of interventions. Despite changing historical and normative contexts and the 
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varying objectives pursued by interveners, over time ‘[s]tates continue to care 
deeply about who governs other states’.3 As Buzan notes, it is exactly because of 
this ‘[…] sustained interest in each other’s domestic affairs’ governments have 
that they ‘[…] interfere in each other’s domestic politics’.4 Overall, these aspects 
stress the need to examine the question of intervention from an explicitly 
political perspective centred on political elites. In this regard, it is necessary to 
analyse why political actors embedded in a specific political context have or 
develop a ‘sustained interest’ in the domestic affairs of other polities and why 
they opt for intervention in order to support or forestall political change abroad.  
In this chapter, I will sketch the defining features of a consistent theory of the 
state based on political elites in order to contextualise elites’ role at the domestic 
level and the socio-political processes through which elites maintain their 
position and compete with both domestic and international actors. For this 
purpose, I will draw on CET and recent reformulations in order to place the 
study of political elites on a more systematic basis. Bringing elites and elite 
theory into IR provides two main advantages. First, elite theory offers a 
coherent theory of the state that is of fundamental importance for the study of a 
practice that by definition connects the decision-making process of the 
intervener to the domestic politics of the target state. In this regard, a theory of 
the state is necessary to clarify which actors and causal mechanisms matter in 
both the intervening and target state in shaping interventionary policies. 
Defining a clear theory of the state overcomes ‘the restricted theory of the state 
which prevails in international relations’ and which, according to Little, has 
hampered the study of intervention in IR.5 Second, an elite theory of the state 
offers the opportunity to advance a consistent and more accurate Realist theory 
of the state.6 In particular, CET draws on specific assumptions derived from the 
tradition of Political Realism: a pessimistic view of people as driven by a 
‘natural passion for power’;7 the ‘natural inclination to struggle’ that 
characterizes politics, a struggle that people conduct in groups due to their 
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social nature;8 and, as I will indicate in the following section, the primacy of the 
political over institutional considerations.9  
In defining a Realist theory of the state, CET provides a twofold contribution. 
First, it offers the possibility of overcoming the rigid distinction between 
international and domestic spheres that has hampered the development of a 
Realist contribution to the study of intervention.10 Thus, it is possible to avoid 
the distinction made by Waltz between domestic politics as the ‘realm of 
authority, of administration, and of law’ and international politics as the ‘realm 
of power, of struggle, and of accommodation’, which is of little use in cases of 
domestic conflicts where authority breaks down and conflict engulfs an entire 
polity.11 For the same reason, it avoids leaning towards a ‘legalistic notion of 
sovereignty’ in which political agency and conflict find little if no space within 
the restrictive framework of the state as a legal-territorial unit.12 Second, CET 
contributes to ongoing efforts to better define Realist theories of the state.13 
Interestingly, Neoclassical Realism has drawn on the ‘return to the state’ begun 
in Sociology during the 1970s to define its intervening variables.14 Yet, 
Neoclassical Realism has so far failed to fully engage with the elite tradition 
underpinning the statist approach.15  
This chapter first presents the main tenets of CET and of more recent elitist 
developments in order to define political elites and their characteristics. Second, 
it examines domestic elite politics, i.e. how political elites’ relationship with 
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their societies and their interest in securing their power affect elite action. Third, 
it addresses the international dimension of elite politics in order to clarify how 
domestic change abroad affects elites’ position and how intervention may serve 
the interests of political elites in this regard.  
 
 
The Inevitability of Elites 
Between the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century, three 
authors, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels, lay the bases for 
what is now defined as CET. The works of these three authors represent the 
first modern attempt to systematise a tradition of political thought on the 
political and social role of minorities that dates back to early philosophers and 
political thinkers.16 Recently, there has been a renewed interest in elite studies 
that has further developed some of CET earlier insights while maintaining its 
basic assumptions.17  
The distinction between rulers and the ruled defines the central argument of 
CET. According to Mosca, the presence of a ruling class and the distinction 
between a ruling and a ruled class are universal and ‘constant facts’ of all 
societies. The ruling class ‘performs all political functions, monopolizes power 
and enjoys the advantages that power brings whereas the second … is directed 
                                                
16 Notably, Plato, Aristotle, Kautilya and Ibn Khaldun underscored the role of 
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and controlled by the first’.18 This is the result of both social and organisational 
dynamics. The ruling class’ dominance derives first and foremost from society 
itself, since it is thanks to their possession of ‘social forces’ (i.e. sources of social 
power) that members of the ruling class obtain the material, intellectual and 
even moral superiority to rule; thus, changes in these social forces will affect the 
political class and its composition.19 The power of the ruling class rests also on 
the advantages that every organised minority enjoys over a disorganised 
majority.20 Robert Michels developed this argument into his renowned ‘iron law 
of oligarchy’, stressing ‘the immanent oligarchical tendencies in every kind of 
human organisation which strives for the attainment of definite ends’. Simply 
put, ‘organization implies the tendency to oligarchy’ with power increasingly 
concentrated in the upper strata due to organisational requirements.21  
The empirical observation regarding the stratification present in every society 
defines the central argument of CET: the inevitability of elites.22 The 
inevitability of elites represents an axiom for subsequent theoretical 
development; it is a constant that shapes societies despite different historical 
and geographical settings. As in Krasner’s work, rulers represent the 
‘ontological givens’ of political analysis.23 Thus, CET authors openly question 
the validity of both Marxist and Liberal-democratic assumptions about the 
state. On the one hand, CET questions Marxist claims over the possibility of 
classless societies. From a CET perspective, Communist societies would not 
have escaped the presence of an elite, something borne out by the experience of 
‘actual existing Socialism’. On the other hand, CET authors provide a corrosive 
critique of Liberal-democratic regimes as well. Elites are present within pluralist 
democracies since even these societies cannot work without a governmental 
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terms as composed of all the individuals that achieve ‘the highest indices in their 
branch of activity’. 
20 Mosca 1923: §I.2.1-I.2.3. 
21 Michels 1915: 11, 31-33, 40. See also Mann 1986: 6-7; Piven and Cloward 2005: 37. 
22 Higley and Burton 2006: 4-7; Hartmann 2007: 36. 
23 Krasner 1999: 7. 
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machine and a political class.24 As summarised by Aron, in democracies 
governments can be of or for the people, but not realistically by the people, ‘[…] 
for it is quite impossible for the government of a society to be in the hands of 
any but a few’.25 In this sense, CET essentially questions the myth surrounding 
the democratic model, the ‘democratic fallacy’ that governments are run by the 
governed.26  
The central claim by CET has been questioned primarily by Pluralist authors.27 
Three elements characterise Pluralist theories of the state: the emphasis on the 
diffused distribution of power among different groups, not just in one single 
elite; the multiplicity of cleavages hence the impossibility of reducing social 
conflict and political dynamics to one single dimension; the process of 
competition and negotiation taking place between interests groups.28 No single 
group, according to the Pluralist perspective, controls decision-making. A 
multitude of groups shape the political process hence assuring that power is 
dispersed among them.29 Therefore, the state is not autonomous from societal 
pressures; if not a fiction, the state at maximum is a cipher or a ‘pawn’, the 
passive target and translator of interests arising exogenously in the society.30 In 
particular, in his renowned analysis of the policy making process in New 
Haven, Robert Dahl’s question – ‘who actually governs?’ – offered a critique of 
elitist positions by arguing that no single elite exercised overall influence on 
every aspect of decision-making, but a differentiated set of political parties, 
interest groups, economic associations and bureaucratic actors influenced the 
                                                
24 Mosca 1925: §I.2; Michels 1915: 21. 
25 Aron 1950: 9. Similarly, from a Marxist perspective, see Hobsbawn 1994: 559.  
26 Laswell and Daniel 1965: v. See also Wintrop 1992: 465-468; Jackson 2000: 133. 
27 On Pluralism and the influence on Western and particularly American Political 
Science, see Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 13-23; Schmidt 2002: 15-18. 
28 Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 23. 
29 Polsby 1960; Dahl 1961; Smith 2006: 26. 
30 Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 43. The same logic has been applied to the study of the 
state’s position vis-à-vis increasing economic interdependence and globalisation. Philip 
Cerny’s (2010) Neopluralist analysis underlines how sub- and supra-national actors, 
involved in a process of competition and negotiation with one another including the 
state, increasingly shape world politics.  
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policymaking process, each on specific issue areas, thus defining the power 
structure of New Haven – and by extension of the US – as a polyarchy.31  
Despite the theoretical and empirical critique put forth by the Pluralists, the 
central claim of CET has not been fundamentally questioned. Specifically, 
Pluralist positions present four limits. First, their focus on the actual observable 
bargaining process among social groups inevitably leaves aside any analysis of 
those policy outcomes that are not explicitly negotiated and that result from the 
undisputed assumptions of the actors – hence with no or little competition 
involved.32 Second, Pluralism seems ‘to mistake…plurality with pluralism’, as if 
the mere existence of a multitude of actors entails decentralisation of power. In 
this regard, Pluralism downplays the asymmetric power relations existing 
within society and among different interest groups.33 Third, Pluralist theory 
fails to account for policymakers’ actions that are not driven by societal groups 
or interests but by state rulers’ interests or ideology.34 Simply put, the role of 
state leaders as autonomous actors cannot be fully portrayed by Pluralist 
theories. Finally, the analysis offered by Pluralist authors to demonstrate the 
empirical absence of an elite does not dispel all the doubts. According to Dahl’s 
own analysis, political leaders exert a constant and relatively high influence on 
policy, a point that is consistent with CET claims.35  
Further, the Pluralist critique points in the direction of a more general and 
persisting misunderstanding regarding CET and its original formulations, 
summarised by Meisel’s description of elites as characterised by ‘the three C’s: 
group consciousness, coherence, and conspiracy’.36 However, CET sustains that 
elites are inevitable, not that elites are always cohesive and unified.37 Notably, 
Pareto stated that ‘the governing class is not a homogenous body’ and that ‘they 
hold no meetings where they congregate to plot a common accord’.38 As 
Ferdinand Kolegar notes, the elite ‘is a social category rather than a genuine 
                                                
31 Dahl 1961: 1. 
32 Schattschneider 1960; Lukes 2005; Smith 2006: 28. 
33 Smith 2006: 27-30. 
34 Krasner 1978: 31. 
35 Dahl 1961: 90-91; Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 19. 
36 Meisel 1962: 4. 
37 Zuckerman 1977: 33; Mann 1993: 50-51; Higley and Burton 2006: 4-5.  
38 Pareto 1935: §2254. 
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group’.39 Hence, elites’ cohesion, coherence and conspiracy are variables, not 
constants. Unified and cohesive domestic elites are historically rare since they 
are the product of either political settlements between former warring or 
conflicting elites or the result of a long-term process of political convergence 
between domestic political actors.40  
The question is not whether an elite defined as a social category exist but what 
forces shape social stratification and what elite groups are established as a 
consequence. Where CET sees social stratification as the result primarily of 
groups hold on social power and organisational specialisation, Marxist theories 
stress the role played by economic structures and class differences as the key 
drivers of social stratification. Importantly for this study, where CET authors 
focus primarily on the governing elite or political class,41 Marxism relegates the 
state to an instrumental role, acting as a tool not of the political class running 
state institutions but of the ruling class controlling the means of production.42  
Marxist analyses present two sets of problems. On the one hand, both Pluralist 
and Statist authors criticise Marxism for reducing social competition and 
conflict to economic cleavages. Multiple cleavages instead operate and shape 
groups formation, identity and interests.43 On the other hand, more recent 
Marxist formulations of the state take into account the relative autonomy of 
political actors from economic actors and forces. Ralph Miliband already 
acknowledged that the state – recte the state elite – is driven also by interests not 
originating in society or by capitalism.44 This point is further developed by 
structural Marxists. While underscoring the state’s key role in sustaining the 
capitalist system, they recognise the state’s relative autonomy from the 
economic upper class whilst still performing a key function in the long-term 
working of the capitalism mode of production.45 Notably, Nicos Poulantzas 
                                                
39 Kolegar 1967: 357. 
40 Higley and Burton 2006: 3-4, 21-22. See also Aron 1950: 10, 141.  
41 The terms governing elite and political class are used respectively by Pareto and 
Mosca. 
42 Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 209; Hay 2006: 61. On instrumentalist views, see Mills 
1956; Domhoff 1967; Miliband 1969, 1970, 1973, 1983. 
43 Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 59; Krasner 1978: 26 
44 Miliband 1969; 1977: 87; Hay 2006: 71. 
45 Krasner 1978: 25; Hay 2006: 62. 
                     84 
recognises that the state is a relatively autonomous entity and the fact that the 
ruling class and the political governing class do not coincide.46 More recently, in 
his Strategic Relational Approach (SRA), Bob Jessop rephrases the relative 
autonomy of the state by stressing the dependency of the state on the wider 
society in material terms whilst acknowledging its operational autonomy. As 
Jessop argues, ‘although the state apparatus has its own distinctive resources 
and power, which underpin its relative autonomy, it also has distinctive 
liabilities or vulnerabilities and its operations depend on resources produced 
elsewhere in its environment’.47   
The analysis conducted so far has underscored two elements. First, the CET 
central claim of social stratification represents an ‘ontological given’ that is not 
fundamentally questioned by contending theories of the state once the plurality 
of elites is taking into account. Second, not all political and state dynamics can 
be reduced to economic drivers and actors. The state elite enjoys at minimum 
relative autonomy.  
 
 
Political Elites 
The debate between Elite, Pluralist and Marxist positions led to more detailed 
analyses of the plurality of cleavages and elites characterising modern societies. 
The plural character of domestic elites is stressed particularly by functionalist 
elite research, which explicitly focuses on the different types of elites 
characterising modern societies.48 While accepting the inevitability of social 
stratification, functionalists have criticised CET for not fully addressing the fact 
that such a process affects different segments of society producing different 
types of elites.49  
                                                
46 Poulantzas 1972: 246-247; 1973. 
47 Jessop 2008: 6. 
48 Hartmann 2007: 3, 21. 
49 Functionalist works focus on three different aspects: the difference between 
separated or functionally different elite types (Dahrendorf 1959; Keller 1963; Giddens 
1974: 4-8, 12; Hartmann 2007: 28); sub-elite groups or dynamics (Aron 1950: 9; Mills 
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In order to reconcile the more parsimonious CET framework with the richer 
functionalist differentiations, I will follow Guido Dorso’s suggestion to 
ameliorate Mosca’s definitions by distinguishing between the ruling elite and 
the political elite in order to differentiate political power from economic power, 
thus reconciling CET with both neo-Marxist and Statist conclusions over the 
autonomy – albeit relative – of the state from economic structures and ruling 
classes.50 The ruling elite represents the broad, composite category including 
individuals exerting asymmetrical influence over societies thanks to their 
command of the key sources of social power, including economic, ideological, 
military, and political leaders.51  
While the ruling elite defines the more general category of individuals that 
exert ‘social influence’ over society, the term political (or state) elite will identify 
exclusively ‘that part of the ruling class [i.e. elite] that has strictly political 
functions’.52 The following study will take the latter subset of the ruling elite, i.e. 
state or political elites, as its object of inquiry.53 The analysis of political elites is 
preferred on three grounds. First, political elites can be distinguished from 
other elites on the basis of the autonomy – albeit relative – of political power 
from other forms of power, which results from the support provided by non-
elite groups and the control of state institutions by political elites.54 Second, 
members of the political elite are ultimately responsible for a state’s decision to 
                                                
1956: 6; Kornhauser 1960); and, the link between elites and economic-class structures 
(Mills 1956; Stammer 1965). 
50 On the need to differentiate between political and economic power, see Aron 1950: 
16, 130; Skocpol 1979: 26; Mann 1986. 
51 Dorso 1947: 127; Putnam 1976: 21-44. On political, economic, military and 
ideological power as the main sources of social power, see Mann 1986: 2, 10-27. For 
instance, Dye (2002: 207-208) lists roughly 6.000 individuals in the US under what is 
here defined as the ruling elite. Albeit substantial, they still represent a tiny minority 
of the wider American society. 
52 Dorso 1949: 127, my translation. See also Mills 1956: 11, 366 fn.6; Higley and Burton 
2006: 7. Note that Dorso uses Mosca’s terms political class (classe politica) and ruling 
class (classe dirigente). However, I prefer the term ‘elite’ in order to avoid the strictly 
economic connotation that the term ‘class’ has acquired. In this regard, see Mills 1956: 
277; Mann 1986: 24-25.  
53 Hence in this paper, unless specified, the term elite will not refer to the following 
categories: economic elites or transnational economic elite groups (Van der Pijl 1998); 
supranational set of politically or economically influential leaders forming a global 
power elite (Rothkopf 2008); or epistemic communities (Haas 1992). 
54 Aron 1950: 16, 130; Poulantzas 1972: 246-247; Mann 1986. On leadership as relational, 
see Ahlquist and Levi 2011: 5.  
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authorise the use of force and, more generally, for the definition of state 
objectives.55 Third, from a sociological perspective, political elites represent a 
social category that can be distinguished from both wider society, given the 
restricted social composition of the former, and the broader ruling elite, 
particularly in more institutionalised and democratic settings where a separate 
class of professional politicians exists.56 Thus, the term political elite identifies 
the social category encompassing the holders of top political positions, 
including members of a state’s government and of legislative assemblies, as 
well as those organised actors involved in the competition for political power 
and operating through existing institutions and selection processes, such as 
party leaders.57 The term ‘counter-elite’, on the contrary, will identify those 
groups formed by contenders for state power that are excluded from political 
institutions and their official selection mechanisms but that are in control of 
significant non-elite support and other sources of social power (military, 
ideological, economic).  
Although executive leaders exert asymmetric influence over the decision-
making process compared to the rest of political elite members, this study will 
examine broader political elite dynamics for two reasons.58 First, non-executive 
members of the political elite play an influential role in terms of the provision of 
policy input, influence over non-elite groups, and the implementation of 
decisions. Particularly within democracies, not only presidents and cabinet 
ministers but also members of legislatures may exert significant influence on 
foreign policy, as exemplified by the role played by US Congressmen.59 Second, 
as underscored by Robert Jervis, the arguments adduced to question the 
importance of leaders in explaining foreign policy decisions rest on three 
elements: ideological homogeneity; socialisation; constraints on leaders.60 Elite 
                                                
55 Krasner 1999: 7; Morgenthau 1985: 119.  
56 Putnam 1976: 37; Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007: 822-824. As noted by Dye (2002: 
55-96), most US political leaders, including both Congressmen and former presidents 
such as Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton, do not originate from well-off families. In this 
regard, as Lerner et al. (1996) argue, differences in terms of race and gender are more 
significant. For studies of the American upper class, see Burch 1981; Domhoff 1983; 
Dye 2002. 
57 Putnam 1976: 14; Higley and Burton 2006: 7; Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007: 829. 
58 Blondel and Müller-Rommel 2007: 822.  
59 Carter and Scott 2009; Marshall and Prins 2011. 
60 Jervis 2013: 155-156. 
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dynamics matter exactly because they help contextualise leaders’ decisions as 
they shape the immediate ideological, social, and relational context that 
influences and constrains leaders’ decisions both prior to and after taking office. 
In particular, the broader political elite represents the immediate relational 
context from which leaders can extract political support and from which 
contenders emerge. Importantly, other political elite members represent the first 
competitors for political power that leaders face. It is a contest where political 
actors strive to gain and maintain the support and allegiance of non-elite 
groups in order to gain or preserve their political power.61  
By focusing on political elites, this approach differentiates itself from two 
contending explanatory frameworks. First, it looks primarily at state leaders as 
political elite members not as bureaucratic actors, thus differentiating itself 
from the Bureaucratic Political Paradigm (BPP) explaining policy outcomes via 
the process of negotiation and competition involving bureaucratic actors.62 
According to this approach, the organisational position of the actors involved 
determines their policy stance as well as their perceptions and the power 
resources available to each actor.63 As a result, the executive leader acts as the 
receptor of inputs generated by the cabinet, administrative units, and their 
experts.64 Examining executive leaders as members of the political elite, 
however, allows for the overcoming of the main shortcomings of the BPP by 
taking into account three important elements left aside by it: the role played by 
common political values that inform political elite members’ action;65 the way in 
which domestic political competition affects policy decisions;66 and, the role 
played by party leaders and Congressmen.67 
Second, this approach questions the model of state action offered by 
Neoclassical Realism. As noted in Chapter 1, the additive model used by 
Neoclassical Realism – adding intervening domestic variables to the initial 
                                                
61 Mosca 1923: §I.2.1; Higley and Burton 2006: 4. 
62 Allison 1971; Allison and Halperin 1972; Halperin 1974. 
63 Welch 1992: 128. 
64 Krasner 1978: 27.   
65 Ball 1974: 92; Freedman 1976: 445-449. 
66 Art 1973: 467, 486. 
67 Freedman 1976. 
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systemic pressures – necessarily means that the entire edifice of Neoclassical 
Realism rests on Neorealist assumptions about state motives.68 In particular, 
restricting the analysis to the FPE, i.e. exclusively to the members of political 
elite dealing with foreign policy formulation, may be both problematic and 
misleading. On the one hand, it runs the risk of leaving aside the role played by 
important political actors, such as Congressmen.69 On the other hand, by 
defining the relevant political actors as part of the FPE an assumption is made 
that their key concern is the ‘national interest’ and foreign policy. Yet, members 
of the FPE are political actors competing with other political actors for state 
power, leadership, partisan gains, and influence. Similarly, FPE members are 
subject to the influence and pressures of the political actors to whom they owe 
their position. For these reasons, partisan politics matters in the formulation of 
foreign policy.70 Hence, reducing the scope of state leaders’ action to national 
interest calculations runs the risk of leaving an important dynamic out of the 
explanatory framework. As John Lewis Gaddis notes with regard to the 
limitation of paradigms offered by both IR and International History on the 
Cold War,  
[s]omehow, in our preoccupation with archives, theory, quantification, 
methodology, and historiography, we’ve lost sight of something 
Presidents Roosevelt and Truman never forgot: that they operated 
within a highly contentious domestic political environment from which 
they could rarely insulate the conduct of foreign policy.71  
As a result, we need to treat political leaders as politicians first and foremost. 
 
 
Political Elites and Power 
A focus on political elites is a focus on the primacy of political interests. As both 
Mosca and Pareto underscore in their works, members of the elite act in order 
to preserve their position within their societies. Specifically, political elites’ 
                                                
68 Fordham 2009: 253. 
69 Schwartz 2009; Trubowitz 2011. 
70 Schwartz 2009: 189. 
71 Gaddis (2000: x) quoted in Logevall 2004: 494-495. 
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action is aimed at the preservation of their political power. As Thomas 
Schwartz argues, members of the political elite are ‘ambitious people seeking 
office for individual recognition, career advancement, and the power to affect 
societies’.72 As political power is always contested, the minimal objective 
driving political elites is to stay in power. Krasner provides a minimalist 
account in this regard, by sketching a ‘homo politicus’ that nonetheless is 
sufficient for the purpose of this study.73 It is a useful simplification: political 
elite members may pursue different objectives, but the preservation of their 
power position – or the acquisition of political power – is a quintessential 
precondition for any other action. Whether this translates within democratic 
settings in actual office-seeking, policy-seeking, or vote-seeking behaviour by 
various factions or parties depends on short-term situational factors as well as 
on the interplay of political, institutional and economic factors.74  
Therefore, the theory of state presented here is consistent with the central role 
assigned by recent theories to the compatibility of policymakers’ decisions with 
their interest in securing their own political position, primarily selectorate 
theory defined by Bueno de Mesquita et al. and Mintz’ polyheurstic theory. For 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., it is possible to assume that every political action 
made by leaders will be ‘intended by them to be compatible with their desire to 
retain power’.75 According to Mintz, in choosing a policy, executive leaders 
follow a two-stage process whereby leaders ultimately choose a policy in terms 
of the national interest after having discarded options that would be costly in 
terms of domestic support.76  
Taking into account the role played by domestic political considerations is the 
key to better situating the decisions of political leaders. In particular, the role 
played by domestic politics in US foreign policy formulations has been 
                                                
72 Schwartz 2009: 177. 
73 On Krasner’s definition of a ‘homo politicus’ and a critique, see Katzenstein 2013: 
141. 
74 Muller and Strom 1999. For instance, given the role played by ideologies in 
legitimising and mobilising political support, specific identitary policies may result 
from both policy-seeking and vote-seeking behaviour. 
75 Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 9. 
76 Mintz 2004.  
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repeatedly stressed.77 However, both selectorate and polyheuristic theories 
present significant limits on the study of foreign policy in general and 
intervention in particular. On the one hand, in contrast to polyheuristic theory’s 
expectations, policymakers often pursue high-risk international political 
adventures.78 Leaders care about their state’s international position yet it is not 
fully clear when change abroad is likely to trigger these high-risk responses. In 
addition, policy formulation can hardly be conceived as a two-stage process 
where leaders ultimately define what they consider to be in the national 
interest. In this regard, polyheuristic theory overlooks the way in which 
leaders’ formulation of the national interest itself is shaped by partisan 
considerations and the interests of the ruling coalition.79  
On the other hand, selectorate theory offers a more detailed account of military 
interventions that nonetheless needs further elaboration. Selectorate theory 
stresses the different impact regime differences have on leaders’ decision to use 
force abroad. In democratic regimes, according to Bueno de Mesquita et al., 
leaders tend to be more sensitive to foreign policy failures. The need for public 
policy success for democratic leaders leads to selection effects on the conflicts 
democratic leaders choose. Yet, this presents two problems. First, autocratic 
leaders too can risk their political position and even the collapse of their 
regimes in the aftermath of military defeats or as a result of foreign 
adventurism. Second, as the review of the Liberal position on intervention has 
showed, regime differences do not substantially matter with regard to causes of 
military intervention.80 
In more general terms, what these approaches fail to take into consideration is 
the incentive political elites have to preserve their influence and control over 
both the domestic and international environment which they operate in. 
Similarly to authors within the Realist tradition, CET authors recognise how a 
struggle for power characterises domestic politics, both in democratic and 
                                                
77 For recent contributions in this regard, see Small 1996; Logevall 2004: 490-496; 
Schwartz 2009. 
78 Stern 2004: 110. 
79 Trubowitz 1998; Schwartz 2009. 
80 See Chapter 1: 51-54. 
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autocratic settings, as much as international politics.81 In this regard, I follow 
Trubowitz’ recent contribution in examining foreign policy decision at the 
intersection of both international and domestic politics.82 In doing so, the 
following approach rejects the competing strands assigning analytical priority 
to either international or domestic factors, i.e. that between Neorealist theories 
stressing the role played by international factors (primat der aussenpolitik) and 
those stressing the role played by domestic factors (primat der innenpolitik).83 
When transplanted to IR, the debate has led to a conflation of international 
factors with security concerns and of domestic factors mainly with economic or 
societal interest groups. Having chosen security as the prime mover of state 
action, Neorealism has fallen back on the primacy of international factors, thus 
having to reconcile domestic factors as intervening variables within 
Neoclassical Realism. Yet, in doing so, domestic factors have been added by 
focusing on societal interest groups (the primary focus of Pluralist, not of 
Realist theories of the state), economic factors (the primary focus of Marxist and 
Revisionist account), and ideational factors (the primary focus of Constructivist 
theories), without reconciling the latter with the interests of political leaders. 
This has led to the overlooking of a more basic assumption underlying Realism 
– the autonomy and primacy of the political. It is this autonomy that defines the 
scope of this thesis, and it is this primacy that makes political elites the 
analytical focus of this thesis.  
Therefore, leaders aim at securing their power over both their international and 
domestic settings. Specifically, an elite’s power is intended in terms of an elite’s 
ability to control both its domestic and international environment and the actors 
that populate them.84 The link between domestic and international power stems 
from two dynamics. First, foreign policy and military success abroad and, even 
more so, foreign policy failures and military defeats damage the position and 
credibility of leaders at home and often irremediably weaken it.85 More 
                                                
81 Morgenthau 1985; David 1998: 84. 
82 Trubowitz 2011: 4. 
83 For an overview of the origin and key aspects of the debate between these two 
approaches, see Simms 2003. For the relevance of this debate within IR and Realism, 
see Zakaria 1992; Rose 1998; Trubowitz 2011: 2-3. 
84 On social power as the ‘… ability to pursue and attain goals through mastery of one’s 
environment’, see Mann 1986: 6. 
85 Trubowitz 2011: 3-6, 17-18. 
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importantly, as I will indicate in the following sections, elites’ international and 
domestic power positions are inextricably linked. 
 
 
Coercion and Consent 
In order to maintain their position, political elite members need to secure the 
allegiance of non-elite strata. As recognised within the elite theory literature, 
elites acquire meaning only with regard to non-elite groups that are willing to 
accept the position of the former. Simply put, ‘[l]eadership is relational; one 
cannot be a leader without followers’.86 The link existing between elites and the 
social types they represent led Mosca to underscore the fact that society exerts 
significant influence over their rulers.87 As discussed in more recent elitist 
works, elites ‘must obtain non-elite support for most undertakings’, thus 
limiting the scope of political leaders’ action.88 For this reason, political elites act 
in order to secure the allegiance of their respective societies. Specifically, 
political elite members manage their relationship with society through both 
coercion and consent. 
First, a political elite’s relationship with its society is hierarchical and 
channelled through the coercive apparatus of the state. Military and police force 
can be used directly to suppress revolts and revolutionary attempts. At the 
same time, the possibility of coercion affects the political and strategic calculus 
of counter-elites and society at large, operating as a background tool always 
available to state leaders.89 Notably, the use of military force for internal 
purposes is not confined to autocratic and totalitarian regimes but also 
characterises democratic regimes. For instance, US political leaders have 
                                                
86 Ahlquist and Levi 2011: 5. 
87 Mosca 1923: §I.2.1. 
88 Higley and Burton 2006: 4, 27. 
89 On the pervasive role played by coercion in establishing and securing leaders’ 
political power, see Machiavelli 1988; Stoppino 1968. On the state as claiming the 
monopoly over the use of force, see Weber 1978. For more recent positions in this 
regard, see Skocpol 1979: 29-31; Tripp 2000: 214-215; Ahlquist and Levi 2011. 
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authorised the use of military force for internal purposes with remarkable 
consistency across the 19th and the 20th Century.90  
Second, elites’ position is assured through the consent of non-elite groups.  This 
point has been widely addressed by early thinkers within various philosophical 
and theoretical traditions.91 Within the Realist tradition, Niccolò Machiavelli 
argued that force alone could not sustain leaders’ rule. In this regard, 
Machiavelli suggested the prince not only to be feared but also to be loved.92 
Max Weber distinguished power from authority, with the latter including ‘a 
minimum of voluntarily compliance…an interest (based on ulterior motives or 
genuine acceptance) in obedience’.93 Consent of the ruled and the mechanisms 
through which an elite ensures the former are central to CET’s analysis. As 
Pareto underlines, ‘consent and force appear in all the course of history as 
instruments of governing’.94 Mosca, in particular, developed this point by 
stressing the role played by ‘compliance’ and consent in explaining society’s 
obedience to a particular regime. According to Mosca, political elites try to 
rationalize their rule through a political formula, a set of ideas providing a legal 
basis to their power as well as the legitimating principle of an elite’s political 
order.95  
                                                
90 David Adams (1995) shows that on average US federal troops and the National 
Guard have been employed for internal security duties nearly 18 times per year across 
the selected timeframes (1886-1895, 1921-1935; 1943-1990).  
91 David Hume (1985: 32) argues that ‘[n]othing appears more surprising…than the 
easiness with which the many are governed by the few; and the implicit submission, 
with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers. 
When we enquire by what means this wonder is effected, we shall find, that, as force is 
always on the side of the governed, the governors have nothing to support them but 
opinion’. Similarly, within the Marxist tradition, Antonio Gramsci argued that 
domination rests on both coercion and consent yet with different degrees in different 
societies. According to Gramsci (2001), the ruling class exerts hegemony, sustained by 
civil society (e.g. Church, schools, etc.), when the subordinate class shares the values of 
the dominant class as if they were inevitable, thus becoming ‘common sense’. See also 
Femia 1975; Abercrombie et al. 1980: 12; Hay 2006: 69-70. 
92 Machiavelli 1988: Ch.17, Ch.19. 
93 Weber 1978: 212, 941-946. 
94 Pareto 1935: §2251, §2257. 
95 Mosca 1923: §I.3.1. For a contemporary use of the concept of the political formula 
within elite studies, see see Lasswell and Kaplan 1950: 126-133; Higley and Burton 
2006. 
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At a macro-level, the political formula represents the principle of sovereignty.96 
Elites need to rationalise their claims to power and their associated political 
order to transcend a situation of perpetual warfare at home, with these 
rationalisations representing the ‘claim to authority’ over non-elite groups.97 At 
a micro-level, the political formula is a legitimating principle of an elite’s 
power, yet not simply a ‘mystification’ or an invention to secure obedience.98 As 
noted also by Michels, the political formula represents a ‘constant fact’ related 
to a human need to rule and be ruled on the basis of some ‘general ethical 
principle’.99 Similarly to authors such as Karl Mannheim and Gramsci, Mosca 
stresses that political formulas and ideologies are the product of specific 
historical and national settings. They are not universally valid per se but inform 
nonetheless leaders’ mental schemes and their perceptions of their power 
position.100 In this sense, Mosca’s political formula is coincident with C.J. 
Friedrich’s definition of ideology as a ‘set of ideas related to existing social and 
political order and aimed at changing or defending it’.101 In other words, 
political ideologies matter in shaping political elites’ position and policies 
aimed at securing the latter.102 From this perspective, the creation and 
management of political consensus represents a central task for members of the 
political elite.103 Yet, from an elite perspective, not all ideas matter, but just those 
ideas that can mobilise political support, strengthen the elite’s role, and either 
legitimise or contest an elite’s political order.104  
The political formula represents the set of fundamental principles of political 
order that the political elite recognises and accepts. It is by definition a 
composite concept, framed by consensual yet very broad principles including a 
vast array of different positions. Despite contrasting political platforms, both 
incumbent factions and opposition groups belonging to the same political elite 
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accept the legitimacy of the general political formula. On the contrary, counter-
elites explicitly profess an alternative political formula legitimising their own 
claim to the state. In order to differentiate between the consensual and 
conflicting elements within the same elite, we might then distinguish between 
the general political formula characterising the overall political elite’s 
relationship with society and the specific political formula or platform on which 
a certain faction or coalition within the political elite bases its consensus. While 
different factions within the elite accept the general principles of the formula, 
they might centre their political platforms on specific ideational subsets that 
both help define the identity of these coalitions and rally political support from 
non-elite groups.  
For instance, in the American case the general political formula is represented 
by Liberal-democratic principles informing US leaders’ views on: legitimate 
political order (democracy); socio-economic order (market economy); and, the 
US role in world affairs (US exceptionalism).105 This is not to say that certain 
dimensions of the American formula have not shifted over long periods of time 
or that there were not significant differences among US elite factions.106 Both 
general and specific political formulas mirror the subset of ideas that matter for 
the elite coalitions struggling for political power in specific historical 
timeframes. However, the concept of the political formula allows taking into 
account both the consensual elements within American political ideology and 
US leaders’ vision of the country’s role abroad. In doing so, it is possible to take 
into account, to use Arne Westad’s words, ‘…the remarkable consistency with 
which the U.S. foreign policy elite has defined the nation’s international 
purpose over the past three to four generations’.107 This point is also picked up 
within the sociological literature. In his study of the American ruling elite, Dye 
notes the consensus existing within the US elite on basic ideas of socio-political 
                                                
105 On the Liberal foundations of the American formula, see Hartz 1955. For a critique 
and re-evaluation of Hartz’ argument, see Abbott 2005; Desch 2007/2008; Hulliung 
2010. On US exceptionalism, see Brands 1998; Monten 2005. 
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Hunt 1987; Smith 1993; Mead 2002; Katzenstein 2013. 
107 Westad 2000: 553-554. On the common Liberal ideological framework informing US 
foreign policy, see also Monten 2005; Kagan 2006; Desch 2007/2008. 
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order as limited government and private enterprise.108 As Moore and Mack 
have found, while different members of the US political elite hold different 
ideas on the use of force in specific foreign policy issues, over time these 
differences are not significant and, importantly, they tend to co-vary.109  
By distinguishing between the general formula and the specific platform of an 
elite faction, it is also possible to take into account both the consensual 
ideological elements underlying elites’ beliefs and the ideological expression of 
elite factionalism. As noted in the previous sections, political elites’ cohesion is 
variable. This in turn varies according to ideological but also changing patterns 
of relations among elite members. The cohesion of an elite is lower in cases of 
increased ideological polarisation and in the absence of thick elite relations. On 
the contrary, cohesion increases as a result mainly of two processes: via a 
process of political convergence, as exemplified by the gradual rapprochement 
by Christian Democrats and the Communist Party in Italy during the Cold War; 
or via political settlements resulting from recent conflicts or the threat of 
renewed civil conflict forcing elite groups to come to a common 
understanding.110 However, even in the case of cohesive elites, the attempt by 
elite members to maintain their power position and the contemporary drive for 
power among political actors fuels elite factionalism.  
 
 
Domestic Elite Politics 
Driven by the need to secure coercive tools and maintain their authority, elites 
are interested in controlling state institutions for two reasons. First, institutions 
provide elites with state power hence the ability to mobilise material resources 
and coercive tools to control and shape both their own societies and the 
international arena in which they operate.111 Second, institutions stabilise a 
                                                
108 Dye 2002: 209. 
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134. For recent overviews of the role played by institutions in this regard, see 
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political elite’s rule by legitimising and extending the political elite’s formula to 
an entire community, thus making elites’ rule more acceptable to non-elite 
groups.112  
Given the advantages offered to elite groups by institutions, the control of state 
institutions represents a key objective of elites’ action.113 Specifically, the 
struggle for the control of state institutions represents the main driver of the 
process of ‘elite circulation’.114 As Pareto famously noted, history is nothing 
more than a ‘graveyard of aristocracies’ holding the remains of once powerful 
elites.115 Pareto distinguished three types of circulation of elite: first, the entry of 
non-elite individuals to the elite stratum; second, the inner circulation between 
different factions of the political elite; third, the creation of new (counter) elite 
groups in the non-elite stratum engaging the existing elite in a struggle for 
power.116 The first process is shaped by people’s ‘natural passion for power’, 
driving individuals to access the elite strata and the countervailing attempts of 
existing elite members to preserve their power.117  
On the contrary, the struggle for the control of state institutions represents a 
key political mechanism fuelling the more consequential competitions taking 
place at the other two levels: first, the attempts by opposition factions within 
the elite to take control of governmental positions via institutionalised channels 
set by the polity to select its governing elite; second, the attempts by counter-
elites excluded from political power to take control of state institutions, as in the 
cases of revolutions or secessionist conflicts.118 In this regard, the leadership of 
revolutionary and secessionist groups constitutes a counter-elite making an 
alternative claim for either the entire state or sections thereof and aiming to 
supplant existing political leaders. As Mosca notes, even in revolutionary 
processes when masses play a major role in overthrowing a political elite, a new 
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organised minority originating from the leadership of the revolutionary groups 
will emerge to take over the state.119 Importantly, counter-elites may lead to the 
creation of a state within the legal state and thus to the condition described by 
Tilly as ‘multiple sovereignty’ characterising the internal conflicts examined in 
this study.120  
As the previous analysis highlights, state institutions favour some actions and 
groups instead of others, that is the political elite that controls them and, in 
particular, the elite faction that temporarily runs the state’s executive bodies. In 
this sense, state institutions are not neutral as they embody specific elite 
interests and ideas.121 The state embodies ‘distinctive ideas of social order’ and 
of domestic arrangements between groups that are the result of past conflicts.122 
Therefore, from an elite perspective, political regimes represent specific 
arrangements determining power relations both among elite members and 
between elite members and non-elite groups.123 In particular, political regimes 
are defined by three co-constitutive elements: a political formula setting the 
boundaries of legitimate political action;124 ‘selection institutions’ regulating the 
contest for political power, that is the circulation of elite among existing and 
new elite factions;125 and, a specific elite structure giving ‘sociological content’ to 
the overall institutional framework.126 The latter refers to the characteristics of 
the actual elite members running state institutions and the pattern of relations 
established by elite members within the same regime. As Aron notes, ‘the real 
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nature of a constitutional system […] can only be understood when the men 
who in fact operate the system are taken into account’. Further, Aron stresses 
the need to take into account the structure of the elite, in other terms ‘the 
relationship between the groups exercising power, [and] the degree of unity or 
division between these groups’.127 In this sense, the forms and functioning of the 
regimes vary according not only to political formulas and selection mechanisms 
but also to ‘the prevailing mode of elite interaction’.128 For instance, from an 
elitist perspective, democratic regimes are defined by three elements: a 
democratic political formula ‘specifying which institutions – political parties, a 
free press, and so forth – are legitimate’;129 a selection mechanism of the political 
elite based on regular, free and open elections;130 and, consensually united 
political elites, where no single faction dominates the other and where both 
formal and informal ‘networks of communication and influence’ exist between 
the various elite factions.131  
Such a perspective on state institutions highlights two important consequences 
for the study of elites and military intervention. First, it helps specify the elite 
dynamics that are central to domestic regimes, hence shaping the decision-
making process taking place within them: political formulas, the process of elite 
selection and circulation, and the pattern of elite relations. Second, an elitist 
perspective rests upon the causal priority of elites and the political imperatives 
driving their actions. Elite characteristics and dynamics ‘predate’ the associated 
regime, since elites establish, shape and provide sociological content to the 
regime.132 For the same reasons, elite change analytically predates regime 
change as regimes vary according to their new elite’s formula, preferred 
selection institutions and structure. As a consequence, personnel and leadership 
change may have a significant impact even when not accompanied by formal 
institutional change. In terms of the study of military intervention, this stresses 
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the importance of looking at how intervention affects the political personnel 
rather than the formal political institutions of the target state.133 
 
 
International Elite Politics 
Political elites operate in both their domestic and international environment. In 
this regard, their power position is affected not only by the circulation of elites 
taking place within their own polity but also by the opportunities and 
challenges arising from the international sphere. Specifically, domestic change 
and internal conflicts in other polities have both a direct and indirect influence 
over the circulation of elites at home. As I will demonstrate in this section, the 
interplay of elite dynamics at both levels begets the systemic incentives shaping 
elites’ policies towards domestic change abroad and, in particular, the 
‘sustained interest in each other’s domestic affairs’ leading policymakers to 
‘interfere in each other’s domestic politics’ highlighted by Buzan.134 
In general terms, the elite dynamics highlighted in the previous section – 
political formulas, power competition, and elite relations – are affected by the 
opportunities offered at the international level. First and foremost, foreign 
actors can strengthen elites’ hold over state institutions and their societies. As 
underscored by Mastanduno et al. in their efforts to outline a Realist theory of 
state action, policymakers’ decisions reflect the twofold competition taking 
place at the domestic and international level, hence they take into account the 
material and ideational resources available in both arenas. Importantly, 
policymakers can uphold their domestic position by relying on external sources 
to strengthen both their coercive tools and their legitimacy: by collecting 
material resources and support from other states (external extraction); and, by 
reinforcing their domestic status and legitimacy through diplomatic and 
political relations with other elites (external validation). The latter consists of 
‘attempts by state officials to utilize their status as authoritative international 
                                                
133 In this sense, an elite perspective distances itself from works on the subject of 
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representatives of the nation-state to enhance their domestic political 
positions’.135 External validation can be derived also from establishing relations 
with foreign elite groups whose rule is predicated upon a similar political 
formula and foreign counter-elites that share the elite’s formula. As pointed out 
by Fred Halliday, social cohesion rests also on a dominant ideology ‘[b]ut for an 
ideology to be dominant it must not just be instilled into a society by those with 
power within it, but also reinforced from outside by an appearance of 
naturalness’.136 Second, cohesion among elite factions at the domestic level can 
be strengthened by the presence of common external foes as well as of common 
allied elite groups providing incentives for increased elite cohesion.137 
Importantly, the pattern of relations established by elite groups at the 
international level may reinforce the cohesion between the latter and foreign 
elites.   
For the same reason, external factors can negatively affect all three dimensions 
of an elite’ regime. Importantly, the process of elite circulation is more likely 
when an incumbent elite’s grip on state coercive means or its legitimacy become 
contested. First, given the twofold nature of political elites as both international 
and domestic actors, elites’ claims can hardly be confined to the domestic 
sphere. Principles of domestic political order inform foreign policy values and a 
state’s national purpose abroad.138 For example, Liberal principles inform 
political institutional order at home as well as US leaders’ views of the specific 
role for America in world affairs. Related to this, principles of political order 
can be – or claim to be – universal, hence they can apply to different polities; 
and, importantly, political principles can question the validity of other types of 
political order. For example, Communism questioned the validity of Liberal-
democratic and capitalist systems. At the same time, even non universalistic 
principles can question the authority claim of an elite. For example, nationalist 
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elites can question both the legitimacy of imperial orders and extend a claim of 
authority over foreign territories inhabited by kin ethnic groups.  
Second, the relative position of domestic elites can be affected by the erosion of 
state resources in external military actions or by the provision of external 
support to internal counter-elite groups.139 In particular, in cases of internal 
conflict, the military balance between the two contenders can be altered by both 
the indirect and direct military intervention of an external actor in favour of 
either the government or the rebels. In these cases of ‘domestic anarchy’, 
international and domestic political struggle become inextricably connected, 
revealing both the international projection of elite groups fighting for the state 
and the domestic projection of external elite groups intervening in internal 
conflicts.140 Third, domestic elite cohesion may be reduced in times of 
impending threats in cases where ideological polarisation, limited resources 
and the different distributional effects of various policies lead elite factions 
towards different policy solutions and increased elite divergence.141 
In particular, domestic change abroad can either strengthen or weaken an elite’s 
hold over its domestic and international position. First, the emergence of 
foreign elite and counter-elite groups abroad holding antithetic and competing 
political formulas may challenge the legitimacy of incumbent elites: antithetic 
formulas contest the claim to authority of an elite over the entire polity; 
competing formulas contest the claim to authority of an elite at the international 
level or over segments of the populations that do not belong to an elite’s main 
ethnic group. On the one hand, as underscored by both Aron and Owen, what 
is particularly threatening for an elite is the emergence of counter-elite groups 
abroad promoting antithetic and exportable political formulas, that is formulas 
that explicitly challenge the legitimacy of an elite’s order by calling for an 
alternative political order that can appeal to domestic groups.142 For instance, 
the French and Russian revolutionary principles represented a direct threat to 
the legitimacy of European absolute monarchies and of capitalist governments 
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respectively. On the other hand, an elite’s legitimacy and influence can be 
questioned by the emergence of elite and counter-elite groups expressing 
competing claims over specific territories. For instance, during the 19th Century, 
Austrian authority over its regions in the Italian peninsula was challenged by 
competing Italian nationalist and irredentist claims, which in turn served the 
purpose of strengthening the legitimacy of the newly established Italian 
political elite. At the same time, competing formulas can question an elite’s 
claim over territories and preferred regional orders to which elites attach 
particular political value. In the abovementioned example, irredentist claims 
were central to the Italian elite’s legitimacy and leadership role in the peninsula. 
Similarly, the Russian and Iranian revolutions posed a challenge not only to 
neighbouring regimes but also to US visions of post-war order in Europe and 
the Middle East respectively.  
Second, the emergence of new elites abroad through revolutionary or 
secessionist processes affects the scope of external extraction and validation 
available to state elites. They affect the former because successful revolutions 
and secessionist conflicts create new international political actors characterised 
by different foreign policy interests. They affect the latter because successful 
revolutions and secessionist conflicts create a new political elite characterised 
by a new political formula.143 As a result of both dynamics, domestic change 
abroad affects the degree of influence state elites enjoy over foreign states as 
well as the pattern of elite relations across state borders.  
Therefore, elite change abroad produces three systemic consequences. First, it 
affects the relationship existing between the domestic character of the states and 
the international society they form.144 As Halliday argues, the success of 
antithetic elites poses a challenge to ‘the established ideas of statehood and 
sovereignty’, thus opening ‘alternative conceptions of international relations 
themselves’.145 Thus, elite change affects the homogeneity of the international 
system, i.e. the degree of commonality between the principles of legitimacy on 
which domestic regimes are based. This, in turn, has profound for international 
stability as homogenous systems increases the possibility of consensus building 
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and compromise among state elites, since ‘states belong to the same type, [and] 
obey the same conception of policy’.146 On the contrary, in heterogeneous 
systems, consensus is lacking over the appropriate ‘rules of the game’ and the 
‘permissible aims and methods of foreign policy’.147 Second, domestic change 
abroad affects the exchange of resources and validation elites have established, 
thus affecting the alignments and the pattern of alliances in the international 
sphere. Third, domestic change affects the pattern of actual relations elites have 
established. As I will indicate in the next chapter, this relates not only to 
existing alliance patterns but also to the established hierarchical relations elites 
have established. 
To sum up, as summarised in Fig. 2, the interplay between domestic elite 
politics across different polities leads to specific elite dynamics at the 
international level that in turn shape the context in which political elites 
operate.  
 
Figure 2 - From Domestic to International Elite Politics 
Domestic Elite Politics ! International Elite Politics 
Political Formula ! 
Contending Formulas 
(antithetic/competing) 
Elite Circulation ! 
External Threats and Opportunities 
to Elite Power 
Elite Structure ! Elite Relations 
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Importantly, domestic change produces broad systemic consequences that 
shape elites’ interests in the utility of military intervention to fence off an 
unfavourable domestic change or secure a more favourable elite in the target 
state. 
 
 
Back to Intervention 
Elites act to maintain their political power position in a context where their 
position is actually or potentially under challenge by both internal and external 
rivals. As such, elites act at the juncture of a twofold struggle for power, both 
internal and external, where it is in their interest to influence the power 
competition taking place in both environments. Political leaders’ action is thus 
‘Janus-faced’ given the pressures originating from both domestic and 
international politics and the constant interaction between the two.148 Elites and 
their factions are primarily power-seeking in both the domestic and 
international arena as their power position depends on their ability to secure 
favourable conditions in both arenas. Elites’ action is projected on the 
international sphere not only because their credibility as leaders can be 
questioned by failures abroad but also because their domestic position can be 
affected by domestic change in other polities: indirectly, via decreased 
opportunities for extraction and validation abroad; directly, via the challenge 
posed by new elite groups, their acts of interference or even their 
interventions.149   
As a result, political elites have an incentive to exert control not only over their 
domestic environment but also over the international system since the latter 
presents them with both opportunities and challenges to their power position. 
From a systemic perspective, an international environment characterised by 
antithetic and competing formulas and offering few opportunities for external 
extraction or validation represents an inherently more hostile setting for 
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political elites. Therefore, elites will seek to manage foreign domestic change 
according to their specific interests in support of allied elite groups.  
Notably, cases of internal conflict abroad present political elites with both 
opportunities and threats. On the one hand, internal conflicts provide external 
elites with the opportunity to shape a friendlier international environment as 
well as increase their ability to extract resources and validation from the target 
elite and, in more general terms, secure the emergence of more favourable elites 
in the target state. On the other hand, internal conflicts can endanger an elite’s 
position, by removing local allies or favouring the emergence of rival elite 
groups. In both cases, the provision not only of external validation but also of 
military support to local groups, either via indirect or direct military 
intervention, can alter the balance of power in the target state in ways 
favourable to both the local elite group and the intervening elite. As noted by 
Mosca, foreign countries can affect processes of elite selection abroad by either 
supporting domestic factions in their local struggle or forcibly imposing new 
political elites.150 In this sense, military intervention acts as a policy tool 
available to policymakers to affect the circulation of elites in foreign polities in 
ways favourable to the intervening elite’s domestic and international power 
position. In the next chapter, I examine how these incentives produce the causal 
mechanisms leading political elite members to intervene in internal conflicts.   
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Chapter 3 
When Elites Fight: The Politics of Military Intervention 
 
 
 
Following Little’s suggestion of the necessity for a theory of the state that can 
drive the study of intervention, in the previous chapter I outlined an elite 
theory of the state that will inform the following analysis of the drivers of 
military intervention.1 This provided the opportunity to define a theory of the 
state that could be consistently linked to: basic Realist assumptions; earlier 
attempts to define a Realist theory of state action; and, importantly, to Realist 
insights of the practice of military intervention offered by Morgenthau and 
Krasner. As discussed in the previous chapter, political elites operate in both 
the domestic and international environment to sustain their power position. In 
doing so, their action is influenced by the power competition taking place in 
both arenas.  
In particular, the previous analysis has highlighted the elite dynamics that 
inform elite action across the domestic-international divide: the clash of political 
formulas; the interplay between domestic and international power struggle; the 
pattern of relations across borders between elite and counterelite groups. These 
elite dynamics represent the constant factors shaping both leaders’ ‘sustained 
interest’ in the identity of the political leadership of other polities and the utility 
of military intervention in supporting or forestalling political change abroad.2 
From this perspective, military intervention represents a tool through which 
political elites influence and control the circulations of elites in other societies in 
order shape a more favourable international and domestic political order better 
suited to the maintenance of their power position. 
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In the following chapter, I will examine in greater detail the specific causal 
processes shaped by the elite dynamics highlighted in the previous chapter that 
drive leaders to opt for direct military intervention. For this purpose, I will first 
present the general features of the proposed framework. Second, I will address 
the underlying causal mechanisms shaping leaders’ interventionary processes. 
Third, I will examine the way in which these dynamics coalesce at specific 
junctures into actual decisions to intervene. Finally, I will outline the 
methodological features that will guide the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
 
Elite Politics and the Drivers of Intervention  
The previous chapters have stressed the primary role played by political elites 
as both the key decision-makers and the principal targets of interventions. 
Therefore, this thesis places political elites at the centre of its theoretical 
framework in order to examine the quintessentially political nature of military 
intervention and, specifically, the way intervention is shaped by elite politics.3 
Central to the argument is the observation that military intervention represents 
the tool through which states can influence the circulation of elites abroad, thus 
shaping political change in other polities according to their interests.4 Overall, 
this study puts forth a Realist framework highlighting the constant causal 
processes affecting political elites’ reaction to internal conflicts.  
In doing so, it differentiates itself from the alternative theoretical approaches 
presented in Chapter 1. First, contrary to Marxist and revisionist accounts, it 
gives analytical priority to security and political dynamics instead of economic 
factors.5 Second, contrary to Liberal theories focusing on the specificity of 
democratic interventions, the framework outlined in the thesis applies to 
different types of regime. Like democratic elites, authoritarian leaders need to 
take domestic politics into account; at the same time, they respond to similar 
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external opportunities and challenges.6 In this way, the thesis accepts the 
argument that there is a limited relationship between regime types and practice 
of intervention.7 For the same reason, the thesis differentiates itself from 
Neoclassical Realist works assigning causal effects to state institutions and their 
‘strength’.8 Furthermore, when states intervene with the explicit objective of 
regime change, as in the cases of democracy promotion, an elite perspective 
suggests distinguishing between the public objective of elites’ intervention and 
the concrete actions and results pursued in the target. In this regard, the 
framework highlights both the role played by political formulas and associated 
ideological claims in shaping elites’ public action as well as the need to examine 
the way in which elites use military intervention to secure favourable elites 
rather than favourable democratic institutions.9  
Third, political ideas play an instrumental, if important, role for political elites: 
they matter as far as they help secure or endanger an elite’s claim to legitimate 
authority. In this sense, military intervention results from and exemplifies not a 
‘clash of ideas’ over the best domestic regime (as indicated by Owen) but a 
more prosaic clash of elites not only over foreign societies but also over elites’ 
domestic societies.10 At the same time, the focus of the thesis is on political elites 
rather than top executive leaders and their belief systems.11 This is not to deny 
the asymmetric influence enjoyed by presidents and prime ministers, which as I 
will indicate is particularly relevant at specific junctures, but it is intended to 
better address the broader domestic political setting within which decisions to 
intervene are taken and to take into account the decisions of other influential 
political actors beyond the executive circle.12  
Specifically, as noted in Chapter 2, three dynamics operating across the 
international/domestic divide shape the incentives elites face when confronted 
                                                
6 Waltz 1967a: 306-311; Trubowitz 2011: 31, fn.26. 
7 Chapter 1: 51-54. 
8 Cf. Zakaria 1998; Taliaferro 2006. 
9 As previously noted, interventions aimed at democracy promotion have usually 
achieved limited results in terms of increasing the liberal character of the target state. 
See Chapter 1: 51-54.  
10 Owen 2010a. See Chapter 1: 54-59. 
11 Cf. Saunders 2011. 
12 Chapter 2: 86-87. 
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with domestic change and internal conflict abroad: the clash of political 
formulas; the interplay between the struggle for power at the domestic and 
international level; and, the pattern of elite relations. Specifically, the adopted 
framework highlights how elite dynamics (political formulas, struggle for 
power, elite relations) shape specific instances of intervention. 
By focusing on these three elite dynamics, it is possible to provide a 
comprehensive evaluation of the causal factors driving leaders to opt for 
military intervention. In his seminal study on intervention, Little distinguishes 
theories of intervention focusing on push factors, originating in the intervening 
state itself, and those focusing on pull factors, originating in the target state. For 
instance, according to Little, while Morgenthau stressed how interventions 
responded to states’ interests and motivations, Thucydides underscored the 
role played by domestic factions in the target state in inviting external 
intervention, as in the example of the Plateaian faction inviting Theban forces 
that opened this thesis.13 At closer look, however, both authors recognised the 
role played by push and pull factors: Morgenthau underscored the need for 
external support of Third World countries after decolonisation and local elites’ 
requests for external support, a point further reinforced by historical works of 
the Cold War;14 and, Thucydides noted how Athenian and Spartan 
interventions were driven by the need to secure existing or new allies. In more 
general terms, while heuristically useful, the difficulty in identifying the 
primacy of either push and pull factors point in another direction, that is the 
self-reinforcing dynamics between push and pull factors, hence the need for a 
theoretical framework that can encompass both. Importantly, the link between 
the two sets of factors sheds light on the often under-theorised dimension of the 
direction of military intervention. Policymakers’ do not solely decide whether to 
intervene or not; any decision about intervention is also a decision about whom 
to support or whom to fight. The two decisions develop together and can 
hardly be disentangled. As I will show in the next sections, the proposed 
schema allows shedding light not only on the push and pull factors behind 
intervention but also on the direction of elites’ intervention. Specifically, while 
political formulas affect the direction of military intervention by hampering the 
                                                
13 Little 1975: 3; Jentleson et al. 1992; Introduction: 11. 
14 Notably by Westad 2005; Grow 2008. 
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prospects for cooperation between the intervener and elite groups in the target, 
the struggle for power taking place at both the international and domestic level 
and the pattern of elite relations generate respectively the push and pull factors 
shaping interventionary policy.  
 
 
Political Formulas: Elite Cooperation 
As both Constructivist and Realist works have underscored, ideas play an 
important role in shaping intervention.15 From an elite perspective, the effect of 
political formulas on intervention is twofold: while the political principles 
shaping an elite’s domestic regime inform leaders’ views, the interplay between 
elites’ political formulas at the international level shapes interventions in more 
direct ways. 
Political formulas exert an indirect influence on intervention by shaping the 
belief systems of the members of the political elite concerning both intervention 
and its legitimacy. First, political formulas shape the identity of political agents. 
In this sense it is possible to connect political formulas to Lang’s description of 
military intervention as a political action revealing the ‘national purpose’ and 
political identity of the agent.16 From the elite perspective adopted in this study, 
military intervention mirrors the general formula as well as the more specific 
values shaping the political platform of an incumbent coalition. By clarifying 
what they are willing to support via the use of force, state leaders make explicit 
in the most forceful way the enemies they want to fight, the allies they seek, and 
the values they stand for, hence strengthening processes of domestic identity 
formation and cohesion. For this reason, military intervention represents a 
starkly political moment when a foreign crisis raises politico-ideological issues 
that resonate with the elite’s general formula or a faction’s specific platform. For 
the same reason, intervention may become a moment of high political 
                                                
15 In this regard, the utility of combining Realist and Constructivist elements in the 
study of intervention has been already noted. See Chapter 1: 64, fn.118.  
16 Lang 2002: 9-12; Finnemore 2003: 2; Chapter 1: 54-59.  
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contestation.17 As exemplified by both US operations in Vietnam and Egypt’s 
operations in Yemen in the 1960s, military interventions abroad can reverberate 
on domestic society in ways that can leave the political fabric of the intervener 
profoundly altered. 
Second, as general political formulas inform the norms and institutions 
considered legitimate at the domestic level, they also shape the kind of norms 
and institutions political leaders consider as legitimate at the international level. 
Following Reus-Smit, it is possible to argue that the political formula is part of 
the complex set of values defining ‘hegemonic beliefs about the moral purpose 
of the state... providing the justificatory foundations for the principle of 
sovereignty and the prevailing norm of pure procedural justice’.18 In particular, 
norms of procedural justice ‘define the cognitive horizons of institutional 
architects’, not only at the domestic but also at the international level.19 In this 
sense, political formulas shape the type of regime elites are likely to publicly 
support when intervening in another polity.20 The combination of both 
dynamics can be seen in US interventions aimed at promoting democracy. In 
general terms, the US political formula helps explain why US leaders tend to 
opt for the promotion of democratic institutions when intervening abroad, 
despite the limits of this practice and the recurrent support offered de facto to 
non-democratic leaders. Importantly, as an expression of ‘America’s own values 
and ideals’, democracy promotion has provided a powerful tool for American 
elites to forge political consensus and foster mobilisation over US 
interventions.21  
While these dynamics influence leaders’ general interventionary policies, the 
clash of political formulas exerts a more direct influence over specific instances 
of intervention. The existing literature has usually focused on the ideological 
clashes arising when elites or counter-elites holding antithetic political formulas 
                                                
17 Lang 2002: 18. 
18 Reus-Smit 1997: 565-566. 
19 Ibid.: 568-569. 
20 Ibid.: 556. See also Goodwin 2001: 12-13; Lang 2002: 18; Chapter 1: 51-54. 
21 Cox et al. 2000: 10. See also Peceny 1999; Lang 2002: 5. 
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emerge and directly threaten existing regimes.22 Notably, antithetic formulas 
represent a direct challenge to an elite’s domestic rule when such formulas exert 
influence over domestic social groups. At the same time, they can pose an 
international challenge when such formulas exert influence on elite and 
counter-elite groups in other states. When both challenges arise, the increased 
political heterogeneity in the system links internal and international conflict, as 
in the case of the Cold War. As Aron notes, increased heterogeneity blurs the 
distinction between ‘enemy state and [domestic] political adversary’, thus 
leading to the exacerbation of internal rivalries.23 In heterogeneous systems, 
[w]hen the enemy appears also as an adversary…defeat affects the 
interests of the governing class and not only of the nation. Those in power 
fight for themselves and not only for the state. ...The adversaries of the 
faction in power become, whatever their stripe, the allies of the national 
enemy.24  
Revolutions, in particular, exacerbate this threat given the validation they offer 
to domestic counter-elite groups. As pointed out by Halliday, ‘revolutions, by 
dint of their example and the ideas they diffuse, undermine the control of 
established states and social orders’.25 Examples are numerous. The French 
revolutionary principles regarding people’s right to directly govern themselves 
and French claims over territories on the bases of popular sovereignty 
represented a direct threat to the legitimacy of European monarchies.26 
Similarly, the Russian Revolution directly challenged the legitimacy of all 
existing capitalist governments and their international treaties. Finally, the 
Iranian Revolution posed a threat to the rule of its neighbouring Sunni or 
atheist regimes given the presence in those countries of significant Shia 
minorities and the support Shia groups received from Teheran.27 In such cases, 
intervention against the revolutionary state directly links international and 
domestic struggles. 
                                                
22 This has been underscored particularly by Owen 2010a. On the counterrevolutionary 
nature of intervention, see Bisley 2004. In addition, Walt (1996) stresses the impact 
revolutions have on perceptions of aggressive intentions.  
23 Aron 1966a: 100-103. See also Morgenthau 1967: 428. 
24 Aron 1966a: 101, emphasis added.  
25 Halliday 1999: 143. A point exemplified by the demonstration effect of the recent 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.  
26 Walt 1996: 56. 
27 Ehteshami 2002: 286-288. 
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Whilst relevant and historically recurrent, these ideologically polarised contexts 
represent an exceptional case of a wider confrontation between elites’ formulas. 
In fact, important instances of intervention take place also in non-ideologically 
polarised contexts where antithetic formulas are absent, as in the case of US 
repeated interventions in Latin America. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter 1, 
ideological clashes and the presence of connections between foreign 
revolutionary elites and domestic counter-elite groups do not per se explain 
cases of military intervention.28 Political formulas exert a significant causal 
effect in specific sets of cases but a more limited causal role in general terms. In 
order to reconcile these two observations, we might hypothesise that both 
antithetic and competing political formulas play a more limited yet still 
important role on the prospects of cooperation between elite groups before the 
decision to intervene is taken. 
First, the possibility of reconciling elite groups based on different political 
formulas will be more difficult the more the two formulas are antithetic, i.e. 
when both explicitly deny the legitimacy and validity of the other. While the 
presence of antithetic political formulas may not suffice to explain the decision 
to intervene, at minimum they will reduce the possibility of cooperation 
between elite groups. In homogenous systems, ruling elites respond to similar 
principles of legitimacy, thus favouring the emergence of a consensus over the 
appropriate ‘rules of the game’ and the ‘permissible aims and methods of 
foreign policy’, which in turn increases the possibility of understanding and 
compromise among elites.29 Simply put, antithetic elites will find it more 
difficult to identify common values and shared rules. For the same reason, they 
will not be interested in supporting elites that profess antithetic claims and that 
could endanger their own power position.  
Second, competing formulas are likely to exert the same effect on elite 
cooperation.30 For instance, as pointed out by Owen, Liberal elites in different 
states do not usually cooperate in the face of direct threats to one’s own 
                                                
28 For instance, Owen’s framework (2010a) leaves aside the repeated cases of US 
interventions in the Caribbean. At the same time, he underscores how TINs are not 
necessary to ignite interventionary reactions. See Chapter 1: 57.  
29 Kissinger 1966: 503. 
30 On the difference between antithetic and competing formulas, see Chapter 2: 102-103. 
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territory. Underlying this phenomenon are not only national security interests 
but also competing claims over the same territory and considerations of status.31 
In particular, competing claims may represent a challenge to the legitimacy of 
an elite’s claim over an external territory. In this case, competing claims will 
reduce the prospect for cooperation between state elites or between elites and 
competing counter-elite groups, such as nationalist movements, as they 
necessarily put them on a collision course over the preferred end state of the 
relevant territory. The prospect for cooperation will be further reduced if such 
ideological claims serve important legitimising functions for political leaders at 
home, as might be the case for nationalist leaders. These claims are crucial not 
only to the identity of the communities that express them but also to the status 
and role of the leadership that sustains them as they can be used by elites to 
mobilise their society in order to strengthen their hold on power. This is 
reinforced when ethnic ties across borders exist that political actors can exploit 
for both domestic and international objectives.32 In more general terms, 
secessionist elite and counter-elite groups represent a direct challenge to an 
elite’s authority over one of its territories or over segments of its social groups, 
as exemplified by Italian irredentist claims over the Austrian Empire’s southern 
regions. The competing Austrian and Italian claims over these territories played 
a legitimising role for both elites, particularly the Italian elite, significantly 
constraining cooperation between Vienna and Rome in 1914 despite the formal 
military alliance linking the two at the time.  
By altering the prospects for cooperation between elites, competing and 
antithetic formulas produce two consequences. First, they reduce the space for 
the peaceful resolution of ongoing crises, thus opening up the possibility for the 
use of force. Second, whilst reducing the possibility of an accommodation 
between antithetic and competing elite groups, they also open up spaces for 
dialogue and cooperation between those elite and counter-elites whose 
ideological claims are consistent or reconcilable. 
 
                                                
31 Owen 1997: 179, 229. 
32 Levy 1989: 270; Saideman 2001; 2011: 278-279; Duffy Toft 2002: 84. In contrast to 
Duffy Toft, I consider claims over territory as relevant when put forth by state elites 
and counter-elites rather than ethnic groups. On the relevance of ethnic ties for US 
foreign policy, see Mullenbach and Matthews 2008. 
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The Struggle for Power: Push Factors 
Whereas political formulas shape the prospect for cooperation between political 
elite members and foreign elite groups, the struggle for power both at the 
international and the domestic level creates a set of powerful incentives driving 
states toward military intervention. As underscored in Chapter 2, I follow 
recent attempts that see political elites’ actions as influenced by both 
international and domestic political objectives. In this regard, military 
intervention represents a useful policy tool in a twofold sense: it is a tool elites 
can use to shape a more favourable interventional environment, including the 
suppression of direct challenges to their domestic position; and it is a tool elite 
factions can use to strengthen their political position at home.  
At the international level, intervention can alter the possibilities of material 
extraction and ideational validation from other polities. In general terms, 
regime change can lead to the reshuffling of alliances due to the increased or 
decreased opportunities of extraction and validation that a new leadership may 
offer.33 For instance, by removing allied elites from power (or taking them to 
power), revolutions reduce (or increase) the possibility of external extraction 
and validation available to foreign states. In addition, new international actors 
may emerge from a secessionist or independence struggle with which external 
elite can establish new political and strategic relations, hence increasing the 
possibility of both external extraction and validation. At the same time, 
leadership change abroad alters the possibility for other states to widen their 
alliance portfolios by easing cooperation between domestic elites and the newly 
established elite. Therefore, military intervention allows external actors to 
secure the position of incumbent allied elite or counter-elite groups either by 
supporting their fight for the state or their secessionist objectives. As a result, 
military intervention is central to the creation of new allies or the protection of 
existing allies from revolutionary or secessionist threats. In this sense, military 
intervention allows states to shape a more favourable balance of power.34  
                                                
33 On the correlation between regime change and the reshuffling of ‘alliance portfolios’, 
see Siverson and Starr 1994: 149-150. 
34 Owen 2010a: 4.  
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For the same reasons, interventions take place in a strategic setting where the 
decision to intervene reflects the actual or potential intervention of other state 
elites. As stressed by Findley and Teo, this interaction with actual and potential 
interveners often leads to cases of multiple interventions in the same internal 
conflict.35 Examples range from cases of concurring interventions, such as the 
allied intervention in the Russian Civil War examined in this thesis, to cases of 
competing interventions, such as Soviet, German and Italian interventions 
during the Spanish Civil War or US support to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan 
after the Soviet intervention in 1979. In these cases, intervention served the 
function of supporting local allies, while confronting and weakening 
international rivals. 
At the domestic level, military intervention can serve two purposes depending 
on the type of elite circulation that is prevalent at a given historical moment. 
When an elite is confronted with an actual or potential counter-elite receiving 
external support, intervention becomes a tool for elite survival. Yet, even in the 
absence of counter-elites, with elite factions struggling within institutionalised 
selection mechanisms, intervention can still represent a tool elites factions can 
use to foster their hold on domestic institutions.  
First, as Machiavelli noted, a leaders’ position can be directly challenged by 
both domestic opponents and external powers.36 Both challenges can coalesce 
when an external elite provides material or political support to internal counter-
elite groups. In this regard, state elites may decide to intervene in order to 
counter the potential or actual threat posed by a foreign elite. Military 
intervention will thus be aimed at removing a threat to one’s own domestic rule 
given the material support and external validation a domestic counter-elite 
receives. Revolutions, in particular, exacerbate this threat given the support 
revolutionary regimes often provide to foreign revolutionary movements, both 
in material terms and in terms of external validation. In addition, nearby 
internal conflicts are likely to produce negative effects on domestic stability 
particularly when nearby regimes are home to similar political, ethnic and 
                                                
35 Findley and Teo 2006. See also Duner 1985: 7; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000: 617; 
Salehyan et al. 2011: 712. 
36 ‘For rulers should have two main worries: one is internal, and concerns his subjects; 
the other is external, and concerns foreign powers’, Machiavelli 1988: 64. For a more 
recent reformulation of this observation within IR, see Trubowitz 2011. 
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social cleavages, thus endangering an elite’s power position.37 In general terms, 
interventions will be more likely when foreign elite and counter-elite groups 
support domestic opponents and when a foreign antithetic or competing 
political formula appeals to domestic groups, thereby fuelling domestic 
tensions.38  
Second, military intervention can still serve elite and factions’ interests by 
providing political payoffs that can strengthen leaders’ political position at 
home. Specifically, elite groups and incumbent factions might opt for foreign 
intervention in order to both increase their domestic support and counter 
domestic opponents.39 Fascist regimes, for instance, forged part of their 
domestic legitimacy in the fight against Communism both domestically and 
internationally, such as during the Spanish Civil War.40 This is more likely 
when the issues ignited by a foreign crisis resonate with core principles of an 
elite’s political formula, thus becoming material for partisan politics. At the 
same time, the control that incumbent factions enjoy over executive institutions 
allow them to use military intervention as a tool to increase their own position 
vis-à-vis competing factions. As I will indicate in the following case studies, 
partisan considerations played an important role in putting military 
intervention on the political agenda. This last function is particularly pressing 
in moments of heightened political competition and when polities select elite 
members via institutionalised channels. Thus, in democratic settings, elections 
are likely to have an effect on the timing of elites’ decisions concerning possible 
interventions.41 For the same reason, securing non-elite support is particularly 
important during such periods.42  
                                                
37 Kathman 2010. For example, the Lebanese Civil War posed a threat to the domestic 
stability of the Syrian regime and, in turn, this shaped Damascus’ decision to intervene. 
See Weinberger 1986. 
38 Walt 1996: 43; Halliday 1999: 257. As Levy (1989: 274) notes, revolutionary outcomes 
may not be imminent or even realistic, yet political elites often overreact to an 
exaggerated revolutionary threat.  
39 On the use of military intervention to mobilise broader domestic support, see 
Halliday 1999: 138-139. 
40 Stone 2005; Preston 2006. 
41 Cf. Gaubatz 1999. 
42 On elites’ need for non-elite support, see Chapter 2: 92-93. 
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While underlining the political function of military intervention and the role 
domestic politics can play, the causal mechanisms originating at the level of 
elite power differ from similar frameworks stressing the link between 
international and domestic factors in explaining decisions over the use of force. 
First, in line with the elite theory of the state outlined in Chapter 2, this thesis 
does not assign primary causal effects to domestic socio-economic actors and 
interest groups. Related to this, it does not take into account the way in which 
military interventions redistribute national resources and income. Although 
political economic considerations matter in the formulation of a state’s ‘grand 
strategy’, this thesis focuses primarily on the political factors pushing elites to 
intervene.43  
Second, while non-elite support matters for elites, this does not mean that 
public opinion directly shapes the decision to intervene. Political elites, in 
particular, play an intervening role with regard to the impact of public opinion 
and its formation. As V.O. Key argues, public opinion matters primarily in 
terms of the perceptions that political leaders hold of the segments of society 
that can shift as a result of elite factions’ positions during elections.44 Moreover, 
political elites play an important role in shaping the views of other elite groups, 
of media representatives, and ultimately of the general public in the initial 
stages of an internal conflict.45 Importantly, disagreements within elites may 
produce divisions within public opinion through the ‘cues’ that elites and 
partisan divisions provide to the public.46 Political leaders can also play a more 
direct informative role about internal conflicts and the possible use of force. For 
instance, the hearings on Vietnam of the US Senate Committee for Foreign 
Relations in 1966 shaped the initial public debate on the conflict by providing 
significant information and cues to the American public.47 In other words, even 
if elite factions strive to mobilise non-elite strata, this should not lead to 
expectations that political leaders will respond automatically to public opinion 
                                                
43 On the role played by political economic factors in grand strategic choices, see 
Narizny 2007; Fordham 1998; Trubowitz 1998, 2011.  
44 Key 1961. 
45 On the supportive relationship between the US press and different US 
administrations in regard to military interventions, see Bennett et al. 2007; Hallock 
2012. 
46 Berinsky 2007. 
47 Small 2005: 65-68. 
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with regard to the decision to intervene. As exemplified also in the case of 
Western humanitarian interventions, political leaders often take the lead 
despite reluctant publics.48 What matters from an elite perspective is whether 
intervention allows elite factions to secure the support not of public opinion 
tout court but of relevant domestic groups whose support is crucial to 
strengthen their political position. 
Third, as discussed in Chapter 2, the importance of leaders’ action abroad stems 
primarily from the need to secure more favourable international and domestic 
environments. In this regard, the credibility and reputation leaders enjoy at the 
international level, albeit important, does not play a primary causal role. What 
matters from an elite perspective is the ability of leaders to use intervention to 
reinforce their position or weaken that of their opponents. For example, 
reputational goals and issues of credibility have been used to explain different 
cases of intervention, from Fidel Castro’s decision to intervene in the Angolan 
Civil War to the repeated interventions by the US during the Cold War.49 Yet, in 
both cases, the importance of leaders’ credibility in the Cold War context was 
shaped by the interplay between the contest for power taking place not only at 
the international level but also at the domestic level. For Castro, appearing as 
the leader of Leftist movements served immediate political objectives at home, 
as Castro’s support for the creation of ‘other Cubas’ was germane in 
strengthening his domestic position.50 While reputational goals played a role in 
Lyndon Johnson’s decisions concerning Vietnam, Johnson’s concerns for his 
own credibility as leader cannot be detached from the domestic political game 
played in Washington by both the Republican opposition and Johnson’s 
Democratic competitors at the time.51 Issues of credibility, reputation and 
ultimately of success are directly related to two factors highlighted in this 
framework: the saliency of a particular internal conflict abroad to the political 
                                                
48 Wheeler 2000: 300-301. 
49 On Castro’s decision, see Kupchan 1992: 248. On the role played by presidents’ 
credibility in shaping decisions to intervene during the Cold War, see Grow 2008. 
50 Halliday 1999: 197; Gleijeses 2002: 21. 
51 Small 2005: 63-100. 
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formula of an elite and of its incumbent faction; and, the utility of intervention 
in securing domestic political objectives.52  
Fourth, the causal mechanism originating from elite power struggle qualifies 
the expectations drawn from diversionary theory of war.53 On the one hand, 
when intended at diverting attention from internal problems, military 
intervention appears to be a problematic form of diversion due to its highly 
political dimension.54 Elites’ ability to use intervention to take advantage of the 
‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect and strengthen both elite and public cohesion is 
dependent on the nature of the internal conflict the elite is facing, the legitimacy 
of the intervention itself, and the mobilisation provoked in different domestic 
groups.55 Intervention, in fact, may alienate significant segments of an elite 
society and exacerbate domestic divisions.56 Thus, incumbent factions are more 
likely to authorise intervention only when this decision is supported by 
relevant social groups whose allegiance is essential to secure the incumbent 
faction’s control of domestic institutions. On the other hand, the prospects of 
military intervention can pose political problems for an elite faction. Because of 
this, military intervention can be used to mobilise political support as much as 
to divide and weaken domestic political opponents.57  
 
 
                                                
52 Trubowitz 2011: 3, 17-18. 
53 For a review of the key tenets of diversionary theory as well as of its theoretical and 
empirical limits, see Levy 1989; DeRouen 2000.  
54 In fact, domestic turmoil may raise additional obstacles against foreign action and 
force elites to focus on containing domestic opponents. See Blainey 1973: 81; Sirin 2011. 
55 Therefore, I do not assume that all foreign internal conflicts will attract the interest of 
the elite or of non-elite groups to the same degree. On this, see Levy 1989: 279; Tir 2010. 
On the utility of external action to increasing domestic cohesion rather than diverting 
public attention from domestic problems, see Sirin 2011. 
56 Coser 1956: 93; Levy 1989: 260-261, 272.  
57 This is related to what is commonly referred to as ‘wedge politics’. As summarised 
by Trubowitz (2011: 28), ‘wedge politics involves framing issues to divide the opposing 
coalition, either by appealing to its core constituencies or by peeling away “swing” 
voters or groups who might otherwise align with it’. 
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Elite Relations: Pull Factors 
Domestic push factors alone cannot account for the drivers and timing of 
military intervention. Elite relations with local political actors shape both the 
legitimacy and the interests of the intervener. As Geoffrey Blainey argues, the 
use of force in international affairs is better conceptualised as a relationship 
between two actors.58 This applies especially to military interventions given the 
support an external intervener provides to elite groups in the target. In this 
regard, the importance of political elites is not confined to the intervener; if 
political elites matter, political elite and counter-elite groups in the target are 
likely to matter as well. In particular, the relationships established between elite 
members in the intervener state and elite/counter-elite groups in the target 
state represent an important pull factor that drives political elites toward 
military intervention.59 Elite relations affect the decision to intervene in both 
indirect and direct ways.  
The political landscape of the target state is of central importance not only in 
creating an initial context of multiple sovereignty but also in opening up spaces 
of contestation and of political alternatives that can be exploited by foreign 
actors. The very possibility of intervention depends on the availability of local 
allies with which the intervener can establish a rewarding political alliance. The 
viability of a political alliance between external and local elite groups is shaped 
by the effects exerted by political formulas and the push factors highlighted in 
the previous sections: external elites will likely support those elite and counter-
elite groups that do not contest the intervener’s ideological claims and that 
could help the intervener secure its own international and domestic objectives.  
Nonetheless, the pattern of elite relations responds also to the interplay 
between the intervener’s objectives and the local actors’ need for external 
support. Therefore, we can hypothesise that external elite groups would likely 
support local elite and counter-elite groups that are more dependent on 
external support. As George Modelski points out, internal wars create ‘a 
                                                
58 Blainey 1973: 68-86. 
59 This has been underscored not only within the historical literature (Westad 2005; 
Grow 2008) but also by different theoretical approaches in IR, as discussed in Chapter 
1. 
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demand for foreign intervention’.60 In internal conflicts, both local elites and 
insurgents are often forced to seek foreign assistance due to their lack of access 
to the territory held by the insurgents or to state resources respectively.61 
Importantly, political elites’ preferences will be shaped by elite dynamics 
determined by the intervener’s formulas and objectives as well as by the 
availability of elite groups in the target rather than by a priori preferences 
regarding the types of formal regimes that could guarantee the intervener’s 
interests. The defining factor is represented by a local elites’ dependency on 
external support, both ideological and material, rather than the institutional 
differences in which they operate.62  
Consequently, military intervention plays a twofold role: it alters the balance of 
power in the internal conflict, via the provision of resources and military 
support; and, in doing so, it reinforces patterns of dependency.63 As 
Morgenthau argues, the provision of military and economic aid represents a 
form of interference creating patterns of power and dependency that the 
provider can exploit by promising increased support or by denying such aid.64 
Direct military intervention, in this sense, represents an extreme case of external 
military support.65 Intervention per se creates room for an asymmetrical political 
exchange as a state elite’s provision of direct support in an ongoing internal 
conflict may result in the recipient’s compliance with the former’s objectives as 
well as increased external extraction (strategic access to the recipient’s territory, 
the provision of raw materials, etc.) and external validation for the intervening 
state elite. Hence, internal conflicts provide powerful incentives for external 
intervention when local elites and counter-elite groups need external support 
and provide external elites with the opportunity to increase the latter’s 
                                                
60 Modelski 1964: 20. 
61 Jentleson et al. 1992: 309; Salehyan et al. 2011: 716-717. In this regard, the key variable 
is represented not by the presence or absence of material sources of power in the target 
state rather by the control exerted on them by contending factions. Cf. Aydin 2010. 
62 On the advantages provided by authoritarian leaders to democratic interveners, see 
Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2003: 631-632; Krasner 2013: 350-351. On the 
advantages of democratic settings, see Pickering and Piceny 2006; Downs and Lilley 
2010: 282. 
63 Saideman 2002. 
64 Morgenthau 1967: 426. 
65 Salehyan et al. 2011: 712-713. 
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influence over the target.66 In turn, military intervention creates and increases 
the dependency of the receiver since the very provision of material and military 
support increases the costs for the receiver of foregoing external support at a 
later stage.  
In doing so, military intervention both responds to and reinforces asymmetrical 
alliances. Such alliances usually originate in situations of asymmetric 
capabilities between the contractors and are based on the provision of security 
by the most powerful actor (in this case the intervening elite) in exchange for 
greater influence and control over the supported actor’s policies and territory.67 
Conceptualising elite relations as asymmetrical alliances highlights the 
hierarchical relations inherent to military intervention. In particular, an elite 
perspective delivers insights on the way in which relationships of dependency 
stemming from an exchange of resources, validation, and security between 
political elite groups shape military interventions. It is important to stress that 
such asymmetric relations, whilst internalising a coercive dimension or at least 
the possibility of coercion, at the same time include a voluntary dimension 
whereby the weaker elite group accepts subordination in exchange for support 
for their own regime.68  
From this perspective, interventionary policies are more likely when they are 
establishing as well as securing patron-client relationships.69 Intervention, in 
this regard, operates as a form of security transfer during internal conflicts 
through which state elites can either extend their influence over existing clients 
or establish new clients; in both cases, intervention provides the means for state 
elites to increase their power, i.e. control over their international environment.70 
Specifically, patrons seek to achieve three objectives through intervention: 
politico-ideological convergence between the intervener’s and the target’s 
domestic regime, hence increased homogeneity; the establishment of an 
asymmetric alliance in return for increased diplomatic support for the 
                                                
66 Young 1974: 113-114. 
67 Morrow 1991: 905, 908-913. 
68 Lake 2009: 7. 
69 On patron-client relationships in international relations, see Eisenstadt and Roniger 
1980: 47-51; Shoemaker and Spanier 1984; Carney 1989: 43-45; Nexon 2009a: 41. 
70 Carney 1989: 47. 
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intervener’s foreign policy; and strategic advantage, through increased access to 
various resources (territory, raw materials, etc.).71 From the clients’ perspective, 
a patron’s support provides an external source of resources and validation, with 
external military intervention representing the most radical form of military 
support in times of internal conflict.  
However, despite their dependency from external support, local elites and 
counter-elites can retain significant room of manoeuvre. Specifically, they 
remain relatively autonomous actors that can directly influence the decision to 
intervene and the course of military intervention. This is the case for two 
reasons. First, elite and counter-elite groups in the target state can favour 
external intervention in direct ways. As Machiavelli notes, foreign elite 
members and exiles often play a key role in influencing the intervener’s 
decision by advocating military interventions in their polities in order to secure 
or retake their position within their state.72 Specifically, both local elites and 
counter-elites can promote external intervention by trying to affect all three elite 
dynamics. Local elites can appeal to the intervening political elite’s ideological 
claims, thus reinforcing ongoing processes of identification between the 
intervener and local domestic conflicts. Related to this, they can provide 
legitimacy to external interventions via a public endorsement and invitation.73 
Further, local actors can take advantage of the partisan competition and intra-
elite divisions characterising the intervener’s elite in order to either increase 
domestic divisions to fence off the possibility of an adversarial intervention or 
support the elite faction that favours intervention. Finally, local elite groups can 
try to influence the decision-making process more directly by establishing 
direct relations with the intervener’s political elite members and by lobbying 
legislative and executive leaders. In this regard, elite and counter-elite groups in 
the target can provide valuable intelligence to both the elite and public opinion 
on the local military and political conditions that can be used to ease the 
decision to intervene. In more general terms, as domestic political elites provide 
                                                
71 Shoemaker and Spanier 1984. 
72 Machiavelli 1996: II.31. 
73 Cases of intervention by invitation are not rare in international history. Russian 
intervention in the Austrian empire to suppress the Hungarian revolt in 1849 followed 
Vienna’s request. Recently, French intervention in Mali followed the government’s 
request for military support.  
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cues to their own domestic public opinion, foreign elite groups can also access 
the elite and public debate and help frame these in terms favourable to them.74  
Second, given the importance of clients’ compliance for the patrons’ position, 
clients may retain some degree of influence towards their patrons during 
military interventions. This reflects what Anthony Giddens defines as the 
‘dialectic of control’ whereby the ruled manages to keep some leverage on the 
ruler when the latter requires the active compliance of the former.75 The relative 
autonomy of local elite groups might be reinforced by two factors: the ability of 
local elite groups to secure new sources of internal validation; and, the inability 
of the intervener to provide sufficient military and material support to its local 
allies. As a result, external interveners may find allied elite and counter-elite 
groups in the target to be less responsive to the intervener’s requests despite the 
local elite groups’ dependency on the intervener’s support.76 Yet, the opposite 
situation may not guarantee better results for the intervener. First, the inability 
of the local elite group to win or mobilise significant domestic support could 
frustrate the attainment of the external intervener’s objectives. Second, the 
provision of additional external support can discredit the local ally in front of 
local nationalist groups, by underscoring the local ally’s dependency on 
external support.77  
To conclude, political elite relations operate as a number of pull factors for 
military intervention. First, they create the conditions for intervention and 
provide opportunities for alliances between elite groups in the intervening and 
target states. Second, elites and counter-elites can affect the intervener’s 
decision-making process by influencing political elite members and the political 
context in which they operate. Finally, by taking into account the asymmetrical 
relations elites establish, it is possible to address the way in which intervention 
                                                
74 Berinsky 2007. 
75 Giddens 1984: 16; Rosenberg 1994: 49. 
76 Notably, Machiavelli (1996: II.31) explicitly alerted his readers to the risks posed by 
supporting exile leaders in their efforts to retake the state as the ability of these leaders 
to muster domestic support would have likely led them to abandon their initial 
supporters or become less responsive to the intervener’s requests. In this regard, see 
the US reduced influence over both Iraqi leaders and Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.  
77 Jentleson et al. 1992: 309. 
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both responds to the incentives arising from these asymmetrical relations and 
affects patterns of dependency between the intervener and the target elite. 
 
 
The Decision to Intervene  
The discussion above has pointed to the three ways in which elite dynamics 
influence the decision to intervene: (i) by altering both the threat perceived by 
elites when confronted with antithetic and competing political formulas as well 
as the prospect for cooperation with them, thus shaping the eventual 
cooperative or confrontational nature of their military intervention; (ii) by 
creating powerful incentives for elites to intervene given perceived returns in 
terms of increased power and influence; (iii) by pulling states into internal 
conflicts given the political and strategic relations established by elite groups in 
the intervening and target state and the asymmetric power relations 
intervention can reinforce.  
Yet, we are still left with the question of how these three elite dynamics lead to 
actual decisions to intervene. The three elite dynamics highlighted above 
explain the causal drivers that lie behind military intervention yet they do not 
tell us when military intervention will take place. To borrow Robinson’s 
distinction, these factors represent the causal background to intervention; it still 
necessary to explain how these causal factors are productive of the immediate 
process driving leaders to intervene.78 Importantly, as noted in empirical 
studies on military interventions, the decision to intervene is often the result of 
a longer engagement with the target, stressing the need to focus on the ‘process 
by which the critical threshold is crossed from other forms of intervention to the 
direct and massive commitment of combat troops’.79 In particular, while 
intervention is the subject of broader causal mechanisms and objectives, the 
actual decision to intervene often results from shifts in both the intervening 
and/or the target country that makes direct military intervention a feasible or 
even a necessary option. As Jentleson et al. note, at the moment of intervention 
                                                
78 Chapter 1: 49. 
79 Jentleson and Levite 1992: 17. 
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the ‘common assumption [is] that more [is] to be lost by not militarily 
intervening than by doing so’.80 
Therefore, the decision to militarily intervene in an ongoing internal conflict is 
better conceptualised as the end result of both a longer term causal process and 
a response to changing conditions. In order to take into account both aspects, I 
borrow from comparative historical analysis the distinction between critical 
antecedents and critical junctures.81 The three dynamics operating at the elite level 
do not act as the independent variables of intervention but more accurately 
serve as the critical antecedents of intervention, with the resulting decision to 
intervene taking place during specific critical junctures.  
Critical antecedents represent ‘factors or conditions preceding a critical juncture 
that combine with causal forces during a critical juncture to produce long-term 
divergence in outcomes’.82 Importantly, ‘critical antecedents shape the choices 
and changes that emerge during critical junctures in causally significant ways’.83 
Such critical junctures represents ‘periods in history when the presence or 
absence of a specified causal force pushes…a single case onto a new political 
trajectory that diverges significantly from the old’.84 Importantly, while being 
characterised by rapidly changing events, these periods present leaders with 
new opportunities and challenges; as a result, they are ‘typically moments of 
expanding agency, not complete contingency’.85 During critical junctures, ‘the 
range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expand 
substantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest 
are potentially more momentous’.86 In these junctures,  
[g]roups and individuals are not merely spectators as conditions change 
to favor or penalize them in the political balance of power, but rather 
                                                
80 Jentleson et al. 1992: 310; Kupchan 1992: 244-245. 
81 Slater and Simmons 2010; Rohlfing 2012: 164-166. On critical junctures, see Collier 
and Collier 1991; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Capoccia and Klemen 2007. 
82 Slater and Simmons 2010: 889. 
83 Ibid.: 887. 
84 Ibid.: 888. 
85 Ibid.: 890. 
86 Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 343. 
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strategic actors capable of acting on ‘openings’ provided by such shifting 
contextual conditions in order to enhance their own position.87  
Specifically, critical junctures represent rapidly changing periods shaped by 
recent and impending events where political agents, particularly executive 
leaders, can exert disproportionate influence thanks to the advantages offered 
by their institutional position within a rapidly changing context. 
With regard to intervention, elite politics act as causal antecedents in two ways: 
by selecting and discarding other possible courses of action; by shaping the 
objectives, interests and relations driving states to intervene. As argued by 
Salehyan et al., state elites will opt for diplomatic solutions or indirect forms of 
intervention whenever possible due to the relatively low costs and risks such a 
course of action entails.88 Hence, direct military interventions are likely to result 
from specific critical junctures during which changing conditions in the 
intervening and/or target state open up new possibilities that political actors 
can grasp, precipitating the decision to intervene by: reducing the costs and 
risks of external intervention; and/or reducing the possibility of securing the 
intervener’s objectives via diplomatic means or indirect military options. For 
example, critical junctures may be represented by: the increased threat posed by 
local elites to the intervening elite’s domestic or international position; the 
emergence of an allied elite group in the target; or the deteriorating conditions 
of the intervening elite and/or of the allied elite.  
Elite dynamics, however, remain critical in causal terms for three reasons. First, 
elite dynamics are fundamental not only in making military intervention one of 
the options considered by political elites but also in underscoring the 
opportunities and challenges presented by critical junctures to the intervening 
elite. For example, the dependency of actors in the target on external support 
plays an important role in highlighting the opportunities offered by particular 
junctures. As Stephen Gent points out, states are more likely to intervene ‘when 
it counts’, that is in situations where local actors are more dependent on 
                                                
87 Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 16-18. 
88 Salehyan et al. 2011:713. 
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external support and the intervener can extract greater control over local events 
and actors or at least expect to do so.89  
Second, elite dynamics shape the modality, size, and specific form of military 
intervention.90 They shape preferences over the overt or covert modality of 
military operations, depending on the legitimacy of the military operations and 
the political utility they can offer elite factions. Further, incumbent factions will 
opt for forms of military intervention that maximise their influence over other 
political actors at home. In addition, the size of military operations will be 
affected by the degree of elite cohesion over the decision to intervene and the 
actual or perceived effect the dispatch of military troops abroad is likely to have 
on an elite or its incumbent faction’s domestic position.91 This is connected to 
the problems military deployments abroad can present elites with. On the one 
hand, they may diminish the number of military units necessary for internal 
security purposes. During the 19th Century, for example, French interventions in 
the Iberian peninsula were questioned by important members of the elite on the 
basis of the diminished number of troops that would have been left in France to 
thwart possible insurrections.92 On the other hand, large-scale interventions can 
increase the human and material costs non-elite groups pay for ongoing 
interventions, thus running the risk of alienating their support, as exemplified 
in the case of US and Soviet interventions in Vietnam and Afghanistan 
respectively. Finally, elite dynamics shape elites’ preferences for forms of direct 
intervention that can strengthen the position of allied local elite groups and/or 
weaken that of local competitors.  
Third, by informing elites’ interests and policy toward the internal conflict, the 
modality and form of intervention, and the patterns of dependency between 
elite groups, elite dynamics exert a ‘roll-on’ effect on intervention, continuing to 
shape the intervener’s policy also in the aftermath of the critical juncture. In this 
sense, the decisions taken by the intervener after the deployment of its troops 
offer an opportunity to assess the continued role played by elite dynamics in 
                                                
89 Gent 2008. 
90 On the different modalities of military intervention, see Introduction: 27. 
91 On the relationship between elite cohesion and states’ ability to balance and 
implement the necessary military investments, see Schweller 2006.  
92 Bullen 1979: 59. 
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affecting military operations. If the proposed framework is valid, external 
interveners will try to influence the composition and selection process of the 
political elite of the target by: supporting a specific elite group in its effort to 
take power; and forestalling rival groups. For these reasons, elite politics will 
continue to shape the intervener’s military operations and involvement in the 
target. Hence, the empirical chapters will focus on both the historical phase 
preceding the decision to intervene as well as the immediate aftermath of 
intervention in order to offer a more robust test of the causal mechanisms 
highlighted in this chapter.  
To conclude, Chapter 2 showed how basic elite dynamics create incentives for 
leaders’ intervention in internal conflicts. Importantly, as explored in this 
chapter, they shape the critical antecedents that constitute specific instances of 
intervention, which are ultimately ignited by changing conditions that make 
direct intervention a feasible if not necessary option to secure elites’ objectives. 
The overall framework is summarised in Fig.3. In the following case studies, I 
apply the proposed framework to two instances of US intervention and one 
instance of non-intervention. In doing so, I will demonstrate how an 
explanation centred on political elites provides a valuable explanation of the 
causal processes leading to the decision to intervene and how this eventually 
sheds light on the practice and consequences of military intervention. 
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Figure 3 - From International Elite Politics to Military Intervention 
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Methodology 
In Part II, I will provide a plausibility probe of the theoretical framework 
proposed in this chapter through the analysis of three case studies of US policy 
towards internal conflicts.93 In focusing on more than one case, I will follow the 
existing consensus about linking ‘within-case analysis and cross-case 
comparisons within a single study’.94 In particular, a process-tracing method 
will be adopted for each case in order to include a diachronic dimension 
through the analysis of the decision-making process and, in doing so, identify 
the relevant causal mechanisms driving political leaders to directly intervene in 
an internal conflict.95 By focusing on a limited number of cases it is possible to 
examine in greater detail not only the exact historical passages leading to such 
decision but also other important aspects: first, the direction of intervention, 
that is the calculations leading selected leaders to support one side involved in 
an internal conflict instead of others; second, the exact modality of intervention; 
third, the aftermath of intervention. In addition, focusing on a restricted 
number of cases instead of a large-n study offers the opportunity of evaluating 
the explanatory power of the proposed framework vis-à-vis other possible 
explanations.  
Cases of intervention conducted by the same country within a precise historical 
timeframe are preferred in order to keep key variables pertaining to the 
intervener’s elite politics relatively constant while maximising variance in terms 
other relevant dimensions, in particular: the geographical setting of the target; 
type of internal conflict in which the intervention is taking place; and policy 
outcome (intervention/non-intervention). The choice of the selected timeframe 
(1898-1939) responds to both methodological and theoretical considerations.  
Historical cases of interventions allow the research to draw on the extensive 
secondary literature on the selected case studies while evaluating the 
contribution of the proposed framework vis-à-vis existing contending 
explanations offered within IR and International History. Importantly, by 
opting for historical cases it is possible to examine relevant primary sources that 
would have not been fully available for more recent cases of intervention. In 
                                                
93 Eckstein 1975. 
94 George and Bennett 2005: 18. 
95 George and McKeown 1985: 35. 
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particular, the review of the relevant primary sources allows examining in 
greater detail two elements: the information policymakers were receiving from 
the target state, especially how they portrayed local political actors; and, in 
turn, the way in which policymakers in the intervening state perceived and 
framed political developments in the target state.96 
Furthermore, the selected timeframe presents significant theoretical advantages. 
First, the pre-Cold War period offers a set of most difficult cases if compared to 
the Cold War given the lack in the former timeframe of any oversimplifying 
bipolar dynamic, that is the absence of any automatic identification of domestic 
political change with foreign policy change and of domestic adversaries with 
international foes typical of the Cold War.97 Second, in contrast to the post-Cold 
War period, such periodisation offers the possibility of addressing cases of 
revolutionary change that are largely absent from the post-Cold War period, 
with the exception of the recent, yet ongoing, revolutions in the Arab world. In 
addition, it allows examining the relative weight of eventual humanitarian 
motivations vis-à-vis different explanations whilst avoiding a narrow focus on 
the question of humanitarian intervention. Third, studying the pre-Cold War 
period allows the examination of the political dynamics of interventions within 
a historical and systemic setting that presents affinities to the existing 
international order, characterised by a shifting distribution of power, evolving 
yet contested normative frameworks, and increasing ideological heterogeneity. 
Finally, choosing to focus on pre-Cold War cases provides the opportunity to 
examine US policy before Washington acquired a position of international 
primacy that could lift the US from systemic constraints and introduce a bias 
against the impact of international and security factors over US foreign policy.98  
I have opted for cases of US military intervention for both empirical and 
theoretical reasons. First, the study of US cases is preferred in terms of the 
relevance of US interventions to both past and current international affairs. In 
this regard, cases of US interventions prior to the Cold War are selected to 
                                                
96 In this regard, I will rely primarily on the ‘Foreign Relations of the United States’ 
(FRUS) series of the U.S. Department of State. 
97 The limits posed by bipolar systems to the study of the causes of military 
intervention have been noted by Little (1975: 4-5) with reference to Thucydides’ 
analysis of the interventions characterising the Peloponnesian War. 
98 Krasner 1978; Katzenstein 2013: 143. 
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explore the origins of American interventionism and to historically 
contextualise subsequent US interventions. In doing so, it highlights how elite 
dynamics shaped US policymakers’ reaction to the emergence of nationalist and 
Communist revolutions already before the Cold War, thus setting the stage for 
later US interventionism.  
Second, as a democratic state, the US offers a particularly challenging test for a 
theoretical framework focused on elite dynamics usually associated only with 
authoritarian regimes. By addressing cases of US intervention, this study aims 
at taking into account the role played by political elite dynamics not only in 
authoritarian but also in democratic regimes. Whereas the role of ideas in US 
foreign policy has been widely recognised and eventually allowed to overcome 
the past tendency to make ‘the other side “ideological” – and one’s own side 
only too logical or interest driven’, analyses of US foreign policy still need to 
overcome the limits intrinsic in the ability to identify the role played by foreign 
elites – often closed, authoritarian elites – without recognising the elite 
dynamics operating in democratic states as well.99  
Specifically, in its empirical section, this thesis examines US decisions in three 
historical cases of internal conflict: US intervention in the Cuban War of 
Independence (1898-1902); US intervention in the Russian Civil War (1918-
1920); and, US non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). The first 
two cases have been selected to test the proposed framework vis-à-vis two 
dissimilar cases of military intervention in terms of both strategic setting and of 
the type of internal conflict examined: a case of a secessionist revolution leading 
to a war of independence in the Cuban case and ultimately a military 
confrontation between the US and the incumbent Spanish authorities on the 
island; and a case of a major revolution leading to a full-fledged civil war in the 
Russian case.  
Although the conflict over Cuba has usually been described as a war, it will be 
examined here as a case of military intervention since the US intervened in an 
ongoing internal conflict between the Spanish incumbent authorities supported 
by loyalist Cubans on one side and the forces led by a Cuban nationalist 
                                                
99 Westad 2000: 554. On the role played by ideology in US foreign policy, see Hunt 
1987. 
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counter-elite on other in order to secure different authority structures over the 
island.100 This choice responds also to the need to overcome the rather 
problematic definition of the 1898 conflict as a strictly Spanish-American War, 
which overlooks the preceding Cuban War of Independence and excludes 
Cuban insurgents from the conflict, itself a by-product of US policy in 1898 as I 
will show in Chapter 4.101 In addition, as a case of successful military 
intervention, it allows the evaluation of how US military intervention in Cuba 
permitted the US to pursue its objectives in the island.   
The choice of the Russian case responds to similar empirical and theoretical 
considerations. In contrast to the Cuban case, the Russian case allows the 
studying of US intervention in a civil war targeting a great power and involving 
other great powers’ interventions. Importantly, it examines US leaders’ reaction 
to revolutionary change driven by a closed elite group imposing and promoting 
a completely antithetic political order. Finally, it allows the evaluation of a case 
of direct intervention resulting in US failure to achieve its initial objectives.  
The third case study, US non-intervention in Spain, responds mainly to 
theoretical exigencies. As previously underscored, non-intervention can be 
examined as either a form of intervention itself or, more generally, as a specific 
policy outcome. In this sense, the negative case offered by US non-intervention 
in Spain works to further test the accuracy of the proposed framework and 
evaluate whether the latter can shed light on US decision not to intervene – as 
well as to maintain that policy for more than two years.102 
 
                                                
100 On US operations in Cuba as a case of intervention, see also Kinzer 2006; Aubone 
2013. 
101 For this reason, different authors have suggested more accurate definitions of the 
conflict, such as the Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War or the Spanish-American-
Cuban War. See Peterson 1998; Perez 1998b. 
102 The utility of addressing cases of non-intervention vis-à-vis cases of intervention has 
been underscored in particular by Western 2005: 24, 26-61; Saunders 2011. 
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Part II 
 
The Politics of US Military Interventions 
 
 
 
I want to recall everything, right from the beginning, the details, chance, the flow of events. 
Before distance obscures my backward glance, muffling the hubbub of voices, of weapons, 
armies, laughter, shouts. And at the same time only distance allows us to go back to a likely 
beginning.  
(Luther Blisset, Q) 
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Chapter 4 
Forbidden Fruit: US Intervention in the Cuban War of 
Independence, 1898-1902 
 
 
 ‘…if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the ground, 
Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain,…can gravitate only 
toward the North American Union…’ 
(John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, 1823) 
 
 
Introduction 
In February 1895, the Cuban revolutionaries called for the island’s 
independence from Spain, igniting the Cuban War of Independence. Madrid 
responded by dispatching up to 150.000 troops to Cuba headed by General 
Valeriano Weyler. The reconcentrado policy implemented by Weyler forced the 
rural population into garrison towns, resulting in the collapse of the Cuban 
economy and 170.000 victims. When the new conflict erupted in Cuba, US 
authorities could hardly ignore it for three reasons: the humanitarian disaster 
brought by Weyler’s reconcentration policy; the destruction of agricultural and 
sugar industry activities on the island; and, the damage inflicted to US citizens’ 
property on the island as well as the arrest of US citizens by Spanish 
authorities.1  
Despite these tensions and the longstanding US interests in the island, the 
Republican administration of William McKinley, as the Democratic 
administration of Grover Cleveland before it, initially opted for non-
intervention, offered US mediation in the conflict and refused to officially 
recognise the Cuban rebels. Following increasing tensions between the US and 
Spain, rising domestic pressures to act and the infamous explosion of the US 
                                                
1 Between 24th February 1895 and 25th January 1897, Spanish authorities arrested 74 US 
citizens and expelled 9 newspapers correspondents from Cuba. FRUS 1896: 746-750. 
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battleship Maine, the US officially opted for direct intervention in Cuba on 11th 
April 1898, resulting in the so called Spanish-American war. With 345 US 
soldiers killed in action and an overall cost of $250 million, the US first occupied 
and subsequently established a protectorate over of Cuba, in addition to 
acquiring control of the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico.2 
As noted in Chapter 3, the conflict will be examined here as a case of military 
intervention since the US intervened in an ongoing internal conflict between the 
Spanish incumbent authorities supported by loyalist Cubans on one side and 
the forces led by a Cuban nationalist counter-elite on the other in order to 
secure different authority structures over the island. This also responds to the 
need to take into account the important role played by Cuban actors in shaping 
US policy and operations on the island.3 The selection of the Cuban case for this 
study responds to both empirical and theoretical considerations. At the 
empirical level, US intervention in Cuba is of particular relevance for two main 
reasons: first, given the impact of the conflict on subsequent US-Cuban 
relations; second, given the importance attributed by subsequent 
historiography to 1898, considered as a watershed in American history marking 
the emergence of the US as a great power – if not of an empire.4 In addition, the 
Cuban case offers a valuable probe for the theoretical framework presented in 
the previous sections for two reasons.  
First, it allows for an evaluation of a case of intervention typical of a category of 
cases left outside by Owen’s general framework. In the Cuban case, US 
intervention took place within a non-ideologically polarised setting 
characterised by competing yet not antithetic claims by the main actors (US, 
Spain, Cuban nationalists) over the same territory.5 In this regard, US 
intervention in Cuba allows the examination of the reaction and the political 
processes affecting the US decision to intervene when faced with a secessionist 
rebellion posing no explicit and immediate threat to the US elite’s domestic 
rule. Second, it offers a challenging test to evaluate the impact of elite politics 
                                                
2 Healy 1963: 9; Offner 1992: 7-13; Tone 2006: 8-9; Herring 2008: 316. 
3 On the conflict in Cuba as a case of intervention rather than war, see Kinzer 2006; 
Aubone 2013. On the need to address the role played by Cuban actors, see Peterson 
1998; Perez 1998b; Tone 2006. 
4 Heiss 2002. 
5 Owen 2010a. On the distinction between competing and antithetic political formulas, 
see Chapter 2: 102-103. 
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vis-à-vis the wide range of competing explanations offered in the literature. On 
the one hand, it is possible to compare the analysis presented here with the 
analyses provided by other works in IR that have directly addressed the Cuban 
case.6 On the other hand, it represents a challenging test for this thesis given the 
causal priority assigned in numerous historical works to the humanitarian, 
economic, and public opinion drivers of US intervention instead of political and 
elite factors. 
As I will highlight in the following chapter, the decision to intervene as well as 
the modality of US military operations and occupation derive from three 
dynamics: first, the limited cooperation between the US and the Cuban 
insurgent leaders given the US leaders’ long-term interests and views about 
Cuba; second, US objectives towards Cuba resulting from the interplay of 
foreign and domestic politics; third, the specific relations between members of 
the US and Cuban elite factions, which represented an important pull factor for 
the US intervention in Cuba and which shed light on the subsequent US policy 
towards the political elite of the new Cuban Republic. For this purpose, I will 
first provide an overview of the contending explanations of US intervention in 
Cuba. Second, I will examine the causal antecedents set by elite politics drawing 
on the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 in order to assess how the 
interplay between political formulas, power struggle, and elite relations shaped 
US interventionary stance. Third, I will examine in greater detail the decision to 
intervene itself and its modality. Finally, given the success of the US operations 
and the ensuing occupation of the island, I will address the way in which elite 
dynamics continued to inform US policy in Cuba until the US withdrawal in 
1902. In doing so, I will show how elite dynamics provide a more detailed 
account for the shift towards intervention and how the same factors coalesced 
at the critical juncture of 1898 to explain not only timing of the US decision but 
also its specific objectives in Cuba after the end of hostilities.  
 
 
                                                
6 Owen 1997; Zakaria 1998; Trubowitz 2011. 
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Contending Explanations 
The Cuban case has been subject to extensive historical and theoretical 
examination. Initially, historical accounts of US intervention in Cuba stressed 
the altruistic and humanitarian concerns driving US action: halting the 
humanitarian disaster resulting from the Spanish reconcentration policy; and, 
promoting Cuban independence.7 Humanitarian considerations were explicitly 
included in president William McKinley’s 11th April war message in 1898. 
Further, humanitarian considerations were coupled with the support for ‘Cuba 
Libre’ in the elite discourse as much as in the wider public.8  
Offering a first and influential critique of these explanations, revisionist authors 
underscore the role played by economic interests in driving US action in Cuba. 
US intervention was ascribed to three elements: the need to protect American 
investments, properties and commercial interests in Cuba; the American upper 
class’ influence on the Republican administration; and, the need to find new 
markets to prop up US domestic economy after the 1893 depression.9 Related to 
these explanations, a number of authors identify in the combined effect of 
economic depression and social tensions the sources of US expansionist policy 
in the 1890s, with the latter representing a useful diversion for the ‘crisis of 
confidence’ that engulfed American society at the time.10 Overall, these 
revisionist accounts successfully question the altruistic and humanitarian 
motivations of US actions, stressing the interested motives of Washington’s 
action towards Cuba and the Philippines. The humanitarian explanation, for 
instance, fails to explain why the US did not intervene when the reconcentrado 
policy was implemented whilst it intervened in April 1898, after Spain had 
already decided to suspend the reconcentrado policy.  
However, revisionist accounts also present significant explanatory 
shortcomings. First, Cuba’s importance for the overall American economy 
should not be overstated: at the time of intervention, more than 75-80% of US 
exports were directed to Europe and only half of the exports to Latin America 
                                                
7 Freidel 1958; Bradford 1993; Smith 1994b: 5; Sewell 2011. 
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9 Beard 1934; McCormick 1963; LaFeber 1963; Foner 1972: 282-310; Williams 1988: 27-57. 
10 Linderman 1974: 5. For similar accounts, see Hofstadter 1967; Healy 1970; Beisner 
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were directed to Cuba.11 Second, the US economic elite did not achieve a clear 
consensus on the benefits of military intervention prior to 1898 as important 
segments of the business and financial community were concerned about the 
instability that a war would bring, with the risk of endangering the post-1896 
recovery.12 Significantly, the Democrats accused McKinley of not intervening in 
Cuba in order to protect the interests of the upper class.13 When members of the 
US upper class began to favour a less passive policy towards Cuba, their 
preferences remained ambiguous on how to bring the conflict to an end; what 
they requested was a solution to the crisis, not necessarily intervention or 
annexation.14 Finally, the economic crisis of 1893 that the intervention was 
sought to solve according to certain revisionist accounts was essentially over by 
1898. At the same time, the economic crisis started in the 1870s did not produce 
similar expansionist outcomes.15  
In contrast to previous analyses, both historical works on the Cuban case and 
Classical Realist authors argued that the conflict resulted not from a rational 
understanding of the national interest but rather from the irrational pressures of 
a war-prone public opinion.16 Considering Cuba as having a marginal strategic 
and intrinsic value, these works stress how two factors fuelled a belligerent 
sentiment in the US public opinion and Congress: the daily stories of Spanish 
atrocities published by the sensationalist press of the New York Journal of 
William R. Hearst and the New York World of Joseph Pulitzer;17 and, the impact 
of two events, the diplomatic incident sparked by the publication on 9th 
February 1898 of a private letter written by Enrique Dupuy de Lome, Spanish 
minister in Washington, and the explosion of US battleship Maine in the port of 
Havana on 15th February.18  
                                                
11 Hoganson 1998: 210 fn.14. 
12 Pratt 1936: 42, 235; Holbo 1963; Healy 1963: 9-12, 21; Benjamin 1990: 30-36. 
13 McCartney 2006: 124. 
14 Pratt 1936: 143-149; Foner 1972: 231-232; Benjamin 1990: 40-47. 
15 Holbo 1963; Zakaria 1998. 
16 Kennan 1951; Morgenthau 1951: 4, 23; Leuchtenburg 1957.  
17 For historical analyses centred on the role played by public opinion and the press, see 
Wilkerson 1932; Wisan 1934; May 1961: 237. 
18 In the letter, de Lome described President McKinley as ‘weak and catering to the 
rabble…and besides, a low politician…’ (quoted in Foner 1972: 232, 235). The explosion 
of the Maine killed 250 US sailors. The US official investigation, on 28th March, 
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Interestingly, Classical Realist authors seem to support an explanation that is 
essentially consistent with recent Liberal analysis stressing the role played by 
public opinion rather than security or power calculations.19 Yet, these analyses 
focusing on the press tend to overrate both the role played by public opinion as 
well as the impact and reach of the sensationalist newspapers. First, not all US 
newspapers endorsed the Cuban cause and not all newspapers adopted 
Hearst’s sensationalism. Importantly, the influence of the Hearst and Pulitzer’s 
newspapers was limited by their geographical reach, as both were mainly New 
York newspapers, and by their partisan affiliation, as both were prominently 
Democratic.20 Second, these accounts do not fully explain why Cuba played 
such an important role in American politics in the first place. As stated by 
Offner, ‘Hearst played on American prejudices; he did not create them’.21 Third, 
the actual impact of public opinion and of events in tilting the US public 
opinion and its leaders towards intervention is not convincingly demonstrated. 
It rather serves to prove an assumption – the influence of the public over 
elected officials – more than providing clear evidence. As Perez astutely notes,  
the linkage of the Maine with public opinion and the connection of both 
to the coming of war…is a causal proposition whose plausibility is 
derived mainly from normative democratic theory than from a body of 
verifiable evidence.22  
Fourth, these explanations are based on the assumption of Congress’ 
acquiescence to public opinion and particularly McKinley’s weakness as a 
political leader.23 On the contrary, more recent historical works reveal a less 
passive president who eventually steered events in Cuba to pursue specific 
domestic and international objectives.24 At the same time, they do not consider 
the possibility of an opposite causal direction, that is how US political leaders as 
well as members of the Cuban counter-elite influenced US public opinion 
regarding Cuba. In doing so, they fail to take into account the fact that 
                                                
identified in an external cause – hence in Spanish authorities – the cause of the 
explosion. See Benjamin 1990: 45. 
19 Western 2005; Chapter 1: 51-54.   
20 Hamilton 2006: 159-157, 208-209. 
21 Offner 1992: 229.  
22 Perez 1989: 304-305. 
23 Fry 1979; Zimmerman 2002. 
24 Gould 1982; Offner 1992; Morgan 2003; Phillips 2003. 
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McKinley and Congressmen were discussing the possibility of intervention 
even before the report on the explosion of the Maine was published.25 
Recently, Neorealist and Neoclassical Realist accounts have treated the conflict 
as the inevitable result of the clash between a rising great power and the 
declining Spanish empire, with Cuba representing simply a geopolitical 
opportunity for the US to grasp. From a Neorealist perspective, John 
Mearsheimer examines Cuba within the broader expansion of US power, with 
Cuba representing an inevitable step in the US drive towards regional 
hegemony.26 Yet, explanations focusing purely on the rise of US power during 
the second half of the 19th Century can hardly explain the Cleveland 
administration’s decision not to intervene in Cuba in 1895-1986. Cleveland’s 
decision is significant since his administration was clearly aware of the US 
power position in the Western hemisphere, as indicated by Secretary of State 
Richard Olney’s famous remarks in July 1895 that the US was ‘practically 
sovereign’ over the American continent.27 
Zakaria’s Neoclassical Realist analysis overcomes this limit by highlighting the 
institutional conditions that allowed the US to increase its state power at the 
end of the 19th Century. According to Zakaria, the institutional and 
administrative reforms of the late 19th Century enabled US leaders and 
especially the presidency to mobilise the national resources necessary for an 
expansionist foreign policy. While enriching Neorealist explanations with a 
more accurate explanation of the timing of US expansion, Zakaria’s account 
presents three problems. First, his conceptualisation of the US as a weak state is 
open to question.28 As Mearsheimer points out, the US managed to expand 
before 1898 whilst being able to manage the internal consequences brought by 
expansion, including a devastating civil war. Second, some of the most 
important reforms strengthening US institutions took place after 1898 and in 
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case were partially ignited by the conflict in Cuba itself.29 Third, the increase in 
state power and mobilisation capabilities highlighted by Zakaria was more the 
result of both an improvement in the conditions of the US economy at the end 
of 1890s and the emergence of a more cohesive political landscape, with the 
Republicans controlling both the Presidency and Congress in 1896.30  
The following chapter contests also Zakaria’s explanation of the timing of US 
intervention. Zakaria argues that the US grasped an opportunity in 1898 as it 
fought the weakest of all European great powers and did so after years of 
Spanish operations and exhaustion in Cuba, when Madrid was ‘almost ready to 
surrender anyway’, that is when the threat was receding.31 On the contrary, as I 
will show, Cuba did not represent simply an opportunity for expansion but a 
long-coveted strategic and political interest for the US. Importantly, the US 
intervened when Spain was losing control of the situation in favour of Cuban 
actors unfavourable to the US and before imminent development in Cuba could 
favour such local competitors. In other terms, the US opted for intervention to 
forestall a possible threat.  
Owen and Trubowitz offer a more comprehensive analysis by addressing the 
role played by political agents and their own views at the time.32 According 
Owen, US intervention resulted from the effect exerted by perceptions of 
Madrid’s illiberalism on Spanish-American relations.33 On the contrary, 
Trubowitz highlights the role played by partisan politics in the US within a 
permissive international context. In doing so, they both take into account the 
interplay between internal and external developments, whether in Spain, in the 
case of Owen’s analysis, or in the wider international setting, in Trubowitz’ 
work.  However, what both Owen and Trubowitz fail to take into account is the 
role played by Cuban actors and how developments in Cuba affected US elite’s 
interests. As I will show in the following section, US-Cuban relations represent 
                                                
29 Cf. Zakaria 1998: 90-127. On the limited impact of pre-1900 reforms compared to the 
reforms of the Progressive Era, see Skowronek 1982. 
30 This point is clear also in Zakaria’s empirical analysis (1998: 60-61). 
31 Zakaria 1998: 174-176. 
32 Owen 1997; Trubowitz 2011. 
33 Specifically, Owen (1997: 143-144) underscores how the establishment of the First 
Spanish Republic (February 1873 - December 1874) eased cooperation between 
Washington and Madrid during the first Cuban crisis, whereas perception of Spanish 
illiberalism impeded cooperation during the Cuban War of Independence. 
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one of the critical antecedents driving US intervention. Furthermore, actual and 
imminent developments in Cuba involving Cuban actors shaped the critical 
juncture within which the US opted for direct intervention.  
In order to overcome the limits of the previous analyses and probe the 
theoretical framework presented in Part I, the present chapter follows more 
recent approaches that take into account not only the interplay between 
international and domestic political dynamics but also the role played by 
Cuban actors.34 In particular, it examines the way in which leaders’ political 
ideas, power competition, and elite relations, in Washington as much as in 
Cuba, shaped the decision to intervene. In this regard, the impact of events in 
Cuba needs to be examined vis-à-vis both political actors’ own decisions as well 
as their interpretations of such events. In doing so, it defines an explanatory 
framework to connect leaders’ own objectives to the political necessities that 
shaped their actions and objectives. This is intended both to avoid the overly 
deterministic accounts of the conflict describing it as inevitable and to address 
the causal dynamics that gradually drove US policymakers towards 
intervention and that have led other authors to describe McKinley as a 
‘reluctant expansionist’, the conflict as an ‘unwanted war’ and the resulting US 
empire as acquired ‘by default’.35 
An elite perspective offers a twofold advantage: it incorporates the empirically 
valid observations provided by previous historical and theoretical works; and, 
it sheds light on the fundamental dimension of elite relations. First, US elite’s 
political formula needs to be taken into account to explain both the importance 
of Cuba for American leaders – thus allowing for Cuba to easily become 
material for partisan politics – and the prospects for cooperation with different 
Cuban leaders. Second, the interplay of international and domestic power 
struggle made Cuba both a possible and necessary objective for US leaders. 
Finally, US-Cuban elite relations and Cuban actions are key to explain not only 
the US shift towards a more pro-Cuban policy but also the importance of the 
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events of early 1898. As I will discuss in the final section of this chapter, an elite 
perspective provides a more convincing analysis not only of the timing but also 
of US policy during the occupation of Cuba, further highlighting the effect 
exerted by elite politics on US policy.   
 
 
Political Formulas: Competing Claims over Cuba 
US decisions regarding Cuba need first of all to be examined vis-à-vis the 
specific ideological framework in which elite members were enmeshed. During 
the 1890s, long-standing symbols of American identity were recast and adapted 
to a changing domestic environment and to an ever competitive international 
system. This set of ideas reinforced the US elite’s rule as it perpetuated social 
hierarchies at home, providing US policymakers with new tools to mobilise 
consensus in a dynamic yet unquiet society, and offered authoritative rationales 
for US primacy and expansion abroad. These ideas shaped the identity of the 
American polity at large as well as defined the appropriate role for its political 
leaders.36 In particular, they affected US policy towards Cuba. First, they 
directly influenced US leaders’ views of Cuba and of the preferred outcome of 
the Cuban crisis. By attaching a specific value to Cuba, the island became more 
than just a foreign policy issue; it became an object of political contest. Second, 
it set the stage for the McKinley administration’s decision to intervene by 
influencing the prospects for cooperation with the Cuban counter-elite. 
At a general level, the ideas that shaped the US political formula provided 
useful ideological tools not only for the management of a changing domestic 
society but also to forge a consensus over foreign policy objectives and the 
extension of US influence abroad. At the end of the 19th Century, the Liberal 
principles informing the American political formula coalesced in an explicit 
foreign policy formulation centred on the US mission to promote its values and 
freedom. In particular, the rise of US power in the second half of the Century 
fostered an expansionist outlook among US leaders. A new foreign policy 
discourse emerged that adapted familiar concepts and doctrines such as the 
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Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine to the 1890s, in an effort to provide 
renewed coherence to an otherwise contradictory set of objectives that tried to 
combine principles with interests, the American commitment to the expansion 
of freedom with the expansion of US military and economic presence, 
imperialism with anti-colonialism.37 As Mary Ann Heiss argues, by the 1890s, 
Manifest Destiny had become an ‘idea rather than a policy’, a ‘reflection of the 
national mood – and indeed, national identity’ providing US leaders with a 
persuasive justification for further advancements.38 Having acquired the 
capabilities to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, US policy shifted from a 
commitment to contrast European interference to the expansion of US influence 
in the Western Hemisphere and the elimination of the remaining European 
colonial outposts.39 In turn, members of the US intellectual elite, such as John 
Burgess, John Fiske, Alfred T. Mahan, and Josiah Strong developed these 
principles to promote the idea of American expansion, of a ‘large policy’, in the 
Western hemisphere and beyond.40  
The American political formula mirrored also more specific ideological 
assumptions of the period. In particular, racial and gender assumptions 
reinforced long-standing social hierarchies within the American polity.41 On the 
one hand, racial assumptions helped to maintain racial hierarchies within the 
US society, through a de facto process of disenfranchisement of black voters and 
the legalisation of segregation. Such assumptions also postulated racial 
hierarchies at the international stage envisaging the superiority of the Anglo-
Saxons over allegedly inferior races.42 On the other hand, gender convictions 
profoundly informed American political culture at the time. In particular, 
gender arguments served a domestic political function, as they were used both 
to contain the mounting requests for the enfranchisement of women and as a 
‘coalition-building political method’ among the jingoists, who stressed the need 
to overcome the decadent and effeminate nature of American society after the 
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closure of the frontier in 1890.43 Importantly, the same convictions fuelled a 
militarist rhetoric that could be marshalled to promote military endeavours and 
gain consensus. As Kristin Hoganson argues, ‘the links between manhood, 
military service, and political authority led a number of political leaders to 
think that they would enhance their political standing if they supported martial 
policies’.44 
The interplay between the abovementioned ideas about US mission, race and 
gender and the awareness of US new capabilities fostered an expansionist 
outlook primarily directed towards the Caribbean. By shaping a paternalistic 
view of the American mission, both racial and gender assumptions shaped a 
self-serving image of Cuba as requiring US tutelage and guidance.45 
Furthermore, expansion toward Cuba fit within the ‘caribbeanized’ version of 
the Manifest Destiny rhetoric that survived the closure of the frontier.46 
Importantly, these views of Cuba were consistent with the enduring vision of 
island’s future in the culture of the US political elite. Already in April 1823, few 
months before President James Monroe’s proclamation of his well-known 
doctrine, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams reflected the same sense of 
entitlement and inevitability characterising the Manifest Destiny discourse in 
what was later described as the ‘ripe fruit theory’:  
there are laws of political as well as physical gravitation; and if an apple 
severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but fall to the 
ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with 
Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North 
American Union, which by the same law of nature cannot cast her off 
from its bosom.47  
According to such view, Cuba could be either Spanish or American; no third 
option was envisaged.48 In this regard, Spanish sovereignty over Cuba 
represented an asset for US policymakers, an insurance against the transfer of 
the island to any other foreign or local actor in view of the inevitable absorption 
of Cuba into the American union. By the end of 1869, the Grant administration 
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had formalised this view in the so-called ‘non-transfer’ principle, whereby Cuba 
could not be transferred to any another foreign power.49 The ‘ripe fruit theory’ 
rested on the assumption that the eventual result would be the annexation of 
Cuba, not Cuban independence.50 As summarised by Perez, ‘opposition to 
Cuban independence was a proposition with a past, possessed of a proper 
history, one that served to form and inform the principal policy formulations of 
the nineteenth century’.51 As a result, such view became an ‘inextricable part of 
the American political culture’.52  
The widespread sympathy for the Cuban rebels’ cause within segments of the 
US society and the US support for Cuban independence from Spain was not in 
contradiction with this view. In fact, Cuban independence was conceptualised 
as freedom from Spanish tyranny – not necessarily from US influence. In 
addition, Cuban independence was not inconsistent with a future annexation of 
the island. The expansion of the Union could still be consistent with the tenets 
of the American Liberal formula if resulting from a new state’s request for 
annexation, as in the case of the Republic of Texas, which joined the US ten 
years after its declaration of independence. Thus, US policymakers did not 
consider the use of military force as inevitable to secure control of the island. 
Yet, as the war against Mexico before and soon the new conflict in Cuba made 
clear, a ‘gentle shaking of the tree’ could become necessary to force events and 
ensure a political order in the island conducive to US interests.53 
The overall principles characterising the US political formula and the resulting 
vision of Cuba informed both the Republican and Democratic Party. During the 
1890s, the two major parties appropriated these ideas and symbols for electoral 
purposes. For instance, both the Democratic and Republican party platforms in 
1896 and 1900 included explicit references to the two parties’ adherence to the 
Monroe Doctrine. In 1896, McKinley and the Republicans won the presidential 
elections with a platform that explicitly contained a commitment to diplomatic 
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solution of the Cuban crisis ‘to restore peace and give independence to the 
island’ of Cuba.54   
At the same time, there were differences between the two parties in regard to 
the issue of US expansion. On the one hand, these ideas shaped an expansionist 
‘large policy’ that found fertile soil particularly but not exclusively within the 
Republican Party that gained the presidency in 1896.55 Expansionist ideas 
became influential particularly among the emerging leaders of the party: 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Massachusetts), Senator Albert Beveridge (R-
Indiana), Senator Elihu Root (R-New York), and Theodore Roosevelt.56 On the 
other hand, intra-elite differences materialised when the US political elite was 
faced with the question of which kind of control – annexation to the Union, 
direct colonial rule, protectorate – the US could exercise over territories that 
were not on the continent.57 These tensions produced divisions within the elite 
and provided new rallying cries that could be exploited for political purposes. 
A determined anti-imperialist front emerged, primarily within the Democratic 
Party, which could mobilise public support against the expansionists’ imperial 
dreams by claiming stricter adherence to values embodied in the US republican 
model.58  
However, these differences should not be exaggerated. Despite partisan and 
ideological differences, political elite members framed the situation in similar 
terms of US duty to save Cuba from the oppression and cruelty of Spanish 
colonial rule. In line with the Liberal principles of the general political formula, 
proponents of the ‘large policy’ did not exclude the possibility of a democratic 
and independent evolution for the newly acquired territories after an initial 
phase of US ‘democratic tutelage’. Similarly, although anti-imperialists rejected 
the idea of annexing or colonising foreign communities, they did not advocate a 
radical isolation for the US. On the contrary, they accepted forms of economic 
and cultural influence, supported the Cuban fight for independence and, 
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importantly, favoured forms of limited humanitarian intervention.59 In this 
sense, humanitarian motivations could provide a legitimate rationale for 
intervention, a politically sensible compromise solution. By expressing the 
higher motivation of US intervention, humanitarism reaffirmed the exceptional 
nature of the US mission abroad whilst forging a domestic consensus between 
the expansionists and the sceptics of American expansion.60  
In the early stage of the internal conflict in Cuba, the US general political 
formula shaped in important ways the possibility of political dialogue with the 
three factions that composed the Cuban counter-elite contesting Spanish 
authority on the island. First, wealthy Creoles supporting the fight against 
Spain looked favourably to a possible annexation of the island to the US as a 
way to guarantee the existing social order in Cuba in case of Spanish 
withdrawal. For a second group composed of moderate separatists, 
independence represented a long-term objective that required a transition 
period under US guidance or protectorate. A third faction, the independentistas, 
sought outright independence not only from Spain but also from the US. This 
last group coalesced around three institutions: Jose Marti’s Partido 
Revolucionario Cubano (PRC); the Liberation Army (LA) conducting military 
operations against Spain on the island led by general Maximo Gomez and its 
second-in-command Antonio Maceo; and, the insurgents’ provisional 
government.61 Marti’s premature death in May 1895 deprived the insurgents of 
a charismatic political leader yet his ideas remained highly influential, 
gradually reducing the space for annexationist and moderate positions within 
the Cuban political formula after Spanish withdrawal.62 
The control exerted by independentistas over the revolutionary organisations 
conducting the rebellion in Cuba, primarily the LA, significantly limited the 
possibility of a full-fledged cooperation between the US and Cuban military 
leadership as the idea of Cuban independence went against the image of Cuba’s 
future held by the American elite. US leaders and the independentistas simply 
held competing claims over Cuba that could not be reconciled. Furthermore, the 
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rebels’ tactics per se – a scorched-earth policy aimed at destroying the economic 
base of the Cuban economy as to reduce Spanish revenues and the resource 
base of the annexationist forces – reinforced US misgivings about them.63 Not 
surprisingly, former president Cleveland saw in the LA men ‘the most inhuman 
and barbarous cutthroats in the world’.64 Concerns for an eventual victory of the 
rebels coupled with racial considerations had initially led US policymakers to 
value continued Spanish authority on the island. As Secretary of State Olney 
expressed to the Spanish ambassador de Lome in April 1896, the administration 
feared that a possible Spanish withdrawal might lead to a civil strife along 
racial lines between the rebels, the ‘establishment of white and black republic’ 
on the island and an inevitable and prolonged conflict between the two.65 As a 
result, both Cleveland and McKinley maintained US policy of non-recognition 
of the rebels. Importantly, by enforcing its proclaimed neutrality in the conflict, 
the McKinley administration put considerable obstacles to the provision of aid 
and military support from US private actors to the Cuban rebels.66 At the same 
time, however, the presence of annexationist and moderate positions among the 
Cuban counter-elite provided the American elite with potentially valuable 
interlocutors. 
 
 
Power Struggle: The Primacy of Cuba and of Domestic Politics 
The sense of inevitability of the eventual acquisition of Cuba permeating US 
policymakers’ views and the obstacles to full-fledged cooperation with Cuban 
independentistas shaped the US elite’s preference for an initial non-
interventionist policy exemplified by McKinley’s conviction that time would 
have eventually forced Spain to give up Cuba.67 At the same time, the caution of 
the McKinley administration resulted from the interplay between international 
and domestic competition. 
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The international struggle for power taking place on a global scale at the end of 
the 19th Century among great powers shaped US policy in indirect ways. 
Contrary to Realist accounts, Cuba represented neither an easy opportunity to 
grasp for its expansionist aims nor an irrational deviation from US strategic 
interests. First, US ambitions over Spanish colonies in the Pacific, usually 
ascribed to the need to secure coaling stations for the navy and access to Asian 
markets, should not be overstated.68 In all contingency plans devised by the US 
Navy before 1898, military operations against Spanish units stationed in the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico were considered in conjunction to the main 
operations against Spanish forces in Cuba and the objective of securing an early 
termination of the conflict with Spain.69 Expansion towards the Pacific derived 
primarily from the rapid – and not entirely foretold – collapse of the Spanish 
forces. International competition shaped US decisions primarily after the 
conflict, creating a powerful incentive to retain US control over these territories 
once they were acquired. As McKinley explained, ‘it is no longer a question of 
expansion with us; we have expanded. If there is any question at all, it is a 
question of contracting; and who is going to contract?’70 
Second, US military plans mirrored the importance of Cuba for both US 
political leaders and strategists. Primarily because of its position guarding the 
main sea lanes of the Caribbean Sea and the estuary of the Mississippi, Cuba 
represented a ‘strategic key’ to the nation’s Gulf coast, essential to safeguard the 
main outlet for the goods originating from the American inland.71 A 1895 
document prepared by the US Naval War College considered ‘the strategic 
relation of Cuba to the United States in a military and naval way’ as 
‘invaluable’.72 In this sense, Cuba did not represent an irrational deviation from 
US national interests as suggested by the early Classical Realist critique, at least 
not in the way in which US policymakers defined US interests at the time.  
In case, considerations of the international setting in which the US operated 
reinforced US caution in the early stage of the Cuban War of Independence. 
First, despite the increase in US power, the US Army still did not exceed 30.000 
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men in 1898 whereas Spain could count on at least 150.000 troops in Cuba 
supported by local loyal units.73 Second, fear of possible European interventions 
heightened US concerns over Cuba. Spain’s inability to restore order in the 
island represented a source of concern for Washington since it could lead either 
to a European multilateral intervention following Spanish invitation or, more 
worryingly, to the transfer of Cuba to another European power. American fears 
were also exacerbated by Spanish initiatives aimed to enlist the support of the 
other European powers in solving the Cuban crisis.74 
However, Spanish calls for European support did not bear any fruit mainly for 
two reasons. During 1896 and 1897, the US not only contrasted Spanish 
diplomatic initiatives to secure European support but also sought to ease 
European fears concerning Washington’s objectives in Cuba, denying its 
intention to either annex or establish a protectorate over Cuba.75 Importantly, 
the emerging British-American alignment prevented any decisive British action 
against the United States. Lacking British support, Russia, France, and Germany 
did not oppose US plans, thus removing a key obstacle to an eventual American 
intervention.76 With European powers out of the equation, the main challenge to 
US interests in Cuba were limited to both Spanish and Cuban provisional 
authorities. Within this increasingly permissive international setting, pressures 
emanating from domestic considerations gradually took centre stage in US 
policymakers’ calculations.  
In particular, domestic politics played a key role in pushing the US towards an 
increasingly interventionary policy.77 The Cuban rebellion aroused strong and 
contrasting sentiments in different segments of the American society. On the 
one hand, lower social classes and discriminated groups – blacks, farmers in the 
West and workers – identified with the Cubans’ fight against oppression and 
actively supported their cause. This in turn took place in the midst of the 
heightened social tensions that characterised the 1890s and that involved 
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primarily these social groups.78 On the other hand, Cuba represented the perfect 
cause for the more nationalist elements in the United States that could spark an 
uncontainable jingoist surge.79 Therefore, by mobilising its political extremes, 
the Cuban crisis essentially problematised the US elite’s rule over an already 
turbulent society that was still experiencing the dislocating effects of rapid 
industrialisation, depression, and deep social changes. These concerns found 
expression also in official documents. In the instructions prepared in July 1897 
for the new US Minister to Spain, Stewart Woodward, the State Department 
clarified that the possibility of military intervention could not be eschewed due 
not only to the conflict’s economic and humanitarian consequences but also to 
its impact on the US domestic context. As stated in the instructions,  
the chronic condition of trouble and violent derangement in that island 
constantly causes disturbance in the social and political condition of our 
own people. It keeps up a continuous irritation within our own 
borders...80  
The attachment of significant segments of the working classes and Western 
farmers to the Cuban cause was particularly consequential to domestic elite 
politics. Workers and farmers, together with new immigrants, represented the 
constituencies providing the bases for the emergence of the People’s or Populist 
Party in 1891. In the context of 1898, Populism and the support of these social 
constituencies could still play an important role. The previous presidential 
election of 1896 saw American politics overcome the strict margins of the 
Gilded Age, in a heated contest between the Republican McKinley and the 
Democrat William Jennings Bryan, endorsed by the People’s Party. Despite 
their presidential victory, the Republicans lost ground in the West as well as 
among the workers’ vote in the North, which represented not only those social 
groups that helped the Republicans secure a landslide in 1894 but also those 
groups that identified with the plight of the Cubans rebels. These results, in 
turn, indicated to the incumbent party that the Democratic-Populist alignment 
led by Bryan could still represent a significant challenge in view of the 1898 
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midterm elections and the presidential elections of 1900.81 Not surprisingly, the 
Democrats used the Cuban card against the Republican administration in order 
to intercept the discontent of the lower classes. For instance, the Democrats 
accused McKinley of not intervening in Cuba given the president’s disinterest 
in stopping the killing of lower classes in Cuba.82 
The fear of losing the support of these constituencies in favour of the Democrats 
raised significant concerns among Republican ranks. The 1897 off-off year 
elections already provided negative indications to the Republicans.83 Political 
concerns for the domestic consequences of the Cuban conflict translated into 
specific pressures within the Republican Party where McKinley’s inaction over 
Cuba fuelled internal divisions.84 As Senator Lodge made clear to McKinley in 
discussing the need for the president’s leadership on Cuba,  
whether that lead will be given is the crucial question. If it is not we shall 
go to pieces with bitter debates in Congress, party divisions and the 
consequent ruin of the party…if the break comes…we shall all go down 
in the wreck, Senator[s] and Representatives alike.85  
Democrats took advantage of McKinley’s inaction to criticise the president’s 
non-intervention and ongoing negotiations ‘with the butchers of Spain’.86 
Republican pressures to take a more active role in Cuba became particularly 
pressing after the events of February 1898.87 At the end of March 1898, Lodge 
restated the point in a letter to McKinley: 
 if the war in Cuba drags on through the summer with nothing 
 done…we shall go down in the greatest defeat ever known…, it will be 
 deadly. I know that it is easily and properly said that to bring on or  even 
 threaten war for political reasons is a crime and I quite agree. But to 
 sacrifice a great party…for a wrong policy is hardly less odious.88  
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Expressing these concerns, forty members of the Republican caucus asked 
McKinley to act to avoid a likely electoral defeat.89  
Thus, partisan competition compelled McKinley to act and recalibrate US policy 
toward Cuba in more interventionist terms to: ensure the cohesion of the 
Republican Party and its survival;90 and counter a possible Democratic-Populist 
resurgence led by Bryan in the upcoming 1898 midterm and 1900 presidential 
elections.91 This last objective was evident already in July 1898: on the same day 
in which John Hay was famously congratulating Theodore Roosevelt for the 
administration’s ‘splendid little war’ in Cuba, the future Secretary of State in a 
letter to Lodge could exclaim: ‘how splendidly things have moved our way! I 
do not see the ghost of a chance of Bryanism in the next few years’.92 Yet, while 
domestic push factors help explain the increased interests towards Cuba in 
1898, they do not explain why intervention was authorised in the spring of that 
year. In this regard, elite relations are of fundamental importance to explain US 
concerns in the critical juncture of March 1898. 
 
 
Elite Relations: A Success of the Cuban Counter-elite? 
The political context shaped by the Cuban crisis made the US political leaders 
particularly responsive to the views of the Cuban actors involved as well as to 
initiatives of the Cuban counter-elite. In particular, the Cuban counter-elite 
facilitated US intervention in two ways.  
First, Cuban Creoles looked favourably to US guidance. Following the sugar 
boom and the dislocating effects of the Ten Years War (1868-78) on the island, 
the Creole upper class became increasingly dependent on the US market and 
investments. Many of its members took US citizenship and were educated in 
the US, granting them access and exposure to US policymaking and values.93 
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Linked to American society via multiple channels, the Cuban upper class saw in 
Washington a possible guarantee for their own socio-economic position in Cuba 
against the more radical elements of the revolution. As a consequence, the more 
Spanish control over the island weakened the more the idea of US control of the 
island became attractive to them.94 In contrast to what predicted by John Quincy 
Adams, it was not Cuba itself that was finally falling into the hands of US 
leaders; it was its Creole elite and its representatives within the Cuban 
revolutionary leadership that were gravitating towards the US. 
As much as the Cuban Creole elite gravitated toward the US, US leaders began 
to gravitate toward them identifying in this group the most suitable elements to 
both administer the island after the end of Spanish rule and secure channels for 
US influence.95 US policymakers increasingly acquired the perspective of the 
Cuban Creoles. The Creoles’ views influenced US policymaking mainly through 
the US consul in Habana whose main local intelligence sources were 
represented by Creoles and the Habana urban elite. Moreover, US 
policymakers’ missions and reports from Cuba in 1897 proved extremely 
influential in reinforcing the emerging consensus within the political elite 
regarding the Cuban actors involved in the fight. Submitted in July 1897, the 
report of William Calhoun highlighted two important elements: the limits of the 
rebel insurgency and of its leadership; and, the fact that Cuban Creoles 
welcomed US intervention, favouring some form of US hegemony if not 
outright annexation to the LA’s control of the island.96 As they looked at Cuba 
through the eyes of the local upper class, US policymakers inevitably 
overestimated the political role the Cuban annexationists and moderates could 
play whilst underestimating the support enjoyed by the leaders of the Cuban 
independentistas.97 As a result, the US locked itself into a potentially useful yet 
problematic relationship with local actors whose ability to exercise control over 
Cuba was hampered by their wealth and distance from other social groups, 
particularly the small peasants that made up the bulk of the LA.98  
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Second, Cuban representatives in the US actively promoted the Cuban cause 
and reinforced US views given their predominantly annexationist and 
moderate positions. To secure American recognition and support, already in 
September 1985 the Cuban provisional government decided to rely on the PRC 
leaders in New York to act as the Cuban revolution’s representatives in the US. 
The so called New York junta was led by Tomas Estrada Palma and included 
Gonzalo de Quesada, Ricardo Diaz Albertini, Benjamin Guerra, and Horatio 
Rubens, a US lawyer that had previously represented Marti.99 Giving expression 
to those positions that sought annexation to the US at maximum, a US 
protectorate at minimum, these representatives fostered the idea that calls for 
Cuban independence – that is, independence from Spain – could be compatible 
with the eventual US control of the island. In doing so, they became a politically 
valuable interlocutor for Washington.  
The New York junta played a crucial role in this regard. First, it fuelled a pro-
Cuban sentiment in segments of the American society, for example by 
providing the sensationalist ‘yellow press’ with reports on Spanish atrocities on 
the island that were often published without any confirmation of their 
accuracy.100 This was accompanied by an extensive propaganda campaign 
through the distribution of pamphlets and the organisation of events, such as 
the so called ‘sympathy meetings’.101 Notably, the junta was responsible for 
leaking de Lome’s letter to Hearst’s New York Journal, sparking a diplomatic 
incident between the US and Spain and arousing anti-Spanish sentiments in the 
American public opinion.102 Second, the junta succeeded in establishing direct 
relations with members of the US political elite. Whilst Estrada Palma operated 
in New York, another member of the junta, de Quesada, worked in Washington 
where he established fruitful contacts with US Congressmen of the two major 
parties, such as Senator Lodge, John Morgan (D-Alabama), and Joseph Bailey 
(D-Texas), leader of the House Democrats.103 Although it is difficult to prove the 
exact impact of the junta’s pressures on US policymakers, it is noteworthy that 
after 1896 US Congressmen in contact with the junta began to support 
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resolutions in favour of the insurgents’ cause.104 Notably, Cuban pressures 
favoured the inclusion of the Cuban issue in the 1896 Republican platform and 
the promotion of non-binding resolutions in the Congress such as the Morgan-
Cameron resolution in early 1896, requesting the administration to grant 
belligerent rights and support to the rebels.105 
The impact of the junta’s actions is exemplified also by Spanish authorities’ 
repeated attempts to limit its influence. Already in 1896, Spanish Prime 
Minister Antonio Cánovas asked Secretary of State Olney to counter the views 
spread by the Cuban delegation and complained about the liberty accorded to 
its members.106 In October 1897, Madrid asked the US to halt the junta’s ‘armed 
hostility and constant provocation against the Spanish nation’.107 Still in January 
1898, the Spanish Queen Regent asked the US President ‘to destroy the Junta of 
New York.’108 Finally, in the infamous de Lome’s letter, the Spanish ambassador 
asked Madrid to ‘send…a man of importance that I may use…to create 
propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta and to 
win over exiles’.109  
 
 
The Decision to Intervene: ‘Neutral’ Intervention 
Elite dynamics gradually led the US from a non-interventionist stance toward a 
more activist and intrusive policy toward Cuba. Yet, this did not automatically 
translate into US military intervention. McKinley’s reluctance to intervene at the 
end of 1897 despite mounting political pressures resulted from the plan of 
reforms issued by the new Spanish government of Praxedes Mateo Sagasta, 
which opened the possibility for a peaceful solution of the crisis. As a result of 
the assassination of the Spanish Prime Minister Canovas, in November 1897 the 
newly proclaimed Liberal government of Sagasta pledged autonomy for Cuba 
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in a an effort to win the consent of the more moderate wing of the Cuban 
separatist movement. In addition, Sagasta recalled Weyler in Spain and 
eventually terminated the reconcentrado policy.110  
The contrast between the calls for intervention and the possibility of a peaceful 
solution of the conflict offered by Sagasta’s reform plan were evident in 
McKinley’s annual message to the Congress in December 1897. In his speech, 
McKinley confirmed the US refusal to recognise the insurgents as belligerents. 
The president also identified two possible military options for the US: either 
‘intervention in favour of one or the other party’, without specifying whether in 
favour of the Cuban rebels or of Spain; or ‘a neutral intervention to end the war 
by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants’, in other words a 
form of unilateral intervention to enforce Washington’s preferred solution to 
the conflict.111 At the time, McKinley discarded these two possibilities in order 
to give the new Spanish government sufficient time to put in effect the 
proposed autonomy plan. In this sense, US non-intervention was dependent on 
the achievement of concrete results through reforms. As McKinley made clear, 
US intervention would ensue in case of failure of the Spanish efforts.112 
However, Sagasta’s reforms backfired. On the one hand, the Creole upper class 
began to look even more favourably to a US protectorate as the new Cuban 
Assembly established by Sagasta’s reforms did not provide the Cubans with 
any real political power.113 On the other hand, the weakening of Spanish 
sovereignty on the island raised concerns among the Spanish property holders 
and soldiers in Cuba, the so called voluntarios: the former increasingly requested 
an American intervention and protectorate to avoid the establishment an 
independent Cuba headed by the PRC and LA leaders; the latter mutinied 
sparking widespread riots in January 1898.114 The events ignited by the munity 
of the voluntarios in Cuba (January-April 1898) are of central importance as they 
represent the critical juncture in which the US decided to intervene. They 
highlight the important role played by developments in Cuba and how US 
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leaders reacted primarily to concerns regarding the Cuban counter-elite. At the 
same time, the critical antecedents examined in the previous section shed light 
on the form taken by US intervention as well as on the immediate objectives 
sought in Cuba after the end of hostilities with Spain.  
The revolt of the voluntarios raised fears in Washington about possible anti-US 
riots and led the administration to authorise the dispatch of the battleship Maine 
to Havana, whose accidental explosion on 15th February offered a casus belli for 
US intervention.115 Rather than Spanish complicity, what both the explosion of 
the Maine and the previous riots highlighted to US policymakers was the 
diminishing control exerted by Spanish authorities over the island and the 
possibility of a further erosion of Spanish authority that could pave the way for 
further advances of the LA, whose forces were benefiting from General 
Weyler’s removal. The instability produced by Spanish reforms stressed the 
need for more incisive measures on the part of the US. At the same time, Lodge 
and the other members of the Republican Party increasingly pressured the 
administration to act. On 9th March 1898, Congress authorised $50 million in 
military appropriation and subsequently the dispatch of additional naval units 
to the Caribbean.116 
Military intervention was hastened also by the impossibility at this stage of 
achieving US objectives through diplomatic means alone. In March 1898, 
McKinley attempted a final diplomatic plan that would have put the US as the 
arbiter of the Spanish-Cuban conflict.117 Despite US pressures, both the junta 
and LA leaders rejected a last American diplomatic initiative, stressing the 
limited political and material tools Washington controlled to influence the 
Cuban counter-elite.118 In the meantime, the report of Senator Redfield Proctor 
(R-Vermont) proved extremely influential in forging a consensus within the 
political elite and the broader ruling elite over the need for US action in Cuba. 
On 17th March 1898, Senator Proctor offered a diagnosis of the situation in Cuba, 
drawing attention to four important elements: the human costs of the war of 
independence; the impossibility for both sides to win the conflict; the costs 
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brought by a continuation of the conflict on the island; and, the limited costs of 
an eventual US operation. The speech had great resonance both within 
Congress and within the business community. By presenting the conflict in 
Cuba as a struggle for freedom and by stressing the costs of a continuation of 
the conflict on the island and the viability of an American intervention, 
Proctor’s report succeeded in erasing the remaining concerns within the 
political and economic elite over the use of force.119  
Given the impossibility of a diplomatic solution to the crisis, concerns for the 
eventual collapse of the Spanish authority and possible LA victory compelled 
the US government to act quickly. Within the historical debate on the subject, a 
general consensus lacks on whether these concerns were real and supported by 
actual developments in Cuba or whether the contestants had reached a de facto 
stalemate on the ground.120 Public speeches and reports, such as Proctor’s 
report, described the situation in Cuba in terms of a stalemate. Similarly, in his 
11th April war message, McKinley argued that ‘a final military victory for either 
side seems impracticable’.121 Zakaria, on the contrary, stresses the impending 
surrender of Spanish forces and how this provided the US with the opportunity 
to intervene at a moment when the Spanish challenge was receding.122 Yet, these 
two interpretations result from two different evaluations: on the one hand, a 
tactical assessment of the military balance on the island; on the other hand, a 
strategic assessment of Spain’s position. While Spanish military forces and the 
LA had reached a de facto stalemate on the island, this essentially equalled to a 
strategic defeat for Spain. As US policymakers admitted in diplomatic 
dispatches, three years of conflict and two years of reconcentration policy made 
clear that Spanish forces could not defeat the rebellion. The poor conditions of 
the Spanish forces and their failure to launch a new offensive in January 1898 
simply confirmed the point. The instability produced by Spanish reforms on the 
island had already made US concerns more concrete, stressing the need for 
more incisive measures on the part of the US.123 In particular, the US needed to 
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act before May, that is: before the start of the rainy season on the island, when 
the US feared the Spanish army could not sustain a renewed offensive of the 
LA; and, before the scheduled local elections on the island envisaged by 
Sagasta’s reform plan. Faced with the prospect of the LA’s victory and of an 
independent Cuba ruled by a local leadership not favourable to Washington yet 
legitimised by the upcoming elections, the administration opted for direct 
intervention.124 
McKinley requested the authorisation to intervene in his message to Congress 
on 11th April. McKinley’s message is revealing of how the same elite dynamics 
that led the US towards intervention, particularly pattern of elite relations, 
informed also the actual form taken by US intervention. First, the 
administration refused to recognise the Cuban provisional authorities in order 
to maintain US autonomy in the ensuing operations and avoid negotiating US 
objectives with the LA and the Cuban provisional government. Simply put, the 
administration was rejecting the possibility of an outright alliance with the LA 
and the Cuban provisional authorities. As McKinley explained,  
to commit this country now to the recognition of any particular 
government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of 
international obligations toward the organization so recognized. In case 
of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or 
disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its 
direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.125  
Second, the president called for a ‘forcible intervention of the United States as a 
neutral’. As such, US intervention would involve ‘hostile constraints upon both 
the parties to the contest as well as to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual 
settlement’.126 In this sense, the US intervention not only took place within a 
context of multiple sovereignty but was also intended to defuse the competing 
claims of sovereignty on the island and enforce an American one over Cuba.127 
Finally, the only solution to the Cuban crisis was identified in the ‘enforced 
pacification’ of the island and the ‘establishment of a stable government, 
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capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, 
insuring peace and tranquillity…’.128  
McKinley’s message responded also to internal political considerations. First, 
the Cuban crisis itself, McKinley reminded its audience, entailed political 
consequences at home which intervention would solve: 
the temper and forbearance of our people have been so sorely tried as to 
beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens which has inevitably 
found its expression from time to time in the National Legislature.129   
Second, to bridge the gap between the expansionists and the anti-imperialists 
and gain consensus within the Democratic camp, McKinley stressed three 
aspects: the continuity of the proposed action with the precedents set by former 
presidents, particularly Democratic ones; the noble cause of the Cuban 
revolution portrayed as a struggle for freedom of a ‘dependent people’; and the 
humanitarian concerns driving US action. As indicated in the address, the US 
was intervening ‘according to the large dictates of humanity’ to ‘put an end to 
the barbarities’.130  
Congress authorised the president to intervene with the Joint Resolution of 20th 
April 1898. In doing so, it also approved the Teller Amendment impeding the 
US to exercise direct sovereignty over the island after its pacification. While 
apparently inconsistent with the longstanding US objectives in Cuba by 
rejecting the possibility to annex the island, the adoption of the Teller 
amendment responded to political considerations. First and foremost, its pledge 
of eventual Cuban independence proved useful to secure support for 
Washington’s intervention from both the anti-imperialist camp within the US 
elite as well as from the junta and the LA.131 Further, the amendment did not 
deprive the US from the possibility of establishing forms of indirect control over 
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Cuba nor the possibility of an eventual annexation via Cuban request, that is 
with the consent of Cuban leaders.132 As Jules Benjamin points out, annexation 
was still possible through ‘a natural rather than a forced process...Nobody 
spoke of ruling the island (for very long) without the consent of its people. The 
trick was to obtain that consent’.133  
This meant primarily the establishment of a new political order on the island in 
line with US interests and values. According to Senator Joseph Foraker (R-
Ohio), the US promise of independence to the Cubans ‘did not mean that we 
would or should be indifferent as to the kind of government they established’. 
Similarly, for Senator Orville Platt (R-Connecticut), pacification ultimately 
meant a specific type of government, precisely the ‘establishment in that island 
of a government capable of adequately protecting life, liberty and property’.134 
For these reasons, the eventual composition of the new Cuban elite became a 
critical concern for the administration; ensuring the control of Cuba to the pro-
American segments of the Cuban counter-elite became necessary to keep the 
door open to American influence and an eventual request of annexation. In this 
regard, the concomitant rejection of the Turpie-Foraker Amendment, requesting 
US recognition of the existing revolutionary institutions on the island, avoided 
empowering those Cuban actors contrary to annexation or a US protectorate.135 
In line with the traditional US policy towards Cuba, the US political elite 
recognised the Cubans’ right to independence but not Cuba’s revolutionary 
institutions. Put differently, the US was intervening in favour of the 
revolution’s basic objective, i.e. the expulsion of Spain, but not of its 
revolutionary leaders. 
Elite dynamics also shaped the US mobilisation effort and eventually the 
modality of US operations. First, domestic political considerations influenced 
military mobilisation. Whilst the US Navy enjoyed a significant build-up during 
the 1880s and 1890s, the US Army consisted only of 28.000 men in the first 
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months of 1898.136 The risks of engaging the 150.000 Spanish troops present in 
Cuba were obvious, especially for an army whose main operations after the 
Civil War had been conducted primarily within US borders against relatively 
small-sized contingents of Native Americans. An expansion of the US army was 
therefore necessary. However, Southern Democrats and Populists blocked the 
possibility of creating an all regular army mainly out of concerns for its possible 
internal use.137 To obviate these obstacles and take advantage of the widespread 
enthusiasm for the war, McKinley issued a call for 125.000 volunteers to be 
added to the regular army and the estimated 100.000 men of the National 
Guard. By May, the US government succeeded in recruiting 200.442 volunteers 
later assigned to the regular army, the National Guard and to all-volunteers 
units, the most famous of which was represented by the 1st United States 
Cavalry Volunteer led by Brigadier General Leonard Wood and Theodore 
Roosevelt, better known as the Rough Riders.138 In addition, the administration 
took advantage of the mobilisation efforts to foster its electoral position among 
those groups it lost in the 1896 elections: military expenditures were channelled 
in a naval build-up that provided employment for northern workers; the 
budgetary surplus was invested in the West to gain consensus in the Populist 
strongholds.139 
Second, the US military had to adapt its contingency plans in Cuba in order to 
take into account both the non-recognition of the Cuban LA and the political 
interests of the administration. All pre-1898 military plans prepared by the US 
Naval War College and Navy Department were centred on the possibility of 
indirect intervention in Cuba, providing military aid to support the land 
operations conducted by the LA.140 The administration’s non-recognition of the 
rebels, however, led to the abandonment of US plans for indirect intervention 
despite the reduced military costs and risks involved compared to a direct 
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ground intervention of the US Army.141 Cooperation with the LA remained 
limited at the tactical level throughout the US operations on the island. The US 
army relied on the LA men mainly for support roles and as guides, leaving 
Cuban troops outside US major military engagements. Military relations 
between the two forces increased US doubts about Cuban rebel’s ability to rule 
Cuba and reinforced longstanding racial stereotypes about the rebels.142 Finally, 
the decision to land US forces in the Eastern province of Cuba, instead of the 
closer Northern shores, stemmed from the administration’s intention to engage 
with the bulk of Spanish troops and end the operations as quickly as possible in 
order to focus on the campaign pledges in view of the November 1898 midterm 
elections.143  
On 14th June, US troops landed at Guantanamo Bay, Daiquiri and Siboney, with 
the major battles taking place in Las Guasimas, El Caney and San Juan Hill 
between 24th June and 1st July. Finally, between 3rd and 16th July, US naval units 
destroyed the Spanish fleet in Santiago, leading to a quick Spanish surrender. 
Often uncritically attributed primarily to the superiority of US forces, the rapid 
Spanish defeat on all theatres of operations derived from a more complex set of 
factors: the poor choices made by Spanish commanders; the logistical problems 
experienced by the Spanish navy in operating on long distances; the 
devastating impact that three years of counterinsurgency campaign against the 
LA; and, the effects of the yellow fever on the organisation and morale of 
Spanish troops.144 Following US landings in Puerto Rico, an armistice was 
declared on 12th August with negotiations finalised in December 1898 with the 
Treaty of Paris. Significantly, the US excluded the LA and PRC representatives 
from both the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Paris as well as from the 
ceremony for the official transfer of power to American authorities in Habana. 
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After Intervention: Selecting the Cuban Elite 
Elite dynamics shed light also on the subsequent steps the administration took 
in Cuba as well as on the underlying objective of securing a favourable political 
elite on the island. In turn, the latter provide additional evidence of the ‘roll-on’ 
effects exerted by the elite dynamics highlighted in the previous sections. 
On 1st January 1899, the government of the island was officially transferred to a 
US military administration led by Major General John R. Brooke. The 
Philippines insurrection begun in February 1899, however, raised concerns in 
Washington over a similar outcome in Cuba and immediately led the 
administration to reconsider its military presence on the island.145 American 
fears in this regard were substantiated in the fall of 1899 when rumours 
concerning the US plan to establish an American permanent civilian 
government in Cuba sparked demonstrations in Habana. Contemporarily, the 
strengthening of the anti-imperialist camp in Washington further stressed the 
political risks the administration could incur, particularly the risk of a 
Democratic victory in the 1900 presidential elections.146 As summarised by the 
journalist and historian Henry Adams in February 1899,  
the President and everybody else are almost as eager to get out of Cuba 
as they were a year ago to get into it. They are as docile as lambs. The 
thought of another Manila at Havana sobers even an army-contractor. If 
the Democrats were united….I think Bryan might be President after 
all…147  
In the autumn of 1899, Elihu Root, the newly appointed Secretary of War, 
accelerated US efforts to militarily disengage from the island, reducing 
American troops from 45.000 men to 11.000 men by the end of 1899. At the same 
time, Root stepped up US plans to establish an effective ‘suitable government’ 
in Habana with the appointment on 20th December 1899 of Leonard Wood as 
the new military governor of Cuba to replace the more moderate General 
Brooke.148 Wood led US efforts into two directions.  
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The US quickly began a process of Americanisation of the island through 
economic and ideological intervention.149 US economic intervention consisted 
primarily of economic investments in Cuba and eventually the signing of the 
Reciprocity Treaty in 1903, opening up the US market to Cuban cane sugar and 
the Cuban market to US products.150 In addition, the military government on 
the island made significant efforts to promote American values in Cuba. 
Similarly to what US authorities were implementing in Puerto Rico and the 
Philippines, the US sought to shape the political culture of the Cuban elite and 
of its society.151 In particular, the US identified in the educational system the 
most important conduit for channelling US values in Cuba, promoting the 
establishment of Protestant schools on the island as well as training 
programmes for Cuban teachers in the US. These initiatives were aimed at 
reducing the cultural and social heterogeneity between the two polities and 
showing Cubans the benefits of joining the American polity.152 
At the same time, the US acted swiftly to favour the emergence of a pro-US 
political elite that could guarantee US influence over Cuba.  This process took 
three forms. First, the US disbanded the LA and dissolved the existing 
revolutionary institutions on the island. In a classic example of divide-and-rule 
tactic, the McKinley administration took advantage of the ongoing tensions 
between the civilian leadership of the Cuban revolution, coalesced under the 
new Cuban Assembly of Santa Cruz, and the LA, intentioned to bypass the 
authority of the Assembly and already working through the New York junta to 
secure a direct channel of communication with the US administration. The 
administration first isolated the Cuban Assembly and subsequently negotiated 
the disbandment of the LA directly with general Gomez. Gomez accepted the 
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US offer in exchange of a direct presidential guarantee for Cuban independence 
in order to facilitate the pacification of the island and eliminate the conditions 
that prevented the US to fulfil the pledge included in the Teller Amendment. 
Yet, the deal made the LA increasingly dependent on the US, as Washington 
provided the necessary support for the maintenance of the LA, setting up a $3 
million fund for its demobilisation. Left outside the agreement and ostracised 
by both the military leadership and the junta in New York, the Assembly 
became increasingly marginal and was dissolved in March 1899.153 
Second, the US co-opted both former Cuban exiles and members of the New 
York junta within the newly established civilian administration set by US 
authorities in Cuba.154 Of the four departments of the civilian administration 
established by the US, three went to former members of the junta and of the 
PRC in New York; only one to a leader of the Assembly.155 As pointed out by 
Perez, ‘in selecting Cubans from the expatriate ranks, Americans recruited allies 
from within the most ideologically compatible sector of the separatist polity’.156 
In addition, in order to fill the gap left by Spanish forces and the LA, the US 
reorganised Cuban military forces into the newly established Rural Guard and 
helped train its new military elite.157  
Third, the US military government in Cuba oversaw the process of institution 
building of the new Cuban republic to ensure a political order in the island 
compatible with the American model and to support those elements that 
favoured close links with the US, namely the Cuban Creoles and annexationists. 
On 25th July 1900, the US started the process for the selection of the Cuba’s 
Constitutional Convention. In this regard, US authorities actively interfered 
with the political competition in Cuba, which revolved around three 
formations: the Union Democratica, which included the upper class 
representatives and controlled the conservative vote; the Nationalist Party, 
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supported by Maximo Gomez, which advocated Cuban independence but also 
included veterans who cooperated with the US military government; and, the 
Federal Republicans of Jose Miguel Gomez, who were contrary to continued US 
presence in the island and controlled most of the black vote. The US provided 
direct support to the Union Democratica, in the hope that they could take 
control of the new Cuban institutions and eventually lead Cuba towards 
annexation.158 For this purpose, the US worked through a form of ‘electoral 
intervention’.159 To counter the Nationalist party in view of the elections for the 
Constitutional Convention scheduled in September, Wood toured the island to 
campaign for what he described as the ‘best men’, that is the conservative 
candidates.160 In addition, given the overall support for US presence among the 
local upper class, the US military administration devised an electoral law that 
limited the franchise via literacy and property requirements, denying the vote 
to two-thirds of all adult men in Cuba. As the only concession made to secure 
the legitimacy of the new electoral law, Wood allowed the right to vote to 
veterans of the LA.161  
However, US efforts in this regard utterly failed. Already at the municipal 
elections of June 1900, the Union Democratica obtained a poor electoral result, 
with the Nationalists winning most of the local competitions thanks to the 
support of the veterans of the LA. The elections for the Constitutional 
Convention in September 1900 resulted in an even more striking defeat for the 
Union Democratica: 30 of the 31 elected members were either Nationalists or 
Federal Republicans, all favouring outright independence.162 The failure of US 
efforts in securing a victory of the Union Democratica sanctioned the failure of 
US projects of annexation by Cuban invitation.163 The defeat of the Union 
Democratica resulted from the influence of the nationalist political formula set 
by Marti within the Cuban society as well as from the Union Democratica’s 
inability to gain the vote of the LA veterans, mainly small peasants who 
actively participated in the destruction of the upper class’ property during the 
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war.164 It also indicated US leaders’ inability to understand the consequences of 
their support to their local allies. The Union Democratica, in fact, suffered from 
its association with the US. In other words, the US support did not provide any 
significant external validation to the Union Democratica; on the contrary, it 
represented a liability for its leaders. In this sense, the US decision to rely on the 
Cuban upper class as its main political interlocutor and get rid of the 
revolutionary institutions pushed American leaders into blind alley. On the one 
hand, it supported a faction on which it could exercise significant influence 
mainly because of shared values and interests but that held scarce political 
legitimacy. On the other hand, this entailed limiting US influence over the 
wider nationalist front, that is the only leaders having political legitimacy 
within Cuban society.165 
As a result, the US had to recalibrate its support toward the more moderate 
independentistas within the Nationalist Party who were willing to cooperate with 
the US. As Wood recollected, in the Convention there were ‘about fifteen men 
of doubtful qualifications and character and about six of the worst rascals and 
fakirs [sic] in Cuba’, yet there were also ‘about ten absolutely first class men’, 
with whom he could still work.166 This possibility of cooperation was also eased 
by the condition of the Cuban elite factions at the time. Deeply divided among 
them and lacking control of the highest positions in Cuba controlled by US 
officials, the Cuban elite factions soon began to seek US support as a way to 
compensate for their own political weakness and enlist Washington in their 
own struggle for power in Cuba.167 The importance of securing American aid 
was exemplified by the presidential elections of 1901, where US support proved 
to be crucial to ensure the election of the former leader of the junta, Estrada 
Palma, as Cuba’s first president. Favoured by the extensive contacts established 
with US political elite members, the US administration fully supported his 
election. On the contrary, Wood contrasted Estrada Palma’s main opponent, 
General Bartolome Maso, who advocated less strict relations with the US.168  
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Finally, in order to secure US influence on more permanent bases before 
withdrawal, the administration pushed for the approval of the so-called Platt 
Amendment.169 Attached to the new Cuban constitution, the amendment 
formalised an American protectorate on the island by guaranteeing US control 
over Cuban foreign policy as well as basing rights. Importantly, the 
amendment’s Article III allowed the US to directly influence the new political 
order established on the island. In this regard, it accorded the US an 
unprecedented ‘right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, 
the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, 
and individual liberty’.170 Once approved, the US proceeded with the 
withdrawal of its troops and the proclamation of the new Cuban Republic on 
20th May 1902 with the former junta leader Estrada Palma as its first president.171 
 
 
Conclusions: The Consequences of Intervention 
The present case study has examined the role played by elite dynamics 
operating at three different levels in shaping the US decision to intervene. First, 
the core ideas of the American political creed defined Cuba as a primary 
objective for US political leaders. Cuba came to represent a political prize that 
specific international and domestic conditions allowed the Republican Party to 
grasp. At the same time, the challenge posed by the competing formula of the 
Cuban independentistas significantly reduced the possibility of cooperation 
between Washington and one of the leading Cuban factions, despite the 
military and strategic rationale for increased cooperation with the LA in an anti-
Spanish function. As noted in Chapter 3, not just antithetic but also competing 
political formulas can reduce the room for diplomatic and political relations 
among elite groups when such ideological claims serve the legitimacy and 
political support enjoyed by elite groups.  
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Second, Cuba’s future mattered not only in ideological and strategic terms. 
Cuba mattered also for the ongoing political confrontation in Washington, 
primarily for the Republicans concerned by a rising Democratic opposition that 
was using the Cuban card to gain control of US institutions. Military 
intervention in Cuba secured not only US elite’s control over the island and the 
wider region, but also reinforced the Republicans’ domestic position. In this 
regard, intervention served a twofold objective: establishing an American order 
over Cuba and the Caribbean; and, securing Republican control in 
Washington.172  
Third, contrary to historical and theoretical explanations focusing primarily on 
causal factors originating in the US or in its relations with Spain, Cuban 
political actors played a decisive role in favouring US intervention. The role 
played by the Cuban counter-elite needs to be taken into account in order to 
develop more accurate explanations of the drivers of US intervention, its 
timing, and the objectives sought by the US on the island during the 
occupation. The timing and modality of US intervention resulted from the 
interplay of elite politics and relations between Washington and Habana, 
favouring military intervention in two ways: first, these dynamics foreclosed 
spaces for cooperation between the US and the Cuban revolutionaries; second, 
they favoured the identification of shared interests between US policymakers 
and those Cuban actors and representatives favouring US presence in Cuba. 
The US intervened when all other options to secure its influence over Cuba 
failed and when faced with the prospects of a possible LA victory. As a result, 
the US intervened bypassing the LA and Cuban provisional institutions, while 
acting to secure the power position of its local allies. Who ruled Cuba mattered 
for US policymakers and intervention, despite all its limits on the ground, 
served the purpose of selecting the new political authorities of the island. 
The consequences of the Cuban intervention for the US were significant. First, 
by fencing off an outright victory of the Cuban counter-elite and of its 
competing claim, the US succeeded in projecting its vision of an American 
order in the Caribbean in line with the American mission and its longstanding 
principles. Moreover, by formalising a US right to intervene as enshrined in the 
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Platt Amendment, the US military victory in Cuba represented a step towards a 
more ambitious interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, as later exemplified in 
the Roosevelt Corollary.173  
Second, US intervention in Cuba had an indirect effect on the US power 
position. The intervention had lasting consequences for US armed forces given 
the expansion of the regular army it produced, the establishment of important 
naval bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and the reforms it sparked in 1903 
establishing a General Staff and an Army War college.174 Importantly, the US 
erased the presence of a European state from its southern border while securing 
a new ally in Cuba which provided material support to Washington during 
subsequent US military efforts, for example during the First World War. 
Finally, having grasped Cuba as well as the other fruits fallen off the Spanish 
empire, the US laid the foundations of its own empire. US intervention ensured 
American indirect control over the island and shaped a client political elite in 
Cuba. The Platt amendment shaped US-Cuban relations in important yet 
unintended ways. It did so by providing Washington with the legal means to 
either militarily alter an unfavourable situation in Cuba in case of political 
change in Habana (ex post) or to exert pressure on the incumbent elite through 
the threat of military intervention (ex ante). Yet, as predicted by Senator Foraker 
at the time, the various Cuban elite factions could take advantage of the 
provisions of the Platt amendment to enlist the US support in their political 
struggle for the Cuban state: the incumbent faction by formal invitation; the 
opposition by rebellion.175 It was a lesson that the US political elite began to 
realise soon, when renewed unrest in the island led to a second US intervention 
in 1906, encouraged this time by the Liberal Party in order to solve the ongoing 
political crisis and depose Estrada Palma.176 As frankly stated by Eduardo 
Guzman, LA veteran and representative of the 1906 rebellion, rebel forces were 
acting  
with the sole end that the Americans shall come as quickly as possible, as 
we prefer to live under the shelter of the justice of a foreign power than 
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submit ourselves to tyranny under the flag which has cost us so much to 
acquire.177  
For the US political elite, the cycles of instability on the island perpetuated a 
self-fulfilling prophecy whereby Cuban leaders continued to show their 
inability to rule Cuba thus requiring US intervention, which in turn created the 
bases for further military interventions, not only in 1906 but also in 1912.178 
Therefore, intervention enforced a dependency pattern that guaranteed US 
influence over the circulation of elites in Cuba and that Cuban factions were 
able to manipulate in order to enlist American support for their own 
purposes.179 As suggested in Chapter 3, intervention both strengthened the 
intervener’s influence over the target while leaving the local elite relatively 
autonomous and able to influence the intervening elite in significant ways.180 
Interestingly, the experience of military intervention in Cuba influenced the 
selection and context of US leaders themselves. If the conflict brought about the 
first glimpse of a new empire, it also favoured the emergence of an imperial 
aristocracy and discourse. On the one hand, as underscored by Zakaria, the 
conflict led to the ‘birth of the modern presidency’, establishing a ‘symbiotic 
relationship between national executive power and foreign policy activism that 
continued throughout the twentieth century’.181 On the other hand, the Cuban 
crisis proved valuable for the imperialist front by providing its advocates with 
new rallying cries.182 As May argues,  
an imperialist movement had come into being and was not to be 
demolished…Its leaders had discerned that public opinion could be 
captured for an imperialist cause, if only that cause could be clothed in 
the rhetoric of piety.183  
It was a set of political symbols that could be used by those political leaders 
whose emergence had been favoured by the Cuban intervention itself. The most 
striking case is represented by Theodore Roosevelt, whose role in the conflict 
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helped him to secure his nomination to the Republican ticket in 1900. Similarly, 
William Taft before becoming president had been Governor-General of the 
Philippines between 1901 and 1903 and subsequently provisional Governor of 
Cuba in 1906. Within the Democratic Party, Bryan enthusiastically supported 
the war and volunteered in the conflict, further contributing to its political 
career.184 The impact of the conflict was effectively grasped by another 
Democrat, Woodrow Wilson. According to Wilson, ‘no war has ever 
transformed [the US] quite as the war with Spain…We have witnessed a new 
revolution. We have seen the transformation of America completed’.185 Soon 
Wilson would witness an even more challenging revolution. 
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Chapter 5 
To Start a Republic in Siberia: US Intervention in the Russian 
Civil War, 1918-1920 
 
 
‘— I am going to buy Siberia and start a republic…In those mines and prisons are gathered 
together the very finest and noblest and capablest multitude of human beings that God is able to 
create. Now if you had that kind of a population to sell, would you offer it to a despotism? No, 
the despotism has no use for it; you would lose money. A despotism has no use for anything but 
human cattle. But suppose you want to start a republic?  
— Yes, I see. It's just the material for it.’ 
 (Mark Twain, The American Claimant, 1891) 
 
 
Introduction 
In 1917, Russia experienced two revolutions. The February Revolution (March 
1917) led to the establishment of a Provisional Government dominated by the 
representatives of the Constitutional Democrats (Kadets) and of the Socialist-
Revolutionaries (SRs). Welcomed in Washington as the realisation of the 
Liberal-democratic principle of government, president Woodrow Wilson 
identified the Provisional Government as ‘a fit partner for a league of honour’, a 
new Liberal-democratic partner that could follow the American model.1 As 
such, the US was the first government to recognise the Russian Provisional 
Government on 22nd March 1917. The administration also provided support to 
the nascent Russian democracy in its ongoing conflict against the Central 
Powers mainly in the form of US political guidance, propaganda initiatives, and 
financial and material support.2  
On the contrary, following the Bolshevik Revolution (November 1917) and the 
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ensuing civil war between the Bolsheviks and the White forces, Wilson 
approved the disbursement of up to $190.2 million in aid to anti-Bolshevik 
forces and authorised military intervention in Russia on 17th July 1918 via two 
expeditions: the American Expeditionary Force Siberia (AEF) (August 1918 - 
winter 1920), consisting of 9.000 men; and the American Expeditionary Force 
North Russia (September 1918 - July 1919) of nearly 5.000 men. The following 
analysis will address the causes of this shift leading the US from its support of 
the Provisional Government to its decision to intervene. 
The case of US intervention in the Russian Civil War is selected for both its 
theoretical and empirical relevance. At the empirical level, US intervention in 
Russia is of particular relevance given the subsequent evolution of US-Soviet 
relations after the Second World War. In addition, it allows the examination of 
the Wilsonian experience from the perspective offered by the theoretical 
framework outlined in Part I as a way to evaluate Wilson’s motivations within 
the political context and elite dynamics affecting his decisions. In overcoming 
the usual analytical focus on Wilson’s own motives and idealist vision, the 
following analysis follows previous efforts to ‘vindicate Wilson’ by evaluating 
the various sources of Wilson’s interventionary policy.3 At the theoretical level, 
US intervention in Russia offers an interesting case to evaluate the reaction and 
the political processes affecting the US decision to intervene when faced not 
only with a revolution in an allied country but also with the emergence of an 
antithetical elite group explicitly questioning the legitimacy the US elite’s 
domestic and international order. In this regard, it offers an alternative test 
compared to the mechanisms activated by the Cuban War of Independence 
examined in the previous chapter. 
As I argue in the following chapter, US policy needs to be examined in regard 
to the elite dynamics ignited by both Russian revolutions. Military intervention 
ensued as a result of concurring processes shifting US policy from embracing 
the February Revolution to indirect forms of intervention and eventually to the 
dispatch of US troops on Russian soil. In particular, drawing on the framework 
developed in Chapter 3, I argue that the US decision was shaped by three 
interrelated elite dynamics. First, both the general and specific political formula 
of the incumbent coalition not only informed the overall political objective 
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sought by the US elite in Russia but also dramatically hampered the possibility 
of accommodation with the Bolshevik elite. Second, military intervention 
allowed the US elite to respond to the effects of the Bolshevik Revolution on 
both the US international and domestic order. Third, the relationships 
established between the members of the US elite and the leaders of the Kadets 
and SRs before the Bolshevik Revolution continued to influence US 
policymaking after the Bolshevik takeover. Importantly, political developments 
in Siberia linked to Washington’s allies in Russia proved decisive to pull the US 
towards intervention in 1918. 
In order to clarify this, I will first address the contending explanations offered 
in the literature. Second, I will examine the causal antecedents shaped by elite 
dynamics. Third, I will clarify the policymaking process taking place in the first 
half of 1918 leading to the decision to intervene. Finally, I will evaluate how the 
same elite dynamics continued to influence US policy during US intervention in 
Siberia. 
 
 
Contending Explanations 
The literature on US intervention has underscored various and often conflicting 
objectives affecting the US decision to intervene in the Russian Civil War. In 
particular, intervention in Russia has been explained with reference to the US 
and its allies’ interests in ensuring Russian war effort against Germany as well 
as in preventing Germany from acquiring allied military supplies present in 
Russia.4 Peter Filene, for instance, stresses how in 1918 concerns for the ongoing 
military operations in Europe were of primary importance for the majority of 
US policymakers when dealing with the Russian question.5 These works point 
out how the idea of revitalising first and then re-opening an Eastern front after 
Russian withdrawal from the First World War ran through allied decision-
making and military planning throughout the post-revolutionary period. 
Albeit sensible, the anti-German explanation for US intervention in Russia 
presents significant explanatory limits at closer scrutiny. Already at the time, 
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US military leaders, such as General Peyton March, US General Chief of Staff, 
contested the strategic rationale of reviving the Eastern Front via military 
intervention in Russia, arguing that such operation would only entail the 
dispersal of troops from the Western front.6 In fact, purely strategic motivations 
would have called to focus all military efforts on the Western front whilst trying 
to reach an accommodation with the Soviets to prevent any German-Soviet 
agreement and secure the Soviets’ support. In addition, the anti-German 
explanation does not fully account for the presence of US troops in Siberia, 
away from the Eastern front. Further, by the time US troops arrived in Northern 
Russia and Siberia, the German threat to Russia was waning and military 
depots were either far from possible German operations or empty due to 
Bolshevik action.7 Importantly, after the armistice of November 1918 ending the 
First World War, any rationale for continued Allied intervention in Russia 
linked to the war effort against Germany would have lost any factual basis, yet 
Allied troops remained on Russian soil until 1920.8 As General William Graves, 
commander of the US Siberian expedition recalled, ‘the Armistice had 
absolutely no effect in Siberia’.9 
A second set of explanations, informed by early Soviet and revisionist works, 
explain US intervention in relation to the anti-Bolshevism of the US elite due to 
the threat posed to US investments and the broader capitalist circuits by the 
Bolshevik Revolution.10 Whilst anti-Bolshevism played an important role in 
determining US decisions towards the Bolshevik elite, as an explanation for US 
intervention it is limited. First, the anti-Bolshevism of the American elite does 
not prove by itself that intervention was conducted with the explicit aim of 
removing the Bolsheviks from power. As Maddox argues, ‘that the President, 
detesting Communism, hoped for a successful counterrevolution is 
incontrovertible but in itself does not prove he conspired to promote one’.11 
Furthermore, if crushing the Bolshevik experiment was so important, then it is 
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not clear why the US did not commit the necessary troops and support to the 
anti-Bolshevik forces to enforce such outcome. As argued by Davis and Trani, 
Wilson was anti-Bolshevik enough to try to counter it whenever possible, but 
not to start a crusade against it.12 Finally, this approach fails to explain why 
Wilson rejected the possibility of intervention for considerable time after the 
Bolshevik Revolution.13 
A third set of explanations stresses the anti-Japanese objectives of US 
intervention.14 Japan intervened in Siberia on 5th April 1918, deploying more 
than 70.000 men and pursuing a clear expansionist agenda. American concerns 
for the presence of Japanese troops in Siberia have been extensively 
documented. In this sense, the anti-Japanese explanation is not incorrect. Yet, as 
I will argue, it needs to be contextualised within the broader strategic setting 
shaping US intervention, including Tokyo’s operations as much as other US 
allies’ actions. In addition, the anti-Japanese explanation presents two 
explanatory limits. First, it is indeterminate as to the timing of US decision to 
intervene insofar as it does not explain why the US opted for intervention only 
four months after the allied authorisation for Japanese intervention in Siberia.15 
Second, if Washington’s objective was to keep Tokyo in check, the anti-Japanese 
explanation does not fully explain the reason why the US did not keep its forces 
in Siberia until the complete withdrawal of all Japanese troops in October 
1922.16  
Finally, linked to both the anti-Bolshevik and the anti-Japanese function of US 
intervention, other works have drawn attention to the economic drivers of US 
policy towards Russia. According to this interpretation, American intervention 
aimed both to ‘preserve the open door in Siberia and North Manchuria, without 
interfering in the factional disputes of the Russians’ and to reintegrate the 
Siberian region in an open international economic system.17 According to Leo 
Bacino, the anti-Bolshevik efforts in Siberia were subordinated to efforts to 
enforce the ‘open door’ principle against both Japanese and European 
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imperialist designs of closed spheres of influence in Russia. In this sense, 
limited military intervention represented a compromise solution between the 
allies’ plans for all-out military intervention and Wilson’s plans for economic 
intervention in Siberia.18 Although this objective appears more consistent with 
US foreign policy tenets and investments in the area, it presents two problems. 
First, economic intervention needs to be analysed within the wider political 
goal pursued by the US in Russia.19 Economic intervention, as I will point out, 
represented a policy tool rather than the objective of US presence there. Second, 
as I will argue in the following sections, contrary to Bacino’s account, the revolt 
of the Czech legion provided the US with more than just the ‘moral grounds’ to 
align with allied pressures for intervention and start its economic intervention.20  
In contrast to explanations focusing on US objectives, other works have centred 
their attention on the role played by president Wilson and his ideological 
outlook, given the numerous interventions he authorised while in office, 
including not only intervention in Russia but also in Mexico and Haiti.21 While 
the image of Wilson as a crusader and an interventionist is still prominent, 
recent works have offered a more nuanced assessment of Wilson’s foreign 
policy, highlighting his reluctance to intervene as well as the non-idealist and 
strategic sources of his foreign policy.22 In fact, the image of Wilson as a Liberal 
crusader misses the complex, problematic and often contradictory view he held 
of military intervention.23 In his encounter with foreign revolutions, the 
president often rejected options of all-out military interventions.24 Importantly, 
the limited interventions Wilson authorised in Mexico reinforced his view on 
the limits and negative consequences of military interventions in revolutionary 
contexts.25 The president’s views of a possible intervention in Russia remained 
negative also in 1918. As Williams Wiseman, a British diplomat, remarked at 
the beginning of July 1918, ‘the [US] President remains quite unconvinced by all 
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political arguments in favor of Allied intervention, nor was he more impressed 
by the military arguments in favor of re-creating an Eastern Front’.26 Given 
Wilson’s personal evaluation of the limited utility of military interventions, the 
study of the sources of his interventionism needs to incorporate but at the same 
time move beyond Wilson’s personal views. This is particularly important for 
the Russian case, since Wilson did not always play an active role in the 
formulation of US Russian policy, often delegating it to his advisor Edward 
House.27  
The IR literature on the subject has drawn on these historical accounts to 
propose various explanations for the military interventions taking place in 
Russia at the time. Classical Realists have focused on the role played by 
Wilson’s inherent interventionism and ideological crusading.28 Recently, 
Saunders explained the president’s decisions concerning US interventions with 
reference to his causal beliefs about the domestic sources of foreign policy 
conduct.29 As previously noted, the problem with these explanations focusing 
on Wilson stems from the negative views Wilson held on intervention, 
particularly in Russia, as well as from the role played by broader strategic 
factors highlighted in other explanations. At the same time, Wilson’s ideological 
views needs to be evaluated vis-à-vis the general ideological framework shaped 
by the Liberal political formula. Not just Wilson, but Liberalism tout court 
connects domestic arrangements with foreign policy behaviour.30 It is this focus 
on the domestic sources of foreign conduct and the possibility of using force to 
alter constitutional arrangements for the security of democratic states that 
makes Liberalism an essentially interventionist project.31  
Other IR authors have focused on the function performed by US military 
intervention in Russia. Nick Bisley treats the intervention in Russia as an 
example of the counterrevolutionary efforts stemming from the very attack 
brought by the Bolsheviks to the common normative basis of the international 
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order at the time.32 Albeit a more nuanced version of the anti-Bolshevik 
argument, Bisley’s analysis presents the same limit of the latter. Furthermore, it 
does not provide a detailed explanation of the US decision to intervene. On the 
contrary, Walt offers one of the most extensive theoretical and empirical 
analysis in IR of the drivers of US and Allied intervention in Russia. Walt 
discusses the strategic objectives of the Allied intervention, aimed at keeping 
Russia in the conflict rather than waging a war against Bolshevism or 
influencing the selection of the new rulers of Russia.33 In this regard, Walt 
points out the limits of explanations relying solely on Allied hostility to 
Bolshevism, arguing in favour of an evaluation of how the Bolshevik 
Revolution affected balance of power dynamics and how these in turn pushed 
the US to intervene.  
Despite the convincing empirical analysis provided, Walt’s study presents two 
problems. First, the main limit of Walt’s analysis stems from the attempt to 
force a complex domestic and international history, presented in great detail in 
his case study, into the theoretical straightjacket offered by Neorealism. Despite 
the valuable addition of his valuable balance-of-threat framework, Walt fails to 
take fully into account the causal impact of numerous factors presented in this 
empirical analysis. For instance, Walt mentions but fails to contextualise and 
explain Wilson’s orders clarifying that the US intervention in Siberia was aimed 
at supporting the ‘any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the 
Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance’.34 While not driven 
exclusively by anti-Bolshevism, who ruled Russia mattered for US 
policymakers. Pace Walt, US policy was indeed affected by changes in Russia 
and by the elite circulation taking place there.35 In addition, Walt notes the role 
played by the Russian ambassador and prominent Russian exiles over US 
Russian policy, yet it is not clear how this fits into his theoretical model.36 
Second, Walt highlights the role played by both the lack of reliable information 
from Russia and by misunderstandings and misperceptions produced by the 
Bolshevik Revolution, which raised the levels of hostility between the US and 
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the Bolsheviks. However, Walt cannot fully explain the origins of such 
misperceptions, arising from the threat the Bolshevik regime posed to US 
leaders’ domestic and international position. As I will argue, rather than from 
misinformation or lack of understating of the nature of Russian political actors, 
US policy was guided by close links with Russian actors.37  
The following analysis aims to overcome these limits by taking into account the 
twofold challenge posed by the Bolshevik Revolution and the way in which 
intervention allowed the US to shape a more favourable domestic and 
international environment. In doing so, it highlights the broader elite dynamics 
that influenced US policy. First, this allows moving beyond the analysis of 
Wilson’s personal views to take into account the broader ideological and 
political framework that informed US intervention. Second, this allows taking 
into account the role played by Russian actors and the pattern of elite relations 
that favoured US intervention and informed its timing. In turn, both allow 
overcoming the confusion about US objectives in Russia. This confusion stems 
not only from Wilson’s attempts to phrase what the US presence in Siberia as 
‘non-intervention’, but also from the fact that the US did not intervene simply to 
counter the revolutionary process taking place in Russia.38 On the contrary, the 
US administration intervened in favour of what they considered an ongoing 
revolutionary project: to support the political project which started with the 
February Revolution. In this regard, the major limit of previous explanations 
derives from their focus on the negative objectives of US intervention. Yet, the 
US intervention should not be seen exclusively in negative terms – as anti-
German, anti-Japanese, or anti-Bolshevik – but also as a positive political project 
pursued via intervention and consistent with the US formula, the US elite’s 
international and domestic objectives, and US policymakers’ interest in 
supporting the leaders of the February Revolution in their ongoing struggle for 
Russia. 
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Political Formulas: From Cooperation to Confrontation  
US policy needs to be evaluated, first and foremost, within the general 
ideological framework shaped by the Liberal political formula on which the 
American model was founded and that defined US international purpose. The 
Liberal premises of the American formula provided US elite with its most basic 
and constant ideological assumption, ‘the belief that the nation’s security is best 
protected by the expansion of democracy worldwide’.39 It is a belief that shapes 
a self-assumed and proclaimed ‘responsibility’ for the US hence for its leaders 
‘for the global expansion of freedom’ according to the American political and 
economic model.40  
While present from its inception, this Liberal vision for the ordering of other 
communities assumes increased centrality at the beginning of the 20th Century 
and especially with the Wilson administration. Wilson operated and 
contributed to shape a specific historical passage characterised by the definite 
emergence of the US as a great power, in both military and economic terms, 
which removed the ‘physical constraints’ on American Liberalism.41 As seen in 
the previous chapter, in the second half of the 19th Century, US leaders began 
projecting onto the Western Hemisphere the principles and rallying symbols 
that had previously informed US expansion westwards. As a result, the US 
moved from the early 18th Century separation from European power politics 
and concerns about European interference in the Western Hemisphere, 
enshrined in the Monroe Doctrine, to a power position that allowed the US elite 
to fulfil the America’s mission in the American continent and beyond.42 This 
process reached its ultimate consequences at the beginning of the 20th Century. 
In particular, the First World War, by engulfing the European system in a 
struggle that ultimately consumed its material and political legitimacy, 
provided an unprecedented opportunity for the US to reshape the European 
system in its own image.43 The consequences of America’s rise to great power 
status and of the context created by the Great War were increasingly evident to 
the US political leadership. As both Howard Zinn and Kendrik Clements note, 
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the rise of US power at the end of the 19th Century brought a ‘new 
consciousness’ of the US strength in the minds of its political leadership; a 
‘newfound sense of economic and military maturity that justified claiming a 
place among the great powers’.44   
With the Wilson administration, the idea of a Liberal peace, that is the 
promotion of the Liberal political and economic model to other societies as a 
tool to establish peace, both internationally and domestically, took a central 
place in the American foreign policy agenda.45 This passage was favoured by a 
set of Progressive ideas that became influential within the American political 
elite in the first decade of the 20th Century. Progressives advocated a more 
activist role for the state both at home, via incisive domestic reforms, as well as 
abroad, via a more internationalist foreign policy that connected imperialist 
endeavours with the promotion of democratic reforms.46 In particular, 
Progressive ideas occupied a central position within Wilson’s specific political 
platform thanks to the role independent Progressives and Progressive 
internationalists played in assuring Wilson’s election in 1916. As a consequence, 
Wilson endorsed a set of Progressive domestic reforms and, in foreign policy, 
embraced Progressive Internationalists’ demands for the expansion of 
democracy abroad as well as for New Diplomacy, arms reduction, self-
determination, and collective security.47 The resulting foreign policy, while 
rejecting outright militarism, was also characterised by marked activism on the 
international scene and reformist ambitions, willing to support similar 
‘revolutionary’ – i.e. reformist and progressive – efforts abroad.48 Importantly, 
the exiguous majority enjoyed by the Democrats in the House of 
Representatives and the challenge posed by William Jennings Bryan after 1916 
made Wilson increasingly dependent on this specific platform.49  
It is through this ideological outlook that both the US political elite and the 
incumbent Democratic faction responded to the events in Russia in 1917. Russia 
had already represented a possible objective for US liberalisation projects before 
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1917 given the peculiar image of Russia held by the American ruling elite as the 
optimal target for the implementation of the American model.50 When the 
February Revolution led to the collapse of the Tsarist regime and opened the 
possibility for a Liberal order in Russia led by the Kadets and the moderate SRs, 
US policymakers fully embraced the new regime. 
The February Revolution was welcomed in Washington as the realisation of the 
Liberal-democratic principle of government.51 As Wilson stated in April 1917, 
Russia ‘was always in fact democratic at heart…and the great, generous 
Russian people have added…to the forces fighting for freedom’.52 In moving 
away from autocracy towards what seemed to be a democratic future, Russia 
provided the US with material that could be modelled according to American 
lines; a Liberal-democratic partner that could serve both Wilson’s international 
agenda and strengthen its political message. As Norman Saul argues, US-
Russian relations were thus premised on a ‘mirror image’, based on the 
assumption of a ‘common relationship’ whereby the US expected Russia to 
follow the American model.53 The very process through which the new regime 
came to power reinforced this identification, distinguishing the February 
Revolution from previous revolutionary attempts that ended in violence and 
tyranny. A report from the US Embassy in March 1917 stated ‘this is 
undoubtedly a revolution, but it is the best managed revolution that has ever 
taken place for its magnitude. The Duma is assuming control and is exercising 
its authority in Petrograd with rare good judgment’.54 As a result, Wilson 
identified the Provisional Government as ‘a fit partner for a league of honour’.55  
In turn, the similarity between the American political formula and the 
principles of the Russian regime had an immediate effect on the levels of 
cooperation between the two states. The US was the first government to 
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recognise the Russian Provisional Government on 22nd March 1917. US aid 
immediately followed recognition by providing humanitarian relief through the 
Red Cross, limited financial assistance and military supplies, and logistical 
support to ensure the functioning of the Trans-Siberian Railway through the 
Steven Railway Commission. This was coupled with political and propaganda 
support through the Commission headed by Elihu Root in May 1917 and Edgar 
Sisson’s mission to establish a section of the Committee on Public Information 
(CPI) in Russia in order to assist the Provisional Government’s internal front in 
its struggle against Germany.56 As Davis and Trani note, the limited material 
support offered by the US government at this stage stemmed from the general 
confidence of the American elite in the prospects of Russian democracy, an 
approach that ultimately created a mismatch between the ambitious US 
objectives in Russia and the limited tools used to support them.57 Related to 
this, the US identification with the Provisional Government led US 
policymakers to ignore the multiple and increasing fissures emerging in the 
new Russian regime. In other words, US officials did not see the October 
Revolution coming.58  
The contrast between US reaction to the February and the October Revolution is 
significant. The very nature of Bolshevik rule and the clash between the 
American and the Bolshevik formulas dramatically reduced the possibility of 
cooperation between the two elite groups. According to Wilson, Bolshevism 
represented the ‘negation of everything that is American’, ‘the negation of 
democracy’.59 It was ‘an “experiment” that tested a political, economic, and 
ideological system antithetical to American values’.60 Further, US policymakers 
increasingly identified the Bolshevik regime with the rule of a tyrannical 
‘minority’, ‘a close monopoly of power by a very small group’.61 On the one 
hand, this discourse resonated within the US political formula, shaped by the 
longstanding Liberal tendency to treat autocratic regimes as an alien, 
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untrustworthy and threatening agent. On the other hand, it resonated with the 
Progressive critique of reactionary elites and ‘personal revolutions’ as 
compared to progressive social revolutions.62 This ‘anti-elite’ discourse was also 
consistent with the overall US military effort against the similarly described 
‘unaccountable’ and ‘dictatorial’ elite ruling Germany.63 In this sense, the anti-
German and anti-Bolshevik wars were not in contradiction from the perspective 
of a leadership conducting a war against ‘autocratic elites’. 
Spaces for cooperation with the Bolsheviks were severely reduced by the 
Bolsheviks’ own public revolutionary and ideological stance. The closing of the 
democratically elected Constituent Assembly in January 1918 by the Bolsheviks 
and the Soviet response to Wilson’s 1918 message crystallized American views 
on the despotic and untrustworthy nature of the Bolshevik regime, making 
subsequent attempts to reach a more pragmatic arrangement politically 
intricate.64 Notably, Bolsheviks’ calls for world revolution further stressed the 
hostile intentions of the new Russian elite thus fuelling adversarial responses in 
the US. As Richard Pipes argues, ‘by challenging the legitimacy of all foreign 
governments, the Bolsheviks invited all foreign governments to challenge 
theirs’.65 
This reaction to the Bolsheviks coupled with the Bolsheviks own public 
revolutionary stance severely limited the spaces of cooperation between the US 
and the Soviet leaders. This did not represent a foregone conclusion as purely 
strategic motivations would have called for an accommodation with the 
Bolsheviks in order to prevent any German advance or any German-Soviet 
alignment. Indeed, both the US and the Bolshevik leaders initially followed a 
flexible and pragmatic approach.66 Leon Trotsky, for instance, sought Allied 
and specifically US support to reorganise the Russian Army against the German 
advances along the Russian Western borders.67 In addition, the Allies and the 
Bolsheviks reached an ‘oral agreement’ for the protection of the strategic 
Northern region of Murmansk from German and White Finns’ operations.  
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However, the case of Murmansk indicates the difficulty in maintaining also 
limited forms of cooperation. The ‘oral agreement’ was ultimately abandoned 
due to the divisions between the Bolshevik elite and the regional Murmansk 
Soviet and following the Allied recognition of the latter.68 Soon, the Bolsheviks’ 
agreement with Germany signed at Brest-Litovsk Treaty in March 1918 
precluded the possibility of further collaboration between the US and the 
Bolsheviks against Germany. In more general terms, these tactical attempts at 
cooperation exemplified the underlying obstacles to a full-fledged recognition 
between the two elite groups. On the one hand, Soviet willingness to cooperate 
with the allies in 1918 emerged out of strategic necessity due to the compound 
threat posed externally by Germany and internally by the anti-Bolshevik forces 
supported by the Allies. On the other hand, US limited attempts to cooperate 
represented a compromise between the need to find an accommodation with an 
elite group that controlled the major Russian centres, and whose collaboration 
was needed for the war effort against Germany, and the ‘intense moral 
antipathy’ towards the Bolsheviks.69 Only strategic necessity and concerns for 
survival forced these attempts; yet, these concerns were insufficient to 
overcome mistrust between the two elite groups. As a result, proponents in the 
US of expanded support to the Bolsheviks in an anti-German function were 
quickly dismissed.70 Similarly, the Wilson administration rejected the idea of 
further collaboration with the Soviets on the bases of the ‘ideological menace’ 
posed by the Soviet regime.71 Two factors contributed to this approach. First, 
Soviet overtures were treated mainly as tactical overtures by the State 
Department.72 Second, the possibility of strengthening collaboration with the 
Bolsheviks – up to an eventual intervention by Soviet invitation to counter 
Germany before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty – was not endorsed also for fear of 
alienating the support of anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia.73  
The anti-Bolshevism of the US elite does not explain by itself the US decision to 
intervene, yet it provides an important intermediate passage reducing the 
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policy options available to US leaders. The inability to reach a compromise with 
the Bolshevik significantly reduced the possibility of affecting events in Russia 
through peaceful channels. As a consequence, coercion became the only viable 
option to address the consequences of political change in Russia. Furthermore, 
this dynamic hampered later attempts to find a diplomatic accommodation 
between the US and Soviet leaders. The twofold international and domestic 
challenge posed by Bolshevism reduced the possibility to create sufficient 
domestic political support and consensus within the US political elite to 
promote more pragmatic solutions to the Russian question. 
 
 
Power Struggle: A Twofold Threat 
While the limits of cooperation with the Bolsheviks became increasingly evident 
to US policymakers, intervention became a compelling option as inaction could 
endanger the position of both the US elite and of its incumbent faction. The 
Bolshevik Revolution represented a twofold challenge for the power position of 
the US political elite, both an international and a domestic threat. 
The Bolshevik takeover altered the international environment in which US 
leaders were operating. The shift from the February to the October Revolution 
deprived the US of a newly acquired yet important ally. Specifically, with the 
Bolshevik Revolution, Washington lost an ally from which the US could derive 
external validation and strategic assistance and on which American leaders 
hoped could exert significant political influence.74 Given the impossibility of 
establishing any profitable political and security exchange with the Bolshevik 
elite, the US found itself with limited tools to influence events in Russia after 
the Bolshevik takeover. As a consequence, the US administration had to look for 
new political interlocutors. In this regard, the direct and indirect support 
provided to anti-Bolshevik forces was aimed at securing a degree of influence in 
the post-revolutionary Russia and establishing a dialogue with those forces that 
could put Russia back on the democratic track set by the February Revolution.  
In turn, the US support to the anti-Bolshevik groups responded to a broader 
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strategic dynamic characterised by the competing influence, interference, and 
eventually intervention by other states, including both US adversaries and 
allies. This struggle for Russia pushed US leaders towards a more intrusive 
policy in Russia in order to limit the actual and perceived influence exerted by 
other states on the various Russian factions. Particularly in the early stage of the 
Bolshevik Revolution, US leaders were concerned with the influence Germany 
was exerting on the Bolshevik leadership, concerns that fuelled a more activist 
policy aimed at contrasting Berlin’s control over the new rulers of Russia.75 Yet, 
US concerns were not limited to Germany. Despite their war alliance, US 
policymakers grew increasingly aware of the various attempts made by their 
allies – France, Britain, and Japan – to influence events in Russia via the support 
provided to their allies within the various Russian factions. A complex struggle 
for influence over the different anti-Bolshevik forces ensued between 
Washington and its allies, with the US, Britain, France, and Japan providing aid 
to different and often competing anti-Bolshevik groups and military leaders in 
an effort to identify and support the next rulers of Russia.76 Responding to other 
states’ initiatives allowed US leaders both to limit the influence of other states 
and extend their own influence over Russia. As Walt argues, ‘by preventing 
foreign powers from controlling Russia’s destiny, the U.S. presence would help 
bring the liberal forces in Russia to the fore’.77 As a result, the Wilson 
administration tried to shape events in Russia and channel them along a path 
between the socialist adventurism of the Bolsheviks and the reactionary 
ambitions of the members of the old regime, in an attempt to save what was left 
of the Liberal revolution in 1917, which the US administration hoped it could 
ensure US influence.78 
Ensuring US influence in Russia was also key to secure Washington’s broader 
foreign policy objectives. The Bolshevik Revolution put into question the US 
political leaders’ ability to shape an international and European system 
according to their vision and interests. With the Bolshevik Revolution the US 
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had lost what represented a ‘precedent for the republicanizing 
(Americanizing?)…of Europe and much of the rest of the world’.79 Fear of the 
spread of Bolshevism was reinforced by reports of Communist advances in 
Europe.80 By threatening the world with revolution, the Bolsheviks were 
endangering the Liberal international order the Wilson administration was 
trying to forge at Versailles.81 As Somin argues,  
a system based on the enforcement of shared liberal values through the 
League of Nations…could not easily function effectively if one of the most 
powerful European states was led by a political movement that not only 
rejected those values but openly proclaimed its intentions to actively 
undermine them.82  
The second paramount concern pushing the US administration to reject any 
accommodation with the new Russian elite and pushing US leaders towards a 
more interventionary stance was the threat posed by the Bolsheviks to the US 
domestic order. There was a shared conviction within the American political 
elite that the Bolshevik Revolution represented a threat to the American 
political order, the domestic cohesion of the American polity as well as a direct 
attack on its ideological foundations.83 In particular, Wilson frequently 
commented on the vulnerability of the American polity to foreign and 
subversive propaganda.84 Further, Secretary of State Robert Lansing claimed 
that the danger posed by the Soviets was even greater than the German one 
given not only Bolsheviks’ rejection of key tenets of the American formula but 
also because they explicitly ‘threatened [the US] with revolution’.85  
Concerns over the domestic threat posed by Bolshevism and the subversive 
propaganda emanating from Russia grew considerably during 1918. Political 
tensions coupled with tense industrial and racial relations.86 The resulting Red 
Scare (1918-20) amplified the US political elite’s apprehension for the mounting 
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social unrest in the country and the alleged threat posed by European 
immigrants and radical Socialists. The Espionage Act (1917) and Sedition Act 
(1918) represented the legal expression of an important political passage 
whereby the distinction between domestic opponent and external enemy 
became increasingly blurred and US radicals became increasingly identified 
with foreign agents.87 In turn, fear for Bolshevism at home favoured a powerful 
anti-Communist rhetoric that political leaders could use as a tool to mobilise 
domestic support against their adversaries.88   
With the worsening of the Russian crisis and its negative international and 
domestic effects on the US political order, the Russian question quickly became 
material for partisan politics. Theodore Roosevelt as well as William Taft and 
other Republican leaders requested more resolute action in Russia.89 Republican 
calls for action in Russia sparked concerns both in the Democratic Party and in 
the Wilson administration, forcing both not to leave the initiative on the 
question of intervention in the hands of the opposition in view of the upcoming 
mid-term elections in the autumn of 1918.90 In tackling the Russian issue, 
however, the Wilson administration had to confront not only the ‘hawkish’ 
demands of Roosevelt but also the ‘dovish’ demands of Bryan, his main 
competitor in the Democratic Party.91 Pressured by both, Wilson followed the 
Progressive platform of his coalition to fence off both challenges, by adopting a 
more interventionist stance towards Russia while following a Progressive 
reformist agenda in line with both the general US formula and his specific 
platform.92  
 
 
Elite Relations: Russian Allies, American Friends 
While international and domestic objectives pushed the US towards 
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intervention, the relations established by US leaders with the leaders of the 
February Revolution represented a decisive pull factor for US intervention. By 
linking the two groups, elite relations provided an important factor reinforcing 
both US policymakers’ interests in the fate of the Kadet and SR leaders and their 
confrontational policy against the Bolsheviks.  
In the first half of 1917, the response to the February Revolution both within the 
US political and broader ruling elite had been enthusiastic. US sympathy was 
directed both towards the principles inspiring the revolution and its leaders. US 
politicians and diplomats praised the Liberal character of the new Russian elite. 
The former US Consul General in Moscow, John H. Snodgrass, stressed the 
longstanding Liberal credentials of Prince Georgi Lvov, head of the Provisional 
Government between March and July 1917, and Paul Miliukov, leader of the 
Kadets. As Snodgrass marked,  
nowhere in the country could the Russian people have found better men 
to lead them out of the darkness of tyranny…Lvoff [sic] and his associates 
are to Russia what Washington and his associates were to America when it 
became a nation.93  
Already in March 1917, members of the US ruling elite established numerous 
committees in support of the emergent Russian democracy, such as the 
American National Committee for the Encouragement of the Democratic 
Government in Russia, including former diplomats, businessmen, and 
intellectuals. State legislatures responded quickly to calls from these groups, 
with nineteen US states welcoming the February Revolution and supporting the 
provision of financial assistance to the Provisional Government.94 US 
politicians, such as Senator William Borah (R-Idaho) and former President 
William Taft, joined renowned Russian experts such as Charles Crane and 
Samuel Harper in the American League to Act and Cooperate with Russia.95 
Overall, these committees and groups played a twofold role. First, they lobbied 
US policymakers to support the Russian Liberal leaders. Second, they acted as a 
transmission belt for the requests of the leaders of the February Revolution, 
either via the direct contacts they established with US politicians or the 
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influence exerted by Crane and Harper, who enjoyed direct access to US 
policymakers and who were involved in the formulation of US Russian policy 
at the State Department.96  
Moreover, the American favourable approach to the leaders of the February 
Revolution both before and after the Bolshevik takeover was reinforced by the 
connections – personal and professional – existing between the leaders of the 
February Revolution and US decision-makers, business representatives and 
members of the intellectual elite. Prince Lvov was related to the American 
consul general in Russia, while other members of the Provisional Government 
had previously worked in the Russian embassy in Washington. Miliukov 
enjoyed connections with US policymakers via Crane and Harper. Alexander 
Guchkov, Provisional Government’s war minister, had previous connections 
with the American business elite.97 At the same time, members of the US 
political elite were involved in the promotion of closer links with the various 
political forces of the February Revolution. While Senator Root continued to 
promote close links with the Kadets, the Society of Friends of Russian Freedom, 
headed by former Representative Herbert Parsons (R-New York), provided 
financial support to the SRs and Alexander Kerensky, head of the Provisional 
Government from July to November 1917.98  
Relations between the two elite groups were also sustained by the incessant 
activity of the Russian Ambassador in the US, Boris Bakhmetev, himself a 
member of the Kadets and acting as both the official Russian representative and 
as the unofficial representative for the Russian Liberals.99 Bakhmetev 
established good relations with Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long 
as well as with Colonel House. As House pointed out, he and Bakhmetev spoke 
‘the same language’.100 The fact that Bakhmetev remained as the official Russian 
ambassador in Washington also after the Bolshevik takeover exemplifies a 
crucial element in the attitude of US policymakers at the time: they continued to 
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treat the leaders of the February Revolution as the legitimate Russian 
representatives and the Bolshevik regime as transitory.101 
The pattern of elite relations established between the American political elite 
and the elite group leading the February Revolution had a pervasive impact on 
US policy towards Russia. First, elite relations acted as an additional disturbing 
factor in the ongoing attempts to find an accommodation with the Bolsheviks. 
In particular, both the Russian embassy and the Kadets lobbied against any 
form of recognition of the Bolshevik regime. Bakhmetev’s influence in the 
formulation of the early US policy towards the Bolshevik regime was 
particularly significant in forestalling any substantial rapprochement with the 
Bolsheviks.102 Notably, before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the possibility of 
strengthening collaboration with the Bolsheviks – up to an eventual 
intervention by Soviet invitation to counter Germany – was not endorsed also 
for fear of alienating the support of the Liberal forces in Russia thus reducing 
US influence over them.103 Russian Liberals’ allies in the US, such as Harper, 
played an important role in this regard. US officials, Harper advised, could ‘get 
in touch with’ Soviet officials, yet they should neither ‘recognize’ nor ‘cooperate 
with’ them.104  
Second, Kadets and SRs actively lobbied US policymakers for increased support 
and eventually for US intervention. Bakhmetev lobbied to promote US support 
for the Kadets.105 Karensky, as well as various Kadet leaders, repeatedly 
pressured US leaders and public opinion on the advisability of an allied 
intervention that could muster anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia.106 In addition, 
Thomas Masaryk, advocate of Czechoslovakia’s independence, represented an 
influential voice in Washington in favour of allied action in Siberia, particularly 
when the fate of the Czech legion present in Siberia became of primary 
importance to US leaders.107 
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Third, favoured by the existing relations with US policymakers, the Kadet and 
SR representatives that were organising anti-Bolshevik forces in Southern 
Russia and Siberia used the available communication channels with American 
officials to stress their democratic credentials as well as their intentions, as the 
natural heir of the Provisional Government, to maintain Russia’s alliance with 
the US.108 At the same time, representatives of the cooperatives present in the 
Siberian region such as the All-Russian Union of Cooperative Societies 
requested US military aid and intervention to resist both German and Japanese 
influence.109 In Mid-June 1918, leaders of the cooperatives tried to promote 
closer relations with both the US as well as with Kadet and SR leaders. As later 
communication from Siberia made clear, Kadets, SRs and cooperatives were 
coalescing in the first half of 1918 into a political coalition sustaining the 
emergence of new provisional governmental authorities in Siberia.110 As I will 
indicate in the following section, this last element represented a defining 
pulling factor in the critical juncture of spring 1918. 
 
 
The Decision to Intervene: From Indirect to Direct Intervention 
In order to save the political project begun with the February Revolution and 
secure its objectives, the US administration needed to manage the consequences 
of the Bolshevik Revolution and steer events towards a more favourable 
outcome. As cooperation with the Bolsheviks proved to be impracticable, the 
administration eschewed any possibility of co-opting the Bolsheviks in a 
comprehensive political process to lead Russia back to a more stable and 
democratic track. As a result, the administration was left with the only option of 
forcing events through the use of force, especially as Russia became engulfed in 
an all-out civil war fought by the Red Army organised by the Bolsheviks and 
the emerging White forces encompassing the various anti-Bolshevik units 
present in Russia. 
Calls for direct intervention emanating from the Russian representatives 
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coupled with increasing allied requests for intervention and domestic 
pressures. However, allied pressure for the deployment of US troops in Russia 
did not produce any tangible result: the Wilson administration rejected all six 
official requests made by its allies during the first five months of 1918.111 At this 
stage, Wilson was still rejecting the hypothesis of direct military intervention 
for fear of alienating Russian support as well as given the assessment of General 
March, Chief of Staff, who argued that no US military contingent could produce 
any significant result in Russia at that stage.112  
While rejecting direct intervention, the Wilson administration decided to offer 
clandestine financial support to the anti-Bolshevik forces in Southern Russia 
regions operating under the command of Alexey Kaledin. Support for Kaledin’s 
Cossacks in Southern Russia was first suggested by Lansing in December 1917 
and approved in the same month. Two elements account for this decision. First, 
it was a limited form of assistance entailing few risks for the administration but 
necessary in keeping alive a military force that overtly optimistic reports 
described as being capable of mounting an effective resistance against both 
German and Bolshevik units.113 Second, Kaledin’s forces acted as a first centre of 
opposition to the Bolsheviks to which both army officers and Kadet leaders 
gravitated, including former Provisional Government leader Miliukov.114 
However, the limits of this formation and Kaledin’s suicide in February 1918 
put an end to this form of indirect intervention.  
The actual decision to directly intervene in Russia and its timing resulted from 
the new spaces of political contestation created in Russia in the spring of 1918. 
In May 1918, the revolt against the Bolsheviks of the volunteer pro-Allied Czech 
and Slovak troops present in Siberia – the so-called Czech Legion – created the 
critical juncture that opened up the possibility of direct intervention for the 
US.115 The Czech revolt eased the US decision to intervene in three ways, by 
making direct intervention logistically possible, ideologically attractive, and 
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politically viable. First, the Czech revolt provided the US with a local and 
already armed ally, ‘a strategically located cadre for anti-Communist activities’, 
thus making the option of a limited direct intervention logistically and 
militarily viable.116 Already before taking the decision to intervene, US officials 
had looked at the Czech troops as offering the possibility of a more ‘moderate 
course’ compared to the ones advocated by US allies.117 As Paul Reinsch, US 
Minister in Beijing, noted, ‘with only slight countenance and support they 
[Czech] could control all of Siberia…’.118  
Second, the Czech revolt offered a rationale for intervention consistent with 
both the US war effort against the Central Powers – as the Legion could be used 
against the Central Powers – and the principle of self-determination – as the 
Czech struggle against the Central Powers could lead to Czech independence.119 
For the same reasons, US officials were concerned that failure to intervene to 
save the Czechs would entail a tremendous blow to the American prestige in 
Russia and among Slavic people more generally. For this reason, according to 
Lansing, the Czech revolt introduced a ‘sentimental element’ into the equation; 
or, in Kennan’s words, a ‘responsibility to aid’ the Czechs.120  
Third, the Czech revolt offered the ‘catalytic ingredient’ to the ongoing acts of 
resistance to the Soviet government in Siberia.121 As Norman Pereira observes, 
by taking the Trans-Siberian out of the control of the Soviets, the revolt ‘created 
political vacuums all along the lines from the Urals to the Pacific Ocean’.122 It 
was the very infrastructural power of the newly established Soviet state that 
was hammered, hampering the Bolsheviks’ ability to reach the vast Eastern 
regions in which their political opponents could find opportunity to thrive. 
Importantly, by weakening the Bolsheviks’ control over Siberia, the Czech 
revolt created a new political landscape in Siberia conducive to US interests and 
objectives. Specifically, by taking the Trans-Siberian railway out of the control 
of the Soviets, the revolt created a political void in which the so-called 
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‘democratic counterrevolution’ in Siberia could emerge.123 Revolts, led primarily 
by the SRs but including representatives of the major leading forces of the 
February Revolution, took place in Samara and in Central Siberia in 
concomitance with the Czech revolt and often supported by the Czech units. 
The emerging political landscape was immediately evident to US policymakers. 
On 26th June 1918, Admiral Austin Knight informed the US Secretary of Navy 
that  
the Soviets have been overthrown in region controlled by the Czech and 
largely as a result of their presence, but without their active assistance, 
and replaced by a new government wholly Russian but anti-Bolshevik and 
made up largely of delegates elected some months ago to Constitutional 
Convention...124 
By allowing multiple groups and provisional institutions to emerge in Siberia in 
June 1918, the Czech corps could work for the allies and the US in particular as 
a ‘nucleus of a new Russian opposition to the Bolsheviks’.125 On the one hand, 
the various autonomist and separatist Siberia movements coalesced first in the 
Provisional Government of Autonomous Siberia led by Peter Derber (PGAS) in 
January 1918 and later in the Omsk Provisional Siberian Government (PSG) in 
June 1918. On the other hand, in June 1918 former SR and Kadet leaders as well 
as former members of the Constituent Assembly established the Komuch, i.e. the 
Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly. In September 1918, after 
the deployment of the first US troops in Siberia, the PSG and the Komuch 
merged in the so called Ufa Directory thus establishing the Provisional All-
Russian Government (PA-RG) in Omsk, soon to become the leading anti-
Bolshevik centre during the civil war and including both SR and Kadet 
representatives.126  
Often overlooked, the Siberian democratic counterrevolutionary phase lasted 
from May to November 1918, the period when the US decision to intervene was 
taken and implemented. Wilson looked with favour at these ‘nuclei of self-
government authority’ in Siberia, requested additional information to identify 
the potential recipient of US support, and eventually opted for intervention in 
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order to secure the Siberian political experiment. The US administration 
acknowledged the continuity between the governments in Siberia and the 
previous Provisional Government, clearly indicated by the presence of former 
members of the latter within the Siberian institutions.127 
The democratic counterrevolution eased US decision to intervene in two ways. 
First, representatives of the democratic counterrevolution used the available 
communication channels with American officials to stress their democratic 
credentials and their pro-US stance. On 19th July 1918, Lansing received a letter 
from Derber providing reassurances about the ‘reconstitution of united Russia 
into a democratic federal republic’ to fight alongside the allies for ‘the triumph 
of democratic principles in international relations’. Derber also clarified the 
priorities of the PGAS as being the establishment of an assembly ‘elected by 
universal suffrage’, guaranteeing individual and property rights, and ensuring 
the ‘revival’ of the laws promulgated by the Provisional Government.128 In 
addition, the representatives of the Siberian cooperatives both requested the 
‘reestablishment of normal economic order’ while agitating the possibility of 
siding with any external power (i.e. Germany) to achieve this end, thus playing 
on the fear of German influence.129  
Second, the leaders of the provisional institutions in Siberia invited openly 
external intervention. The Supreme War Council in Paris reported that  
there is much evidence…that the most liberal and democratic elements in 
Russia are beginning to lift their heads and to get in touch with one 
another….The Liberal and democratic elements urgently ask for Allied 
intervention, and make it clear while they desire economic assistance, the 
essential need is military support.130   
In doing so, Russian Liberals reinforced the views held by both US diplomats 
and policymakers regarding the likely support US troops would have enjoyed 
in Siberia. According to the US Diplomatic Liaison officer to the Supreme War 
Council in Paris, the Czech revolt and the ensuing political development 
‘remove[d] the apprehension that Allied intervention will meet with such 
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serious opposition from local population east of the Urals…’.131 As Kennan 
concluded, Wilson expected that the intervention ‘would elicit so powerful and 
friendly a reaction among the population that a pro-Allied authority would be 
initiated throughout Siberia and in North Russia by spontaneous democratic 
action’.132  
For the abovementioned reasons, the revolt of the Czech Legion in Siberia 
represented more than a pretext for US intervention; it altered the 
administration’s decision-making more than domestic and allied pressures as 
indicated by US documents.133 In the new conditions emerging in Siberia, the 
Wilson administration could identify the ‘shadow of a plan’ for direct 
intervention.134As a result, Wilson overcame his previous reluctance and 
officially decided for direct intervention on 17th July 1918. In opting for military 
action, Wilson authorised two distinct military operations:  an intervention in 
the Northern Russia (Archangel) and a second one in Siberia (Vladivostok). The 
two interventions were perceived as two separate efforts by the US 
administration, with the expedition in the Archangel representing the less 
problematic of the two to justify. The northern expedition, in fact, had a clearer 
military objective, being responsible for the protection of the military supplies 
in the Kola Peninsula and of the only harbour that could be used also during 
winter to provide supplies and access to Russia.135 On the contrary, intervention 
in Siberia escaped an immediate military justification.136 Not surprisingly, the 
Wilson administration devoted most of its official explanations on the purpose 
of US intervention in Russia to clarify the set of objectives the US was trying to 
achieve in Siberia.  
An analysis of the key documents produced in early July helps shed some light 
on these objectives. The decision to intervene was finalised during a high-level 
meeting on 6th July 1918 between Wilson, Lansing, Newton Baker (Secretary of 
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War) and General March Peyton. In the memorandum written on the meeting, 
the participants made clear that intervention did not serve the purpose of 
establishing a new Eastern front as advances beyond Irkutsk were deemed 
unfeasible. The operations of the US forces would have been limited to the 
Siberian Eastern regions and to support the Czech units that revolted against 
the Bolsheviks. They also noted that failure to act would have infringed US 
stance vis-à-vis ‘friendly Slavs everywhere’.137 In the following aide memoir sent 
to the allied ambassadors on 17th July 1918, Wilson affirmed that US military 
units were sent to Russia  
to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful 
cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-
government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be 
willing to accept assistance.138  
 
Since Wilson used the term ‘self-government’ to indicate forms of constitutional 
or representative governments,139 the US administration identified the ultimate 
beneficiary of its intervention, that is the panoply of non-Soviet institutions 
present at the time throughout Siberia and representing the democratic 
alternative to the Soviet elite. One year after the decision had been taken, this 
objective was confirmed a in response to a Senate resolution, where the White 
House justified US presence in Siberia with the need to protect the Czech 
Legion, support Russian efforts at self-defence, secure the functioning of the 
Trans-Siberian railway in order to avoid further anarchy in Siberia, and ensure 
the political and economic survival of the opposition forces in Siberia.140  
US troops landed in Siberia in September 1918. Military operations were limited 
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to the Eastern regions and to support the Czech units.141 Following specific 
orders from the State Department, US troops neither operated in the interior 
nor moved to Omsk, thus stationing in Vladivostok and the area around 
Archangel. As a consequence, US troops did not take part in the operations 
against the Red Army, thus having limited impact on the military balance in 
Western Siberia.142 US diplomats and military commanders present in Siberia 
promptly stressed the need for a more active role for US troops to boost the 
morale of the Russian troops and extend US influence over the provisional 
government in Omsk, yet the administration maintained its caveats on the 
employment of US forces.143 The administration’s reluctance to engage in 
military combat or increase its troops during the summer and autumn of 1918 
responded to three factors. First, US intervention resulted from the conditions 
shaped by the Czech revolt. From its inception, the AEF was conceived as a 
having exclusively an indirect and supporting role: securing the rear of the 
Czech forces to allow them to operate in the Western regions of Siberia. 
Furthermore, at this stage a full-fledge military role in Western Siberia was out 
of question given the concurring US operations in Western Europe and the 
limited achievements obtained in Archangel, which did not permitted US 
commander to link the Northern and Siberian fronts.144  
Second, US limited operations responded also to political and domestic 
considerations. In line with the self-determination principle and the importance 
it occupied within the specific formula supporting Wilson’s platform, the 
administration was keen on reducing the active interference of US troops with 
the internal politics of Russia.145 It was evidently a contradiction if not an 
exercise in self-delusion. Yet, it responded both to the constraints posed by 
Progressive ideas and the broader Liberal assumptions that allowed Wilson to 
see his attempts to ‘steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense’ in 
Siberia as in the interest of the Russian people, not in the interest of the US or of 
any elite faction involved in the Russian civil war. 
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Finally, US prudence resulted also from the changing situation within the 
democratic counterrevolution after the arrival of US troops. At this stage, the 
US administration was not granting official recognition to any government in 
Siberia, not because of its lack of sympathy for the ‘distinguished men’ that 
were behind the Ufa Directorate but because of the confusion due to the 
numerous contending claims made by various actors in the region.146 Related to 
this, concerns grew for the possible secessionist aims of the Siberian 
government and for the influence exerted by the Left SRs on the PA-RG.147 More 
importantly, the events of November 1918 dramatically ended the democratic 
phase of the Siberian counterrevolution that eased US intervention in the first 
place. 
 
 
After Intervention: White Flag 
In November 1918, Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak took control of the Omsk 
government, removed the SR leadership from the PA-RG institutions, and 
declared himself Supreme Ruler, opening the more properly defined ‘White’ 
phase of the anti-Bolshevik counterrevolution in Siberia.148 The failure of the SR 
and Kadet elite groups and Kolchak’s takeover deprived the US of a legitimate 
domestic interlocutor able to mobilise the Russian peasantry against the 
Bolsheviks and committed to continue the basic agenda of the Provisional 
Government.149 With his coup, Kolchak eliminated the possibility of a ‘third 
path’ between Socialism and autocracy, that is the very political alternative that 
pulled the US into Russia.  
Initially, the Wilson administration opted to maintain its troops in Siberia. US 
presence in early 1919 responded primarily to two objectives. First, continued 
military intervention allowed supporting the anti-Bolshevik forces in a moment 
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where US leaders became increasingly concerned about the possible spread of 
Bolshevism in Europe, particularly in Germany and Hungary. Second, US 
military presence allowed US policymakers to influence Russian actors and 
events in a highly strategic environment shaped by the interventions of 
Washington’s allies: Britain, France, and Japan. On the one hand, the AEF 
allowed the US to maintain a channel of influence over Kolchak and limit the 
competing influence exerted over Kolchak’s government by Britain and France, 
as indicated by London and Paris’ support for Kolchak’s rejection of US 
diplomatic initiatives in 1919.150 On the other hand, it allowed US leaders to 
contrast Japanese influence exerted mainly via the support provided to a 
Cossack leader, Grigory Semenov, who was challenging Kolchak’s authority in 
Eastern Siberia.151 As Richard Goldhurst points out, ‘there were many reasons 
why [the US] came to Russia, but there was only one reason why they stayed: to 
intervene in a civil war to see who would govern the new Russia – the largest 
country in the world’.152 
However, Kolchak’s coup problematised US position in Siberia, endangering 
the possibility of securing the political order in Russia that US leaders 
considered to be conducive to both their international and domestic interests. 
At this stage, US policymakers were left with three options to lead Russia 
toward a different political outcome: attempting a diplomatic solution to 
reconcile the various Russian factions; sending a larger interventionary force to 
either support Kolchak’s reactionary government or even imposing an halt to 
the hostilities in Russia; exerting pressures on Kolchak to liberalise the Omsk 
government.153 The effects produced by the elite dynamics highlighted in the 
previous sections substantially affected US policy throughout 1919 by 
hampering all three solutions.  
The possibility of diplomatic solution to the Russian civil war had been opened 
by the November 1918 Soviet ‘peace offensive’, driven by the need to put an 
end to the twofold threat posed by the White forces and foreign intervention. In 
January 1919, Wilson took the opportunity by calling the different Russian 
factions, including the Bolsheviks and the White leaders, to a peace conference 
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to be held at Prinkipo Island.154 The failure of the Prinkipo proposal as well as of 
the subsequent attempts to devise a bilateral agreement with the Bolsheviks 
through William Bullitt’s mission resulted from two factors. First, Kolchak, with 
the support of the British and French governments, rejected any power-sharing 
agreement with the Bolsheviks. Second, the Red Scare and the heightened anti-
Bolshevik rhetoric in the US impeded any substantial concession, raising 
significant elite and public opposition in the US to any agreement with the 
Bolshevik leaders.155 Ideological differences and the antithetic challenge posed 
by the Bolshevik regime represented once again an obstacle to substantial 
public cooperation. With a diplomatic solution off the table, a military victory of 
the White forces and the possibility for Kolchak to establish a democratic 
regime acceptable to the US became the only alternatives for continued US 
presence in Siberia.156  
Kolchak’s renewed military operations against the Red Army in May 1919 – the 
so-called ‘Ufa Offensive’ – raised the question of increasing allied military 
deployments in Russia as a way to tilt the military balance in favour of the 
White forces.157 Yet, Washington responded with scepticism to allied requests to 
increase its troops in Siberia.158 US leaders’ caution responded to both 
international and domestic considerations. In part this reflected US concerns 
that increased US troops would lead to a Japanese response thus igniting a 
dangerous military build-up in the region.159 More importantly, the Wilson 
administration was fully aware of the domestic consequences of increased 
involvement in Russia. First, calls for US withdrawal appeared both within the 
administration as well as in the broader political elite. At the beginning of 1919, 
opposition in Congress to Wilson’s foreign policy started to grow, with the first 
requests for the withdrawal of US troops appearing in the Senate.160 In 
particular, Progressive representatives began to attack Wilson’s Russian policy 
                                                
154 Grayson 1919a; 1919b; Wilson 1919b.  
155 Walt 1996: 158-163; Saul 2001: 360-361; Alston 2006: 27. On the details of these two 
diplomatic initiatives as well as on the ensuing Hoover-Hansen plan, see McFadden 
1993: 191-217, 218-243, 244-263. 
156 Davis and Trani 2002: 174. 
157 For instance, London and Paris considered this possibility after the initial success of 
Kolchak’s offensive. See Alston 2006: 27. 
158 FRUS 1919a: 421-422; Saul 2001: 366-367. 
159 FRUS 1919a: 345-346. 
160 Ibid.: 323-324; Maddox 1967: 437, 446; Saul 2001: 372. 
                     213 
despite their early support for intervention.161 This demonstration of the ‘critical 
spirit in Congress’ convinced the acting Secretary of State, Frank Polk, and 
ultimately the administration that the room for maintaining US military 
presence in Russia was shrinking at a fast pace.162 Second, the Red Scare 
gradually pushed the members of the US political elite to a more inward-
looking approach regarding Communism; to fight Bolshevism at home rather 
than abroad.163 Notably, as pointed out by Colonel House in January 1919, 
sending additional troops to Russia would have not only exacerbated the 
situation in Russia but also fuelled social tensions (‘labour troubles’) in the 
US.164  
Unable and unwilling to deploy the necessary troops in Russia, the Wilson 
administration tried to find a modus vivendi with Kolchak and push the 
Supreme Leader towards democratic reforms. The emerging pattern of relations 
between the US leaders and the White leaders shaped the last significant US 
initiative in the Russian Civil War before the withdrawal of US troops. In the 
early phase of Kolchak’s rule, between the end of 1918 and early 1919, the 
administration tried to get a better grasp of the nature of Kolchak’s leadership 
in order to assess its democratic credentials and the appropriate policies 
towards his government. Initially, both Bakhmetev and Prince Lvov expressed 
a positive assessment of Kolchak’s coup to US policymakers, stressing 
Kolchak’s ability to unify all Russian factions.165 Diplomatic dispatches from US 
diplomats found Kolchak ‘as a man in the…[best] class where one would group 
Milyukov [sic], Alexeev [sic], Guchkov, Lvov…he represented no upper-house 
[class] party, was neither Social Revolutionary nor reactionary’.166  
However, reports regarding Kolchak and his government became increasingly 
divergent during 1919. While Consul General Harris provided a positive 
picture of Kolchak and his government, Ambassador Roland Morris and Major 
General Graves raised doubts about Kolchak’s leadership.167 Diplomatic 
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dispatches in the first half of 1919 increasingly noted the duplicitous nature of 
Kolchak’s government: stressing its Liberal stance in its public statements 
directed at the US and Allied policymakers while implementing starkly 
conservative policies in Russia.168 In particular, diplomatic dispatches 
denounced the presence of reactionary and Tsarist military leaders in Kolchak’s 
government.169 As a result, there were divisions in the US on whether to aid and 
recognise Kolchak.  
At the end of May 1919, US opted for conditional support. The Wilson 
administration managed to rally Allied power behind a common dispatch 
stating the conditions for providing aid to Kolchak, including: reviving a 
democratically-elected constitutional assembly once taken control of Moscow; 
and, allowing democratic elections for selecting local governments. Following 
Kolchak’s acceptance of these requests, the US authorised the provision of 
material support and humanitarian relief yet refusing to extend formal 
recognition and increased military aid.170 Before proceeding with the eventual 
military aid and recognition, in July 1919 Wilson decided to send Ambassador 
Morris a mission to Omsk to evaluate both the sincerity of Kolchak’s democratic 
intentions and his prospects of success against the Bolsheviks. The US mission 
highlighted that Kolchak’s democratic intentions were weak at best: Kolchak 
suppressed local institutions, lacked popular and particularly peasants’ 
support, and was increasingly reliant on the support provided by the Russian 
reactionaries. As Morris concluded, Kolchak’s government ‘had failed to 
command the confidence of anybody in Siberia except a small discredited 
group of reactionaries, Monarchists, and military officials’.171 Furthermore, 
Kolchak’s government was judged as ineffective and its survival strictly linked 
to the Czech presence. Although Morris’ personal judgment of Kolchak 
remained positive, he stressed Kolchak’s limits as a leader, his lack of control 
over his ministers and the inability of the whole government to implement the 
reforms they promised. Inefficiency, corruption and detachment from 
significant and moderate social groups were the characterising element of 
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Kolchak’s government.172 This became evident also at the military level. 
Kolchak’s military advances in May 1919 did not reverse the course of the civil 
war; after the initial success, the Red Army pushed back Kolchak’s units.173  
Given its deteriorating position, Morris suggested strengthening Kolchak’s 
government by providing both external validation via formal recognition and 
increased external resources and military support via the dispatch of 40.000 US 
troops.174 However, US inability to send additional troops to Siberia prevented 
such course of action. In turn, this prevented the US to force Kolchak towards 
any meaningful democratic or administrative reform, stressing the limits of US 
influence over Kolchak and the White military leaders in general. By failing to 
send combat troops at the front and provide critical material and political 
support, White forces became less dependent on US support thus reducing US 
controls over Kolchak’s decisions.  
Left with a reactionary ally that it could not fully support, influence or reform 
without deploying a larger contingent and incurring in significant political costs 
at home, the Wilson administration decided to put an end to military 
intervention. US troops withdrew from Northern Russia in June 1919. A first 
agreement within the administration on the withdrawal of US troops from 
Siberia was reached at the end of September 1919 and approved in December.175 
Eventually, US forces were kept longer in Siberia to keep Japanese forces under 
control, safeguard the remaining Czech units as well as avoid hastening the 
demise of Kolchak’s government.176 However, the collapse of Kolchak’s 
authority in December 1919 and his capture and execution in February 1920 led 
to the demise both of the White counterrevolution in central Siberia and of the 
US illusion of revitalising the February Revolution in the Siberian plains, thus 
leaving no other rationale for US operations. By February 1920 half of US troops 
had already left Siberia, with remaining units leaving Vladivostok in August 
1920.177 
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Conclusion: The Consequences of Intervention 
This chapter has underscored the role played by elite dynamics in shaping the 
US decision to intervene. The interplay of these elite dynamics increasingly 
reduced the feasibility of alternative courses of action for the Wilson 
administration and eventually offered it the possibility to shape the internal 
conflict in Russia through limited military measures.  
First, ideological affinities and differences affected the decision to intervene 
only in an indirect but important way. Ideological commonality reinforced the 
identification of US leaders with the political project set in motion by the 
February Revolution. At the same time, ideological differences limited the 
possibility of cooperation with the Bolsheviks. Similarly to the Cuban case, the 
clash of contending political formulas reduced the room for cooperation 
between US leaders and local elite groups. In this case, however, the antithetic 
conceptions of political order held by the two elites represented an 
insurmountable obstacle to even limited forms of cooperation not only in 1917-
1918 but also in the subsequent years. Second, the actual threat posed by the 
Bolshevik Revolution to the US elite’ position both at home and in Europe made 
inaction an unfeasible policy for Washington, pushing American leaders 
towards an increasingly interventionist stance as a way to preserve the results 
of the February Revolution and shape a more favourable domestic and 
international environment. Importantly, US policymakers tried to secure the 
position of their Russian allies as a way to secure both their domestic and 
international position. Third, relations between the US political elite and the 
leaders of the February Revolutions were of paramount importance in shaping 
US intervention in 1918. The leaders of the February Revolution enjoyed direct 
relations with US policymakers and could also take advantage of their contacts 
with the members of the wider US ruling elite who in turn enjoyed access to US 
politicians. In particular, elite relations produced three effects: they reinforced 
existing ideological ties with the leaders of the February Revolution; they 
provided a channel Russian leaders could use to influence the US policymaking 
process towards Russia; and, they acted as a disturbing factor in US-Bolshevik 
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relations. When the Czech revolt allowed these Russian actors to take centre 
stage once again in the struggle for Russia, US leaders opted for direct 
intervention as a way to secure a Liberal political order in Russia.  
Changing political conditions in both Russia and the US ultimately reduced the 
possibility for the Wilson administration to exert any significant influence over 
the Russian Civil War and support the establishment of a more democratic 
order. Significantly, US policymakers refused to fully embrace Kolchak. 
Support for the White forces was linked to attempts to influence not only 
Kolchak’s policies but also the nature of his government. This dynamic presents 
significant parallels with the Cuban case. Similarly to the US intervention in 
Cuba, US objectives in the target state prevented US policymakers from siding 
with the more relevant military forces on the ground: the LA in Cuba and the 
White forces commanded by Kolchak in Russia. Similarly to Cuba, US 
policymakers used their military presence to shape the identity of the political 
actors the US supported. Yet, in the Russian case, fear of the domestic political 
costs of an all-out intervention profoundly limited US ability to deploy the 
military forces that would have made Kolchak dependent on US support and 
increased Washington’s influence. Eventually, the impossibility of restoring a 
reformist ‘third path’ in Siberia, the break-up of US elite consensus over 
Wilson’s internationalist agenda, and Kolchak’s defeat made it clear to US 
policymakers that intervention had become nothing more than a political and 
military burden.  
Without adventuring into a fully developed counterfactual analysis, it is 
difficult to underestimate the potential systemic impact that a successful US 
intervention would have brought. The Bolshevik Revolution interrupted a 
political process that was leading towards closer ties between the US and 
Russia, diverting it towards increased confrontation. In this regard, the eventual 
victory of the forces supported by the US would have ensured greater 
ideological homogeneity and a more favourable balance of power from the 
perspective of US leaders. While a successful intervention would have secured 
such process, US failed intervention contributed to poison US-Soviet relations, 
with formal recognition of the Soviet Union taking place only in 1933. US 
recognition was extended only after Moscow’s pledge  
                     218 
to respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to 
order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to 
refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the 
United States, its territories or possessions.178   
The failure of US intervention reflected a more profound limit originating from 
the systemic incentives shaped by elite politics. While intervention was the 
result of specific conditions, US support for the Provisional Government and its 
adversarial stance towards the Bolshevik regime responded respectively to the 
security and political benefits originating from a Liberal Russia and the 
impossibility of finding a rewarding accommodation with the Soviets, both 
during and after US intervention. The twofold challenge posed by the Bolshevik 
elite was still clear to US policymakers in 1920. According to Lansing,  
a limited group of men in Moscow are endeavoring to impose upon the 
civilized world by opportunism and force a new order of existence of 
their own conceiving. The more destructive forms of the unrest now 
existing in this country cannot be disassociated from the inspiration of 
their propaganda and example…They challenge us to the defense of our 
well-being and institutions.179  
What changed at this stage in US policy was not the overall objective pursued 
in 1918 rather the tactics employed to pursue it. After the withdrawal of US 
troops from Siberia, Washington opted for non-recognition of the Soviet Union 
as indicated in the Colby note on non-recognition of August 1920.180 Non-
recognition represented the inevitable diplomatic result of a policy shaped by 
the impossibility of cooperation with the Communist leadership and the failure 
of military action in Russia.  
Furthermore, when military intervention failed to secure a more favourable 
elite instead of the Bolsheviks, US policymakers reverted to economic 
intervention as a way to conquer the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Russian people 
and forestall the spread of Bolshevism in Russia and beyond. As Lansing had 
noted in a report to Wilson in December 1919, there was a distinction between 
the Bolsheviks and their political formula. Against the Bolsheviks and the Red 
Army only force could prevail. On the contrary, Bolshevism could not be 
countered by force as it represented ‘pre-eminently an economic and moral 
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phenomenon against which economic and moral remedies alone will prevail’.181 
A form of economic intervention had been pursued in Siberia alongside 
military intervention from the early phases of US involvement in the Russian 
conflict. Already in the aide memoir of July 1918, Wilson made clear his intention 
to intervene in Siberia also ‘to relieve the immediate economic necessities of the 
people there’.182 As military intervention had its interlocutors primarily among 
the Liberal and White forces, economic intervention was conducted in 
collaboration with the cooperatives present in Siberia. The immediate objective 
of such efforts was not just purely economic assistance but the ‘industrial and 
economic rehabilitation’ of the region.183  
Economic intervention became prominent as military intervention showed all 
its limits. The economic measures approved by the administration became 
strictly linked to a food relief operation organised via the American Relief 
Administration (ARA) established in February 1919 and headed by Herbert 
Hoover. The importance of this operation can hardly be overstated, as food 
allocation became a fundamental tool in the view of US policymakers to counter 
the revolutionary wave in Europe and compensate for the limits of military 
intervention.184 In urging the Congress to approve Hoover’s requests, Wilson 
stated that  
food relief is now the key to the whole European situation and to the 
solutions of peace. Bolshevism is steadily advancing westward, has 
overwhelmed Poland, and is poisoning Germany. It cannot be stopped 
by force, but it can be stopped by food.185 
Military intervention, economic assistance and the food relief programme were 
aimed at exactly the same political objective the administration was trying to 
pursue via military intervention: saving the democratic revolution in Russia.186 
While at the diplomatic level the US opted for non-recognition, economic 
collaboration and humanitarian assistance continued with the Harding 
administration. Following the so-called Hoover’s ‘Treaty’ with the Soviet Union 
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(August 1921), the Congress agreed to provide ARA with nearly $19 million to 
deliver food and medical aid to Russia.187 At this stage, the food relief and 
economic assistance programmes represented the only tool left to the US 
political elite to maintain its influence over the Soviet Union. As such, both non-
recognition and economic relations were simply the continuation of 
intervention by other means.  
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Chapter 6 
The Greatest Error: US Non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War, 
1936-1939 
 
 
‘The position adopted by [the US] government with regard to the Civil War in 
Spain…constitutes the greatest error in the foreign policy of this country during the past twelve 
years’ 
(Sumner Wells, former Under Secretary of State, 1944) 
 
 
Introduction 
After having examined two instances of direct intervention, the following 
chapter will address a negative case. Specifically, this last case study is intended 
to examine whether and how the three dynamics operating at the elite level 
(political formulas, power struggle, and elite relations) influenced the US non-
intervention in the Spanish Civil War.  
The Spanish Civil War resulted from the rebellion of military forces on 17th July 
1936 against the Spanish Republic ruled by the Popular Front coalition. The 
conflict between the rebel forces – the Nationalists led by General Francisco 
Franco – and the Republican forces – the so called Loyalists – lasted for nearly 
three years and left more than half a million casualties.1 The war ended with the 
victory of the Nationalist forces in March 1939 and the eventual recognition by 
all powers of the Nationalist regime of Franco. The relevance of this case stems 
from two factors. First, the Spanish Civil War represented a major international 
issue during the late 1930s. The conflict not only raised concerns across 
governmental and diplomatic circles but also led to widespread mobilisation in 
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European and American societies. Second, the conflict itself had a 
quintessentially international dimension: it was primarily a ‘European 
phenomenon’ that soon sparked contrasting sentiments across the Atlantic.2  
The international nature of the conflict derived from two elements. First, the 
conflict marked the end point of the long crisis of the Spanish monarchy, caused 
by both the loss of its empire in 1898 addressed in Chapter 4 and the dynamics 
ignited by the Bolshevik Revolution addressed in Chapter 5.3 The attempts 
aimed at modernising the Spanish economy after the loss of the colonial market, 
the concomitant rise of the Leftist forces, and an increasingly inward-looking 
military elite altered an already fragile political and institutional equilibrium. 
This led first to the establishment of the Republic in 1931 and later the victory of 
Spain’s Popular Front in February 1936, against whom the military revolted in 
the subsequent July. Second, external powers directly influenced the course of 
events via their interventions. Whilst German and Italian support ensured the 
initial success of the military coup, Soviet support ensured the Loyalist defence 
of Madrid in November 1936.4 Foreign troops as well as thousands of 
volunteers took part in the war, affecting it in dramatic ways.5  
Despite the international dimension of the conflict, Western democracies opted 
for non-intervention. This position was enshrined in the Non-Intervention 
Agreement of September 1936, signed by 27 European countries, and the related 
Non-Intervention Committee established in London. The position taken by 
Western democracies was subject to intense criticism both during the crisis and 
in subsequent evaluations as it prevented the legitimate Spanish government at 
the time from acquiring substantial aid for its defence.6 Officially, the US 
administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) that came to power in 1933 
did not sign the Non-intervention Agreement yet it immediately adopted a 
strict neutral position in the Spanish conflict. Its intention not to become 
involved in Spain was first formulated under a ‘moral embargo’ aimed at 
impeding the provision of war material to Spain from American citizens and 
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companies. Later this position was officially proclaimed by the US Congress in 
its Spanish Embargo Act in January 1937 and reaffirmed in the Neutrality Act of 
May 1937.  
The US response to the Spanish conflict represents a valuable case for four 
reasons. First, the US position has not been subject to extensive examination 
within IR theory. As Richard Little notes, the Spanish Civil War has assumed a 
key importance for statesmen in the years preceding the Second World War and 
yet it has gained very little attention within IR Theory.7 Second, although 
usually referred to as the manifestation of US isolationism during the 1930s, 
with Spain representing a secondary issue for US policymakers, a closer look at 
the case highlights the profound interest the Spanish conflict sparked both 
within American society and among US policymakers.8 If non-intervention did 
not originate from US policymakers’ disinterest, its causes need to be carefully 
examined. As argued in the Introduction of this thesis, non-intervention 
represents a political decision and should be treated as such. Third, despite the 
firm policy of neutrality towards Spain, key figures in the administration, 
including FDR himself, already in 1939 came to consider US non-intervention as 
a ‘grave mistake’.9 An accurate explanation of this case needs to shed light on 
how US top policymakers’ negative assessment of US neutrality did not prevent 
them from altering US policy. Fourth, as a negative case, US policy towards the 
Spanish Civil War provides a challenging probe for the theoretical framework 
outlined in Part I. If elite dynamics matter to explain intervention, they should 
also elucidate cases of non-intervention. Further, elite dynamics should shed 
light not only on US non-intervention in 1936 but also on the reasons that led 
US policymakers to maintain US neutrality until 1939. Thus, in this Chapter, I 
will devote particular attention to evaluate the explanatory payoffs of elite 
dynamics for the 1937-1939 period. 
In order to provide a detailed analysis of the factors leading to US decision, 
after a review of the explanations offered in the literature, I will examine how 
political ideologies, power struggle, and elite relations affected US policy in the 
run up and during 1936. In addition, I will also highlight how the same 
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dynamics help shed light on both the continued non-interventionist policy 
maintained in 1937-1939 and the limited yet important shift that takes place 
within this period.  
 
 
Contending Explanations 
Detailed explanations of US policy towards the Spanish Civil War are lacking 
within IR. This is particularly surprising given not only the importance of the 
conflict at the time but also the various IR works on great powers’ policy during 
the 1930s, centred mainly on the study of appeasement.10 In particular, Realist 
works have addressed the question of appeasement from the perspective of 
balance of power mechanisms and alliance politics, giving preference to a 
purely strategic reading of US policy during this period while essentially 
overlooking the Spanish case.11  
The main exception to IR silence on the case is represented by Richard Little. 
Little shows not only the impact of systemic pressures on British decision but 
also how entrenched norms regarding internal conflicts and non-intervention 
constrained British decision-makers. These societal practices proved to be 
‘sticky’ especially for status quo states such as Britain.12 When applied to the US 
case, it can be easily noted that the Roosevelt administration referred to the US 
longstanding adherence to the principles of neutrality when formulating its 
policy. However, this presents significant explanatory limits at closer scrutiny. 
In the case of the Spanish conflict, the US did not follow customary 
international law that allowed for the provision of arms to legitimate 
governments, in this case the Loyalist government.13 Notably, the difference 
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with traditional norms on neutrality was repeatedly noted during the 
formulation of US neutrality.  
On the contrary, numerous historical works have examined the causes of US 
non-intervention in Spain. The main historical accounts of US non-intervention 
can be divided in four groups. A first set of explanations focuses on the impact 
that economic and commercial interests in Spain had on both British and US 
decision on non-intervention.14 US direct investments in Spain, connected 
mainly to the ITT, equalled more than $80 million in 1936 with more recent 
estimates pointing to $100 million.15 In particular, Douglas Little stresses the 
impact of two factors. First, successive Spanish Republican governments 
aggravated Spanish trade relations with the US during the 1930s given their 
attempts to nationalise US assets and redress Madrid’s trade imbalance with 
Washington.16 These attempts represented a twofold concern for US 
policymakers as they considered increased international trade as necessary to 
stabilise both the international system and the US economy during the Great 
Depression.17 Second, US initial response to the civil war was shaped by the 
expropriation of US companies and plants in the areas held by the Loyalists 
where the majority of US investments were located, causing significant 
economic losses to US companies.18 Related to this, US policymakers and 
business representatives were also concerned about the repercussions that a 
possible Socialist takeover in Spain could have on US economic interests in 
Latin America given the existing ties between Spain and Latin America.19 
Hence, according to Douglas Little, US non-intervention represented a case of 
‘malevolent neutrality’: officially avoiding any entanglement in the Spanish 
conflict yet favouring a Nationalist victory in Spain.20 According to this account, 
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not only the US denied the possibility of arms sale to the legitimate Spanish 
government, as permitted under customary international law, but American 
private companies also directly supported the Nationalist war effort, as in the 
case of the Texaco Oil Company, which sold oil on credit to Franco’s forces.21  
Douglas Little’s analysis offers a valuable contribution, particularly in stressing 
the way in which pre-1936 US-Spanish relations influenced US non-
intervention, a point to which I will come back in the following sections. Yet, 
the economic explanation of US non-intervention presents five limits. First, US 
economic interests in Spain were not significant in relative terms, accounting for 
only 7% of all US foreign direct investment in Europe, 1.3% worldwide.22 
Second, despite the alleged US preference for the Nationalist cause, US 
policymakers did not establish significant political and economic relations with 
the provisional government the Nationalists set up in Burgos. For example, the 
administration did not recognise the Nationalist government and US diplomats 
were given clear instructions to avoid any sign of recognition of the rebels.23 
Third, the provision of material aid to the Nationalists by Texaco Oil and other 
US companies indicates the support enjoyed by the Nationalists within the 
American economic elite, not necessarily among the members of the US 
political elite.24 Notably, the Roosevelt administration acted to curb these 
initiatives, resulting in fines being imposed on Texaco for its violation of the US 
embargo. Fourth, non-intervention hardly helped Washington to defend its 
economic interests in the country. In case, it left ample room for growing 
economic ties between Spain and the intervening powers, mainly Germany and 
Italy.25 In particular, a lift of the embargo could have advantaged US arms 
manufacturers who were willing and ready in the summer of 1936 to respond to 
the Loyalists’ requests for airplanes and weapons. Finally, explanations 
focusing on economic factors do not fully explain the increasingly anti-
Nationalist stance taken by the Roosevelt administration after 1936. As I will 
discuss, throughout 1937 and 1938, US policymakers became increasingly 
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concerned about a possible Nationalist victory in the Spanish conflict, given its 
potential impact on US strategic and political interests in Latin America, rather 
than about a Socialist victory. 
In more general terms, the central role played by capitalism within the 
American political formula and the concurring antithetical challenge posed by 
Communism makes it difficult to distinguish the causal impact of economic 
factors from the causal impact of ideological differences. Not surprisingly, both 
Douglas Little and recent historical materialist analyses treat economic and 
ideological considerations as part of the same causal dynamic.26 As such, US 
concerns for its economic interests cannot be disentangled from the Communist 
menace Washington perceived arising in Spain during the 1930s and in the 
summer of 1936. As I will indicate in the following section, ideological 
considerations are central to explain the lack of cooperation between US 
policymakers and the Loyalists. In this sense, US-Spanish trade tensions during 
the 1930s mattered primarily because they reinforced these ideological 
concerns. 
A second set of works stresses the role played by international objectives and 
security interests in shaping US non-intervention. As highlighted by a number 
of authors, one of the key reasons for US and more generally Western 
democracies’ non-intervention was their fear of further internationalising the 
conflict in Spain, hence igniting a general war in Europe.27 In this regard, US 
policy responded to the need to support Britain and France in their efforts to 
appease Germany and contain the conflict.28 These explanations have been 
subject to two types of critiques. First, the impact of the ‘war scare’ in the 
summer of 1936 should not be overestimated. Although democracies were 
interested in avoiding direct clashes with the revisionist powers, we should be 
careful in projecting onto 1936 concerns about a possible international 
conflagration that became more pressing only during 1937-1938, that is after the 
Japanese attack on China in 1937 and the crisis over Czechoslovakia in 1938.29 
Second, the US did not participate in the Non-Intervention Committee Britain 
                                                
26 Little 1985; Anievas 2011. 
27 Traina 1968: 227-228; Divine 1962: 223; Dallek 1995: 143, 161; Stone 2005: 210-211. 
28 Puzzo 1962: 161; Traina 1968. 
29 Little 1985: 238. 
                     228 
and France organised and adopted its official policy before London and Paris 
formally agreed on the non-intervention position.  
A third set of explanations highlights the need to take into account domestic 
factors. Particular attention has been given to the influence of isolationism on 
both the US Congress and public opinion.30 According to Paul Preston, ‘the 
United States was too wrapped up in its New Deal isolationism to be overly 
preoccupied by what was happening in Spain’.31 Another important factor has 
been identified in the influence of the Catholic vote, which generally supported 
Franco, on FDR and the Democratic Party.32 While adding a fundamental 
corrective to previous explanations, these works raise further questions. First, 
isolationism does not explain important aspects of US policy, such as: the 
rapidity of the US decision in 1936; its deviation from traditional forms of 
neutrality; and, FDR’s increasing interventionist stance in 1938.33 Second, if 
Catholic votes mattered, it is necessary to explain why this exerted such a 
significant impact given the limited number of potential swing votes within the 
Catholic communities.34 Related to this point, it is necessary to explain why 
influential pro-Loyalist Liberal and Protestant voters did not shift US policy 
towards greater support for the Spanish Republic.35 FDR himself was 
sympathetic to the Spanish Republic and yet the non-intervention policy was 
not altered.36 Third, these two elements (isolationism and the Catholic vote) 
need to be reconciled as they refer to different constituencies; it is important to 
clarify how and, importantly, when they mattered most. Finally, these 
explanations overlook the role played by Spanish actors in affecting US 
policymakers’ calculations.  
Existing historical accounts of both the interventionist and non-interventionist 
powers’ decisions have already discussed the need to address the interplay 
between ideological factors, international and domestic interests as well as the 
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pattern of relations between external powers and the Spanish actors. On the one 
hand, ideology, strategic interests and domestic considerations fuelled the 
direct interventions by Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union.37 Similar factors 
played an important part behind British and French decisions. For instance, 
British policy originated not only from the need to avoid another general war 
but also from the need to deactivate the possibility of further political 
polarisation within Britain.38 Moreover, multiples links existed between the 
British elite and the Spanish conservatives. Related to this, it is worth noting the 
mismatch between elite and public opinion in Britain: while the latter clearly 
sided with the Republic, British policymakers sided with the Nationalists. 
Ideological and class differences as well as elite relations played a fundamental 
role in shaping British elite views.39 French positions were influenced by the 
need to preserve its alliance with London as well as by the French elite’s 
concerns that intervention in Spain could have exacerbated the divisions within 
the French elite and society.40 Yet close diplomatic and political relations 
between French and Spanish leaders tilted French neutrality in favour of the 
Republic. 
In the following sections, I will try to highlight how similar elite dynamics can 
be applied to elucidate US response to the Spanish conflict. In this regard, an 
elite framework provides three possibilities. First, it allows systematising the 
various factors highlighted in the existing literature. Second, it draws attention 
to the contrasting incentives such elite dynamics provided, thus explaining both 
the continuation of non-intervention throughout the conflict and the more 
interventionist stance taken by the US administration in 1938. Third, it 
contextualises the role played by US-Spanish elite relations. As I will show, that 
pre-1936 US-Spanish relations and events in 1936 hampered any possibility of 
support to the Spanish Republic is out of question. Yet, that US neutrality was 
intended to favour the Nationalists is a more difficult conclusion to sustain. US 
policy in 1936 denied US support to the Republicans; it was not intended to 
favour Franco. Despite the indirect advantage that non-intervention accorded to 
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the Nationalist forces, the problem was that any other options would have 
dragged the US into the conflict, forcing it to support local actors led by 
unfavourable elites for US interests. Only when international priorities and 
events in Spain started to change their strategic calculus, US policymakers 
began shifting their position against Franco. Once again, elite dynamics 
impeded the completion of this shift.  
 
 
Political Formulas: Communism, Fascism, and Progressivism 
Spain itself, contrary to Cuba and Russia analysed in the previous chapters, did 
not play a central role in the imagination of US policymakers. Left to a marginal 
position within Europe and in the international arena following 1898, Spain did 
not represent a key objective for US political and strategic ambitions. If 
anything, the image of Spain remained tainted by the very assumptions of 
Spanish backwardness that informed US policymakers’ views in 1898.41 It was 
an image that endured amongst US policymakers. In 1941, Cordell Hull, the US 
Secretary of State, did not hesitate to begin his discussion with the Spanish 
ambassador with a self-explanatory remark: ‘in all of the relations of the [US] 
Government with the most backward and ignorant governments in the 
world…’.42 Yet, these views per se do not explain the US’s non-interventionary 
position. Images of backwardness can easily reinforce the mirror image of a 
leadership role for great powers and shape a more interventionist approach 
aimed at modernising the target state, as exemplified not only by the Cuban 
case but also by numerous interventions in history.43 On the contrary, US 
political elite’s restraint in 1936 was profoundly shaped by its ideological 
framework. On the one hand, the diffusion of antithetic formulas in Spain as 
well as the emergence of new ones altered the prospects of US cooperation with 
the main Spanish actors associated with those formulas. On the other hand, 
ideas that were instrumental to the position of the US incumbent faction 
constrained US policy towards Europe.  
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As underscored in Chapter 5, Communism represented an antithetic formula 
that challenged the basic tenets of the US liberal order, both at home and 
abroad. Despite the recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, Communism was 
still perceived as a fundamentally antithetic order during the 1930s.44 American 
fears regarding the spread of Communism were reinforced during the late 
1920s and early 1930s by instability in Latin America, particularly in Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Cuba, and Peru. But US policymakers were also concerned about 
possible Communist advances in Europe.45 In particular, US views of Spain 
were filtered through the actual and supposed control exerted by Communist 
and Socialist elements over the Spanish Republic. Since its establishment, 
developments in the Spanish Republic painted the picture of a regime markedly 
influenced by Socialist, Anarchist and Syndicalist groups.46 Notably, it was a 
picture portraying an unstable regime that could easily slide into the hands of 
more radical elements. Instead of welcoming the establishment of a Republican 
and democratic regime, US leaders quickly drew an analogy with the February 
Revolution in Russia, which reinforced mistrust towards those political forces 
that were feared to be unable to contain a possible shift to the left. Repeated 
revolts in Spain, primarily the violent revolt of October 1934 ignited by the 
more radical Socialist forces led by Largo Caballero, reinforced US fears about 
an eventual Communist takeover in Spain.47 
US leaders were also confronted with the question of Fascism’s grip on Spain as 
a result of the increased challenge posed to the Spanish Republic by the extreme 
right, the rebellion of the Nationalist forces in July 1936 and the support the 
rebels received from Berlin and Rome. However, in 1936 US leaders’ concerns 
for the diffusion of Fascism were mitigated by various factors. First, the Falange 
Espanola, the ‘nearest approach to a Fascist party in Spain’ established in 
October 1933, took centre stage in Spanish politics only in April 1937, after 
Franco’s decision to merge it with the Carlist forces to become the only political 
formation in Franco’s regime, the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas 
de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS).48 Second, from the 
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perspective of the US elite, at this stage Fascism represented a competing 
political formula, which showed both the scope of its challenge and its 
fundamentally antithetic character only gradually.49 Specifically, US perceptions 
of the threat posed by Fascism became clearer only between 1936 and 1939, in 
the midst of the Spanish Civil War. Yet, American views of Italian Fascism were 
not completely negative in the early 1930s.50 Starting in the 1920s, the US 
policymakers began to develop a policy of support for right-wing regimes 
when considered necessary to contain the more pressing danger posed by 
Communism.51 From this early perspective, authoritarianism could be co-opted 
in order to contain the diffusion of Communism both at home and abroad.52 As 
a result, while aware of the challenge posed by the Fascist regimes, in 1936 the 
US leaders’ views of the right-wing forces in Spain were informed by the 
prioritisation of the Communist over the Fascist challenge.  
The belated realisation of the Fascist threat owned also to the ideological tenets 
of US leaders at the time. During the 1930s, the emergence of an ‘Americanist’ 
creed stressing the US distance from European actors and their values became 
influential within segments of the US elite. In turn, this responded the so-called 
isolationism characterising the US polity during the 1930s.53 The term 
‘isolationism’ itself and its utility have been repeatedly questioned.54 First, 
various works have described American isolation as a ‘myth’, observing that the 
US was far more engaged with international affairs during the 1920s and 1930s 
than usually assumed.55 As these works point out, the US opted to say aloof in 
the 1930s, but it was hardly isolated. Second, according to these authors, 
isolationism is better conceptualised as a form of unilateralism, of ‘exemplarism’, 
and of restraint from direct interventionary policies in Europe.56 It represented a 
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form of prudent and selective engagement based on strict priorities, informed 
by a nationalist outlook, and focused primarily on the Western Hemisphere.57  
In addition, these works stress the need to contextualise American isolationism 
within the historical and political setting where it originated. First, isolationism 
responded to influential symbols and domestic exigencies. It spoke to 
longstanding tenets of US identify and foreign policy, which linked American 
exceptionalism and US avoidance of entangling alliances with Europe. It was 
inward-looking in a moment when US society was focused on recovery from 
economic depression. It was the expression of US disillusionment with 
international developments but also of an elite that was called to address the 
effects of the great depression on US society.58 Second, albeit linked to broader 
pacifist ideas advocated by numerous groups such as the Women’s 
International League for Peace and Freedom, isolationism was first and 
foremost linked to Progressive ideas and politicians, primarily from Western 
and rural states.59 The primacy of domestic economic reforms, distrust of 
Northern ‘big business’, and concerns about private interests’ influence on 
foreign policy characterised the Progressives’ reaction against the foreign policy 
decision of the previous decades.60 The Senate Investigation of the Munitions 
Industry led by Senator Gerald P. Nye (R-North Dakota) marked the climax of 
the so-called isolationism advocated by Progressive leaders. The findings of the 
Nye Committee on arms manufacturers’ profits reinforced American public 
opinion on establishing controls on US politicians’ ability to declare war.61 
Importantly, the findings of the Nye Committee were key in securing public 
attention on the debate over Spain and the neutrality laws between 1935 and 
1937.62  
Progressive ideas became particularly influential due the critical support 
Western Progressives provided to FDR’s candidacy in 1932. FDR included clear 
references to these anti-business feelings in his inaugural address. Further, FDR 
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nominated Harold Ickes, a Progressive Republican, as his Secretary of the 
Interior and followed Progressive suggestions in nominating a Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull, who was not linked to Wall Street and major corporations.63 
Between 1932-1937, that is when US policy towards Spain was formulated, FDR 
and the Progressives remained in an ‘uneasy alliance’, until domestic and 
international developments eroded this association.64  
While isolationist positions were closely related to the incumbent coalitions’ 
position at home, they were also linked to preserve US leaders’ influence 
abroad. Isolationism entailed first and foremost military non-interventionism, 
both in Europe and Latin America. Washington’s non-interventionism was 
reinforced by the repeated military operations the US conducted in Latin 
American during the previous decades, such as in Haiti and Nicaragua, which 
made the US elite and the public aware of the costs, risks, and limits of military 
intervention.65 Already the Republican administrations before FDR realised that 
US military interventions themselves were part of the problem in Latin 
America.66 This, coupled with Latin American states’ reactions against US 
interventionism, led to the formulation of the ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ enshrined 
in the 1933 Montevideo Treaty.67 The ‘Good Neighbour Policy’ became soon a 
foreign policy priority for the Roosevelt administration as it allowed for the 
securing of multiple objectives: improving trade relations with Latin America in 
a time of economic crisis; strengthening Western Hemispheric solidarity in view 
of a common defence against external threats; and, appeasing pacifist and 
Progressive sentiments in the US.68 As such, it responded to domestic ideals as 
much as to US attempts to maintain its hegemonic position in the Western 
Hemisphere.69 
Therefore, ‘isolationism’ became a useful ideological and policy tool for an elite 
interested in ensuring its influence over the Western Hemisphere and for an 
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incumbent faction led by FDR intentioned to secure his domestic position. The 
centrality of Progressive ideas and of the ‘Good Neighbor Policy’ was evident 
in the Democratic electoral platform of 1936:  
In our relationship with other nations, this Government will continue to 
extend the policy of the Good Neighbor…We shall continue to observe a 
true neutrality in the disputes of others;…to work for peace and to take 
the profits out of war; to guard against being drawn, by political 
commitments, international banking or private trading, into any war 
which may develop anywhere.70  
The Republican Party followed similar lines in his 1936 platform, indicating the 
widespread consensus within the US elite on this issue and how both parties 
tried to lure so called isolationist sentiments in view of the upcoming elections 
in November 1936.71 Therefore, when the Spanish conflict started, both the 
general and specific formula of the incumbent coalition did not favour any 
substantial involvement in Spanish affairs. Importantly, challenging its non-
interventionist policy entailed both negative international and domestic 
consequences. 
 
 
Power Struggle: Limiting the Impact of the Spanish Conflict 
What the US political elite and, specifically, its incumbent faction faced in the 
1930s was a changing international and domestic context. US policy in this 
period and towards Spain in particular need to be examined through the 
attempts made by US policymakers to navigate these challenges by maintaining 
their position both abroad and at home while limiting the impact of the Spanish 
Civil War. In this regard, the Spanish Civil War did not activate any particular 
incentive for US policymakers. On the contrary, the conflict in Spain acted as a 
disturbing factor that could have endangered recently acquired positions. 
At the international level, the Spanish Civil War represented a problem for the 
US position both in Europe and in Latin America. Non-intervention, in this 
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regard, allowed US leaders to secure a twofold objective. First, neutrality 
allowed the US to support the French and British initiative on non-intervention 
in the Spanish conflict.72 Despite all its limitations, which became increasingly 
evident after 1936, the non-intervention agreement provided the status quo 
powers with an institutional mechanism for containing the revisionist powers’ 
activities in Spain. In other words, since the Western powers were unable or 
unwilling to intervene, non-intervention represented a tool to curb German, 
Italian, and Soviet interventions.73 As the French Prime Minister Leon Blum 
pointed out, ‘non-intervention was essentially an attempt to prevent others 
from doing what we were incapable of accomplishing’.74  
Second, non-intervention in Spain allowed US policymakers to secure its newly 
found position in Latin America through the ‘Good Neighbour Policy’. The 
importance of this policy stemmed from the objectives it served: strengthening 
the cohesiveness of the American states; reinforcing US hegemony in the 
hemisphere; securing a defensible perimeter in the Western Hemisphere; and, 
shielding Latin America from the contending European models, whether 
Communist or Fascist.75 Improving US relations with Latin American countries 
was of paramount importance in this regard; avoiding any divisive policy its 
necessary corollary. In this sense, the Spanish conflict represented a challenging 
test for the US as Latin American states adopted contrasting positions towards 
Spain. Whilst Mexico embraced the Loyalist cause and provided material 
support to the Republic, other states such as Argentina and Brazil did not hide 
their preferences for the Nationalist regime.76 Taking sides in the Spanish 
conflict would have embittered US relations with key countries in Latin 
American and endangered the US attempts’ to form a cohesive Western 
hemispheric bloc.77 Consequently, the international scenario in the mid-1930s 
reinforced caution among US policymakers with regard to Spain. In this, they 
were influenced also by domestic political considerations. 
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As previously noted, both domestic isolationism and the importance of the 
Catholic vote have been used to explain US non-intervention. However, the 
impact of these two domestic factors varied during the Spanish conflict. 
Whereas concerns for the Catholic vote entered in the administration and 
Congress’ calculations in the 1937-1938 period, they were less preeminent in the 
summer of 1936 when the US political elite formulated its policy towards the 
Spanish conflict.   
The Spanish Civil War started in the midst of a political context shaped by 
domestic imperatives, with the administration focusing on its demanding 
economic programmes. FDR was already requesting significant support from 
Congress for its domestic reforms, thus the administration could hardly extract 
additional support for any substantial foreign policy initiative in Europe.78 This 
was due mainly to the resistance FDR met in Congress to major domestic 
reforms of his New Deal, confronted not only by sections of the Republican 
Party but also by a conservative bloc within his own party.79 Consequently, the 
support of the Progressives for both its domestic reforms and for the upcoming 
presidential elections in 1936 became of central importance to the Roosevelt 
administration and the New Deal coalition.80 The results of the Nye Committee 
had just been released, fuelling both the isolationism sentiment in the country 
and the importance of the Progressive leaders’ support in Congress. By courting 
a non-interventionist position, FDR could appeal both to the Progressives that 
had just reached the apex of their influence as well as to a wide array of 
positions on the left that favoured detachment from European adventures and 
pacifist positions.81  
As I will show, the importance of Progressives’ support became evident in the 
summer of 1936 during the formulation of FDR’s own response to the crisis in 
Spain. What is worth noting at this stage is that neither the international nor the 
domestic struggle for power in which the US elite was enmeshed provided 
significant push factors for US interventionism in 1936. On the contrary, they 
shaped a non-interventionist policy that provided better prospects to secure the 
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objectives of the US elite and of its incumbent coalition, both at the international 
and domestic level. Simply put, a strong initiative towards Spain would have 
entailed risks both at home and abroad.82  
 
 
Elite Relations: Not our ‘SOB’  
At the same time, the Spanish Civil War did not offer any significant pull for US 
policymakers. US-Spanish relations before the civil war are key to 
understanding the lack of cooperation and established relations between 
American and Spanish policymakers.83 US political leaders’ relations with their 
Spanish counterparts were minimal; when they existed, they further convinced 
US leaders that there was little to gain in Spain. Ideological clashes and 
repeated crises further distanced US leaders from the Spanish Republic. 
Importantly, developments in Spain likely deprived the US of the only 
alternative to the extreme factions that took the lead in the subsequent war. 
Once the war started, the Spanish elite could do little to pull the US in the 
conflict and what it did was probably counterproductive. 
As previously noted, fear of Spain’s shift to the left after the establishment of 
the Republic affected US views of the Republican regime. When the Republic 
was established in 1931, Irwin Laughlin, the American ambassador to Spain, 
first suggested non-recognition and later advocated it with the sole purpose of 
avoiding ‘a further shift to the extreme left’.84 These concerns were coupled by 
negative assessments of the new Spanish policymakers. As Irwin noted, ‘the 
men composing [the Spanish government]…are not credited with distinctive 
ability’.85 In November 1932, Laughlin defined the Cortes as ‘ruled by mob 
psychology’.86  
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US concerns for the Spanish Republic were reinforced by the repeated tensions 
originating from Spain’s attempts both to redress the trade imbalance with the 
US and to take control of the Spanish subsidiary of the ITT in 1931-32, resulting 
in a ‘commercial cold war’ that poisoned Spanish relations during both the 
Hoover and Roosevelt administration.87 The problematic trade relations 
highlighted, in fact, was the Spanish leaders’ attraction to forms of collectivism 
that could be hardly reconciled with the US formula. Internal violence in Spain 
confirmed the weakness of the democratic regime. During the so-called October 
Revolution of 1934, the newly appointed American ambassador, Claude 
Bowers, noted ‘the lack of parliamentary spirit’ in Spain.88 Overall, ‘the 
Republic did not appear to represent American democratic values’.89  
In more general terms, what is striking in US-Spanish relations before the civil 
war is not only their unfriendly nature but also the absence of significant 
political dialogue between the two elites. Trade relations represented the only 
substantial channel between the political leaders of the two countries. Organic 
political relations were missing from the picture.90 This resulted mainly from 
the interplay of ideological and policy clashes. Yet, it was also the result of 
Spanish Republican elite’s decisions. The focus of Spanish foreign policy on the 
League of Nations, from which the US was absent, did not offer any substantial 
channel of communication with Washington.91 In particular, there is evidence 
that Spanish Republican leaders did not prioritise political relations with the 
US. As Augusto Barcia Telles, Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1936, argued before 
the civil war, ‘we can deal in a business way with the United States without 
involving ourselves politically because the United States is remote from the 
intrigues of European politics’.92 Albeit correct in its evaluation of US deliberate 
distance from European affairs, the Spanish Republic’s lack of substantial links 
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within the American political elite proved consequential for the Loyalist cause 
during the civil war. 
Furthermore, in the run up to the conflict, the polarisation taking place in Spain 
deprived US leaders of a possible political interlocutor. In September 1935, the 
collapse of the Spanish Radical Party led by Alejandro Lerroux under repeated 
scandals opened the last crisis of the Republic, leading to the elections of 
February 1936. Often overlooked, the demise of the Radical Party deprived the 
political scene of a moderate centrist party, a ‘third-way’ representative of an 
essentially Liberal-democratic position, contrary to collectivist solutions 
advocated by leftist forces, aiming at an inclusive parliamentary democracy, 
and that already demonstrated its pro-allied position during the First World 
War.93 US diplomats expressed positive views of Lerroux, as his government 
had managed to improve US trade relations with the US, leading to the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1934. As a result, there was optimism in 
the US about the new Lerroux government in 1935. Importantly, the demise of 
the Radical Party was clearly perceived in the US as the disappearance of a 
more reformist right that could contain both the extreme right and the extreme 
left.94  
On the contrary, the formation of the Popular Front in Spain after the 
Comintern’s call reignited fears in the US about a shift to the left and of Soviet 
subversion.95 US policymakers quickly viewed the Popular Front as a ‘stalking-
horse for the Soviet Union’.96 The victory of the Popular Front coalition in the 
general elections of February 1936 further reinforced US concerns.97 The 
decisions of the Popular Front, its composition, the early violence portrayed the 
image of a fragile democracy that was easily sliding towards anarchy or 
Communism.98 Also a sympathetic observer of the Republic such as ambassador 
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Bowers in the spring of 1936 observed the presence of ‘communistic elements in 
Spain…working towards another French Revolution with its Terror’.99 
Notably, US policymakers increasingly viewed Spain through the prism of US 
experience in Russia. Already in May 1931, when Madrid made public its 
intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, former 
ambassador Laughlin cautioned against a possible ‘Kerensky interlude’ in 
Spain.100 The positions of prime minister Manuel Azana and of President 
Alcala-Zamora y Torres were compared to that of Kerensky and of the Russian 
Provisional government, a weak Liberal government that could not withstand 
the challenge of Communism. This idea informed also the views of FDR, who 
came to believe that the ‘Kerensky phase’ of the Republic could not last.101 
When Azana became President and Santiago Casares Quiroga prime minister in 
May 1936, the Kerensky analogy was quickly applied to Quiroga.102 The 
contrast with the Russian experience is significant. Whereas in 1918 the US 
intervened to secure the political project represented by the Provisional 
Government and its last president, in 1936 every moderate Republican leader in 
Spain revived the ghost of Kerensky in the American leaders’ psyche and, with 
it, the failure of US intervention in Russia. 
When the conflict started in July 1936, US policymakers lacked a political 
interlocutor with whom they could establish any meaningful political and 
strategic dialogue. What they confronted was, on the one hand, a legitimate 
government ruled by a mistrusted elite that they feared could pave the way to 
Communism and, on the other, extreme right-wing rebel forces supported by 
Fascist powers. Contacts established by the Spanish Loyalists in the US could 
not overcome this basic problem. When the Loyalist representative in the US, 
Ambassador Fernando del los Rios, approached US political figures, he did so 
through two channels: via official diplomatic channels; and, via the American 
Socialist and Communist groups. In particular, American Communists led by 
Earl Browder and the American Socialists led by Norman Thomas actively 
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supported the Loyalist forces and worked closely with Rios.103 While important 
in promoting the Loyalist cause in the American public opinion, these efforts 
did not alter the lack of identification of the US political elite with the Spanish 
Republic. Importantly, they showed two limitations. First, Rios’ attempts to 
influence the administration via diplomatic channels ended up in direct 
contacts with Hull and State Department’s officials, who were interested 
primarily in securing the existing US policy towards both Europe and Latin 
America. Second, Rios’ political relations were directed primarily at members of 
the American counter-elite, thus reinforcing the idea of the Loyalists’ radical 
nature. As Puzzo later commented, Rios was simply ‘turning the wrong key in 
the wrong lock’.104 
Only the Liberal elements within the broader US ruling elite identified with the 
Spanish Republic.105 Yet the majority of US policymakers did not see any 
automatic identification with the various Spanish sides. As Chester Rowell of 
the San Francisco Chronicle argued in relation to the likely approval of the 
Spanish embargo act in January 1937, ‘we have no avowed communists and few 
conscious Fascists [in the Congress] to try to get us into the Spanish War on one 
side or the other’.106 Although FDR expressed sympathy for the Spanish 
Republic, he clearly identified his distance from both Franco and the Leftists in 
the Republican side. In 1936, FDR defined the Spanish government as ‘far from 
“democratic” as we understood the term’. He then explained his decision in 
January 1937 by remarking that he was ‘not a Fascist, but…not a Communist 
either’.107  
To sum up, US policymakers framed the conflict as between two extremes with 
which they could hardly cooperate, a conflict in which they had no clear local 
ally. Given US policymakers’ distance from both contenders, there was no local 
actor providing sufficient incentives to pull the US in the conflict. To 
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paraphrase FDR’s remarks, from the perspective of US policymakers there were 
many SOB in Spain but none was ‘their’ SOB.108  
 
 
The Decision Not to Intervene: Beyond Neutrality 
Given the lack of any significant push or pull factors, it is not surprising that 
neither direct nor indirect military intervention entered the list of policy options 
evaluated by US political leaders in the second half of 1936.109 Non-intervention 
became a default choice in July-August 1936 and the conditions that motivated 
this stance reinforced US policy as the preferable option in both late 1936 and 
early 1937.110 
US non-intervention allowed the administration to achieve two objectives. First, 
it was in line with both the administration’s international and domestic 
interests. While it helped secure the adopted foreign policy towards Latin 
America, it also secured the support of different US elite members: of the more 
internationalist members, given the support it provided to British and French 
policy towards Spain; and of the pacifists and Progressives in Congress.111 
Second, non-intervention denied US support to both sides of the conflict while 
keeping the door open for a dialogue with both. In essence, the decision 
allowed US policymakers to contain the conflict in Spain, secure US-Latin 
American relations, and muster domestic support.112 Importantly, the interplay 
of the elite dynamics helps explain the exact form US non-intervention took and 
how concurring developments reinforced US policy in late 1936 and the 
beginning of 1937. 
The initial response of US authorities to the civil war was hastened by the 
Loyalists’ intention to acquire weapons from US private companies, with the 
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Glenn Martin Company requesting a clarification on the administration’s 
position regarding the sale of bombing planes to Spain.113 Given that FDR was 
on a cruise and with Congress already adjourned for the summer, the State 
Department took the lead in the first formulations of the policy.114 Two sets of 
factors informed US policy formulation at this stage. First, US response was 
calibrated to ensure US foreign policy objectives. Aware of both the European 
efforts to contain the conflict and of the different Latin American positions on 
Spain, the State Department considered rigid neutrality as a way to support 
European initiatives and avoid divisions with the Latin American countries.115 
As Hull commented in 1936, ‘sentiment in Latin America regarding the Spanish 
situation is highly combustible’ and for that reason neutrality was necessary.116 
Second, developments in Spain suggested implementing exceptional restraint in 
the provision of weapons by US private actors despite the legitimate requests of 
the Spanish government under customary international law. As argued by 
undersecretary of State William Phillips in early August, the issue of Spanish 
acquisition of weapons in the US represented a problem as American weapons 
were ultimately ‘destined for what amounts to a communistic government’.117 
In particular, the decision of the Loyalist government led by Jose Giral to 
provide weapons to popular militias and the occupation of American factories 
raised fears in Washington about ongoing anarchic conditions and possible 
Communist takeover.118 The problem, as Hull stated in a message to FDR on 24th 
July 1936, was not the provision of weapons to the population but specifically to 
‘irresponsible members of Left-wing political organisations’.119  
As the existing neutrality law adopted in August 1935 did not apply to civil 
conflicts, US authorities needed to formulate new policies. On 5th August 1936, 
Hull clarified that the US would follow a non-interventionist policy set in the 
Montevideo Treaty of 1933 denying any ‘right to intervene in the internal or 
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external affairs of another [state]’.120 On 7th August 1936, Phillips and Hull 
prepared a telegram for US officials in Spain, made public on 11th August, 
stating the 
necessity of maintaining a completely impartial attitude with regard to 
the disturbances in Spain…in conformity with its well-established policy 
of non-interference with internal affairs in other countries, either in the 
time of peace or in the event of civil strife, this Government 
will…scrupulously refrain from any interference whatsoever in the 
unfortunate Spanish situation. We believe that American citizens…are 
patriotically observing this well-recognized policy.121 
It was a ‘moral embargo’ that the US government was asking its citizens to 
follow, yet by definition it lacked the legal means to be enforced as the 
Neutrality Act applied only to interstate conflicts.122 A political confirmation of 
the policy adopted by the State Department came directly from the president. 
Domestic political considerations shaped by the upcoming presidential 
elections significantly influenced FDR’s response at this stage. On 14th August, 
in a speech at Chautauqua, the president confirmed the general policy of 
neutrality as well as the ‘Good Neighbor Policy’.123 In doing so, FDR fully 
embraced the position of the Progressives on war and war profits, enriching his 
speech with Progressive refrains: 
we shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign 
wars…We are not isolationist except in so far as we seek to isolate 
ourselves completely from war…Nevertheless, if war should break out 
again in another continent, let us not blink the fact that we would find in 
this country thousands of Americans who, seeking immediate riches – 
fools' gold – would attempt to break down or evade our neutrality.124  
Both FDR’s speech and his choice of words were not accidental. As Wayne Cole 
argues, it ‘was part of [FDR] continuing efforts to win and retain the political 
support of western progressives’.125 Notably, FDR’s speech fully embraced the 
ideas of Nye’s Committee. There is evidence that before 14th August Secretary 
Ickes tried to co-opt Nye within FDR’s camp linking Nye’s endorsement for the 
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presidential election to a peace statement by FDR.126 Although Nye did not 
officially endorse FDR, Nye and other nine Congressmen supported the 
administration’s embargo.127 Political concerns were therefore of primary 
importance in pinpointing the policy adopted by the State Department and 
securing the political conditions that kept US neutrality in place.  
Yet, continued attempts to circumvent the moral embargo by US private actors 
forced US policymakers to formulate binding rules prohibiting the sale of US 
weapons to Spanish forces. This was translated first in the Spanish Embargo 
Act (January 1937) and eventually in the Neutrality Act (May 1937).128 The 
impending shipment of planes to the Spanish Republic hastened the discussion 
in Washington. As a result, Congress passed an embargo directed only at Spain 
and FDR decided to give up presidential discretionary powers on the issue in 
order to ensure a quick agreement, thus ensuring Congress’ control over the 
Spanish embargo.129 The Spanish Embargo Act prohibited not only the sales of 
weapons and munitions in the Spanish Civil War but also hampered the 
provision of credit and loans. Limited non-military goods could be provided on 
a ‘cash-and-carry’ basis, that is all material had to be purchased in the US and 
transported to Spain on non-American ships.130 Haste and a broad consensus 
within the US political elite on the need to avoid US involvement in Spain 
explain the widespread agreement on the embargo.131 Notably, Senator Key 
Pittman (D-Nevada) argued that the embargo was in the interest of the US as 
the contending sides in Spain represented ‘foreign theories of government’.132  
This widespread consensus, however, did not erase the doubts about the exact 
formulation of the Spanish embargo. To US Congressmen, it was clear that the 
adopted policy marked a departure from traditional neutrality. Representatives 
Hamilton Fish (R-New York) and Maury Maverick (D-Texas) as well as a few 
Progressive Congressmen, including Senator Nye and Thomas Amlie 
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(Progressive-Wisconsin), objected that the usual neutral practice of the US 
allowed for weapons to being sold to the legitimate government. Further, they 
noted that the proposed solution was unfavourable to the legitimate 
government of Spain, since the Nationalist rebels could count on German and 
Italian support.133 These criticisms show that the adoption of the embargo did 
not rest on a principled attachment to existing norms, but to specific conditions 
shaping US elite’s interests at that time. In fact, these legitimate observations 
about the novelty of US policy could not overcome US elite members’ interests 
as well as their concerns over both sides of the Spanish conflict. As a result, 
Congress confirmed US non-intervention by adopting a new Neutrality Act in 
May 1937 including general provisions for all civil wars.134  
During this period, developments in Spain did not provide any incentive to 
alter a policy that served multiple elite interests at once. On the contrary, they 
reinforced it. The attack on the US destroyer Kane on 29th August 1936 by a 
Spanish plane sparked a public reaction in the US, yet it was downplayed by 
US policymakers. The contrast with US politicians’ reaction to the sinking of the 
Maine in 1898 is striking. While US reaction in 1898 was fuelled by clear 
interests in Cuba, in 1936 incidents such as the attack on the Kane had the 
opposite effect, raising fears of another Maine and confirming US policymakers’ 
views on the need to remain neutral in the conflict.135  
Reports from Spain reinforced US leaders’ position on the need to stay aloof. 
First, the new Loyalist government formed in September 1936 by the radical 
Socialist leader Largo Caballero did little to erase US concerns. Despite 
Caballero’s reassurances on Spain’s rejection of Communism, Bowers described 
Caballero as aiming at ‘proletarian dictatorship’.136 In November 1936, Bowers 
reported that, while President Azana wanted closer relations with the US, 
Socialist actors that had entered the government shifted Loyalist requests 
towards Russia and Mexico.137 Bowers also noted that the increasing violence of 
the conflict could increase Communist influence in Spain. As he concluded, 
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‘this war is making Communists’.138 In the meantime, reports concerning the 
Nationalists actors were mixed. They stressed how a Nationalist defeat might 
lead to a Communist Spain.139 However, Nationalists’ attempts to establish 
friendly relations with the US failed.140 After initial positive assessments of 
Franco, initially described by Bowers as ‘a man of keen intelligence and 
common sense’, opinions of Franco became markedly negative by the end of 
1936.141 
At the same time, the ongoing external interventions by Germany, Italy and the 
Soviet Union began to affect both the situation on the ground and US 
calculations. In particular, foreign interventions stressed the marginal role US 
support could play given the already substantial aid sent by the revisionist 
powers to both contenders. As Michael Alpert points out, while Roosevelt’s 
victory in the presidential elections of 1936 might have persuaded the president 
to relax the embargo towards Spain to favour the Loyalists, the beginning of 
Soviet intervention in September 1936 underscored the limited impact such a 
decision would have had.142 In this regard, the growing presence of German, 
Italian and Soviet personnel reinforced the administration’s sense of caution.143 
Loyalists’ attempts to court US support did not produce any tangible result 
either. The meeting of Rios with Hull in October 1936 is particularly instructive 
of the limits of Loyalist diplomacy at this time. First, Rios described the conflict 
as one between two ‘theories of government’, democracy and totalitarianism. 
Second, Rios noted that given the existing links between Spain and Latin 
America, the fall of the Spanish Republic would have had significant 
repercussions on Latin American regimes.144 Rios’ remarks were both 
premature, as US concerns over the repercussions of a Loyalist defeat on Latin 
America did not inform US policy until 1938, and tardy, as US policymakers 
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had already developed an image of the conflict that did not coincide with the 
democracy-totalitarian dichotomy cited by Rios. From the perspective of US 
policymakers, there was no democratic side in the Spanish conflict. The report 
of the US consul in Barcelona, Mahlon Perkins, on the situation in Catalonia in 
April 1937 is enlightening in this regard:  
we do not have a clear cut issue of right or wrong, but the deplorable 
existence of excesses on both sides and the complete absence of what we 
understand by democratic government. The choice at the moment may 
be briefly described as the alternative between ‘tyranny’ and ‘chaos’.145  
What US political leaders lacked was a clear alternative to two equally 
unfavourable political solutions. 
 
 
After Non-Intervention: A Second Chance 
Between the second half of 1937 and early 1939, the Spanish Civil War 
increasingly took centre stage in the American political elite’s discourse and 
calculations. This led to a partial yet significant shift in US policy. As I will 
show in this section, the same causal mechanisms that shaped US non-
intervention in 1936 subsequently led to contradictory incentives. As the Fascist 
challenge emerged more clearly during 1937-1939, the Roosevelt administration 
began to evaluate ways to contrast a Nationalist victory in Spain given the 
repercussions this might have on the US position in Europe and Latin America. 
However, domestic elite politics and elite relations constrained any substantial 
policy change. The combined effect of these dynamics locked the US into its 
policy of non-intervention until the end of the Spanish conflict but also resulted 
in the Roosevelt administration’s attempts to devise indirect schemes to support 
the Loyalists. 
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Political formulas: prioritising the Fascist challenge 
Beginning in 1937, the revisionist threat posed by the Axis emerged more 
clearly, starting with Japan’s attack on China.146 German annexation of Austria, 
the crisis opened by Hitler’s ambitions towards Czechoslovakia in early 1938 
and the following agreement reached in Munich in September 1938 clarified 
Adolf Hitler’s aggressive intentions to FDR. Japanese and German revisionist 
attempts forced FDR and his administration to realise the threat Fascist powers 
could pose to the US position. Whereas in 1936 Fascism could still be perceived 
as a competing yet containable challenge, events in 1937 and 1938 stressed the 
irreconcilable nature of the Fascist regimes and the impossibility of co-opting an 
increasingly antithetic challenge that could threaten the foundations of the US 
political and economic model.147 
US perceptions of the Nationalist forces shifted according to the ideological 
challenge posed by Fascism and its advance in Spain. The formation of the FET 
y de las JONS in April 1937 marked the Nationalist government’s shift towards a 
more clearly Fascist regime. In October 1937, Bowers noted that Franco’s 
government increasingly resembled the Grand Fascist Council in Rome.148 The 
same developments raised concerns among sections of the wider American 
political elite. Already in early 1937, given the extensive German and Italian 
intervention, Congressmen on the left but including also Senator Nye started to 
consider an extension of the embargo to Fascist powers.149 At this stage, the idea 
of extending the embargo to Germany and Italy was dropped in order to avoid 
any further internationalisation of the Spanish crisis.150 However, pressures to 
allow the flow of arms towards Spain continued in late 1937, fuelled by 
concerns that the ongoing policy increased Fascist take on Spain.151 Importantly, 
these concerns fuelled US unease with the Nationalist government in Burgos 
denying any possibility of recognition or substantial contacts. 
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Power struggle: contrasting push factors 
Given the growing challenge posed by the Fascist regimes, the question of who 
would rule Spain at the end of the civil war acquired renewed importance. 
First, a Nationalist victory could affect the strategic balance in Europe. Despite 
Spain’s marginal military capabilities, who ruled Spain mattered due to the 
strategic location of the country, its mineral reserves, and the access to both the 
government in Madrid could provide to its allies. Specifically, the US 
administration began to fear that a Nationalist government could bring Spain 
into an alliance with Germany and provide Berlin with access to Spanish 
territory and its raw materials in case of war. This fear was fuelled by the 
growing German and Italian involvement in Spain and the resulting grip Hitler 
and Benito Mussolini had on the Nationalists. By April 1937, evidence of 
German and Italian involvement in military operations became more 
substantial, as exemplified by the operation of Italian troops at Guadalajara and 
the German bombing of Guernica. From this support, Germany was already 
extracting significant concessions on Spanish mines to support its rearmament 
programme.152  
Second, the Roosevelt administration was also confronted with the potentially 
negative repercussions of a Nationalist victory on Latin America. While in 1936 
US policy towards Latin America strengthened the administration’s policy of 
non-intervention, the same interest for US position in the Western Hemisphere 
forced a reconsideration. FDR and Hull grew increasingly concerned of the 
attraction exerted by the Fascist model in the Western Hemisphere, especially to 
the 1 million Germans present in Latin America. These fears were the result of 
the undergoing ideological shift that increasingly led the US to give priority to 
the Fascist challenge but they were also fuelled by the recent events, such as the 
attempted coup by a Fascist group in Brazil in May 1938.153 In particular, the 
administration feared the replication of the Spanish conflict in the Western 
Hemisphere, with a series of internal conflicts in Latin America ignited by local 
Fascist groups or military rebellions followed by subsequent German military 
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intervention.154 Gradually these concerns spread to the wider political elite, 
particularly among those Congressmen for whom separation from European 
conflicts could only be sustained by US hegemony in Latin America and a 
hemispheric defence perimeter.155 
Despite the shifting ideological and strategic calculations of the Roosevelt 
administration and of segments within the US elite, concurrent developments at 
the domestic level represented an insurmountable obstacle, primarily for the 
majority of US Congressmen, to any major revision of US policy. During 1937 
and 1938, the civil conflict in Spain mobilised an increasing number of activists 
within the American society as well as among the members of the American 
intellectual elite.156 Divisions between the pro-Nationalists and the pro-Loyalists 
became tense as the conflict increasingly mobilised the extremes of the 
American political spectrum.157 Pro-Nationalists included conservatives, the 
Catholic hierarchy, a relative majority of Catholics, and the most anti-
Communist elements within American society and ruling elite. In addition, 
Hearst’s journals and a significant section of economic elite supported Franco, 
as exemplified by the case of Texaco’s President Thorkild Rieber.158 Pro-
Loyalists in the US included not only Socialists and Communists but also 
Liberals, members of Protestant clergy as well as the relative majority of both 
the African American and Jewish community.159 Throughout 1937 a growing 
number of volunteers with the help of Socialist and Communist organisations 
in the US joined the International Brigades fighting alongside the Loyalists. 
Eventually, up to 2.800 American volunteers fought in Spain within the 
Abraham Lincoln Brigade and other formations, nearly as many as the Soviet 
citizens present in Spain at the time.160 
From the perspective of the US political elite, the situation was different. The 
views of US politicians towards the Spanish conflict were more nuanced. While 
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American citizens and intellectuals identified more easily with the Loyalist 
cause, US policymakers remained wary of the role played by extreme left 
groups within the Loyalist camp.161 The difference between public and elite 
opinion on this point was underscored by Undersecretary Welles in a meeting 
with Rios in October 1937, when the former noted that the American people 
might have been in favour of the Republic but the US Congress remained for 
strict neutrality.162 This, in turn, resulted from the twofold problem that the 
increased polarisation concerning the Spanish conflict posed to the US elite.  
First, the sentiments and mobilisation sparked by the Spanish conflict created 
significant tensions within American society in 1937-1938, primarily between 
Catholics on the one hand and Protestants and Liberals on the other.163 As the 
correspondent for the New York Times, Herbert Matthews, argued, ‘no event in 
the outside world, before or since, aroused Americans in time to such religious 
controversy and such burning emotions’.164 Senator Pittman feared that these 
tensions could escalate if debate on the Spanish embargo and its repeal 
continued.165 Any interventionist position in the Spanish conflict would have 
further exacerbated these tensions, thus making it an unappealing option for an 
elite already focused on absorbing the socio-political consequences of the 
depression and the polarisation of the New Deal period. 
Second, the polarisation created by the conflict between Liberals and Catholics 
represented a political challenge for the New Deal coalition in power. During 
1937, the coalition that helped shape a non-interventionist policy in 1936 started 
to crumble. Relations between the administration and the Progressives 
deteriorated after FDR’s attempt to liberalise the Supreme Court, in what 
became known as the ‘court-packing attempt’. FDR’s alliance with the 
Progressives was shaken, leaving the president and the Democratic Party 
increasingly dependent on their supporters among the urban Liberal vote and 
the Catholic vote that had sided with FDR in the presidential election of 1936.166 
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Thereafter, publicly siding with one of the two Spanish factions ran the risk of 
alienating the support of one of the two key constituencies of the New Deal 
coalition given the bitter debate over Spain between the two.167 
This mattered primarily for Democratic Congressmen and party leaders 
intentioned to secure their position in view of the upcoming mid-term elections 
in November 1938.168 Fears concerning the possibility of losing the Catholic vote 
were discussed in a meeting between FDR and House Democratic leaders in 
May 1938.169 As reported by Ickes, FDR commented that ‘to raise the embargo 
would mean the loss of every Catholic vote next fall and that the Democratic 
Members of Congress were jittery about it and didn’t want it done’.170 In a more 
forceful tone, he allegedly concluded: ‘if I lift the embargo, the Catholics will 
crucify me!’171 The predicament FDR and the New Deal coalition were in was 
evident to its adversaries.  In May 1938, Nye introduced Senate Joint Resolution 
288 requesting the lifting of the embargo against the Spanish Loyalists on a 
cash-carry basis while keeping the embargo against the Nationalist rebels. 
Nye’s resolution had a clear political objective: forcing FDR to either side with 
the Loyalists, thus losing the Catholic vote, or against them, thus alienating the 
Liberals.172 As an American diplomat at the time, Jay Pierrepoint Moffat, 
commented,  
few if any documents are politically as dangerous[,] for the bitterness 
inspired by this Spanish strife among the Left Wingers on the one hand 
and the Catholic conservative elements on the other surpasses anything I 
have seen for years.173  
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Elite relations: Loyalist limits, Nationalist success? 
Spanish actors also affected both the administration’s and Congress’ position, 
reinforcing US caution. While developments in Spain allowed the 
administration to consider new ways to contrast the Nationalists, Franco’s 
representatives in the US operated effectively in securing that no major 
alteration of US policy took place. 
While the US Congress was adopting its Neutrality Act, the clashes that took 
place in May 1937 within the Loyalist camp in Spain marginalised Caballero 
and the anarchic groups, leaving the more moderate Left forces led by Juan 
Negrin in control.174 Initially, diplomatic dispatches from Spain as well as the 
American press stressed three elements: the more moderate positions of the 
new government; its more effective war effort; and, its intention to establish a 
more constructive dialogue with foreign powers, primarily the US and 
Britain.175 Yet, reports from Spain also raised the issue of increasing Soviet 
influence on the Negrin’s government, exerted through the Spanish Communist 
party and the Russian Embassy.176 The eventual formation of a second Negrin 
government in April 1938, marked by increased Communist and Soviet 
influence, confirmed the composite picture of a non-democratic government 
that nonetheless could mobilise its internal front to resist the Nationalist 
advance and that was interested in seeking help abroad.177  
This had a twofold effect on the Roosevelt administration. On the one hand, it 
stressed the difficulty of an open and public embrace of the Loyalist 
government. Despite the May 1937 events, there were still significant concerns 
over the nature of its regime and leaders. On the other hand, it was clear to the 
Roosevelt administration that the Negrin’s government could mount a 
significant resistance against the Nationalists and that the impossibility of 
acquiring weapons from Western democracies made Madrid more dependent 
on Soviet support, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy: continued US non-
intervention would have only pushed Negrin further to the left and into 
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Moscow’s arms.178 Given the impossibility of full-fledged cooperation with 
Negrin, the administration had to explore new ways to contrast the Nationalists 
and increase its influence over the Loyalist government. 
While the administration considered these new options, the broader US 
political elite’s caution over Spain was reinforced by the direct and indirect 
influence exerted by Spanish actors. While the Loyalist won the confrontation 
for the hearts and minds of the majority of the American public, the results with 
regard to elite opinion were different.179 The perceptions of US politicians were 
filtered through not only the domestic political considerations highlighted 
earlier but also through contacts with the representatives and lobbyists of the 
two Spanish sides.180 While relations between the Loyalists and US officials 
continued to be mediated by Rios, Juan Francisco de Cardenas, former Spanish 
ambassador in the US, became the unofficial representative of the Nationalist 
government in the US.181 Both established contacts with the respective pro-
Loyalist and pro-Nationalist groups in the US.182 However, the impact of these 
relations was markedly different. 
In the Loyalist front, Rios continued to work closely with American Socialist 
and Communist leaders such as Thomas, who in turn continued to lobby FDR 
for US action in Spain and actively helped the Loyalist cause by organising the 
recruitment of volunteers to fight in the international brigades.183 Whilst able to 
target the Liberal impulses of the American society, Rios did little to erase US 
policymakers’ concerns over the Republic’s leftist tendencies. More 
importantly, Rios failed to establish significant relations with US Congressmen, 
whose support was crucial to remove the embargo. The limits of the Republic’s 
representatives in the US during the civil war were pointed out by Thomas 
himself, who in 1938 criticised the Republic’s decision to rely on an academic 
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such as Rios instead of sending a more politically savvy ambassador to work 
alongside the arms manufacturers in lobbying Congress.184 
Cardenas’ action, on the contrary, proved to be more effective. First, Cardenas 
worked with Catholic groups that were exerting pressure directly on 
Congressmen.185 Second, Cardenas established good relations with a series of 
influential pro-Nationalist lobbyists in the US, such as John Eoghan Kelly, W. 
Cameron Forbes, and Ellery Sedgwick, who were driven in their efforts by their 
anti-Communism and anti-New Deal stance.186 Cardenas’ ability consisted in 
targeting members of the wider US ruling elite, who in turn had privileged 
access to US politicians. As pointed out by Michael Chapman, ‘Forbes’s and 
Sedgwick’s primary concern was to influence elites, the sector of opinion that 
policy makers, many of whom were old stock like themselves, judged to be the 
most weighty’.187 During 1938-1939, pro-Nationalist lobbyists targeted ruling 
elite members and Congressmen alike, following a plan put together by both 
Kelly and Cardenas. Notably, they succeeded in liaising with Sen. David Walsh 
(D-Massachusetts), chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, and were partly 
responsible for his shift towards a non-interventionary and increasingly pro-
Nationalist position.188  
 
From non-intervention to failed intervention 
To sum up, during the 1937-1939 period elite dynamics provided contrasting 
incentives with regard to the Spanish Civil War. Domestic considerations and 
elite relations reinforced US non-intervention. For the Democratic Party direct 
intervention as well as public forms of support for the Loyalists represented a 
political risk. In more general terms, taking sides in the Spanish conflict ran the 
risk of exacerbating existing domestic divisions.189 Negrin’s reliance on 
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Communist and Soviet support made a public embrace of the Loyalists even 
more problematic. In addition, while pro-Nationalist actors maintained their 
pressure on Congress, Loyalists’ activities in the US failed to alter the image of 
the Loyalists held by the majority of US politicians. Similarly to FDR in 1936, 
members of the political elite still failed to identify any significant political 
return for either themselves or the US from providing military support to either 
Spanish faction. As late as in January 1939, Senator Borah made this clear: 
I want nothing to do with either outfit and I do not want, if it is possible, 
to favor either of these forces. The fascists and communists are all the 
same to me when I come to consider the interests of my own country.190  
However, the administration had become concerned of the challenge posed by 
the Fascism and the need to contrast the Nationalist forces. Importantly, the 
Negrin government seemed capable of mobilising sufficient resources to 
confront the Nationalists. At the same time, the administration was aware that 
the US rigid neutrality was only increasing Moscow’s influence on the 
Loyalists. The resulting policy adopted by the Roosevelt administration in 1938 
mirrored the interplay of these contradictory impulses. Constrained by these 
considerations yet pushed towards a more interventionary position due to the 
evolving international context, the Roosevelt administration could act in Spain 
only through indirect and covert means in order to: avoid a victory of the 
Nationalists; support the Negrin government’s renewed military efforts; and, 
create a new channel for US influence over the Loyalists.191 This resulted in two 
decisions in early 1938. 
First, FDR supported the plan devised by Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of 
Treasury, to acquire $14 million of Spanish silver in 1938. As Morgenthau 
informed the Spanish ambassador, ‘we can give you cash…and you could do 
whatever you wanted with the cash’.192 Second, there is now sufficient evidence 
to affirm that in the spring of 1938 FDR attempted to provide covert military aid 
to the Loyalists. FDR’s scheme entailed the secret transfer of 150 US airplanes to 
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France to be transported to Republican Spain.193 While the covert modality of 
this interventionary scheme resulted from the necessity to avoid any public 
commitment in favour of the Loyalists, its timing resulted from the evolving 
situation in Spain. As Tierney points out, the French decision to open the 
frontier with the Spanish Republic in March 1938 ‘created the possibility for 
American intervention in the Spanish Civil War’.194 The scheme was favoured 
by FDR’s awareness that the Spanish Republic depended on aerial support from 
the US to reverse its worsening military position in early 1938. In this sense, 
FDR’s initiative guaranteed a greater relative impact and influence on both the 
conflict and the Loyalist forces. However, the plan was first slowed down by 
the opposition from within the State Department and then failed due to the 
closing of the French frontier in June 1938.195 
The failure of the covert aid plan left the administration with two possibilities: 
either embarking in a domestic contest to repeal the embargo; or finding a 
diplomatic solution to the Spanish conflict. Domestic political developments 
hampered the possibility of a repeal of the embargo. As a result of the 1938 
elections, a significant number of Liberal and pro-Loyalist Democrats had not 
been re-elected, leaving their seats to Republicans and conservative Democrats 
who would not have supported FDR in his attempt to revise US policy towards 
Spain.196 Given the impossibility of repealing the embargo, the administration 
attempted a last diplomatic initiative. This solution was encouraged by 
Negrin’s diplomatic initiative in summer 1938, inviting external mediation in 
the conflict.197 FDR tried to enlist the Vatican and Latin American countries to 
strengthen his initiative and secure both Catholic support at home and broader 
consensus within the Western hemisphere.198 Yet, continued Latin American 
divisions on the Spanish conflict precluded a concerted initiative and led FDR 
to abandon his plans.199 
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Despite his repeated failures in pushing US policy towards the Loyalists, FDR 
remained convinced of the need to change track. In his State of the Union 
address in January 1939, FDR openly questioned non-intervention and US 
neutrality arguing that they favoured ongoing acts of aggressions at the 
international level. A last battle over the embargo ensued in January 1939. Once 
again, the strong reaction by pro-Nationalist and Catholic groups led senators 
to drop attempts to change policy over Spain.200 As Senator Pittman argued:  
the conflicting avalanche of telegrams from both sides had convinced 
individual senators that they were on too hot a pot to sit with ease and 
the sooner they could get it off it by avoiding the issue the happier they 
would be.201  
At this stage, however, US intervention could have achieved little. By January 
1939, FDR and his administration were aware that the situation of the Loyalists 
was desperate. Soon, the last advances of the Nationalist front led to the fall of 
Barcelona and eventually Madrid, with Franco declaring the war over on 1st 
April 1939.   
 
 
Conclusion: The Consequences of Non-Intervention 
The case analysed in this chapter represents an outlier with respect to all three 
elite dynamics (ideas, power, relations) analysed in the previous two cases. 
First, whereas in both the Cuban and Russian case the interplay between the 
political ideas held by the US elite and those held by local leaders helped to 
shape US cooperation with the local counter-elite groups, in the Spanish case 
political formulas represented an obstacle to US leaders’ cooperation with either 
Loyalist or Nationalist leaders. Second, whereas international and domestic 
political competition created strong incentives for the US elite to intervene in 
Cuba and Russia, the same factors provoked restraint in the Spanish case. 
Notably, in the Spanish case, non-intervention and the peculiar form it took 
allowed US leaders to secure both their international and domestic position. 
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Third, whereas relations established with local leaders created a decisive pull 
for US intervention in the previous two cases, in the Spanish case US 
policymakers lacked any clear ally in the conflict. Furthermore, the lack of 
substantial political relations between the two elites and the inability to 
establish fruitful relations during the civil war significantly hampered Loyalists’ 
ability to influence US decisions and pull US political leaders, particularly 
within Congress, towards a more interventionist policy.  
In addition, the same elite dynamics shed light on the partial shift that took 
place in 1938. The growing Fascist challenge, heightened international 
competition and changing conditions in Spain opened the possibility for a more 
active US role. Nevertheless, domestic political concerns, amplified by the role 
played by pro-Nationalist groups, represented an insurmountable obstacle for 
any major revision of US policy or any public embrace of the Loyalists. FDR’s 
scheme for covert aid to the Loyalists as well as the administration’s additional 
attempts to support the Loyalists in 1938 resulted from the combined effect of 
these elite dynamics. Similarly to the Cuban and Russian cases, the 
administration’s plans for intervention were favoured by developments on the 
ground, primarily the opening of the French border with Spain. 
FDR’s sympathy for the Loyalist cause and his repeated attempts to circumvent 
the embargo did not result in any substantial alteration of US policy or any 
improvement for the Loyalists forces. This case shows the limits of explanations 
of intervention and non-intervention centred primarily on executive leaders’ 
preferences.202 To explain non-intervention in the Spanish case, it is necessary to 
take into account the missing political conditions in both the US and Spain. The 
lack of fundamental push and pull factors at the elite level prevented the 
formation of a broader consensus within the American political elite on an 
interventionary policy. Further, US leaders did not identify any leadership 
group in Spain that could guarantee their interests and influence. Put 
differently, once the Roosevelt administration shifted towards a more 
interventionist policy in 1938, it lacked the necessary allies both within the 
American political elite and among the contending factions in Spain to 
implement an interventionary policy.  
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Moreover, the Spanish case offers the opportunity to evaluate US policymakers’ 
attitude when confronted with two opposing political formulas. On the one 
hand, the US political elite’s views responded to relative evaluations, with its 
overall approach towards Fascism initially influenced by the concurrent 
Communist challenge. While both were perceived as un-American, the 
antithetic threat posed by Communism initially held priority over the 
competing Fascist challenge, hampering US cooperation with the Loyalists. On 
the other hand, events forced US leaders to reconsider their views. During the 
1936-1939 period, Fascism was increasingly perceived first as a threatening 
competing formula and later as a clearly antithetic one. This led FDR and 
increasingly the entire US elite to prioritise the Fascist challenge over the 
Communist challenge. Once this shift had taken place, it proved difficult to 
overcome and continued to inform US views of the Nationalists. 
As a result of the Nationalist-Fascist connection, US recognition of the new 
Spanish regime set up by Franco after its victory was not easily granted. 
Suspicion of Franco remained strong among US leaders both during and at the 
end of the Second World War. Initially, Franco attempts to portray himself as a 
credible ally for Washington went without success.203 FDR still considered the 
regime in Spain as ‘repugnant to American ideas of democracy and good 
government’.204 In 1945, both FDR and former pro-Loyalists within the 
American political elite called for further anti-Franco policies including support 
for anti-Nationalist forces and regime change.205 Significantly, Franco’s regime 
could be reconciled within the American international order only at the end of 
the 1950s, in the heightened political climate of the early Cold War when the 
Communist challenge took centre stage once again in the views of the US 
policymakers. Ensuring the stability of the Spanish regime became necessary to 
reduce the possibility of Communist subversion and of an eventual shift to the 
left that could alter Spain’s international alignment and create repercussions in 
France and Italy.206  
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Furthermore, the interplay between international and domestic power struggles 
in the Spanish case reveals important elements. Similarly to the previous two 
cases, the policy adopted by the US in 1936 served both domestic and 
international objectives: securing the US position abroad, while securing the 
position of the US elite and of its incumbent faction at home. However, 
international and domestic pressures began to diverge in 1937-1938. The 
majority of US Congressmen continued to perceive the Spanish conflict as a 
conflict between two equally extreme factions, with which the US could hardly 
establish any beneficial political alliance. In addition, involvement in the 
Spanish conflict would have exacerbated domestic tensions and reduced their 
political capital. US executive leaders, on the contrary, were also aware of the 
growing challenge posed by Germany to US security and power position and 
the limited influence the US could exert on Spain due to its strict neutrality. But 
these considerations coalesced in FDR’s covert aid scheme only in 1938, exactly 
when electoral priorities forced US Congressmen and Democrats in particular 
to avoid the Spanish issue. In this regard, the Spanish case reinforces an 
element already highlighted in the previous case studies, that is the pervasive 
influence exerted by domestic political considerations in the formulation of US 
policy towards foreign internal conflicts.  
Yet, FDR’s concerns for the eventual international alignment of the Spanish 
regime proved vindicated, leading Welles to define US non-intervention in 
Spain as the greatest foreign policy mistake of the Roosevelt administration. 
Throughout the Second World War, US relations with Franco’s regime 
remained bitter, due to the de facto support Spain provided to the German war 
effort. Franco continued to represent an additional problem for US operations 
during the conflict, particularly after the landing of Allied forces in North 
Africa, when ensuring Franco’s neutrality for Allied operations became of 
paramount importance. Washington opted for a carrot-and-stick approach, 
providing food and oil to Spain to reduce its dependency on the Axis, while 
imposing an oil embargo on Madrid in both 1940 and 1944 to force Franco’s 
hand when necessary.207 Only the strategic necessities shaped by the zero-sum 
calculations of the Cold War led policymakers in Washington to hasten Spain’s 
inclusion within the security architecture the US was setting up in Europe. The 
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process was completed with the signing of the US-Spanish Treaty of Mutual 
Defence in 1953, securing US military access to Spain in exchange for economic 
aid.208  
Finally, in the absence of established and organic relations between political 
elites in the US and Spain, ruling elite members (economic elite representatives, 
intellectuals, etc.) acted as influential mediators between the Nationalist leaders 
and the American political elite. In particular, Cardenas’ success in liaising with 
members of the US ruling elite who had direct access to US Congressmen 
amplified the actual influence exerted by Nationalist leaders over US 
policymaking. In turn, this shaped the contours of the group of pro-Nationalist 
US politicians, including both Republican and Democrat representatives such as 
Senator Walsh, who first contrasted any intervention in the Spanish conflict and 
later supported the recognition of Franco’s regime.209 Subsequently, this formed 
the basis for the network of US policymakers put together after the Second 
World War by the new inspector at the Spanish Embassy in the US, Jose 
Lequerica. The so-called ‘Spanish lobby’ included among others Joseph 
McCarthy (R–Wisconsin) and played a crucial role in the late 1940s and early 
1950s in promoting the inclusion of Franco’s regime within the international 
institutional arrangements set up by US policymakers in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.210  
As with the Spanish Republic in 1931, US recognition of Franco’s regime was a 
half-hearted embrace forced by a de facto situation that left US leaders with no 
feasible alternative. Worse, this situation was the result of a strategic mistake to 
which US non-intervention had contributed and that US policymakers had to 
confront in the midst of a world conflict. Eventually, the Cold War favoured 
Franco’s inclusion within the American international order, giving the upper 
hand to those members of the US political elite for whom supporting Franco 
was part of a broader anti-Communist crusade. 
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Conclusion 
An Intervention in History and Theory 
 
 
 
Summary of the Theoretical Framework 
Military intervention stands out as one of most recurrent forms of the use of 
force in history. From the early interventions in Ancient Greece to the cases 
examined in this thesis, from the Cold War to the recent interventions in North 
Africa, intervention represents a persistent practice in international relations. 
Given the recurrent nature of this practice and its effects, the study of the causes 
of intervention is – and should remain – central to the field of IR. As I discussed 
in Chapter 1, the contending explanations offered in the literature focusing on 
either the primacy of material or ideational factors are not entirely satisfactory. 
Similarly, both economic and institutional factors alone are of limited utility to 
explain the specific cases of intervention presented in this thesis. English School 
and particularly Constructivist works provide relevant observations on the 
function and drivers of intervention, yet they also leave important issues aside. 
Realism, despite its early insights to the subject, has offered only a limited 
contribution to the study of intervention. 
At the same time, the existing literature has repeatedly underscored the crucial 
role played by political elites in shaping the practice of intervention. In spite of 
this, existing works adopt a rather unproblematic approach to elites. Elites are 
rarely defined and, when they are, they are conceptualised with no or scant 
reference to the vast literature in Political and Historical Sociology on the nature 
and role of elites. This is part of a wider gap. While works in other disciplines 
have revitalised interest in elites and political leaders, IR has only partially 
engaged with elite theory. Hence, there is still the need in IR to take elites 
seriously and fully engage with the concept of elites and related works. This is 
particularly striking for Realism given not only the frequent references to elites 
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within Neoclassical Realism but also the shared assumptions about power and 
political action underlying both elite theory and Realism.  
In this regard, this thesis had a primarily theoretical objective, aimed at 
contributing to the existing literature on intervention in three ways: i) bringing 
the study of elites into IR, by exploring the insights offered by elite theory to 
clarify the concept and the underlying dynamics driving political elites’ actions; 
ii) systematising the existing contributions on the subject, particularly with 
regard to the role played by political ideology and power considerations, within 
a consistent theoretical framework; iii) and, offering an original theoretical and 
empirical contribution on the often overlooked role played by elite relations 
between the intervening and target state. As I have showed in this thesis, 
despite the different motivations pursued in specific instances of interventions, 
political elites’ views and interests profoundly affect the decision to intervene. 
In focusing on the centrality of political elites for the practice of military 
intervention, I do not claim that elite dynamics are the only reason why states 
intervene. However, I maintain that despite different contexts and motivations, 
elite dynamics represent constant causal mechanisms affecting not only the 
decision to intervene but also the direction, modality, and timing of 
intervention. 
To demonstrate this, in Chapter 1 I drew on earlier Realist works to develop an 
alternative Realist-inspired approach to the study of intervention that could 
overcome contemporary Realism’s self-imposed silence on intervention. Not 
only a Realist theory of intervention is possible but it also allows for: a fruitful 
dialogue with competing theoretical approaches, particularly Constructivism; 
and, exploring the relationship between the centrality of political elites both for 
explaining the practice of military intervention and addressing the normative 
problematique of intervention. In focusing on the former, this thesis argued in 
favour of a reconceptualisation of military intervention as a tool for the 
management of the consequences that elite circulation abroad entails for the 
intervening elite’s position, both at home and abroad.  
In Chapter 2, I developed a theory of the state drawn from CET and later 
contributions to elite theory in order to define both the basic assumptions of the 
proposed framework and the key actors of this study: political elites. In doing 
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so, I elucidated the defining features of elite politics by identifying three co-
constitutive elite dynamics: political formulas, elite circulation, and elite 
structure. These dynamics are co-constitutive as all three mirror the underlying 
drivers of elites’ action and mutually influence each other. Importantly, by 
clarifying the dual nature of elites as political agents acting in both the domestic 
and international sphere, I have explored how domestic change abroad affects 
elites’ interests and position elsewhere. Who rules other countries matters as the 
circulation of elites in other societies influences the position of other political 
elites. Specifically, the interplay between elite dynamics at the domestic level 
(domestic elite politics) creates challenges and opportunities at the international 
level that affect political elites’ positions and decisions (international elite 
politics). In this regard, military intervention represents one of the tools 
available to policymakers to respond to such pressures and incentives, and 
affect the circulation of elites abroad accordingly.  
Drawing on the underlying incentives resulting from international elite politics, 
in Chapter 3 I defined the main causal mechanisms shaping an elite’s 
interventionary policy with regard to specific instances of internal conflict. In 
particular, I argued that the three political elite dynamics identified in Chapter 
2 represent a set of critical antecedents driving states to intervene in internal 
conflicts. In this regard, decisions to intervene result from the interplay of: the 
ideological frameworks informing elites’ belief systems; elites’ considerations 
for both state and regime security; and, the influence exerted by foreign political 
groups striving for power in the target state.  
First, political formulas exert a twofold effect. At a general level, they provide 
the ground for the political value assigned by political elites and its various 
factions to specific cases of internal conflicts abroad. At a more specific level, 
the interplay between political formulas affects the degree of cooperation 
between elite groups in the intervening and target state. Second, political elites’ 
response to internal conflicts is informed by elites’ interest in securing both 
their domestic and international power position. As a result, the struggle for 
power taking place both at the domestic and international level represents a set 
of push factors driving states to intervene. Third, as the pattern of relations 
established between elite members matter at the domestic level, elite relations 
between elite members with foreign elite or counter-elite groups act as a pull 
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factor for external intervention. This can have both an indirect effect on elites’ 
decision, by providing them with local allies easing the decision to intervene, 
and a direct effect, by establishing close relations with the intervener’s decision-
makers in order to promote their intervention. 
While the interplay between these three elite dynamics is likely to drive elites 
towards an interventionist position, such an interventionist stance can take 
different forms (military, economic, ideological) and different modalities 
(direct/indirect; over/covert). Given the greater material costs and risks the 
decision to directly intervene in an internal conflict entails, the decision to 
directly intervene needs to be examined in regard to the opportunities and 
challenges shaped by contingent conditions, events, and local actors’ decisions, 
making direct and overt intervention the preferable solution over other 
modalities of intervention. In order to take this into account, I adopted the 
distinction between causal antecedents and critical junctures. On the one hand, 
elite dynamics act as the critical antecedents driving states towards an 
interventionist position. On the other hand, critical junctures represent 
historical passages characterised by rapidly changing conditions that force the 
intervening elite to confront the increasing costs of non-intervention or the 
increasing return of military intervention. In turn, these critical junctures are 
connected to critical antecedents as the former acquire meaning only given the 
interests and relations with the target state shaped by elite dynamics.  
 
 
An Assessment 
In the second part of the thesis, I offered a plausibility probe of the theoretical 
framework based on US policy towards three major internal conflicts taking 
place between 1898 and 1939: the Cuban War of Independence, the Russian 
Civil War, and the Spanish Civil War. The empirical analysis provided in Part II 
permits a first assessment of the causal impact of elite dynamics. In addition, 
the case studies offered additional elements that qualified some of the 
expectations of the theoretical framework. 
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General considerations  
The case studies have confirmed two broader expectations drawn from the 
theoretical framework. First, military intervention allowed the US political elite 
to influence the circulation of elites in the target state by favouring one of the 
sides involved in the conflict. Importantly, military intervention provided US 
leaders with the opportunity to influence the allied elite group in order to shape 
its identity and policies (Russia) and select the actual members of the emerging 
political elite (Cuba). Similarly, intervention was still considered in the Spanish 
case as a way to both deny the victory of the Nationalists and increase US 
influence over the Loyalists.  
Second, elite dynamics shed light not only on the function performed by 
intervention but also on the details of US interventions, specifically its direction 
(which group the US supported), its timing (when the US shifted from non-
intervention to intervention), and its modality and actual form. While elite 
dynamics were crucial in shifting US policy from non-intervention to 
intervention in the Cuban and Russian cases, changing conditions in the target 
state played a critical role in accelerating the decision to intervene due to the 
threats (Cuba) and opportunities (Russia) offered by possible or actual 
developments in the target. Notably, in all three cases, the critical juncture 
allowing for US intervention was represented by changes in the target state 
(January-March 1898, May-July 1918, spring 1938), rather than in the 
intervening state (as also hypothesised in Chapter 3). While it is not possible to 
generalise solely from these three cases, the evidence provided in this thesis 
does point to the need to focus on the interplay between the intervener and the 
target state in elucidating the timing of intervention. In addition, given the ‘roll-
on’ effect produced by the causal antecedents, the case studies showed how 
elite dynamics continued to shape US intervention after the critical juncture up 
to the withdrawal of US troops.  
The case studies have also indicated how the proposed framework adds to the 
existing literature on intervention. In particular, the three case studies have 
drawn attention to the limits of explanations based exclusively on: economic 
factors and objectives (cf. Cuba, Russia, Spain); the strategic, state security and 
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international objectives of the US elite (cf. Cuba, Russia); the effects of the 
ideological clash between the intervener and the target, particularly US anti-
Communism (cf. Russia, Spain); and, the role played by the US President (cf. 
Russia, Spain). Further, the factors central to Liberal theories (regime type and 
domestic public opinion) did not provide satisfactory explanations of the cases 
analysed in this thesis. While the American Liberal formula informed both the 
degree of cooperation with local elite groups and the institutions the US 
attempted to promote in Cuba and Russia, the three cases show that the US 
intervened ultimately to secure the position of elite groups aligned with 
Washington’s objectives, connected with US leaders, and responding to US 
influence rather than the imposition of democratic regimes tout court. In Cuba, 
US authorities interfered with the electoral process in order to secure a position 
of power for its local allies. In Russia, ensuring the success of a third way 
between the old regime and the emerging Socialist regime responded to US 
interests. Only by saving the February Revolution (and its leaders) could the US 
secure its influence and objectives in Europe. Notably, in Spain, the US did not 
extend its support to the democratically elected government. In all three cases, 
elite ideology and interests played a greater role compared to the formal regime 
of the target states.  
The three case studies also stress the co-constitutive nature of the critical 
antecedents. Similarly to the elements defining domestic elite politics, 
international elite dynamics represent mutually reinforcing mechanisms 
shaping political leaders’ stance on intervention. First, there is a self-reinforcing 
relationship between political formulas and the pattern of elite relations: on the 
one hand, political formulas either favour or hamper the possibility of 
establishing substantial elite relations; on the other hand, elite relations ease the 
tensions arising from different ideological backgrounds. In the Cuban case, the 
relations established between US leaders and the more moderate 
representatives of the Cuban nationalists relaxed the obstacles to cooperation 
during the US occupation in the aftermath of the electoral defeat of the Union 
Democratica. Second, general and specific formulas informed elites’ views of 
the target state and of its domestic political value. Both Cuba and Russia 
mattered to US political leaders before the beginning of the internal conflict. 
This in turn raised the political costs of non-intervening and the political return 
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from intervention. On the contrary, Spain did not represent a valuable political 
objective in 1936. Third, the push factors emanating from international and 
domestic politics were reinforced by the presence of potential or actual allied 
elite groups in the target. Intervention in both Cuba and Russia served US 
leaders’ international and domestic interests because of the presence of pro-US 
actors in the target states that could secure US objectives. Similarly, the lack of 
push factors in 1936 was due also to the lack of an elite group with which US 
leaders could establish a strategically and politically valuable relationship.  
Furthermore, the three case studies permit the evaluation of the effect exerted 
by each elite dynamic. In this regard, they highlight important additional 
elements. 
 
Political formulas 
The effect exerted by elites’ political formulas corresponds to the expectations 
presented in Chapter 3. Both general and specific political formulas informed 
US leaders’ views of the US role in regard to the internal conflicts they were 
facing and the relative importance of the target state for US leaders’ position. As 
noted in Chapter 4, the idea of Cuba’s eventual integration within the American 
union became part of the political culture of the US elite. Cuba mattered not 
only for its strategic and economic value but also for its political value in terms 
of the realisation of a longstanding objective held by US leaders. In addition, the 
set of ideas informing US leaders’ views of domestic order at the time (frontier, 
race, gender) allowed them to envision a guidance role for the US in regard to 
the Cuban struggle for independence. In the Russian case, not only did Russia 
represent a target for US civilising mission before 1917, but the February 
Revolution also created the possibility for US leaders to assist the new Russian 
elite in its efforts to construct a Liberal-democratic regime. Both situations 
allowed the US political leaders to extract political validation from these 
conflicts, while reinforcing their leadership role both at home and abroad. Put 
differently, political formulas help explain why the question of who rules 
certain states acquires particular importance for a political elite. The specific 
political platforms of the incumbent US factions further reinforced this 
mechanism. While the influence of nationalist and expansionist ideas reinforced 
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Republicans’ views of the US role in the Caribbean, Progressive ideas were 
crucial to explaining Democrats’ search for a ‘reformist’ alternative in Russia as 
well as their non-interventionism in 1936. 
Furthermore, the interplay between political formulas profoundly affected the 
pattern of cooperation between the US elite and the elite and counter-elite 
groups in the target states. This dynamic entailed direct consequences for the 
resulting intervention. In the two cases of intervention examined here, the 
challenge posed by either the competing formula of the Cuban counter-elite or 
the antithetic formula of the Bolshevik elite significantly hampered cooperative 
solutions despite the presence of shared strategic interests in both cases. In the 
Cuban case, US leaders opted for a unilateral intervention in order to 
marginalise the Cuban nationalist leaders despite existing military plans calling 
for an indirect intervention in Cuba via the provision of arms to the LA. In the 
Russian case, the limited attempts to cooperate with the Bolsheviks against 
German advances were soon abandoned. In the Spanish case, concerns over 
Socialist influences on the Spanish Republican leaders hindered cooperation 
with the Loyalists despite the growing concerns over the Fascist challenge in 
1937-1939. In this regard, general political formulas operated primarily as a 
negative mechanism, impeding cooperative and diplomatic solutions with local 
actors.  
Overall, political formulas exerted a twofold effect: favouring the emergence of 
domestic interests in specific internal conflicts abroad; and, precluding 
diplomatic and peaceful solutions to secure those interests. Yet, the Spanish 
case highlights additional points of interest. When confronted with both an 
antithetic and a competing formula, respectively the Communist formula of the 
Soviet regime and the Fascist formula of the German and Italian regimes, US 
leaders initially prioritised the challenge posed by the former. This is consistent 
with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 and 3, as we would 
expect antithetic formulas to pose a more threatening model to an elite’s rule 
compared to a competing formula targeting external or peripherical territories 
controlled or claimed by an elite. However, this underscores two elements. 
First, political elites evaluate the challenge posed by concurrent contending 
formulas in relative terms, favouring the possibility of co-opting a contending 
elite group against the other. Second, elites’ evaluations shift over time 
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depending on the actual threat posed by the states upholding those contending 
formulas. Thus, the Spanish case indicates the need for further research to 
examine elites’ changing perceptions of contending political formulas and how 
these shifts affect the decision-making process. 
 
Power struggle 
US decisions in all three cases have been shaped by the interplay between the 
competition for power taking place at the international level and at the 
domestic level. When confronted with an internal conflict, US leaders had to 
assess the costs and benefits that elite change in the target state would entail on 
both their international and domestic power position. In the two cases of 
intervention examined in this thesis, the twofold struggle for power in which 
US leaders were enmeshed created powerful incentives to intervene in order to 
secure their position both at home and abroad. This is particularly evident in 
the Russian case, where intervention allowed the US political elite to fence off a 
challenge to both their domestic rule and international influence. In the Spanish 
case, non-intervention allowed both the US elite to avoid endangering its 
influence over its European and Latin American allies as well as its incumbent 
coalition to risk its control of US institutions.  
Importantly, international and domestic considerations exerted a diverse effect 
in the three cases. In the Cuban case, fear of European intervention initially 
acted as an obstacle against US intervention. Once the international setting 
became more permissive, domestic political considerations dramatically pushed 
the McKinley administration towards intervention due to the repercussions 
non-intervention could have on the Republicans’ position. In this case, contrary 
to the expectations of Neorealist and Neoclassical Realist theories, domestic 
political interests and necessities took precedence over international pressures 
or evaluations of the US national interest. On the contrary, in 1938 partisan 
politics constrained the Roosevelt administration while heightened 
international competition pushed FDR to consider new ways to intervene in 
Spain as a way to curb German advances. The difference between the Cuban 
and Spanish cases stresses the need to further examine the diverse role played 
by international and domestic politics in particular cases. However, in contrast 
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to Neoclassical Realism, the theoretical framework provided in Chapter 3 takes 
into account not only how domestic politics constrain leaders from pursuing 
international objectives but also vice versa, how international factors either 
constrain leaders from or ease leaders towards intervention to pursue domestic 
objectives. 
The three cases also highlight further elements concerning the US elite’s 
evaluations of its international and domestic position. In both the Russian and 
Spanish case, the key aspect of US international evaluations concerned the 
possibility of securing an allied elite in the target state (Russia) or denying the 
same to rival states (Spain). In the Cuban case, once Washington’s initial 
projects failed, US leaders froze Cuba’s alignment with the US through the Platt 
Amendment. Overall, these case studies stress the need, especially for Realist 
theories, not to take allies as a given but to examine the mechanisms through 
which military intervention can create alliances by securing the position of 
allied or dependent elites. 
In regard to the domestic considerations affecting elites’ decisions, the case 
studies confirmed the twofold challenge a foreign elite or emerging counter-
elite can pose: to the overall elite’s domestic rule; and, to the incumbent 
faction’s hold over domestic institutions. The two are not mutually exclusive. In 
the Russian case, the Bolshevik elite represented both a general threat to the US 
elite’s rule and a specific challenge for the Democratic coalition. The direct 
threat posed by the Bolsheviks was due to the far-reaching challenge arising 
from an antithetic elite that intended to export its revolution. Yet, the case 
studies highlighted also an indirect yet pervasive effect on US leaders’ domestic 
position. The Cuban War for Independence, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the 
Spanish Civil War gradually problematised US elite’s rule by mobilising 
segments of US society and contributing to the polarisation of the US political 
spectrum – farmers, blacks and workers in the Cuban case; urban workers in 
the Russian case; Liberals and Catholics in the Spanish case. In this regard, 
intervention served not only the purpose of fencing off direct threats to the US 
elite’s rule or to its incumbent faction. It also helped elites to manage the 
consequences produced by those internal conflicts on the social fabric of the US 
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polity. Intervention represented a tool not only for the management of domestic 
change abroad but also for the management of US society.1  
In turn, this dynamic shaped partisan competition by providing opposition 
factions with the opportunity to mobilise those groups against the incumbent 
faction. Elections in 1898, 1918, and 1936 informed the decision to intervene (or 
not) as well as its timing, as incumbent factions were pressed to assess the 
impact that non-intervention (or intervention) could have on their electoral 
success. Notably, this concerned both the president, for instance in 1936, and 
the wider political elite, as represented in the impact of mid-term elections in 
1898, 1918, and 1938 on US decisions. Nonetheless, elections per se did not 
represent the underlying dynamic pushing US leaders to intervene. The driving 
causal mechanism was represented by the competition for power expressed via 
open elections in democratic settings, imposing recurrent tests on the support 
enjoyed by competing factions.2  
 
Elite relations 
The three case studies have examined the pervasive role played by the indirect 
and direct relations established by members of the US political elite and 
members of the local elite or counter-elite groups. On the one hand, the 
moderates within the PRC and the political leaders of the February Revolution 
not only created the conditions of multiple sovereignty by contesting Spanish 
and Bolshevik authority but also represented local allies that could ensure the 
establishment of a political order in line with US leaders’ interests. Importantly, 
the presence of actual or potential allies in the target state reinforced the idea of 
the feasibility of military intervention. On the other hand, PRC, SR, and Kadet 
leaders established direct relations with US policymakers, conveying an image 
of the Cuban and Russian counter-elites as in accordance with US values and 
                                                
1 On this point, there are significant overlaps with the conclusions reached within Neo-
Marxist studies. See for instance Rosenberg 1994. 
2 It is worth noting that the US presidential system does not provide a robust test for 
the impact of elections on intervention as the other possible causal dynamic (i.e. the 
impact of intervention on elections) cannot be tested since the timing of elections are 
fixed in advance. Contrary to parliamentary systems, US presidents cannot call 
elections in the aftermath of successful interventions. See Gaubatz 1999.  
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interests, and lobbying successfully for support and, eventually, intervention. In 
doing so, they provided legitimacy for US interventions and created political 
ties that US leaders could activate and benefit from. In turn, the limits of US 
interventions in both Cuba and Russia confirm the lasting validity of 
Machiavelli’s remarks concerning the ability of foreign elite groups to drag 
great powers into problematic – even potentially disastrous – interventions.3 
The Spanish case provides an instructive contrast in this regard. Simply put, the 
US elite could not identify a pro-US ally in the fight for the Spanish state. From 
the perspective of US leaders, both factions were considered as ‘un-American’. 
This was the result of both ideological differences and the lack of sustained 
relations between US and Spanish policymakers during the early years of the 
Spanish Second Republic. Subsequent Loyalist attempts at establishing 
constructive relations with US politicians proved to be ill-advised, especially if 
compared to the Cuban and Russian actors’ ability to work with those US 
policymakers that could use the Cuban and Russian card for their own political 
objectives. Norman Thomas’ remarks on Rios’ inability to establish relations 
with arms manufactures to lobby Congress stands as a reminder on the need for 
foreign groups to understand the political game in Washington and act 
accordingly to advance their requests.  
At the same time, the case studies provide further evidence of the importance of 
elite relations and related dynamics. First and foremost, the three case studies 
stress the underlying effect exerted by patterns of dependency. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, local leaders were pushed to look for external support to sustain 
their fight against their adversaries. This reinforced their dependency from 
external actors. Cuban moderates increasingly relied on the US given the 
greater military resources and legitimacy enjoyed by nationalist leaders in 
Cuba. Anti-Bolshevik also became dependent on US and Allied support and 
manoeuvring. Spanish Nationalists and Loyalists’ need for external assistance 
increased German, Italian, and Soviet influence, which in turn confirmed US 
leaders’ views of the lack of actors in Spain that could respond to US influence. 
Both intervention and non-intervention reinforced these processes. In the 
Cuban and Russian cases, local leaders became even more dependent on US 
                                                
3 On Machiavelli’s remarks, see Chapter 3: 125-126, fn.76. 
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support, the only state that could guarantee their own military and political 
position. In the Spanish case, US non-intervention increased the Loyalists’ 
dependency on Soviet support, further reinforcing US concerns about the 
Socialist tendencies of the Loyalists.  
Yet, US intervention did not deprive local leaders of all autonomy. This resulted 
from two factors. On the one hand, external control was limited by the 
availability of alternative external sources of support for local actors, as 
exemplified by the British and French support for Kolchak, and by the 
autonomous sources of power local actors enjoyed, as exemplified by the ability 
of the Cuban nationalists to win the support of the majority of Cuban 
constituencies. On the other hand, the material and political costs that a longer 
military occupation in Cuba and increased troops in Russia entailed constrained 
US options, limiting their ability to force the hand of local leaders. Thus, the 
autonomy of local leaders resulted from the interplay of three elements: the 
availability of multiple sources of external support; autonomous sources of 
power in the target state; and, the possibility for the US to mobilise additional 
resources. 
Second, in both the Russian and Spanish case, Kadet and Nationalist 
representatives ensured their influence over the political debate in the US by 
accessing the members of the wider US ruling elite. In particular, Russian 
democratic leaders and Spanish Nationalists established fruitful contacts with 
members of both the US upper class and intellectual elite who were involved in 
the formulation of US policy towards the target state, as in the Russian case, or 
that had direct access to US policymakers, as in the Spanish case. The influence 
of these ruling elite members was not direct but acted as an important 
transmission belt between the foreign leaders’ views and US policymakers.4 
Although this is consistent with the premises of the theoretical framework 
probed in this thesis on the centrality of elite relations and of political elites in 
particular, it nevertheless points in the direction of further study on the 
                                                
4 This could be broadened to the PRC’s efforts to work with the US press and Hearst’s 
journals to influence US public opinion. 
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relationship between political elites and ruling elites and the different nature of 
this relationship beyond the American context and in non-democratic settings.5 
Finally, the role played by local elites in US leaders’ calculations made local 
developments central to the decision to intervene. In this regard, the fate of 
local allies was consequential to US objectives both in the Cuban and Russian 
case. As a result, the pattern of elite relations established between US leaders 
and local leaders help to further elucidate the timing of US decisions to 
intervene. While partisan competition and elections raised the stakes for US 
leaders during election years, developments in the target state played an even 
greater role in forcing US decisions in specific junctures to either avoid the 
emergence of an unfavourable political order, as in the Cuban case, or to 
promote a more favourable political order, by taking advantage of the Czech 
revolt in the Russian case. Both junctures were central in tilting the balance in 
favour of direct military intervention. In turn, these junctures acquired 
significance in light not only of US leaders’ domestic objectives but also of the 
stake they had on local elites.  
 
Concluding observations and future research  
Overall, the plausibility probe offered in Part II has substantiated the theoretical 
elements presented in Chapter 3, stressing the analytical payoffs resulting from 
examining US decisions to intervene from the perspective offered by elite 
dynamics. However, both the methodological choice operated in favour of 
historical cases of US interventions and the theoretical focus on the causes of 
intervention suggest the need to explore: first, the applicability of this 
framework to different case studies; second, the utility of the results of this 
thesis for further study of the practice of military intervention and its 
consequences. As clarified in Part I, the theoretical framework presented in this 
thesis is intended as a general schema applicable to different historical, 
systemic, and institutional settings. The generalisability of this schema rests not 
                                                
5 In particular, cross comparison is needed in order to examine whether the close 
relations existing between members of the political elite and ruling elite in the US 
represent a distinguishing feature of the American polity or of democratic settings tout 
court.  
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only on the general elite dynamics highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3 
characterising all social and political settings but also on the possibility of 
applying this theoretical framework both to later cases of US intervention and 
to other states’ interventionary practices. In the following sections, I will 
provide first an evaluation of the analytical prospects offered by an elite 
perspective on cases of intervention beyond the timeframe selected in this 
thesis. Subsequently, I will indicate the theoretical prospects offered by an elite 
perspective on the consequences of intervention. 
 
 
Beyond 1939: Implications for the Study of Intervention 
Although the following section allows only for an exploratory assessment of the 
applicability of the proposed framework to different contexts and states, both 
the Cold War and more recent cases of intervention suggest the utility of an 
elite perspective for a thorough comprehension of the causal mechanisms 
driving interventions also in more recent historical settings.  
 
Elite dynamics and Cold War interventionism 
This thesis offered a twofold contribution concerning the study of intervention 
during the Cold War, both at the empirical and theoretical level. At the 
empirical level, this thesis stressed the need to explore the roots of US 
interventionism with regard to the early years of US-Soviet relations. Both the 
Russian and Spanish cases emphasised the US elite’s confrontational reaction to 
the antithetical challenge posed by the Bolshevik elite and the spread of 
Communist influence before the Cold War. Far from resulting exclusively from 
bipolar competition, the new regime in Moscow posed immediately both an 
international and a domestic challenge to the US elite. Importantly, US 
policymakers used military intervention to respond this twofold challenge.  
When faced with the failure of their intervention to revitalise the political 
project of the February Revolution, US policymakers did not abandon their 
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attempts to steer Russia away from Bolshevism. They simply opted for 
economic intervention, as they later used the European Recovery Plan (ERP) on 
a broader scale to reduce the appeal of Communism in Europe after the Second 
World War. Yet the rationale behind these instruments had been developed in 
the aftermath of the Siberian adventure: military intervention against 
Communist elites, economic intervention against Communism. Furthermore, in 
the Cuban case, US leaders had already experimented with a vast array of 
interventionary tools that became part of the ‘technology’ of US Cold War 
interventionism, including not only military intervention but also economic, 
ideological and ‘electoral’ interventions. The Cuban case also highlighted the 
US elite’s early problematic relationship with nationalist revolutions and 
longstanding concerns for external interference in the Western Hemisphere. 
Similarly to the Cuban case, where the conflict initially raised the possibility of 
European interventions, repeated revolts and financial instability in Latin 
American countries opened the possibility for renewed European meddling in 
American affairs, which in turn fuelled US interventionism in the region, for 
example in the case of Haiti (1915).6 What changed during the Cold War was 
the ideological reach and resources the Soviet Union enjoyed, which allowed 
Moscow to influence and interfere in Latin American politics without directly 
intervening. The concerns this raised in Washington led to renewed 
interventions, as exemplified by the case of Guatemala (1954) and US attempts 
to remove Castro in Cuba.7 
At the theoretical level, this thesis explores the elite dynamics that shaped 
interventions also during the Cold War. This is not to argue that the Cold War 
did not have an impact in and of itself on US interventionism. However, what 
Cold War interventions reveal are not so much distinct causal mechanisms but 
the self-reinforcing and heightened effects of the causal mechanisms presented 
in this thesis: ideological heterogeneity, resulting from antithetical political 
formulas; global competition for power under bipolarity in the midst of 
profound social changes; and, following decolonisation, the appearance on the 
world scene of weak state elites in the Third World requiring external 
assistance. The resulting systemic conditions reinforced underlying elite 
                                                
6 Schmidt 1995; Introduction: 26. 
7 On the difference between influence, interference, and intervention, see Introduction: 
22. 
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dynamics resulting in the third major wave of intervention and regime change 
in modern history.8  
First, the interplay between political formulas and the struggle for power 
removed the distinction between internal opponent and external foe.9 Second, 
the conditions deriving from the struggle for power and elite relations resulted 
in zero-sum calculations affecting superpowers’ decisions in regard to internal 
conflicts.10 With international alignments resting on domestic arrangements, 
who ruled European and Third World states mattered even more to US and 
Soviet elites, as elite change could entail not only the loss of an ally but also a 
net gain for the only rival that could threaten the other superpower.11 In 
addition, the zero-sum calculations of the Cold War favoured forms of 
intervention specifically aimed at weakening the other superpower by raising 
the costs of the rival’s interventions. For example, in response to renewed 
Soviet interventionism in the 1970s, the US embarked in a ‘counterforce 
strategy’ leading to the provision of aid to the Islamist forces in Afghanistan in 
order to wear down Soviet resources and military forces.12 Third, intervention 
in the Third World was a result of both the weakness of local elites and their 
ability to shift their allegiance, as exemplified by the shifting position of 
Ethiopian and Somali elites in the 1970s.13 Despite their limited economic and 
military resources, Third World countries could yield significant returns to the 
superpowers in the Cold War context in terms of validation (for their 
proclaimed modernisation and revolutionary models) and resources (such as 
raw materials, access to strategic territory, etc.).14 As pointed out by Finnemore, 
‘Africa, south and southeast Asia, the Middle East…were prizes to be gained, 
and much of the cold war was a struggle for the allegiance of these states’.15  
                                                
8 Owen 2010a. 
9 Aron 1966a: 99-101. See also Chapter 2. 
10 Kaplan 1964: 110-111. 
11 Finnemore 2003: 86, 94-95, 127; Hook and Spanier 2004: 79-80. 
12 Westad 2005: 331-332, 354. In this regard, these counter-interventions served a 
‘negative balancing’ function aimed at undermining the rival superpower. See He 2012. 
13 On the structural weakness of Third World states as favouring external intervention, 
see Morgenthau 1967: 426. 
14 David 1989. 
15 Finnemore 2003: 128. 
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Therefore, the conditions of the Cold War exacerbated the effects of the more 
general causal mechanisms that underlie intervention. But the same elite 
dynamics continued to operate informing not only US but also other powers’ 
interventions. First, Cold War interventions were characterised by the interplay 
between ideological confrontation and power competition. On the one hand, 
superpowers’ interventions responded to the deeply entrenched modernising 
and revolutionary ethos of the American and Soviet elites.16  Having secured 
their respective spheres of influence under military alliances, the Third World 
represented the ground for confrontation and the exportation of their respective 
models. On the other hand, the mutually antithetic challenge posed by the two 
models hampered substantial cooperation between US and Communist 
regimes, fuelling a confrontational rhetoric both abroad and at home. For 
example, the delay with which US policymakers took advantage of the first 
signs of the Soviet-Chinese split is instructive of the influence exerted by 
ideological rivalry during the Cold War.17 Notably, increased US cooperation 
with Chinese leaders starting from the 1970s and then the Soviet leadership 
during the 1980s was accompanied by domestic reforms that increasingly 
aligned the Chinese and Soviet regimes to the principles of the US formula, 
particularly but not exclusively in regard to its socio-economic tenets. 
Second, major military interventions during the Cold War responded to both 
international and domestic factors. Interventions responded to the exigency of 
supporting allied elite and counter-elite groups. Specifically, it served three 
objectives at the international level: i) securing existing allied elites, as 
exemplified by repeated US interventions in the Western Hemisphere or Asia 
and Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe;18 ii) supporting allied counter-elite 
groups in taking over state structures, as exemplified by multiple interventions 
in Angola starting from the 1970s; iii) denying the imposition of allied elites to 
the counterpart or raising the costs of such efforts, as exemplified by US indirect 
                                                
16 Morgenthau 1967: 428; Westad 2005. 
17 Christensen 1996. 
18 In this regard, the two formal alliance systems in Europe were functional not only in 
deterring a conventional or nuclear attack against their members but also any 
intervention within each alliance by the rival superpower. Similarly, they provided 
strategic and political support for superpowers’ interventions aimed at their allies, for 
instance in the case of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968). See Bull 1977: 210-
218; Wight 1978: 199. 
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intervention in Afghanistan. The fight for allies characterised also non-
superpowers’ interventions. For instance, China’s 1979 intervention against 
Vietnam, a Soviet ally, responded to the exigency both of confronting Hanoi for 
its intervention against Cambodia, Beijing’s main ally in Indochina, and of 
reducing Soviet influence in the region.19  
At the same time, elites’ domestic position and partisan calculations shaped 
those interventions in profound ways. In this regard, Vietnam stands as an 
example of the overlapping effects of both international and domestic factors on 
US leaders. While US intervention responded to the zero-sum calculations 
expressed in the so-called ‘domino theory’, partisan antagonism as well as the 
competition for power within the Democratic Party pushed Lyndon Johnson 
towards a more interventionist stance in Vietnam.20 Elites’ considerations for 
their domestic position influenced also the interventions of lesser powers. Such 
interventions responded partly to attempts to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
interveners’ regimes; partly to fence off threats to the stability of those regimes 
posed by internal conflicts in neighbouring countries. The former is exemplified 
by Cuba’s decision to intervene in Latin America and Angola, which reinforced 
the regime’s revolutionary credentials; the latter by Syrian intervention in the 
Lebanese Civil War, which resulted from Damascus’ hegemonic objectives as 
much as its need to control the spill-over effects of the civil war on Syrian 
internal stability.21 
Third, local elites continued to act as a decisive ‘pull’ factor for foreign 
interventions. Both Arne Westad and Michael Grow have shown the influential 
role played by Third World elites in inviting American and Soviet 
interventions.22 Latin American leaders repeatedly accessed policymakers in 
Washington to lobby for US intervention in order to secure their own domestic 
position and projects. Similarly, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979) 
cannot be examined without taking into account political developments in 
Kabul and Afghan Communist leaders’ requests for Soviet intervention. Similar 
dynamics characterised also non-superpowers’ interventions. Chinese covert 
                                                
19 Scobell 2003: 119-129. 
20 Small 2005. 
21 On Cuba, see Gleijeses 2002. On Syria, see Weinberger 1986. 
22 Westad 2005; Grow 2008. 
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direct intervention in Korea (1950) and its indirect intervention in Vietnam were 
both shaped by the close elite ties existing between Chinese leaders and their 
Korean and Vietnamese counterparts.23 The existing ties with allied local elites 
likewise informed French interventions in Africa.24 
In general terms, allied elites represented channels for superpowers’ influence, 
as exemplified by US relations with political actors in West Germany and 
Italy.25 As such, securing the position of allied elite groups and of specific 
leaders within them represented an important objective of third party 
interventions during the Cold War. On the one hand, interventions could help 
secure the intervener’s influence over local elites and counter-elites. For 
example, the multiple and overlapping indirect US, Soviet, and Chinese 
interventions in the Angolan Civil War responded to the intervening states’ 
interest in securing the allegiance of national liberation movements in Africa.26 
On the other hand, interventions could help secure the position of specific 
factions and preferred leaders. For example, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
allowed Moscow to interfere in the struggle for power within the Afghan 
Communist Party and favour a more amenable leadership.27  
 
The politics of humanitarian interventions 
The framework presented in this thesis can also shed light on the causal 
mechanisms that shaped the so called humanitarian interventions of the 1990s. 
Hailed as a major shift both in normative terms and in terms of states’ practice, 
recent studies have stressed the numerous precedents of humanitarian 
interventions in both European and non-European history.28 The empirical 
analysis presented in Part II confirms the need for further research on this issue, 
in particular to assess the role played by humanitarian motivations in specific 
cases. In the Cuban case, there are no reasons to doubt that humanitarian 
                                                
23 Chen 2001: 7, 54; Record 2006: 44-45. 
24 Moisi 1984. 
25 Krasner 1999: 207-212. 
26 Glejseis 2002; Westad 2005: 131-143; 160-170, 210-241.  
27 Westad 2005: 300-326. 
28 Finnemore 2003; Bass 2008; Barnett 2011; Simms and Trim 2011. 
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concerns informed US elite views, yet humanitarian motivations alone fail to 
explain the timing and modality of US intervention. At the same time, 
humanitarian considerations played an important instrumental role as they 
helped McKinley to forge a broader consensus by bridging the 
expansionist/anti-imperialist divide within the US elite. In the Russian case, the 
US ‘responsibility to aid’ the Czech units in Siberia can hardly be disentangled 
from the opportunity offered by the Czech revolt. Further, the case of the US 
relief operation in Russia underscores the need to examine the way in which 
humanitarian efforts can serve broader political objectives. 
In more general terms, the conceptual and theoretical perspective presented in 
the Introduction to this thesis and in Chapter 1 reinforces these conclusions. 
Despite their self-declared altruistic motivations, humanitarian operations share 
with other forms of intervention the extensions of the intervening elites’ 
authority over the target state. Through humanitarian intervention, the 
intervening elite arrogates for itself the right – recte, the responsibility – to 
protect the target population thus infringing the target elite’s claim to 
autonomy. In practice, this translates in the coercion or removal of local leaders 
considered to be responsible for human rights abuses. For this reason, similarly 
to other interventions, neutrality in these conflicts is nothing more than a 
delusion.29 Despite their motivations, humanitarian interventions represent an 
exercise in control through which the intervening elite ensures a political re-
ordering of the target. For these reasons, the analysis of humanitarian 
interventions, including the recent developments related to the Responsibility 
to Protect, cannot and should not eschew the political dimension underlying 
these interventions.30  
At a more specific level, the practice of military intervention in this period 
indicates the role played by elite dynamics. Although further empirical research 
is needed, a cursory examination of major interventions during the 1990s 
suggests the applicability of the proposed framework to humanitarian 
interventions.   
                                                
29 Betts 1994. 
30 On how political and strategic considerations shape humanitarian interventions, see 
Trachtenberg 1993; Betts 1994. On the antipolitical theory underlying the Responsibility 
to Protect, see Brown 2013. 
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The norm of humanitarian intervention was not immediately embraced by 
Western elites. For example, neo-isolationist impulses emerged both within the 
elite and public opinion in the US in the aftermath of the Cold War. For 
instance, a broad consensus initially existed within the US political elite over 
non-intervention in Somalia (1991-1992). Subsequent US losses in Somalia 
reinforced such stance, as evident in US non-intervention in Rwanda (1994).31 
However, as Western policymakers lost the framing provided by the notion of 
the ‘free world’ against the Soviet challenge and humanitarism continued to 
filter into Western political formulas, Western elites’ leadership was 
increasingly called into question when failing to prevent mass atrocities. 
Similarly to the Cuban case, genuine humanitarian concerns coupled with 
deep-rooted ideas of US exceptionalism and of its guidance role vis-à-vis the 
target communities. As such, they served both altruistic and imperial 
objectives.32  
In particular, the Liberal tenets of the US political formula continued to inform 
US policymakers’ views of foreign non-democratic elites. Similarly to the 
Russian case examined in Chapter 5, the discourse underpinning US 
intervention continued to target local dictators and autocratic elites, held 
responsible for humanitarian disasters and instability. As Western notes, 
requests for US intervention in Somalia became gradually informed by a 
description of the conflict as the result of  
violent campaigns orchestrated by ruthless elites to advance their narrow 
political ambitions. Based on this portrayal, [liberals] argued that U.S.-
led intervention targeted against these political elites would quickly 
mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe.33 
In an increasingly homogenous system centred on Liberal values, such a 
discourse became predominant, reducing the space for cooperation with local 
leaders who were rejecting both US hegemony and its ideological tenets. In 
addition, the specific political platforms of the incumbent elites both in the US 
and Europe at the time reinforced these dynamics. As Brian Rathbun argues, 
the specific political platforms of the incumbent coalitions shaped European 
                                                
31 Klinghoffer 1998: 91-96; Herring 2008: 921. 
32 Sewell 2011. 
33 Western 2005: 137. 
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leaders’ acceptance of humanitarian norms and of the utility of force in this 
regard, which in turn affected their decisions to intervene.34 Similarly, the neo-
Wilsonian platform with which Bill Clinton was elected in 1992 led to a public 
commitment for the enlargement of the perimeter of democracies, linking US 
security to the nature of foreign regimes.35  
Interventions were driven also by elite’s calculations of power. In this regard, 
focusing exclusively on the humanitarian motivations of these operation risks 
overlooking the power dynamics underlying US and Western interventions 
during the 1990s. Although the US elite for the first time in its history faced no 
direct threat to either its international or domestic power, US policymakers still 
had to confront a twofold challenge: the consequences of the Soviet collapse 
and of the Cold War system on former clients and Third World states; and, the 
domestic consequences of US action and inaction in regard to the resulting 
conflicts.  
The removal of the Soviet Union further weakened state elites in the Balkans 
and the Third World, fuelling the disintegration of numerous state structures. 
In this regard, US interventions responded to the US elite’s attempt to both 
manage the consequences arising from this process and retain its newly 
acquired power position in the aftermath of the Cold War. An increasing 
awareness of the position of the US characterised the discourse of the American 
elite, especially after the economy began to grow again under the Clinton 
administration. As Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Chairman of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, noted in 1996: 
we remain uniquely positioned, not only geographically, but 
strategically, politically and economically at the center. The United 
States, in that, remains the world's anchor. And that is where we must 
stay.36 
Stabilising such international order allowed US leaders to prolong the ‘unipolar 
moment’.37 Ensuring US leadership in security affairs became of paramount 
importance, although this resulted in contrasting incentives. While intervention 
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36 Helms 1996. 
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in Somalia responded to requests to uphold the Bush administration’s vision of 
a ‘new world order’, the possibility of fracturing the Atlantic Alliance initially 
led the Clinton administration to refrain from a more forceful policy in the 
Bosnian conflict (1992-1995).38 
Yet, partisan competition at home provided additional push factors in both the 
case of Somalia and Bosnia. Pressures arising from US Congressmen and Bill 
Clinton, the presidential candidate at the time, reinforced the Bush 
administration’s decision to intervene in Somalia.39 Similarly, domestic political 
considerations played an important role in the decision of the Clinton 
administration to authorise US intervention in Bosnia in 1995. While concerns 
that intervention would endanger Clinton’s domestic plans reinforced the US 
initial cautious stance in Bosnia, the Republican victory in the 1994 mid-term 
elections changed the political calculus for Clinton and the Democrats.40 
Weakened and increasingly under attack by the Republicans also on its Bosnian 
policy, Clinton took control of the Bosnian dossier in order to strengthen the 
president’s image as a credible leader in view of the upcoming presidential 
elections. Republicans, in the meantime, further restricted the administration’s 
options. In 1995, majority leader and future presidential candidate Bob Dole 
coalesced a group of US policymakers behind intervention, attacking the 
president’s inaction. Subsequently, Congress passed a bill put forth by Dole and 
Helms extending military assistance to Bosnia.41 Eventually, both Republican 
pressures and Clinton’s attempts to restore its position eased US support for 
NATO air operations against the Serbs in the summer of 1995. 
Finally, elite relations shaped Western and US interventions during the 1990s in 
important ways. The availability of local allies – or lack thereof – helps clarify 
the pattern of intervention and non-intervention during this period.42 For 
example, the usual focus on US non-intervention in Rwanda overshadows how 
elite ties between French and Rwandan political elites contributed to the French 
decision to intervene in Rwanda both in 1990 (Operation Noroit) and in 1994 
                                                
38 Daalder 2000: 35-36; Patnam 2010. 
39 Patnam 2010. 
40 Daalder 2000:17-18. 
41 Ibid.: 63-64; Halberstam 2001: 306-309. 
42 Notably, Robert Pape (2012) included the availability of allied groups in the target 
state as part of his proposed ‘pragmatic standard’ of humanitarian intervention.  
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(Operation Turquoise).43 Importantly, in the early phase of the conflict in the 
former Yugoslavia, Washington lacked clear allies in the struggle for the 
remnants of Yugoslavia. As former Secretary of State James Baker noted in June 
1991, US leaders simply did not ‘have a dog in that fight’.44 Furthermore, the 
pre-existing US ties with Serb authorities initially hampered cooperation with 
Croatian and Bosnian representatives. Concerns about the leadership groups of 
the three sides involved in the war in Bosnia continued to reinforce US caution. 
As John Deutsch, Deputy Secretary of Defence at the time, noted: 
one of the reasons that is was hard to have a good policy there is how 
terrible all sides were…To whom would you give a Thomas Jefferson 
Award? Not Milosevic certainly. And not Tudjman, equally certainly. 
Izetbegovic? Not a great candidate himself….Probably Izetbegovic 
would kill the fewest, but perhaps only because he lacked the means. It 
took a long time for arms to get to the Bosnian Muslims.45  
With the prosecution of the conflict, US leaders gradually sided with both the 
Croatian and Bosnian leaders. Elite relations played an important role in this 
regard. On the one hand, cooperation with Croatia was eased by the Croatian 
defence minister at the time, Grojko Susak, who requested US military support 
and made clear his intention to lead Croatia into NATO.46 On the other hand, 
support for the Bosnians responded to Muslim Bosnian leaders’ lobbying on US 
Congressmen as much as from the isolation in which they operated in Western 
Europe, which made them more dependent on US support.47 Notably, by 
helping negotiate a peace between the Bosnians and the Croatians in March 
1994, the US could promote the formation of a local military ally.48 Local actors 
played a major role also in ‘pulling’ intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In this 
regard, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and Albanian leaders played two 
specific roles: first, by attacking Serb positions in Kosovo, the KLA induced 
further Serb reprisals that reinforced a compelling narrative of victimhood that 
in turn legitimised intervention against Belgrade; second, similarly to the 
Muslim Bosnians, they lobbied Congress for increased support and 
                                                
43 Callamard 2000; Prunier 2000. 
44 Quoted in Halberstam 2001: 46.  
45 Ibid.: 91-92. 
46 Ibid.: 334-335. 
47 Woodward 2013. 
48 Daalder 2000: 26-27. 
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intervention.49 In more general terms, as Susan Woodward argues, the cases of 
Bosnia and Kosovo represent the last examples of a recurrent historical pattern 
that has seen Balkan elites exerting an important pulling effect on foreign 
intervention since the 19th Century.50 
Moreover, both cases indicate the utility of taking into account how 
developments in the target state act as critical junctures opening up the 
possibility for intervention. As Ivo Daalder notes, the summer of 1995 
represented a window of opportunity for the Clinton administration.51 In 1995, 
the improved military positions of all three sides involved in the Bosnian 
conflict could have brought the conflict to a quick end.52 Importantly, Croatian 
and Bosnian concomitant ground offensives during the summer allowed the US 
to rely exclusively on air operations, which entailed inferior material costs and 
political risks.53 In turn, military intervention served the purpose of favouring a 
new political settlement devised by US policymakers and imposed by US 
policymakers, resulting in the Dayton Agreement.54 Similarly, events on the 
ground pulled US intervention in Kosovo, particularly the massacre in Račak, 
which tilted the international and domestic balance in favour of intervention.55 
 
Intervention today 
The 9/11 attacks created new push factors for US interventionism. Faced with 
both a rising Islamist challenge to its position in the Middle East and a direct 
security threat, US policymakers embarked in an ambitious interventionist 
project to shape a more favourable international system and a more secure 
domestic context. Enjoying unprecedented military capabilities coupled with 
the renewed domestic elite consensus on military operations, the Bush 
administration used military intervention to reshape those countries in the 
                                                
49 Halberstam 2001: 397, 409-411; Woodward 2013. 
50 Woodward 2013. 
51 Daalder 2000: 167. 
52 Ibid.: 37-38. 
53 Halberstam 2001: 424-425; Trubowitz 2011: 124-125. 
54 Daalder: 179-180. On the democratisation process implemented in Bosnia and its 
limits, see Chandler 2000. 
55 Halberstam 2001: 397, 409-411. 
                     291 
image of US values and interests. Removing radical Islamist or authoritarian 
elites not aligned with the US represented the first step towards the imposition 
of new elites that could respond to US ideological, strategic, and political 
objectives.56 In this regard, US interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and 
especially in Iraq (2003) represented the highest manifestation of US Liberal 
interventionism, aimed at establishing democracies entrusted to new political 
elites drawn from both opposition forces with which the US had already 
established relations in the past, such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan 
and the Kurd leadership in Iraq, and the Afghan and Iraqi exiles.   
The potential utility of an elite perspective on these interventions stems from 
two elements. First, recent studies on US intervention in Iraq have pointed out 
the need to move beyond explanations focusing exclusively on either security 
factors or the role played by the neoconservatives within the Bush 
administration in order to take into account the elite dynamics examined in this 
thesis, specifically: the broader consensus within the American political elite on 
US Iraqi policy and the ideological underpinnings of US leaders’ policy towards 
Iraq;57 the interaction between international and domestic political 
considerations;58 and, the relationship established by US policymakers with 
Iraqi exiles and how the former saw the latter as the nucleus of the post-Baathist 
Iraqi political elite.59 Notably, the case of Ahmed Chalabi and his connections 
with both US political leaders and members of the ruling elite stands as a 
powerful reminder of the influence members of the Iraqi counter-elite at the 
time had on US decision-making.60  
Second, an elite perspective helps to shed light on the limits of US 
interventions. Similarly to the US experience in Cuba and Russia, US leaders 
had to confront local elites whose autonomy from US power rested on both 
local sources of political power and foreign powers. For example, the 
ideological and political relations established by Iraqi Shia leaders with the 
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Iranian elite during Saddam Hussein’s regime help explain Teheran’s influence 
over the new political leaders in Baghdad. In more general terms, the 
difficulties experienced in Afghanistan and the shift towards authoritarianism 
in Iraq are a stark reminder of how the functioning of formal institutional 
arrangements, including democratic ones, rests primarily on the quality, 
structure and interests of the elites that sustain and staff them.61  
Similarly to previous experiences in the interwar period and the Cold War, the 
costs and failures of US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq coupled with the 
effects of the financial crisis wore down the domestic consensus for full-scale 
unilateral interventions. Yet, when faced with the revolutionary wave of the so-
called Arab Spring, intervention became once again a tool not only Western 
powers but also Middle Eastern states could use to manage the consequences of 
domestic change and support favourable elites. Both democratic and 
authoritarian states intervened to either uphold the position of their allied elites 
or to remove rival leaders. Importantly, a narrow focus on either humanitarian 
motivations or formal institutional differences can hardly explain the different 
policies pursued by democratic and authoritarian states during the Arab 
Spring. In March 2011, following Bahrain’s request, Saudi Arabia and the other 
countries of the GCC intervened in Bahrain in order to secure the position of the 
al-Khalifa family, threatened by a domestic uprising. The intervention of the 
GCC responded to both international objectives (securing an allied elite in 
Manama) and domestic concerns (quelling an uprising that could be spread and 
challenge the stability of the regimes of the GCC). While the existing security 
and political relations with the Bahraini elite prevented any major Western 
involvement in support of the Bahraini protesters, Western states with the 
support of the GCC countries intervened in the Libya Civil War on the side of 
the anti-governmental forces.  
In particular, the case of Western intervention in Libya offers a challenging test 
for the framework presented in this thesis. Krasner has recently pointed out 
that Western countries not only did not know much about the Libyan 
opposition and but also that they did not have much confidence in it.62 
However, further research is needed on this point to assess how elite relations 
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affected Western elites’ decision-making process. Notably, Western intervention 
acted in favour and was itself eased by the formation of the National 
Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi, which was first recognised as the 
legitimate authority in Libya and subsequently went to establish the new 
governmental and legislative bodies of the Libyan state. In addition, three 
elements suggest reconsidering Krasner’s observation: first, the NTC’s 
professed democratic credentials, as enshrined in its ‘Vision of a Democratic 
Libya’ released on 29th March 2011, and its public requests for UN-backed air 
strikes and no-fly zones;63 second, NTC’s diplomatic activism in early 2011 and 
the resulting contacts with Western policymakers in the days preceding 
Western intervention leading to the early recognition of the NTC; finally, the 
identity of the NTC leaders, well-known to Western policymakers, as 
exemplified by the early positive views of Mahmoud Jibril, head of the NTC 
provisional government, expressed by the US ambassador in Libya in 2009.64  
Finally, elite dynamics can elucidate the various positions of external countries 
regarding the ongoing conflict in Syria. The struggle for power taking place in 
the region coupled with the pattern of relations and dependency established by 
elite groups has provided significant push and pull factors to Middle Eastern 
actors to intervene. As a result, regional actors are considerably involved in the 
Syrian Civil War by supporting their local allies in the struggle for Syria: 
Russia, Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah supporting the incumbent elite; Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey supporting different factions within the National 
Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (or Syrian National 
Coalition, SNC).65 
On the contrary, elite dynamics provide contrasting incentives in the case of the 
Western powers’ policy towards Syria. On the one hand, elite dynamics 
gradually led the US and its European allies towards a more active role in Syria. 
First, the repeated human rights violations and the fight of the SNC against an 
authoritarian regime resonated with the tenets of the Western elites’ formulas 
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and foreign policy discourse, placing significant obstacles to any collaboration 
with the Syrian elite from an early stage on the conflict.66 Second, the provision 
of support to the SNC offered the possibility of weakening Iran’s main ally in 
the region and, in case, secure the position of a more favourable leadership in 
Damascus. Third, members of the SNC have established direct relations with 
Western policymakers, particularly with members of the French elite, the first 
Western elite to recognise the SNC as the sole legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people, and of the US Republican Party, as exemplified by Senator John 
McCain’s visit to Syria in May 2013, which in turn helped to project the Syrian 
question onto the US political debate. On the other hand, the same elite 
dynamics help explain Western reticence in Syria. In particular, the domestic 
economic and political costs direct forms of intervention might entail and the 
presence of radical Islamist groups within the opposition prevented a more 
direct Western involvement. As a result of the contrasting incentives shaped by 
elite dynamics, Western elites have, so far, opted for limited indirect 
intervention in Syria, primarily via the provision of arms to secular and 
moderate insurgent groups. In the US case, this resulted in a bipartisan pull in 
the Senate for a ‘Syrian Transition Support Act’ (May 2013) to ensure the 
provision of defence material and training to vetted groups in Syria.67  
The recent debate in Western capitals over a possible limited strike following 
the use of chemical weapons in Syria (August 2013) further underscored the 
need to take into account broader elite dynamics to account for the decision to 
intervene or not, including Western elites’ domestic political concerns and the 
perceived lack of reliable allies in Syria. Yet, both the theoretical and empirical 
results of this thesis suggest focusing on the way in which both evolving elite 
relations and conditions in the target state could provide new critical junctures 
and precipitate foreign intervention.  
In more general terms, the ongoing interventions in the Syrian conflict by 
regional actors and the debate over possible Western direct intervention draw 
attention to the continued interest decision-makers attach to ‘who rules’ other 
states and the continued availability of intervention as a policy tool to influence 
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the circulation of elites in such states. In turn, this stresses the need to refine the 
theoretical tools to examine this practice and its links with political elites’ views, 
interests, and relations across different political and institutional contexts. This 
is particularly relevant today, as Western elites are confronted with the 
expanding interests of emerging powers and their evolving interventionary 
practices. In this regard, Russia’s ongoing support for the Syrian elite and, 
before that, its direct intervention in Georgia in 2008 stress the need to examine 
the way in which existing elite ties shape Moscow’s interventionism and how 
both intervention and its defence of the non-intervention norm, in turn, allows 
Moscow to secure its allies in its ‘near abroad’ and beyond. Similarly, the 
expanding international interests and ties of the Chinese elite as well as China’s 
increased participation in UN peacekeeping operations suggest exploring the 
way in which elite dynamics may affect Beijing’s traditional non-interventionist 
stance.68  
 
 
The Consequences of Intervention: Implications for Theory 
In the previous section, I highlighted the utility of the proposed framework for 
the study of military interventions conducted by both democratic and 
autocratic regimes beyond the timeframe selected in this study. In this regard, 
further research is needed to evaluate in greater detail the role played by elite 
dynamics in specific instances of intervention both during and after the Cold 
War. At the same time, both the case studies analysed in Part II and the 
analytical overview presented in the previous section suggest the utility of the 
theoretical framework presented in this thesis for the study of the consequences 
of intervention. As discussed in Chapter 2, elite change produces significant 
systemic consequences that in turn shape the interests elites face when 
confronting internal conflicts. For the same reason, military interventions are 
likely to produce three significant systemic effects connected to the three elite 
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dynamics highlighted in this study. In turn, these consequences highlight 
avenues of future theoretical research. 
First, by operating as a tool for the management of political change abroad, 
intervention influences the degree of ideological homogeneity in the system, 
thus affecting the degree of stability and patterns of cooperation within it. In 
this sense, intervention acts as a tool for the forceful homogenisation of the 
international system or for its forceful heterogenisation when conducted by 
revolutionary states. The question remains whether elites based on different 
principles of legitimacy can overcome their differences and reach an acceptable 
accommodation. As noted in Chapter 2, two processes can lead to such an 
outcome: formal settlements or processes of political convergence.69 Both 
Neorealism and the English School have – albeit with different terms – usually 
focused on the possibility of convergence between different states induced by 
the international system (or society) via processes of emulations and 
socialization.70 
Both historical evidence and the analysis presented in this thesis, however, 
depict a less straightforward process. For instance, Western recognition of the 
Soviet Union and cooperation during the Second World War do not negate the 
decades of political, ideological and military confrontation that continued up to 
the collapse of the Soviet state itself in the early 1990s.71 Similarly, the shift of 
the early interventionist foreign policy of the Iranian Islamic Republic towards 
the more pragmatic foreign policy of the 1990s following the Iraq-Iran War 
needs to be reconciled with the continued confrontational posture 
characterising US-Iranian relations.72  
As Halliday argues, there is no inevitable shift from confrontation to 
accommodation; on the contrary both tendencies persist.73 From the theoretical 
perspective presented in this thesis, the point overlooked by both Neorealist 
and English School perspectives is how systemic incentives shaped by elite 
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dynamics could work in the opposite direction, by pressuring a revolutionary 
state not to come to terms with the limits and costs of a continued 
interventionist foreign policy but to support foreign revolutionary groups as a 
means of strengthening its domestic status and create more favourable external 
conditions. In this regard, the elite perspective adopted in this thesis reinforces 
the Burkean view on the intractability of fundamental domestic and ideological 
differences.74 In addition, it complements the observations offered by elite 
theory on the processes that can lead elites to settle ideological differences, 
beyond settlements and convergence. In the case of elites operating in an 
anarchic environment or involved in an internal conflict, an additional course of 
action is available, that is military intervention. In this regard, further research 
is needed to evaluate both the additional contribution that elite theory can 
provide to the study of the elite ideologies and socialisation processes and the 
contribution that IR theory can offer to the study of elites and their dynamics. 
Second, by supporting a local elite group’s bid for the state, intervention can 
generate allies, thus affecting the international or regional balance of power. 
Internal conflicts allowed the possibility to create new allies, deny new allies to 
rival states, and, in case, undermine existing alliances. In the Spanish case, the 
US administration attempted to curb Nationalist advances in order to avoid the 
creation of regime in Madrid allied to Berlin that could weaken the position of 
the US in both Latin America and Europe. During the Second World War, US 
concerns regarding Spain’s support for Germany were vindicated, representing 
an additional strategic issue for US war plans. Other cases of intervention had 
greater impact. For instance, Soviet external support to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) during the Chinese civil war (1946-1950) favoured the victory of 
the CCP. In turn, this led to the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance signed by the Soviet Union and China in February 1950, which 
initially established China as a key Soviet ally.75  
This is of particular importance to Realist theories and ongoing efforts to refine 
existing theories of balancing.76 Realist authors have usually questioned the 
impact internal conflicts can have on the balance of power, except in limited 
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number of cases. As Waltz argued in 1967, ‘the revolutionary guerrilla wins 
civil wars, not international ones, and no civil war can change the balance of 
world power unless it takes place in America or Russia’.77 This argument, 
however, presents a number of problems. Regime changes and internal conflicts 
are recurrent events in international politics; hence they cannot be discarded 
easily. In fact, civil wars took place in both states mentioned by Waltz and had 
(or would have had) significant systemic consequences. In particular, the 
Bolsheviks’ success had profound foreign policy implications for both the US-
Russian rivalry and the Cold War. Today, the civil war in Syria makes clear the 
relevance of domestic change and internal conflicts in terms of: the opportunity 
provided by the war to Iran’s regional (Saudi Arabia) and international (US) 
competitors; and, the different degree of influence that groups within the 
opposition may grant to their external patrons if they win the war. As a 
consequence, Realist authors such as Kissinger and Walt might well argue that 
vital security interests are not at stake in Syria. But, by ignoring the influence of 
civil wars on balancing mechanisms in the Middle East and historical 
development more generally, they run a double risk: failing to examine why 
policymakers repeatedly consider the outcome of internal conflicts as a vital 
interest; and, of making Realism redundant in the explanation of important 
power and security dynamics in a highly strategic region.78  
Finally, by establishing and reinforcing elite relations, intervention helps shape 
patron-client relations thus affecting the degree of hierarchy in the international 
system. As Daniel Nexon points out, the social interactions between state elites 
and non-ruling groups constitute the ‘structural context’ within which political 
elites operate.79 Thus, by strengthening or loosening patron-clients relations, 
intervention ultimately strengthens or weakens broader patterns of hierarchy. 
As indicated by the Cuban case, military intervention was key to establishing 
imperial relations between the US and Cuba reinforcing the dependency of the 
Cuban elite on US support. In turn, these relations increased the likelihood of 
subsequent US interventions in Cuba due both to US interest in securing more 
amenable leaders on the island and to the Cuban factions’ attempts to enlist US 
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support in their own struggle for power. In this regard, further research is 
necessary to investigate the way in which military intervention and political 
elite relations interact not only to establish but also to replicate and preserve 
imperial domains. Therefore, a fruitful dialogue can be established: on the one 
hand, with works that have examined the role played by the ‘pull factors’ in the 
periphery on imperial expansion;80 on the other hand, with works that have 
explored how clienteles and military interventions shaped imperial rule and its 
eventual decline.81  
These three consequences stress once more the ‘roll-on’ effect of elite dynamics. 
While in the short-term elite dynamics inform the timing, modality and 
objectives of intervention, in the long-term elite dynamics continue to influence 
the intervener’s relationship with the target by affecting the degree of 
homogeneity between the two, the power position of the elites involved (both at 
home and abroad), and the asymmetrical relations between the two. As a result, 
international homogeneity, the balance of power, and imperial relations result 
affected. In this regard, the same dynamics that maintain intervention as a 
constant practice also make intervention a consequential practice for 
international relations. Ideologies, power, empires: ultimately, the fate of all 
three hinges on political elites. 
 
                                                
80 Galbraith 1960; Woodward 2013. 
81 Lake 2009; Nexon 2009a; Go 2011. 
                     300 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Abbott, Philip (2005), ‘Still Louis Hartz after All These Years: A Defense of the Liberal 
Society Thesis’, Perspectives on Politics 3(1): 93-109. 
Abercrombie, Nicholas; Hill, Stephen; Turner, Bryan S. (1980), The Dominant Ideology 
Thesis (London: Unwin Hyman). 
Adams, David (1995), ‘Internal Military Intervention in the United States’, Journal of Peace 
Research 32(2): 197-211. 
Ahlquist, John S.; Levi, Margaret (2011), ‘Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and 
What We Want to Know About It’, Annual Review of Political Science 14: 1-24. 
Alden, Chris (2005), ‘China in Africa’, Survival 47(3): 147-164. 
Allison, Graham T. (1971), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: 
Little, Brown). 
Allison, Graham T.; Halperin, Morton H. (1972), ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and 
Some Policy Implications’, World Politics 24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in 
International Relations: 40-79. 
Alpert, Michael (2004), A New International History of the Spanish Civil War, second edition 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Alston, Charlotte (2006), ‘The Suggested Basis for a Russian Federal Republic: Britain, 
Anti-Bolshevik Russia and the Border States at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919’, 
History 91(301): 24-44. 
Amenta, Edwin (2005), ‘State-Centered and Political Institutional Theory: Retrospect and 
Prospect’, in Thomas Janoski, Robert R. Aldford, Alexander M. Hicks and Mildred 
Schwartz (eds.), The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 96-114. 
Anderson, Matthew (1979), ‘Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821-41’, in Alan Sked (ed.), 
Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815-1848 (London: Macmillan): 79-97. 
Anievas, Alexander (2011), ‘The International Political Economy of Appeasement: The 
Social Sources of British Foreign Policy during the 1930s’, Review of International Studies 
37(2): 601-629. 
Armstrong, David (1993), Revolution and World Order: The Revolutionary State in 
International Society (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
Armstrong, John A. (1965), ‘The Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy’, International 
Affairs 41(1): 37-47.  
Aron, Raymond (1950), ‘Social Structure and the Ruling Class’, Part I and II, British 
Journal of Sociology 1(1-2): 1-16, 126-143. 
                     301 
Aron, Raymond (1966a), Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson). 
Aron, Raymond (1966b), ‘The Anarchical Order of Power’, Daedalus 5(2): 479-502.  
Art, Robert (1973), ‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique’, Policy 
Sciences 4(4): 467-490. 
Ashmead-Bertlett, Ellis (1919), Memorandum on the Position in Hungary, 7th June 1919, 
enclosed in a letter dated 15th June 1919 from Wade Chance to Cary T. Grayson, Cary T. 
Grayson Papers, The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at: 
{http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30524}. 
Aubone, Amber (2013), ‘Explaining US Unilateral Military Intervention in Civil Conflicts: 
A Review of the Literature’, International Politics 50(2): 278-302. 
Auxier, George (1939), ‘The Propaganda Activities of the Cuban Junta in Precipitating the 
Spanish American War’, Hispanic American Historical Review 19(3): 268-305. 
Aydin, Ayegul (2010), ‘Where Do States Go? Strategy in Civil War Intervention’, Conflict 
Management and Peace Science 27(1): 47-66. 
Bacino, Leo J. (1999), Reconstructing Russia: U.S. Policy in Revolutionary Russia, 1917-1922 
(Kent: The Kent State University Press). 
Bakhash, Shaul (2006), ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy Under The Islamic Republic, 1979-2000’, in L. 
Carl Brown (ed.), Diplomacy in The Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and 
Outside Powers (London and New York: I.B. Tauris): 247-258. 
Balch-Lindsay, Dylan; Enterline, Andrew J. (2000), ‘Killing Time: The World Politics of 
Civil War Duration, 1820–1992’, International Studies Quarterly 44(4): 615-642. 
Balch-Lindsay, Dylan; Enterline, Andrew J.; Joyce, Kyle (2008), ‘Third-Party Intervention 
and the Civil War Process’, Journal of Peace Research 45(3): 345-363. 
Ball, Desmond J. (1974), 'The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic 
Politics Theory', Australian Journal of International Affairs 28(1): 71-92. 
Barkin, Samuel J. (2010), Realist Constructivism: Rethinking International Relations Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Barnet, Richard J. (1980), Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World, 
revised and updated edition (New York: New American Library). 
Barnett, Michael (2011), Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarism (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press). 
Bartlett, Christopher (1979), ‘Britain and the European Balance’, in Alan Sked (ed.), 
Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815-1848 (London: Macmillan): 145-163.  
Bass, Gary J. (2008), Freedom’s Battle: The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf). 
Beard, Charles (1934), The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Macmillan). 
Beard, Charles (1939), Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels: An Estimate of American Foreign 
Policy (New York: Macmillan). 
                     302 
Beisner, Robert L. (1986), From Old Diplomacy to the New, 1865-1900, Second Edition 
(Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson). 
Bellamy, Alex J. (2003a) 'Humanitarian Intervention and the Three Traditions', Global 
Society 17(1): 3-20. 
Bellamy, Alex J. (2003b), ‘Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in 
International Society’, Review of International Studies 29(3): 321-340. 
Bellamy, Alex J. (2004a), ‘Ethics and Intervention: The “Humanitarian Exception” and the 
Problem of Abuse in the Case of Iraq’, Journal of Peace Research 41(2): 131-147. 
Bellamy, Alex J. (2004b), ‘Introduction: International Society and the English School’ in 
Alex J. Bellamy (ed.), The English School and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press): 1-26. 
Bellin, Eva (2004), ‘The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical 
Perspective’, Political Science Quarterly 119(4): 595-608. 
Beloff, Max (1968), ‘Reflections on Intervention’, Journal of International Affairs 22(2): 198-
207. 
Beman, Lamar T. (1928), Intervention in Latin America (New York: The H.W. Wilson 
Company). 
Benbow, Mark (2010), Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant 
Theology, and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1915 (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University 
Press). 
Benjamin, Jules R. (1977), The United States and Cuba: Hegemony ad Dependent Development, 
1880-1934 (Pittsburgh and London: University of Pittsburgh Press). 
Benjamin, Jules R. (1990), The United States and the Origins of the Cuban Revolution: An 
Empire of Liberty in an Age of National Liberations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press).  
Bennett, Lance W.; Lawrence, Regina G.; Livingston, Steven (2007), When the Press Fails: 
Political Power and The News Media from Iraq to Katrina (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press). 
Bentley, Arthur (1908), The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Berinsky, Adam J. (2007), ‘Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American 
Public Support for Military Conflict’, Journal of Politics 69(4): 975-997. 
Berry, Nicholas O. (1973), ‘The Management of Foreign Penetration’, Orbis 17: 598-619. 
Best, Heinrich; Higley John (2009), ‘Democratic Elitism in Transition’, Special Issue, 
Comparative Sociology 8(3). 
Betts, Richard K. (1994), ‘The Delusion of Impartial Intervention’, Foreign Affairs 73(5): 20-
33. 
Bisley, Nick (2004), ‘Counter-Revolution, Order and International Politics’, Review of 
International Studies 30(1): 49-69. 
Blainey, Geoffrey (1973), The Causes of War (London: Macmillan). 
                     303 
Blair, Tony (2013), ‘Tony Blair Calls for UK Intervention in Syria Crisis’, BBC News, 27th 
February, available at: {http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-21602723}. 
Blondel, Jean; Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand (2007), ‘Political Elites’, in Russell J. Dalton and 
Hans Dieter Klingemann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press): 818-832.  
Bottomore, Thomas Burton (1964), Elites and Society (London: Watts & Co.). 
Boyle, Peter G. (1993), American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of 
Communism (London and New York: Routledge).  
Bradford, James C. (ed.) (1993), The Crucible of Empire: The Spanish American War and Its 
Aftermath (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press). 
Brands, H.W. (1998), ‘Exemplary America versus Interventionist America’, in Robert L. 
Hutchings (ed.), At The End Of The American Century: America’s Role In The Post Cold 
War World (London: John Hopkins University Press): 29-51. 
Braumoeller, Bear F. (2010), ‘The Myth of American Isolationism’, Foreign Policy Analysis 
6(4): 349-371. 
Brinkley, George A. (1966), The Volunteer Army and Allied Intervention in South Russia, 1917-
1921: A Study in Politics and Diplomacy of the Russian Civil War (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press). 
Brown, Chris (2002), Sovereignty, Rights, and Justice: International Political Theory Today 
(Cambridge: Polity).  
Brown, Chris (2013), ‘The Antipolitical Theory of Responsibility to Protect’, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, In Press. 
Brown, Michael E. (ed.) (1996), The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict (Cambridge: 
MIT Press). 
Brownlee, Elliot W. (2008), ‘Wilson’s Reform of Economic Structure: Progressive 
Liberalism and the Corporation’, in John Militon Cooper Jr. (ed.), Reconsidering 
Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace (Wahington DC: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press): 57-84. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Downs, George W. (2006), ‘Intervention and Democracy’, 
International Organization 60(3): 627-649. 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Smith, Alastair; Siverson, Randolph M.; Morrow, James (2003), 
The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge: MIT Press). 
Bull, Hedley (1977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke 
and London: Macmillan). 
Bull, Hedley (1984a), ‘Introduction’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in World Politics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press): 1-6. 
Bull, Hedley (1984b), ‘Intervention in the Third World’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention 
in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 135-156. 
Bull, Hedley; Watson, Adam (1984), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon). 
                     304 
Bullen, Roger (1977), ‘France and the Problem of Intervention in Spain’, The Historical 
Journal 20(2): 363-393. 
Bullen, Roger (1979), ‘The Great Powers and the Iberian Peninsula, 1815-48’, in Alan Sked 
(ed.), Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815-48 (London: Macmillan): 54-78. 
Burch, Philip H. (1981), Elites in American History: Vol. 1 The Federalist Years to the Civil War; 
Vol 2. The Civil War to the New Deal; Vol 3. The New Deal to the Carter Administration 
(New York and London: Holmes and Meier). 
Burke, Edmund (1989), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Volume VIII, edited by 
Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Burke, Edmund (1991), The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Volume IX, edited by 
Paul Langford (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
Buzan, Barry (2001), ‘The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR’, Review of 
International Studies 27(3): 471-488. 
Buzan, Barry (2007), People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the 
Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition (Colchester: ECPR Press). 
Buzan, Barry; Jones, Charles; Little, Richard (1993), The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to 
Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press). 
Byman, Daniel (2013), ‘Explaining Western Response to the Arab Spring’, Journal of 
Strategic Studies 36(2): 289-320. 
Byman, Daniel; Pollack, Kenneth (2001), ‘Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the 
Statesman Back In’, International Security 25(4): 106-146. 
Byrnes, Mark (1999), ‘“Overruled and Worn Down”: Truman Sends an Ambassador to 
Spain’, Presidential Studies Quarterly 29(2): 263-279.  
Byrnes, Mark (2000), ‘Unfinished Business: The United States and Franco’s Spain, 1944-
47’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 11(1): 129-162.  
Calhoun, Frederick (1986), Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign 
Policy (Kent: Kent University Press). 
Callamard, Agnes (2000), ‘French Policy in Rwanda’ in Howard Adelman and Astri 
Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New 
Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers): 156-183. 
Calvert, Peter (1984), Revolution and International Politics (St. Martin’s Press: New York). 
Capoccia, Giovanni; Kelemen, Daniel R. (2007), ‘The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism’, World Politics 59(3): 341-
369. 
Carney, Christopher P. (1989), ‘International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual 
Framework’, Studies in Comparative International Development 24(2): 42-55. 
Carr, Edward Hallett (1984), The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War (London: MacMillan). 
Carr, Edward Hallett (2001), The Twenty Years’ Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
                     305 
Carr, Raymond (1986), The Spanish Tragedy: The Civil War in Perspective (London: Phoenix 
Press). 
Carroll, Peter N. (1994), The Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish 
Civil War (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
Carter, Ralph G.; Scott, James M. (2009), Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional 
Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs (Durnham: Duke University Press). 
Casey, Steven (2001), Cautious Crusader: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and 
the War against Nazi Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Castle, Timothy (1993), At War in the Shadow of Vietnam (New York: Columbia University 
Press). 
Cavaglieri, Arrigo (1928), Nuovi Studi sull’Intervento (Roma: Società Anonima Editrice). 
Cerny, Philip G. (2010), Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transnational Neopluralism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Cesa, Marco (2009), ‘Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War: Morgenthau, Aron and 
Waltz’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11(2): 177-191. 
Cetinyan, Rupen (2002), ‘Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Third-Party Intervention’, 
International Organization 56(3): 645-678. 
Chandler, David (2000), Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton, second edition (London 
and Sterling: Pluto Press). 
Chapman, Michael E. (2011), Arguing Americanism: Franco Lobbyists, Roosevelt’s Foreign 
Policy, and the Spanish Civil War (Kent: The Kent State University Press). 
Chatterjee Deen K.; Scheid , Don E. (2003), ‘Introduction’, in Deen K. Chatterjee and Don 
E. Scheid (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Intervention (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press): 1-18. 
Chavarria, Ricardo E. (1994), ‘The Revolutionary Insurrection’, in Jack A. Goldstone (ed.), 
Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies, second edition (Forth Worth: 
Harcourt Brace): 159-165. 
Chen, Jian (2001), Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press). 
Chong, Ja Jan (2012), External Intervention and the Politics of State Formation: China, 
Indonesia, and Thailand, 1893-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Christensen, Thomas J. (1996), Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and 
Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
Clements, Kendrick A. (1987), Woodrow Wilson: World Statesman (Boston: Twayne). 
Clements, Kendrick A. (1992), The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas). 
Clodfelter, Michael (2002), Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty 
and Other Figures, 1500-2000, second edition (Jefferson and London: McFarland and 
Company Publishers). 
                     306 
Cobden, Richard [1835] (1903), The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London: T. Fisher 
Unwin). 
Cohen, Jerome A. (1974), ‘China and Intervention: Theory and Practice’, in John N. Moore 
(ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press): 348-379. 
Cole, Wayne S. (1983), Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945 (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press). 
Collier, Ruth Berins; Collier, David (1991), Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, The 
Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press).  
Collum, Danny Duncan (ed.) (1992), African Americans in the Spanish Civil War: “This Ain’t 
Ethiopia but It’ll Do” (New York: G.K. Hall). 
Cooper, John Milton Jr. (1983), The Warrior and the Priest: Woodrow Wilson and Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press). 
Cooper, John Milton Jr. (2008), ‘Making a Case for Wilson’, in John Militon Cooper Jr. 
(ed.), Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson: Progressivism, Internationalism, War, and Peace 
(Wahington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press): 9-23. 
Cortada, James W. (1978), Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States, 1776-1977 
(Westport and London: Greenwood Press). 
Coser, Lewis A. (1956), The Function of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press). 
Coulter, Matthew Ware (1997), The Senate Munitions Inquiry of the 1930s: Beyond the 
Merchants of Death (Westport and London: Greenwood Press). 
Coverdale, John F. (1975), Italian Intervention in the Spanish Civil War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press).  
Cox, Michael; Ikenberry, G. John; Inoguchi Takashi (2000), ‘Introduction’, in Michael Cox, 
John G. Ikenberry, Takashi Inoguchi (eds.), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, 
Strategies and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 1-17. 
Cox, Michael; Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline (2005), ‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: 
Rethinking the Marshall Plan’, Journal of Cold War Studies 7(1): 97-134. 
Cunningham, David E. (2006), ‘Veto Players and Civil War Duration’, American Journal of 
Political Science 50(4): 875-892. 
Daalder, Ivo H. (2000), Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press). 
Dahl, Robert (1961), Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, 
Conn ; London : Yale University Press). 
Dahrendorf, Ralf (1959), Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul). 
Dallek, Robert (1995), Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New 
York: Oxford University Press). 
David, Steven R. (1989), ‘Why the Third World Matters’, International Security 14(1): 50-85. 
                     307 
David, Steven (1998), ‘The Primacy of Internal War", in Stephanie G. Neuman (ed.), 
International Relations Theory and the Third World (New York: St. Martin’s Press): 77-102. 
Davis, Donal E.; Trani, Eugene, P. (2002), The First Cold War: The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson 
in U.S.-Soviet Relations (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press).  
Dawley, Alan (2003), Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press). 
DeRouen, Karl Jr. (2000), ‘Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note’, 
International Studies Quarterly 44(2): 317-328. 
Desch, Michael C. (2007/2008), ‘America’s Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of 
Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy’, International Security 32(3): 7-43. 
Deutsch, Karl W. (1964), ‘External Involvement in Internal War’, in Eckstein, Harry (ed.), 
Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York and London: The Free Press and 
Collier Macmillan): 100-110. 
Dimuccio, Ralph B. A. (1998), ‘The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: 
Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems’, Journal of Peace Research 35(2): 245-259. 
Divine, Robert A. (1962), The Illusion of Neutrality (Chicago: Chicago University Press). 
Dodge, Toby (2005), ‘Iraqi Transitions: From Regime Change to State Collapse’, Third 
World Quarterly 26(4/5): 705-721. 
Dodge, Toby (2010), ‘The Ideological Roots of Failure: The Application of Kinetic Neo-
Liberalism to Iraq’, International Affairs 86(6): 1269-1286. 
Dodge, Toby (2013), Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies). 
Doenecke, Justus D. (1977), ‘Non-Interventionism of the Left: The Keep America out of the 
War Congress, 1938-41’, Journal of Contemporary History 12(2): 221-236. 
Domhoff, G. William (1967), Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall). 
Donnelly, Jack (1995), ‘State Sovereignty and International Intervention: The Case of 
Human Rights’, in Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? 
State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press).   
Dorso, Guido (1949), Dittatura, Classe Politica e Classe Dirigente (Torino: Einaudi).  
Downs, Alexander B.; Lilley, Mary Lauren (2010), ‘Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert 
Intervention and the Democratic Peace’, Security Studies 19(2): 266-306. 
Downs, Alexander B.; Monten, Jonathan (2013), ‘Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-
Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization’, International Security 27(4): 
90-131. 
Doyle, Michael W. (1986), ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review 
80(4): 1151-69. 
Dueck, Colin (2003), ‘Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to 
Bush’, World Policy Journal 20(4): 1-11.  
                     308 
Dueck, Colin (2009), ‘Neoclassical Realism and the National Interest: Presidents, 
Domestic Politics, and Major Military Interventions’, in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. 
Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, The State, and Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 139-169. 
Duffy Toft, Monica (2002), ‘Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic 
War’, Security Studies 12(2): 82-119. 
Dumbrell, John (1993), The Carter Presidency: A Re-Evaluation (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press). 
Duner, Bertil (1985), Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s (Aldershot: Gower).  
Dunleavy, Patrick; O’Leary, Brendan (1987), Theories of the State: The Politics of Liberal 
Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Dunn, David H. (2005), ‘Isolationism Revisited: Seven Persistent Myths in the 
Contemporary American Foreign Policy Debate’, Review of International Studies 31(2): 
237-261. 
Dunne, Tim (1995), ‘The Social Construction of International Society’, European Journal of 
International Relations 1(3): 367-389. 
Dunne, Tim; Hill, Cameron; Hanson, Marianne (2001), ‘The New Humanitarian 
Interventionism’, in Marianne Hanson and William T. Tow (eds.), International Relations 
in the New Century: An Australian Perspective (Melbourne and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press): 93-116. 
Dura, Juan (1985), U.S. Policy Toward Dictatorship and Democracy in Spain 1931-1953: A Test 
Case in Policy Formation (Sevilla: Arrayan Ediciciones). 
Dye, Thomas R. (2002), Who’s Running America? The Bush Restoration, Seventh Edition 
(Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall). 
Eckhardt, William; Azar, Edward (1978), ‘Major World Conflicts and Intervention, 1945-
1975’, International Interactions 5(1): 75-110. 
Eckstein, Harry (1975), ‘Case Studies and Theory in Political Science’, in Fred I. 
Greenstein; Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Volume 7 
(Reading: Addison-Wesley): 79-138. 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan (2002), ‘The Foreign Policy of Iran’, in Raymond A. Hinnebusch 
and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States, Boulder, 
Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers): 283-309. 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan; Nonneman, Gerd (1991), War and Peace in The Gulf: Domestic 
Politics and Regional Relations into the 1990s (Reading: Ithaca Press). 
Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah; Roniger, Louis (1980), ‘Patron-Client Relations as a Model of 
Structuring Social Exchange’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 22(1): 42-77. 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim; Sambanis, Nicholas (2000), ‘External Interventions and the Duration of 
Civil Wars’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2433, available at: 
{http://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/workingpaper/10.1596/1813-9450-2433}. 
Eley, John W. (1972), ‘Toward a Theory of Intervention: The Limitations and Advantages 
of a Transnational Perspective’, International Studies Quarterly 16(2): 245-256 
                     309 
Esenwein, George; Shubert, Adrian (1995), Spain at War: The Spanish Civil War in Context, 
1931-1939 (Harlow: Longman). 
Etzioni, Amitai (1965), Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Forces and Leaders 
(New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston). 
Eulau, Heinz (1977), ‘The Hoover Elite Studies Revisited’, Social Science History 1(3): 392-
400. 
Evans, Mark (2006), ‘Elitism’, in Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh (eds.), The 
State: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan): 39-58. 
Evans, Peter B.; Rueschemeyer, Dietrich; Skocpol, Theda (eds.) (1985), Bringing the State 
Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Fabry, Mikulas (2010), Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of 
New States since 1776 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 
Fabry, Mikulas (2011), ‘International Involvement in Secessionist Conflict: From the 16th 
Century to the Present’, in Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan (eds.), The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Secession (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate): 251-266. 
Fadel, Leila; Sly, Liz (2011), ‘As Gaddafi Holds On, Some Libyans Seek Foreign 
Intervention’, The Washington Post, 2nd March, available at: 
{http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030106963.html}.  
Falcoff, Mark; Pike, Frederick B. (eds.), The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939: American 
Hemispheric Perspectives (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press). 
Falk, Pamela S. (1986), Cuban Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest (Lexington: Lexington 
Books). 
Falk, Richard A. (1959), ‘The United States and the Doctrine of Non-Intervention in the 
Internal Affairs of Independent States’, Howard Law Journal 5: 163-189. 
Falk, Richard A. (ed.) (1971), The International Law of Civil War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press).  
Falk, Richard A. (1984), ‘Intervention and National Liberation’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), 
Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 119-133. 
Faulkner, Harold U. (1959), Politics, Reform, and Expansion, 1890-1910 (New York: Harper).  
Femia, Joseph (1975), ‘Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci’, 
Political Studies 23(1): 29-48. 
Femia, Joseph (1993), ‘Mosca Revisited’, European Journal of Political Research 23(2): 115- 
161. 
Ferris, Jesse (2012), Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and 
the Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Feste, Karen A. (1992), Expanding the Frontiers: Superpower Intervention in the Cold War 
(Westport: Praeger). 
                     310 
Fic, Victor (1995), The Collapse of American Policy in Russia and Siberia, 1918: Wilson’s 
Decision Not to Intervene (March – October 1918) (Boulder and New York: East 
European Monographs; distributed by Columbia University Press). 
Field, James A. Jr. (1978), ‘American Imperialism: the Worst Chapter in Almost Any 
Book’, American Historical Review 83(3): 644-668. 
Filene, Peter G. (1967), Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 1917-1933 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press). 
Filene, Peter G. (ed.) (1968), American Views of Soviet Russia, 1917-1965 (Homewood: 
Dorsey Press). 
Findley, Michael G.; Teo, Kwang Tze (2006), ‘Rethinking Third-Party Interventions in 
Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach’, The Journal of Politics 68(4): 828-837. 
Finnemore, Martha (2003), The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).   
Finnemore, Martha; Goldstein, Judith (2013), ‘Power Politics in the Contemporary World’, 
in Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: State Power in a 
Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 18-27. 
Fischer, Nick (2006), ‘The Founders of American Anti-Communism’, American Communist 
History 5(1): 67-101 
Flynn, George Q. (1976), Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American Diplomacy, 1937-45 
(Westport: Greenwood). 
Foglesong, David S. (1995), America’s Secret War Against Bolshevism: U.S. Intervention in the 
Russian Civil War, 1917-1920 (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina 
Press). 
Foglesong, David S. (2007), The American Mission and the ’Evil Empire’: The Crusade for a 
‘Free Russia’ since 1881 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press). 
Foner, Philip S. (1972), The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American 
Imperialism, Volume I and II (New York and London: Monthly Review Press). 
Foran, John (1993), ‘Theories of Revolution Reconsidered: Towards a Fourth Generation?’, 
Sociological Review 11(1): 1-20. 
Fordham, Benjamin O. (1998), Building the Cold War Consensus: The Political Economy of U.S. 
National Security Policy, 1949-1951 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
Fordham, Benjamin O. (2007), ‘Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American 
Intervention in World War I’, International Organization 61(2): 277-310. 
Fordham, Benjamin O. (2009), ‘The Limits of Neoclassical Realism: Additive and 
Interactive Approaches to Explaining Foreign Policy Preferences’, in Steven E. Lobell, 
Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 251-279. 
Forman, Eric M. (1972), ‘Civil War as a source of International Violence’, Journal of Politics 
34(4): 1111-1134. 
                     311 
Forsythe, David P. (1992), ‘Democracy, War, and Covert Action’, Journal of Peace Research 
29(4): 385-395. 
Freedman, Lawrence (1976), ‘Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique of 
the Bureaucratic Politics Model’, International Affairs 52(3): 434-449. 
Freidel, Frank (1958), The Splendid Little War (New York: Bramhall House). 
Fried, Richard M. (1990), Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective (New York: 
Oxford University Press). 
Friedel, Frank (1990), Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Boston: Back Bay 
Books). 
Friedrich, Carl Joachim (1963), Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics 
(London: McGraw-Hill). 
Friedrich, Carl Joachim; Blitzer, Charles (1965), ‘Toward a New Balance of Power’, in Paul 
Seabury (ed.), Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company): 36-49. 
FRUS, see: U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States.  
Fry, Joseph (1979), ‘William McKinley and the Coming of the Spanish-American War: A 
Study of the Besmirching and Redemption of an Historical Image’, Diplomatic History 
3(1): 77-97. 
Gaddis, John Lewis (1990), Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative 
History, second edition (Boston: McGraw Hill). 
Gaddis, John Lewis (2000), The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, second edition 
(New York: Columbia University Press). 
Galbraith, John S. (1960), ‘The “Turbulent Frontier” as a Factor in British Expansion’, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 2(2): 150-168. 
Gambino, Luigi (2005), ‘Introduzione’, in Luigi Gambino (ed.) (2005), Il Realismo Politico di 
Gaetano Mosca: Critica del Sistema Parlamentare e Teoria della Classe Politica (Torino: 
Giappichelli Editore): vii-xxxiii.  
Gardner, Lloyd (1984), A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to 
Reagan (London: Macmilan). 
Gat, Azar (2007), ‘The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers’, Foreign Affairs 86(4): 59-69.  
Gaubatz, Kurt Taylor (1999), Elections and War: The Electoral Incentive in the Democratic 
Politics of War and Peace (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
Gent, Stephen E. (2008), ‘Going In When It Counts: Military Intervention and the Outcome 
of Civil Conflicts’, International Studies Quarterly 52(4): 713-735. 
George, Alexander L.; Bennett, Andrew (2005), Case Studies and Theory Development in 
the Social Sciences (Cambridge and London: MIT Press). 
George, Alexander L.; McKeown, Tim J. (1985), ‘Case Studies and Theories of 
Organizational Decision-Making’, in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (eds.), 
Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, vol. 2 (Greenwich: JAI Press): 21-
58. 
                     312 
Giddens, Anthony (1974), ‘Elites in the British Class Structure’, in Philip Stanworth and 
Anthony Giddens (eds.), Elites and Power in British Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press): 1-21. 
Giddens, Anthony (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration 
(Polity Press: Cambridge). 
Gill, Bates (2007), Rising Star: China’s New Security Policy (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press). 
Gilpin, Robert G. (1996), ‘No One Loves a Political Realist, Security Studies 5(3): 3-26. 
Girling, John Lawrence Scott (1980), America and the Third World: Revolution and 
Intervention (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2007), ‘Transnational Dimensions of Civil War’, Journal of 
Peace Research 44(3): 293-309. 
Gleijeses, Piero (2002), Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 
(Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press).  
Go, Julian (2008), American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Culture in the 
Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press).  
Go, Julian (2011), Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present 
(New York: Cambridge University Press). 
Goldhurst, Richard (1978), The Midnight War: American Intervention in Russia, 1918-1920 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company). 
Goldin, Vladislav (2000), ‘New Views on the Allied Intervention’, Revolutionary Russia 
13(1): 88-95. 
Goldstone, Jack A. (1980), ‘Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation’, World Politics 
32(3): 425-453. 
Goldstone, Jack A. (1991), Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press).  
Goodwin, Jeff (2001), No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Gould, Lewis L. (1982), The Spanish-American War and President McKinley (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas).  
Gourevitch, Peter (1978), ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
Domestic Politics’, International Organisation 32(4): 881-912. 
Graebner, Norman A. (1985), Foundations of American Foreign Policy: A Realist Appraisal 
from Franklin to McKinley (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources).  
Graham, Helen (2002), The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press).  
Graham, Helen (2005), The Spanish Civil War: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
                     313 
Gramsci, Antonio (2001), Selection from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by 
Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Electric Book Co.). 
Graves, William S. (1931), America’s Siberian Adventure, 1918-1920 (New York: Peter 
Smith). 
Grayson, Cary T. (1919a), Peace Conference Diary Entry, 16th January, Cary T. Grayson 
Papers, The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at: 
{http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=27795}. 
Grayson, Cary T. (1919b), Peace Conference Diary Entry, 22nd January, Cary T. Grayson 
Papers, The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at: 
{http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=27801}. 
Grayson, Cary T. (1919c), Peace Conference Diary Entry, 10th March, Cary T. Grayson 
Papers, The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at: 
{http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=29700}. 
Grow, Michael (2008), US Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime 
Change in the Cold War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). 
Guelke, Adrian (1974), ‘Force, Intervention and Internal Conflict’, in Frederick Samuel 
Northedge (ed.), The Use of Force in International Relations (London: Faber): 99-123. 
Gurr, Ted R. (1974), ‘The Relevance of Theories of Internal Violence for the Control of 
Intervention’, in John N. Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press): 70-91. 
Guttmann, A. (1962), The Wound in the Heart: American and the Spanish Civil War (New 
York: Free Press of Glencoe). 
Haas, Ernst B. (1953), ‘The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda’, 
World Politics 5(4): 442-477. 
Haas, Peter M. (1992), ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination’, International Organization 46(1): 1-35. 
Halberstam, David (2001), War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals (London: 
Bloomsbury). 
Hall, John A.; Paul, T.V. (1999), ‘Preconditions for Prudence: A Sociological Synthesis of 
Realism and Liberalism’, in John A. Hall and T.V. Paul (eds.), International Order and the 
Future of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 67-77. 
Halliday, Fred (1987), ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’, 
Millennium 16(2): 215-229. 
Halliday, Fred (1999), Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
Halliday, Fred (2009), ‘The Middle East, Interstate Norms and Intervention: The Great 
Anomaly’, Paper prepared for the Workshop ‘Globalisation and the Middle East’, 
Universitat der Bundeswehr Munchen, Kochel am See, 16-18th October 2009.  
Halliday, Fred; Rosenberg, Justin (1998), ‘An Interview with Kenneth Waltz’, Review of 
International Studies 24(3): 371-386. 
                     314 
Hallock, Steve (2012), The Press March to War: Newspapers Set the Stage for Military 
Intervention in Post-World War II America (Peter Lang Publishing). 
Hamilton, Richard F. (2006), President McKinley, War, and Empire: President McKinley and 
the Coming of War, 1898 (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).  
Hamilton, Richard F. (2007), President McKinley, War, and Empire: President McKinley and 
America’s “New Empire” (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers).  
Hartmann, Michael (2007), The Sociology of Elites (Oxon and New York: Routledge). 
Hartz, Louis (1955), The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political 
Thought since the Revolution (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.). 
Harvey, Frank P. (2011), Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Hay, Colin (2006), ‘(What’s Marxist about) Marxist State Theory’, in Hay, C.; Lister, M.; 
Marsh, D. (eds.), The State: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan): 59-78 
Hay, Colin; Lister, Michael (2006), ‘Introduction: Theories of the State’, in Colin Hay, 
Michael Lister, and David Marsh (eds.), The State: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan): 1-20. 
He, Kai (2012), ‘Undermining Adversaries: Unipolarity, Threat Perception, and Negative 
Balancing Strategies after the Cold War’, Security Studies 21(2): 154-191. 
Healy, David F. (1963), The United States in Cuba 1898-1902: General, Politicians, and the 
Search for Policy (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press).  
Healy, David F. (1970), U.S. Expansionism: The Imperialist Urge in the 1890s (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press).  
Hefner, D. L. (1980), ‘Castlereagh, the Balance of Power, and “Nonintervention”’, The 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 26(1): 71-84. 
Hehir, Aidan (2012), The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Heiss, Mary Ann (2002), ‘The Evolution of the Imperial Idea and U.S. National Identity’, 
Diplomatic History 26(4): 511-540. 
Helms, Jesse (1996), ‘Entering the Pacific Century’, Asia Policy Address at the Heritage 
Foundation, available at: {http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1996/960326-taiwan-
usia2.htm}. 
Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (1996), ‘Ballots, A Barrier against the Use of 
Bullets and Bombs: Democratization and Military Intervention’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40(3): 436-460. 
Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (1998), ‘The US Use of Military Intervention 
to Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Record’, International Interactions 24(2): 91-114. 
Hermann, Margaret G.; Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (2001), ‘Democracies and Intervention: Is 
there a Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?’, Journal of Peace Research 38(2): 237-245. 
Hernandez, Jose M. (1993), Cuba and the United States: Intervention and Militarism, 1868-
1933 (Austin: University of Texas Press).  
                     315 
Herring, George C. (2008), From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations from 1776 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Hershey, Amos S. (1907), ‘The Calvo and Drago Doctrines’, The American Journal of 
International Law 1(1): 26-45. 
Hicks, Alexander M.; Janoski, Thomas; Schwartz, Mildred A. (2005), ‘Political Sociology in 
the New Millennium’, in Thomas Janoski, Robert R. Aldford, Alexander M. Hicks and 
Mildred Schwartz (eds.),The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and 
Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 1-30. 
Higgins, Rosalyn (1984), ‘Intervention and International Law’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), 
Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 29-44. 
Higley, John; Burton Michael G. (2006), Elite Foundation of Liberal Democracy (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers).  
Hironaka, Ann (2005), Neverending War: The International Community, Weak States, and 
the Perpetuation of Civil War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Hobsbawn, Eric J. (1994), The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century (London: 
Michael Joseph). 
Hodges, Henry G. (1915), The Doctrine of Intervention (Princeton: The Banner Press).  
Hoffmann, Stanley (1984), ‘The Problem of Intervention’ in Hedley Bull (ed.), 
Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 7-28. 
Hofstadter, Richard (1967), ‘Cuba, the Philippines, and Manifest Destiny’, in Armin 
Rappaport (ed.), Essays in American Diplomacy (New York: Macmillan): 149-170. 
Hoganson, Kristin L. (1998), Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked 
the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press). 
Hokayem, Emile (2013), Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant, Adelphi Paper 
No.438 (London: Routledge).  
Holbo, Paul S. (1963), ‘Economics, Emotions, and Expansion: An Emerging Foreign 
Policy’, in Wayne H. Morgan (ed.), The Gilded Age (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press): 199-221. 
Holbo, Paul S. (1967), ‘Presidential Leadership in Foreign Affairs: William McKinley and 
the Turpie-Foraker Amendment’, American Historical Review 72(4): 1321-1335. 
Holbrooke, Richard (1998), To End a War (New York: Random House). 
Holsti, Kalevi J. (1972), International Politics: A Framework of Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall). 
Holzgrefe, J. L. (2003), ‘The Humanitarian Intervention Debate’, in J. L. Holzgrefe and 
Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political 
Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge University Press): 15-52. 
Hook, Steven W. (2002), ‘Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad’, in 
Peter J. Schraeder (ed.), Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric vs. Reality (London and Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner): 109-128. 
                     316 
Hook, Steven W.; Spanier, John W. (2004), American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 
sixteenth edition (Washington: CQ Press). 
Hooks, Gregory; Rice, James (2005), ‘War, Militarism, and States’, in Thomas Janoski, 
Robert R. Aldford, Alexander M. Hicks, and Mildred Schwartz (eds.), The Handbook of 
Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press): 566-584.  
Howson, G. (1998), Arms for Spain: The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John 
Murray). 
Hull, Cordell (1948), Memoirs, Volume I (New York: Macmillan Company).  
Hulliung, Mark (ed.) (2010), The American Liberal Tradition Reconsidered: The Contested 
Legacy of Louis Hartz (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). 
Hume, David (1985), ‘Of the First Principles of Government’, in David Hume, Essays: 
Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics). 
Hunt, Michael H. (1987) Ideology and US Foreign Policy (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press). 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press). 
Huth, Paul K. (1998), ‘Major Power Intervention in International Crises, 1918–1988’, The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 42(6): 744-770. 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS] (2001), The 
Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre).  
Jackson, Robert (1990), Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Jackson, Robert (2000), The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press). 
Jahn, Beate (2005), ‘Kant, Mill, and Illiberal Legacies in International Affairs’, International 
Organization 59(1): 177-207. 
Jahn, Beate (2007), ‘The Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, 
Statebuilding (Part I and II)’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1(1-2): 87-106, 211-
229. 
Jenne, Erin K. (2004), ‘A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog 
that Did not Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia’, International Studies Quarterly 48(4): 729-754. 
Jentleson, Bruce W.; Levite, Ariel E. (1992), ‘The Analysis of Protracted Foreign Military 
Intervention’, in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds.), Foreign 
Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia 
University): 1-22. 
Jentleson, Bruce W.; Levite, Ariel E.; Berman, Larry (1992), ‘Foreign Military Intervention 
in Perspective’, in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (eds.), Foreign 
Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia 
University): 303-325. 
                     317 
Jervis, Robert (2013), ‘Do Leaders Matter and How Would We Know?’, Security Studies 
22(2): 153-179. 
Jessop, Bob (2008), State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
Johnson, Chalmers (1982), Revolutionary Change (Stanford: Stanford University Press).  
Jolliffe, M.F. (1938), ‘The Movement of Capital to and from the United States in 1935 and 
1936’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 53(1): 150-159. 
Jonas, Manfred (1990), Isolationism In America 1935–1941 (Chicago: Imprint Publications). 
Joseph, Lawrence B. (1981), ‘Democratic Elitism Revisited’, American Journal of Political 
Science 25(1): 160-187. 
Kagan, Robert (2006), Dangerous Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). 
Kaldor, Mary (1999), New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press). 
Kalyvas, Stathis, N. (2001), ‘Old and New Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?’, World Politics 
54(1): 99-118. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N.; Kenny, Paul D. (2010), ‘Civil Wars’, The International Studies 
Encyclopedia (Denemark: Robert A. Blackwell Publishing), available at: 
{http://www.isacompendium.com/public/}. 
Kaplan, Morton A. (1964), ‘Intervention in Internal War’, in James N. Rosenau (ed.), 
International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 92-102. 
Kaplan, Robert D. (2000), The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War 
(New York: Random House). 
Kanawada, Leo V. (1982), Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Diplomacy and American Catholics, Italians, 
and Jews (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press). 
Karp, Walter (1979), The Politics of War: The Story of Two Wars Which Altered Forever the 
Political Life of the American Republic (1890-1920) (New York: Harper).  
Kathman, Jacob D. (2010), ‘Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions’, 
International Studies Quarterly 54(4): 989-1012. 
Katzenstein, Peter J. (2013), ‘States and Power as Ur-Force’, in Martha Finnemore and 
Judith Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press): 139-156. 
Kaufmann, Chaim D.; Pape, Robert A. (1999), ‘Explaining Costly Moral Action: Britain’s 
Sixty-year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade’, International Organization 53(4): 
631-668. 
Keene, Eddie (2002), Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Keene, Eddie (2013), ‘International Hierarchy and the Origins of the Modern Practice of 
Intervention’, Review of International Studies 39(5): In Press.  
Kegley, Charles W. Jr.; Hermann, Margaret G. (1995), ‘Military Intervention and the 
Democratic Peace’, International Interactions 21(1): 1-21. 
                     318 
Kegley, Charles W. Jr.; Hermann, Margaret G. (1996), ‘How Democracies Use 
Intervention: A Neglected Dimension in Studies of the Democratic Peace’, Journal of 
Peace Research 33(3): 309-322. 
Kegley, Charles W. Jr.; Hermann, Margaret G. (1997), ‘Putting Military Intervention into 
the Democratic Peace: A Research Note’, Comparative Political Studies 30(1): 78-107. 
Keller, Suzanne (1963), Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New 
York: Random House). 
Kemp, Tom (1972), ‘The Marxist Theory of Imperialism’, in Roger Owen and Robert B. 
Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory f Imperialism (London: Longman). 
Kende, Istvan (1978), ‘Wars of Ten Years’, Journal Peace Research 15(3): 227-239. 
Kennan, George F. (1951), American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press). 
Kennan, George F. (1958a), Soviet –American Relations, 1917-1920: Russia Leaves the War, 
Vol.1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Kennan, George F. (1958b), Soviet –American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene, 
Vol.2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Keohane, Robert O. (2013), ‘Stephen Krasner: Subversive Realist’, in Martha Finnemore 
and Judith Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press): 28-53. 
Key, Valdimer Orlando Jr. (1961), Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf). 
Khosla, Deepa (1999), ‘Third World States as Intervenors in Ethnic Conflicts: Implication 
for Regional and International Security’, Third World Quarterly 2(6): 1143-1156. 
Killen, Linda (1978), ‘The Search for a Democratic Russia: Bakhmetev and the United 
States’, Diplomatic History 2(3): 237-256. 
Kim, Kyung-Won (1970), Revolution and International System (New York: New York 
University Press).  
Kinzer, Stephen (2006), Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq 
(New York: Henry Holt and Company). 
Kisingani, Emizet N.F.; Pickering, Jeffrey (2008), ‘Codebook: International Military 
Intervention, 1989-2005’, Inter-University Consortium of Political and Social Research, 
available at: {http://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/}. 
Kissinger, Henry A. (1964), A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of 
Peace, 1812-22 (New York: Grosset and Dunlap). 
Kissinger, Henry A. (1966), ‘Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy’, Daedalus 5(2): 503-
528. 
Kissinger, Henry A. (2012), ‘Syrian Intervention Risks Upsetting Global Order’, 
Washington Post, 1st June, available at: {http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-
01/opinions/35460488_1_intervention-regime-change-national-interest/2}.  
                     319 
Kitchen, Nicholas J. (2010), ‘Systemic Pressures and Domestic Ideas: A Neoclassical 
Realist Model of Grand Strategy Formation’, Review of International Studies 36(1): 
117-143. 
Klare, Michael T. (1981), Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome”: U.S. Interventionism in the 
1980s (Washington DC: Institute for Policy Studies).  
Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay (1998), The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
Knock, Thomas J. (1992), To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World 
Order (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Knock, Thomas J. (2009), ‘Playing for a Hundred Years Hence: Woodrow Wilson’s 
Internationalism and His Would-Be Heirs’, in G. John Ikenberry, Thomas J. Knock, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Tony Smith, The Crisis of American Foreign Policy: 
Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University 
Press): 25-52. 
Koga, Jun (2011), ‘Where Do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties’ Domestic Institutions 
and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts’, International Studies Quarterly 55(4): 1143–
1166. 
Kolegar, Ferdinand (1967), ‘The Elite and the Ruling Class: Pareto and Mosca Re-
Examined’, The Review of Politics 29(3): 354-369. 
Kornhauser, William (1960), The Politics of Mass Society (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul). 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1972), ‘Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)’, 
Foreign Policy 7: 159-179. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1978), Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press).  
Krasner, Stephen D. (1995), ‘Sovereignty and Intervention’, in Gene M. Lyons and Michael 
Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press): 228-249. 
Krasner, Stephen D. (1999), Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press). 
Krasner, Stephen D. (2013), ‘New Terrains: Sovereignty and Alternative Conceptions of 
Power’, in Martha Finnemore and Judith Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics: State Power in a 
Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 339-358. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (1986), ‘Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into 
the Formation of the State System’, World Politics 39(1): 27-52. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich (1995), ‘Sovereignty as Dominium: Is There a Right of Humanitarian 
Intervention?’, in Gene M. Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia: 
State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press): 21-42. 
Krauthammer, Charles (1990), ‘The Unipolar Moment’, Foreign Affairs  70(1): 23-33. 
                     320 
Kupchan, Charles A. (1992), ‘Getting In: The Initial Stage of Military Intervention’, in Ariel 
E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman (eds.), Foreign Military Intervention: The 
Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia University): 243-260. 
Kuperman, Alan, J. (2008), ‘The Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons 
from the Balkans’, International Studies Quarterly, 52: 49-80. 
Lachmann, Richard (2003), ‘Elite Self-Interest and Economic Decline in Early Modern 
Europe’, American Sociological Review 68(3): 346-372. 
LaFeber, Walter (1963), The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press).  
LaFeber, Walter (1993), The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume II: The 
America Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Lahneman, William J. (ed.) (2004), Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First 
Century (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers). 
Lake, Anthony (1993), ‘From Containment to Enlargement’, 21st September, available at: 
{http://www.fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.htm}. 
Lake, David A. (2009), Hierarchy in International Relations (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press). 
Lang, Anthony F. (2002), Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention (New York: 
State University of New York Press). 
Lang, Anthony F. (ed.) (2003), Just Intervention (Washington DC: Georgetown University 
Press).  
Lasch, Christopher (1962), The American Liberals and the Russian Revolution (New York and 
London: Columbia University Press). 
Lasswell, Harold D. (1936), Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, Inc.). 
Lasswell, Harold D.; Kaplan, Abraham A. (1950), Power and Society: A Framework for 
Political Inquiry (Yale University: Oxford University Press). 
Lasswell, Harold; Lerner, Daniel (1965), ‘Foreword’, in Harold Lawsell and Daniel Lerner 
(eds.), World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge: 
MIT Press). 
Lawson, George (2005), Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa and Chile 
(Hants: Ashgate). 
Lawson, George; Little, Richard; MacMillan, John (eds.) (2013), ‘The “Will to Order”: 
Intervention in the Modern World’, Special Issue, Review of International Studies 39(5): 
In press. 
Lawson, George; Tardelli, Luca (2013), ‘The Past, Present and Future of Intervention’, 
Review of International Studies 39(5): In Press. 
Leffler, Melvyn (1994), The Specter of Communism: the United States and the Origins of the 
Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang). 
                     321 
Lemke, Douglas M.; Regan, Patrick (2004). ‘Interventions as Influence’, in Paul F. Diehl 
(ed.): The Scourge of War. New Extensions on an Old Problem (Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press): 145-168. 
Lerner, Robert; Nagai, Althea K.; Rothman, Stanley (1996), American Elites (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press). 
Leuchtenburg, William E. (1952), ‘Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive 
Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916’, The Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 39(3): 483-504. 
Leuchtenburg, William E. (1957), ‘The Needless War with Spain’, American Heritage 8(2), 
accessed at: {http://www.americanheritage.com/content/needless-war-spain}. 
Leurdijk, J.H. (1986), Intervention in International Politics (Leeuwarden: Eisma B.V.). 
Levin, Gordon (1968), Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America’s Response to War and 
Revolution (London and Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Levite, Ariel E.; Jentleson, Bruce W.; Berman, Larry (eds.) (1992), Foreign Military 
Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press). 
Levy, Jack (1989), ‘The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique’, in Manus I. Mildarsky 
(ed.), Handbook of War Studies (London: Unwin Hyman): 259-288.  
Li, Hak Yin; Zheng, Yongnian (2009), Re-interpreting China's Non-intervention Policy 
towards Myanmar: Leverage, Interest and Intervention’, The Journal of Contemporary 
China 18(61): 617-637. 
Liedtke, Boris (1999), ‘Spain and the United States, 1945-1975’, in Sebastian Balfour and 
Paul Preston (eds.), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (London and 
New York: Routledge): 229-244. 
Linderman, Gerald L. (1974), The Mirror of War: American Society and the Spanish-American 
War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
Lingelbach, William (1900), ‘The Doctrine and Practice of Intervention in Europe’, Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 16(1): 1-32. 
Link, Arthur S. (1979), Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace (Arlington Heights). 
Lippmann, Walter; Merz, Charles (1920), ‘A Test of the News: An Examination of the 
News Reports in the New York Times on Aspects of the Russian Revolution of Special 
Importance to Americans, March 1917-March 1920’, New Republic, 4th August 1920.  
Lipset, Martin Seymour (1968), Revolution and Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence in 
Social Structures (New York: Basic Books Inc. Publishers). 
Lipset, Martin Seymour (1983), Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, expanded Edition 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Little, Douglas (1985), Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins 
of the Spanish Civil War (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press).  
Little, Richard (1975), Intervention: External Involvement in Civil War (London: Martin 
Robertson). 
                     322 
Little, Richard (1987), ‘Revisiting Intervention: A Survey of Recent Developments’, Review 
of International Studies 13(1): 49-60. 
Little, Richard (2007), ‘British Neutrality versus Offshore Balancing in the American Civil 
War: The English School Strikes Back’, Security Studies 16(1): 68-95. 
Little, Richard (2008), ‘The British Response to the Spanish Civil War: The Impact of 
Systemic Pressures on Societal Practices’, Working Paper No.08-08, School of 
Sociology, Politics, and International Studies, University of Bristol, available at: 
{http://www.bristol.ac.uk/spais//research/workingpapers/wpspaisfiles/little0808.p
df}.  
Little, Richard (2013), ‘Intervention and Non-intervention in International Society: 
Britain’s Responses to the American and Spanish Civil Wars’, Review of International 
Studies 39(5): In press. 
Lobell, Steven E. (2003), The Challenge of Hegemony: Grand Strategy, Trade and Domestic 
Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
Lobell, Steven E., (2009), ‘Threat Assessment, the State, and Foreign Policy: a Neoclassical 
Realist Model’, in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), 
Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press): 42-74. 
Lobell, Steven E.; Ripsman, Norrin M.; Taliaferro, Jeffey W. (eds.) (2009), Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Logevall, Fredrik (2004), ‘A Critique of Containment’, Diplomatic History 28(4): 473-499. 
Lukes, Steven (2005), Power: A Radical View, second edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
Lukowski, Jerzy (1999), The Partitions of Poland: 1772, 1793, 1795 (London and New York: 
Longman). 
Luttwak, Edward (1999), ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs 78(4): 36-44. 
Lyons, Gene M.; Mastanduno, Michael (1995), ‘Introduction: International Intervention, 
State Sovereignty, and the Future of International Society’, in Gene M. Lyons and 
Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press): 1-18. 
MacFarlane, Neil S. (1985), Intervention and Regional Security, Adelphi Paper No. 196 
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies). 
MacFarlane, Neil S. (2002), Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, Adelphi Paper No. 
350 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies). 
Machiavelli, Niccolò (1988), The Prince, edited by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Machiavelli, Niccolò (1996), Discourses on Livy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
MacMillan, John (2012), ‘Myths and lessons of Liberal Intervention: The British Campaign 
for the Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade to Brazil’, Global Responsibility to Protect 4: 
92-117. 
                     323 
MacMillan, John (2013), ‘Intervention and the Ordering of the Modern World’, Review of 
International Studies 39(5): In Press. 
Maddox, Robert James (1967), ‘Woodrow Wilson, the Russian Embassy and Siberian 
Intervention’, Pacific Historical Review 36(4): 435-448. 
Magdoff, Harry (1974), The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press). 
Mann, Michael (1986), The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the 
Beginning to A.D. 1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Mann, Michael (1993), The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2, The Rise of Classes and 
Nation States 1760-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Mannheim, Karl (1991), Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, 
second edition (London: Routledge).  
Manning, Clarence A. (1952), The Siberian Fiasco (New York: Library Publishers). 
Marshall, Bryan W.; Prins, Brandon C. (2011), ‘Power or Posturing? Policy Availability 
and Congressional Influence on U.S. Presidential Decisions to Use Force’, Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 41(3): 521-545. 
Martin, Charles E. (1921) The Policy of the United States as Regards Intervention (New York: 
Longman, Greens & Co. Agents). 
Mason, T. David; Weingarten, Jr. Joseph P.; Patrick J. Fett (1999), ‘Win, Lose, or Draw: 
Predicting the Outcome of Civil Wars’, Political Research Quarterly 52(2): 239-268. 
Mastanduno, Michael; Lake, David A.; Ikenberry, G. John (1989), ‘Toward a Realist 
Theory of State Action’, International Studies Quarterly 33(4): 457-474. 
 Matheson, Neil (1982), The ‘Rules of the Game’ of Superpower Military Intervention in the 
Third World 1975-1980 (Washington DC: University Press of America). 
Mawdsley, Evan (1987), The Russian Civil War (Boston, London : Unwin Hyman). 
May, Ernest R. (1961), Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and World).   
Mayer, Arno (1971), Dynamics of Counter-revolution in Europe, 1870–1956 (London: Harper 
Torchbooks). 
McCartney, Paul T. (2006), Power and Progress: American National Identity, the War of 1898, 
and the Rise of American Imperialism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press).  
McCormick, Thomas (1963), ‘Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market 
and the Spanish American War’, Pacific Historical Review 32(2): 155-169. 
McFadden, David W. (1993), Alternative Paths: Soviets and Americans, 1917-1920 (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
McKillen, Elizabeth (2010), ‘Integrating Labor into the Narrative of Wilsonian 
Internationalism: A Literature Review’, Diplomatic History 34(4): 643-662. 
Mead, Walter Russell (2002), Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed 
the World (New York: Routledge).  
                     324 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2001), The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton). 
Mearsheimer, John J.; Walt, Stephen M. (2003), ‘An Unnecessary War’, Foreign Policy 134: 
50-59. 
Meernik, Jamess (1996), ‘United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of 
Democracy’, Journal of Peace Research 33(4): 391-402. 
Meisel, James H. (1962), The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the “Elite” (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
Melton, Carol Willcox (2001), Between War and Peace: Woodrow Wilson and the American 
Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918-1921 (Macon: Mercer University Press).  
Merk, Frederick (1963), Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Michels, Robert (1915), Political Parties: A Sociological Study of The Oligarchical Tendencies 
of Modern Democracy (New York: Dover Publications).  
Miliband, Ralph (1969), The State in Capitalist Society (London:  Winfield and Nelson). 
Miliband, Ralph (1970).  ‘The Capitalist State - Reply to Poulantzas’, New Left Review, 59: 
53-60. 
Miliband, Ralph (1973),  ‘Poulantzas and the Capitalist State’, New Left Review 82: 83-92. 
Miliband, Ralph (1977), Marxism and Politics (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Miliband, Ralph (1983), ‘State Power and Class Interests’, New Left Review 138: 57-68. 
Mill, John Stuart ([1859] 1984), 'A Few Words on Non-Intervention', in The Collected 
Works of John Stuart Mill, edited by John M. Robson, Vol. XXI (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press): 109-124. 
Millar, T.B. (1980), ‘Conflict and Intervention’, in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), Conflict and 
Intervention in the Third World (London: Croom Helm): 1-11. 
Millett, Allan Reed (1968), The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-
1909 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press). 
Mills, Charles Wright (1956), The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Milner (1993), Legalistic notion of sovereignty (see first IR essay), Ch. 2, page 3. 
Mintz, Alex (2004), ‘How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective’, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 48(1): 3-13. 
Mitchell, Christopher R. (1970), ‘Civil Strife and the Involvement of External Parties’, 
International Studies Quarterly 14(2): 166-194. 
Modelski, George (1964), ‘The International Relations of Internal War’, in James N. 
Rosenau (ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 
45-91. 
Moisi, Dominique (1984), ‘Intervention in French Foreign Policy’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), 
Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 67-77. 
                     325 
Monten, Jonathan (2005), ‘The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and 
Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy’, International Security 29(4): 112-156. 
Moore, Gwen; Mack, Stephanie (2007), ‘From Vietnam to Iraq: American Elites’ Views on 
the Use of Military Force’, Comparative Sociology 6(1-2): 215-231. 
Moore, John N. (ed.) (1974), Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore and London: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press).  
Moradiellos, Enrique (1999), ‘The Allies and the Spanish Civil War’, in Sebastian Balfour 
and Paul Preston (eds.), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (London and 
New York: Routledge): 96-126. 
Morales Dominguez, Esteban; Prevost, Gary (2008), United States – Cuban Relations: A 
Critical History (Lanham and Boulder: Lexington Books). 
Morgan, Howard Wayne (2003), William McKinley and his America, revised edition (Kent: 
Kent State University Press) 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1951), In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Knopf). 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1965), Vietnam and the United States (Washington: Public Affairs 
Press). 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1967), ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene’, Foreign Affairs 45(3): 425-
436. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1985), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf). 
Morrow, James D. (1991), ‘Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science 35(4): 904-933. 
Mosca, Gaetano (1923), Elementi di Scienza Politica, second edition (Torino: Fratelli 
Bocca Editori); English translation in Mosca, Gaetano (1939), The Ruling Class (New 
York: McGraw-Hill).  
Mosca, Gaetano (1925), Teorica dei Governi e Governo Parlamentare: Studi Storici e Sociali, 
second edition (Milano: Soc.An. Istituto Editoriale Scientifico). 
Mosler, Hermann (1937), Die Intervention im Völkerrecht (Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt 
Verlag). 
Mullenbach, Mark J.; Matthews, Gerard P. (2008), ‘Deciding to Intervene: An Analysis of 
International and Domestic Influences on United States Interventions in Intrastate 
Disputes’, International Interactions 34(1): 25-52. 
Muller, Wolfgang C.; Strøm, Kaare (1999), ‘Conclusions: Party Behaviour and 
Representative Democracy’, in Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strøm (eds.), Policy, 
Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press): 279-310. 
Murray, Robert K. (1955), Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria, 1919–1920 (Minneapolis, 
MN: University of Minnesota Press). 
Musicant, Ivan (1998), Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the 
American Century (New York: Henry Holt).  
                     326 
Nardin, Terry (2006), ‘Introduction’, in Terry Nardin and Melissa S. Williams (eds.), 
Humanitarian Intervention (New York and London: New York University Press): 1-28. 
Narizny, Kevin (2007), The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press).  
National Transitional Council (2011), A Vision of a Democratic Libya, 29th March, available 
at: 
{http://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/Documents/2011/3/29/2011329113923943811T
he%20Interim%20Transitional%20National%20Council%20Statement.pdf}. 
Nexon, Daniel (2009a), The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, 
Dynastic Empires, and International Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Nexon, Daniel (2009b), ‘The Balance of Power in the Balance’, World Politics 61(2): 330-359. 
Nichols, Christopher McKnight (2011), Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global 
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).  
Nordlinger, Eric (1981), On The Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press). 
Novak, William J. (2008), ‘The Myth of the “Weak” American State’, The American 
Historical Review 113(3): 752-772. 
O’Connor, James (1972), The Fiscal Crisis of the State (New York: St Martin’s Press). 
O’Toole, George J.A. (1984), The Spanish War: An American Epic 1898 (New York: W.W. 
Norton). 
Offner, John L. (1992), An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain over 
Cuba, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).  
Offner, John L. (2004), ‘McKinley and the Spanish-American War’, Presidential Studies 
Quarterly 34(1): 50-61. 
Onuf, Nicholas (1995), ‘Intervention for the Common Good’, in Gene M. Lyons and 
Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press): 43-58. 
Oppenheim, Lassa (1905), International Law: A Treatise (London: Longmans, Green and 
co.). 
Otte, Thomas G. (1995), ‘On Intervention: Some Introductory Remarks’, in Andrew M. 
Dorman and Thomas G. Otte (eds.), Military Intervention: From Gunboat Diplomacy to 
Humanitarian Intervention (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company): 3-11. 
Owen, John M. IV (1997), Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International 
Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Owen, John M. IV (2002), ‘The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions’, International 
Organization 56(2): 375-409. 
Owen, John M. IV (2010a), The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, 
and Regime Change, 1510-2010 (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
                     327 
Owen, John M. IV (2010b), ‘Domestically Driven Deviations: Internal Regimes, Leaders, 
and Realism’s Power Line’, in Ernest R. May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner 
(eds.), History and Neorealism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 29-48. 
Owens, Patricia (2004), ‘Theorizing Military Intervention’, International Affairs 80(2): 355-
365. 
Paine, Thomas [1791] (1999), Rights of Man (Mineola: Dover Publications Inc.). 
Pang, Zhongying (2009), ‘China’s Non-Intervention Question’, Global Responsibility to 
Protect 1: 237-252. 
Pape, Robert A. (2012), ‘When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian 
Intervention’, International Security 37(1): 41-80. 
Paquin, Jonathan; Saideman, Stephen, M. (2010), ‘Foreign Intervention in Ethnic Conflict’, 
The International Studies Encyclopedia (Denemark: Robert A. Blackwell Publishing), 
available at: {http://www.isacompendium.com/public/}. 
Pareto, Vilfredo (1935), The Mind and Society, edited by Arthur Livingstone (London: 
Jonathan Cape). 
Paterson, Thomas G. (1998), ‘U.S. Intervention, 1898: Interpreting the Spanish-American-
Cuban-Filipino War’, OAH Magazine of History 12(3): 5-10. 
Patman, Robert G. (1990), The Soviet Union in the Horn Africa: The Diplomacy of Intervention 
and Disengagement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).   
Patnam, Robert G. (2010), Strategic Shortfall: The Somalia Syndrome and the March to 9/11 
(Santa Barbara, Denver, and Oxford: Praeger). 
Patterson, James T. (1967), Congressional Conservatism and the New Deal: The Growth of the 
Conservative Coalition in Congress, 1933-1939 (Organization of American Historians: 
University of Kentucky Press). 
Payne, Stanley G. (1993), Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936 (Madison: 
the University of Wisconsin Press). 
Payne, Stanley G. (2004), The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union, and Communism (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press). 
Payne, Stanley G. (2012), The Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Pearson, Frederic S. (1974), ‘Foreign Military Intervention and Domestic Disputes’, 
International Studies Quarterly 18(3): 259-289. 
Pearson, Frederic S.; Baumann, Robert A. (1993),  ‘International Military Intervention, 
1946-1988’, Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data 
Collection No 6035 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan). 
Pearson, Frederic S.; Baumann, Robert A.; Pickering, Jeffrey J. (1994), ‘Military 
Intervention and Realpolitik’, in Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl (eds.), 
Reconstructing Realpolitik (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press): 205-225. 
Peceny, Mark (1995), ‘Two Paths to the Promotion of Democracy during U.S. Military 
Interventions’, International Studies Quarterly 39(3): 371-401. 
                     328 
Peceny, Mark (1997), ‘A Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Peace: The 
Ambiguous Case of the Spanish-American War’, Journal of Peace Research, 34(4): 415-
430. 
Peceny, Mark (1999), Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press). 
Pereira, Norman G.O. (1988), ‘The “Democratic Counterrevolution” of 1918 in Siberia’, 
Nationalities Papers 16(1): 71-93. 
Perez, Louis A. Jr. (1983), Cuba between Empires 1878-1902 (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press).  
Perez, Louis A. Jr. (1989), ‘The Meaning of the Maine: Causation and the Historiography 
of the Spanish-American War’, Pacific Historical Review 58(3): 293-322. 
Perez, Louis A. Jr. (1995), Essays on Cuban History: Historiography and Research (Gainesville 
and Tallahassee: University Press of Florida).  
Perez, Louis A. Jr. (1998a), The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and 
Historiography (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press). 
Perez, Louis A. Jr. (1998b), ‘1898: A War of the World’, OAH Magazine of History 12(3): 3-4. 
Perez, Louis A. Jr. (2008), Cuba in the America Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos 
(Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press).  
Peters, B. Guy; Pierre, Jon (2006), ‘Governance, Government and the State’, in Colin Hay, 
Michael Lister, and David Marsh (eds.), The State: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan): 209-222. 
Pfeiffer, Tom (2011), ‘Rebels in East Libya Set Up Crisis Committee’, Reuters, 5th March, 
available at: {http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/libya-east-council-
idAFLDE7240EP20110305}.  
Phillips, Kevin (2003), William McKinley (New York: Henry Holt).  
Pickering, Jeffrey; Kisangani, Emizet F. (2005), ‘Democracy and Diversionary Military 
Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis’. International 
Studies Quarterly 49(1): 23-43. 
Pickering, Jeffrey; Peceny, Mark (2006), ‘Forging Democracy at Gunpoint’, International 
Studies Quarterly 50(3): 539-559. 
Pike, Frederick B. (1982), ‘The Background to the Civil War in Spain and the U.S. 
Response to the War’, in Mark Falcoff and Frederick B. Pike (eds.), The Spanish Civil 
War, 1936-1939: American Hemispheric Perspectives (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press): 1-48. 
Piotrowski, Harry (1989), ‘The Structure of the International Society’, in Peter J. Schraeder 
(ed.), Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers): 175-189. 
Pipes, Richard E. (1990) The Russian Revolution (London: Harvill Collins). 
Piven, Frances F.; Cloward, Richard A. (2005), ‘Rule Making, Rule Breaking, and Power’, 
in Thomas Janoski, Robert R. Aldford, Alexander M. Hicks and Mildred Schwartz 
                     329 
(eds.), The Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 33-53. 
Polsby, Nelson W. (1960), ‘How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative’, 
The Journal of Politics 22(3): 474-484. 
Poulantzas, Nicos (1972), ‘The Problem of the Capitalist State’, in Robin Blackburn (ed.), 
Ideology in Social Science (London: Fontana): 238-253. 
Poulantzas, Nicos (1973), Political Power and Social Class (London: New Left Books). 
Powell, Thomas G. (1981), Mexico and the Spanish Civil War (Albuquerque : University of 
New Mexico Press). 
Pratt, Julius W. (1936), Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish 
Islands (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).  
Preston, Paul (1993), Franco: A Biography (London: Fontana Press). 
Preston, Paul (2006), The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution, and Revenge (London: 
Harper Perennial). 
Prunier, Gerard (2000), ‘Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political 
Dead End’, in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds.), The Path of a Genocide: The 
Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick and London: Transaction 
Publishers): 281-305. 
Putnam, Robert D. (1976), The Comparative Study of Political Elites (London: Prentice-Hall). 
Puzzo, Dante A. (1962), Spain and the Great Powers, 1936-41 (New York: Books for Libraries 
Press). 
Quinn-Judge, Sophie (2006), ‘Victory on the Battlefield; Isolation in Asia: Vietnam's 
Cambodia Decade, 1979-1989’, in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge (eds.). 
The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79 (London: 
Routledge): 207-230. 
Quinn, Adam; Cox, Michael (2007), ‘For Better, for Worse: How America’s Foreign Policy 
became Wedded to Liberal Universalism’, Global Society 21(4): 499-519. 
Radan, Peter (2008), ‘Secession: A Word in Search of a Meaning’, in Aleksandar Pavkovic 
and Peter Radan (eds.), On the Way to Statehood: Secession and Globalisation (Aldershot: 
Ashgate): 17-32. 
Rathbun, Brian C. (2004), Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace 
Enforcement in the Balkans (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press). 
Rawls, John (1999), The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Recchia, Stefano; Urbinati, Nadia (eds.) (2009), A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe 
Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations, with an 
Introduction by Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press). 
Record, Jeffrey (2006), ‘External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success’, Parameters 
(Autumn): 36-49; available at: 
                     330 
{http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/06autumn/record.pdf}
.  
Regan, Patrick M. (1998), ‘Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal 
Conflicts’, Journal of Politics 60(3): 759-765.  
Regan, Patrick M. (2000). Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate 
Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 
Regan, Patrick M. (2002), ‘Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate 
Conflicts’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46(1): 55-73. 
Reinhard, Wolfgang (1996), ‘Introduction: Power Elites, State Servants, Ruling Classes, 
and the Growth of State Power’, in Wolfgang Reinhard (ed.), Power Elites and State 
Building (Oxford and New York: Oxford university Press): 1-18. 
Reus-Smit, Chris (1997), ‘The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the 
Nature of Fundamental Institutions’, International Organization 51(4): 555-589. 
Ringmar, Erik (2002), ‘The Recognition Game: Soviet Russia Against the West’, Cooperation 
and Conflict 37(2): 115-136. 
Ripsman, Norrin M. (2009), ‘Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups’, in 
Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical 
Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 170-193. 
Ripsman, Norrin M.; Levy, Jack S. (2008), ‘Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of 
British Appeasement in the 1930s’, International Security 33(2): 148-181. 
Robinson, William I. (1996), Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and 
Hegemony (Cambridge University Press). 
Rohlfing, Ingo (2012), Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Rose, Gideon (1998), ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World 
Politics 51(1): 144-172.  
Rosenau, James N. (1964), ‘Internal War as an International Event’, in James N. Rosenau 
(ed.), International Aspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 45-91. 
Rosenau, James N. (1968), ‘The Concept of Intervention’, Journal of International Affairs 
22(2): 165-176. 
Rosenau, James N. (1974), ‘Foreign Intervention as Adaptive Behavior’, in John N. Moore 
(ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press): 129-151. 
Rosenau, James N. (1995), ‘Sovereignty in a Turbulent World’, in Gene M. Lyons and 
Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International 
Intervention (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press): 191-227. 
Rosenberg, Justin (1994), The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations (London: Verso). 
Roston, Alan (2008), The Man Who Pushed America to War: The Extraordinary Life, 
Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi (New York: Nation Books). 
                     331 
Rothkopf, David (2008), Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making 
(London: Little Brown). 
Rowlands, Dane; Carment, David (1998) ‘Moral Hazard and Conflict Intervention’ in M. 
Wolfson (ed.), The Political Economy of War and Peace (Boston, Dordrecht, and London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers): 267-285. 
Russett, Bruce (1993), Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Saideman, Stephen M. (1997), ‘Explaining the International Relations of Secessionist 
Conflicts: Vulnerability versus Ethnic Ties’, International Organization 51(4): 721-753. 
Saideman, Stephen M. (2001), The Ties That Divide: Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy, and 
International Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press). 
Saideman, Stephen M. (2002), ‘Overlooking the Obvious: Bringing International Politics 
Back into Ethnic Conflict Management’, International Studies Review 4(3): 63-86. 
Saideman, Stephen M. (2011), ‘The International Relations of Secession’, in Aleksandar 
Pavkovic and Peter Radan (eds.), The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession (Farnham 
and Burlington: Ashgate): 266-283. 
Saldin, Robert P. (2011), War, the American State, and Politics since 1898 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press).  
Salehyan, Idean; Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede; Cunningham, David E. (2011), ‘Explaining 
External Support for Insurgent Groups’, International Organization 65(4): 709-744. 
Salvado, Francisco J. Romero (2005), The Spanish Civil War: Origins, Course and Outcome 
(Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Sarkin, Jeremy (2009), ‘The Role of the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s 
Sub-Regional Organizations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: 
Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’, Journal of 
African Law 53(1): 1-33. 
Sasaki, Masamichi (2007), ‘Elites: New Comparative Perspectives’, Special Issue, 
Comparative Sociology 6(1-2).  
Saul, Norman E. (2001), War and Revolution: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas). 
Saul, Norman E. (2006), Friends or Foes: The United States and Russia, 1921-1941 (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas). 
Saunders, Elizabeth N. (2009), ‘Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of 
Intervention Strategy’, International Security 34(2): 119-161. 
Saunders, Elizabeth, N. (2011), Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Saz, Ismael (1999), ‘The Second Republic in the International Arena’, in Sebastian Balfour 
and Paul Preston (eds.), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century (London and 
New York: Routledge): 73-95. 
                     332 
Schattschneider, Elmer E. (1960), The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in 
America (New York and London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston). 
Schild, Georg (1995), Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian 
Revolution, 1917–1921 (Wesport: Greenwood Press). 
Schmid, Alex P. (1985), Soviet Military Interventions Since 1945, with case studies by Ellen 
Berends (New Brunswicjk and Oxford: Trasaction Books). 
Schmidt, Brian C. (2002), ‘Anarchy, World Politics and the Birth of a Discipline: American 
International Relations, Pluralist Theory and the Myth of Interwar Idealism’, 
International Relations 16(1): 9-31. 
Schmidt, Hans (1995), The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934 (Rutgers University 
Press). 
Schmitz, David F. (1999), Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States and Right-Wing 
Dictatorship, 1921-1965 (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina 
Press). 
Schraeder, Peter J. (1989), ‘Concepts, Relevance, Themes, and Overview’, in Peter J. 
Schraeder (ed.), Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World (Boulder 
and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers): 1-14. 
Schrecker, Ellen (1998), Many Are The Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Boston: Little 
Brown). 
Schumpeter, Joseph (1976), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, fifth edition (London: 
Routledge). 
Schwartz, Thomas Alan (2009), ‘“Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important”: 
Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations’, Diplomatic History 33(2): 173-
190. 
Schwarz, Urs (1969), ‘Great Power Intervention in the Modern World’, in Alastair 
Buchanan (ed.), Problems of Modern Strategy, Part II, Adelphi Paper No.55 (London: The 
Institute for Strategic Studies): 30-41. 
Schwarz, Urs (1970), Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World (Dobbs Ferry: 
Oceana Publications). 
Schweller, Randall L. (2006), Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of 
Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press).  
Schweller, Randall L. (2009), ‘Neoclassical Realism and State Mobilization: Expansionist 
Ideology in the Age of Mass Politics’, in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and 
Jeffrey W. Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press): 227-250. 
Scobell, Andrew (2003), China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long 
March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Scott, James (1996), Deciding to Intervene: The Regan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy 
(Durham: Duke University Press). 
Seabury, Paul (1965), ‘The Idea of the Status Quo’, in Paul Seabury (ed.), Balance of Power 
(San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company): 202-219. 
                     333 
Sewell, Mike (2011), ‘Humanitarian Intervention, Democracy, and Imperialism: The 
American War with Spain, 1898, and After’ in Brendan Simms and D.J.B. Trim (eds.), 
Humanitarian Intervention: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 303-
322. 
Sexton, Jay (2006), ‘The United States, the Cuban Rebellion, and the Multilateral Initiative 
of 1875’, Diplomatic History 30(3): 335-365. 
Sheehan, Michael J. (1996), The Balance of Power: History and Theory (London and New 
York: Routledge). 
Shmelev, Anatol (2003), ‘The Allies in Russia, 1917-20: Intervention as Seen by the 
Whites’, Revolutionary Russia 16(1): 87-107. 
Shoemaker, Christopher; Spanier, John (1984), Patron-Client State Relationships (New York: 
Preager). 
Silverlight, John (1970), The Victor’s Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War 
(London: Barrie and Jenkins Ltd). 
Simms, Brendan (2003), ‘The Return of the Primacy of Foreign Policy’, German History 
21(3): 275-291.  
Simms, Brendan; Trim, D.J.B. (eds) (2011), Humanitarian Intervention: A History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Simon, Michael W.; Gartzke, Erik (1996), ‘Political System Similarity and the Choice of 
Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together, or Do Opposites Attract?’, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 40(4): 617-635. 
Sirin, Cigdem V. (2011), ‘Is It Cohesion or Diversion? Domestic Instability and the Use of 
Force in International Crises’, International Political Science Review 32(3): 1-19. 
Siverson, Randolph M.; Starr, Harvey (1994), ‘Regime Change and the Restructuring of 
Alliances’, American Journal of Political Change 38(1): 145-161. 
Sked, Alan (1979a), ‘The Metternich System 1815-48’, in Alan Sked (ed.), Europe’s Balance 
of Power, 1815-1848 (London: Macmillan): 98-121. 
Sked, Alan (1979b), ‘Metternich’s Enemies or the Threat from Below’, in Alan Sked (ed.), 
Europe’s Balance of Power, 1815-1848 (London: Macmillan): 164-189 
Skocpol, Theda (1979), States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
Skocpol, Theda (1985), ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research’, in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), 
Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 3-37.  
Skowronek, Stephen S. (1982), Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Slater, Dan; Simmons, Erica (2010), ‘Informative Regress: Critical Antecedents in 
Comparative Politics’, Comparative Political Studies 43(7): 886-917. 
                     334 
Small, Melvin (1996), Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. 
Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Small, Melvin (2005), At the Water’s Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War (Chicago: 
Ivan R. Dee). 
Smith, Alastair (1996), ‘To Intervene or Not to Intervene: A Biased Decision’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 40(1): 16-40.  
Smith, Joseph (1994a), The Spanish-American War: Conflict in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
1895-1902 (London and New York: Longman). 
Smith, Martin (2006), ‘Pluralism’, in Colin Hay, Michael Lister, and David Marsh (eds.), 
The State: Theories and Issues (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan): 21-38. 
Smith, Rogers (1993), ‘Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz – The Multiple Traditions in 
America’, American Political Science Review 87(3): 549-566. 
Smith, Tony (1994b), America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for 
Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Smyth, Denis (1999), ‘Franco and the Allies in the Second World War’, in Sebastian 
Balfour and Paul Preston (eds.), Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century 
(London and New York: Routledge): 185-209. 
Snyder, Jack (1991), Myths of Empire. Domestic Politics and International Ambitions (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press). 
Snyder, Jack; Shapiro, Robert Y.; Bloch-Elkon, Yaeli (2009), ‘Free Hand Abroad, Divide 
and Rule at Home’, World Politics 61(1): 155-187. 
Somin, Ilya (1996), Stillborn Crusade: The Tragic Failure of Western Intervention in the Russian 
Civil War 1918-1920 (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers). 
Stammer, Otto (1965), Politische Soziologie und Demokratieforschung: Ausgewa ̈hlte Reden und 
Aufsa ̈tze zur Soziologie und Politik (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot). 
Stapleton, Augustus Murray (1866), Intervention and Non-Intervention or The Foreign Policy 
of Great Britain from 1790 to 1865 (London: John Murray). 
Starr, Harvey (1994), ‘Revolution and War: Rethinking the Linkage between Internal and 
External Conflict’, Political Research Quarterly 47(2): 481-507. 
Steigerwald, David (1999), ‘The Reclamation of Woodrow Wilson?’, Diplomatic History 
23(1): 79-98. 
Sterling-Folker, Jennifer (2009), ‘Neoclassical Realism and Identity: Peril Despite Profit 
Across the Taiwan Strait’, in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman and Jeffrey W. 
Taliaferro (eds.), Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press): 99-138. 
Stern, Eric (2004), ‘Contextualizing and Critiquing the Poliheuristic Theory’, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 48(1): 105-126. 
Stone, Glyn A. (2005), Spain, Portugal, and the Great Powers, 1931-1941 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
Stone, Lawrence (1966), ‘Theories of Revolution’, World Politics 18(2): 159-176. 
                     335 
Stoppino, Mario (1968), Potere Politico e Stato (Milano: Giuffre Editore). 
Stoppino, Mario (2000), Potere ed Elites Politiche: Saggi sulle Teorie (Milano: Giuffre Editore).  
Stowell, Ellery C. (1921), Intervention in International Law (Washington: John Byrne and 
co.). 
Strakhovsky, Leonid (1937), The Origins of American Intervention in North Russia (1918) 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Strupp, Karl (1928), Intervention in Finanzfragen (Leipzig: Universitätverlag von Robert 
Noske). 
Suganami, Hidemi (2004), ‘The English School and International Theory’ in Alex J. 
Bellamy (ed.), The English School and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press): 29-43. 
Sullivan, Michael J. (2004), American Adventurism Abroad: 30 Invasions, Interventions, and 
Regime Changes since World War II (Westport: Praeger). 
Sullivan, Patricia L.; Koch, Michael T. (2009), ‘Military Intervention by Powerful States, 
1945–2003’, Journal of Peace Research 46(5): 707-718. 
Suzuki, Shogo (2011), ‘Why Does China Participate in Intrusive Peacekeeping? 
Understanding Paternalistic Chinese Discourses on Development and Intervention’, 
International Peacekeeping 18(3): 271-285. 
Swain, J.E. (1938), ‘Talleyrand’s Last Diplomatic Encounter’, The Historian 1(1): 33-53. 
Swettenham, John Alexander (1967), Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918-1919 (London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd).  
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (2004), Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention at the Periphery 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press).  
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. (2006), ‘State Building for Future Wars: Neoclassical Realism and the 
Resource-Extractive State’, Security Studies 15(3): 464-495. 
Taylor, Foster Jay (1956), The United States and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Octagon 
Books).  
Teson, Fernando (1997), Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 
second edition (New York: Transnational). 
Teson, Fernando (2003), ‘The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention’, in J.L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and 
Political Dilemmas (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press): 93-129. 
Thayer, William Roscoe (1915), The Life and Letters of John Hay, Volume 2 (Boston and New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Co.). 
The New York Times (1917a), ‘The Foreign Policy of the New Russia: A Liberal 
Imperialism Which Will Cultivate Close Relations with Great Britain, France, and 
America’, 20th March, available at: 
{http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10B16FB3F5E11738DDDAC0A94D
B405B878DF1D3}. 
The New York Times (1917b), ‘Russia’s New Leaders: Former U.S. Consul General at 
Moscow Tells of Men Who Ousted Czar and Formed Liberal Government’, 25th March, 
                     336 
available at: 
{http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00C12FB3F5E11738DDDAC0A94D
B405B878DF1D3}. 
The New York Times (1917c), ‘Nineteen States Greet New Russia’, 13th April, available at: 
{http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10C15FC3E5E11738DDDAA0994D
C405B878DF1D3}. 
The New York Times (1917d), ‘Russia to Stand Squarely by Allies’, 4th May, available at: 
{http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-
free/pdf?res=F70717FE395E11738DDDAD0894DD405B878DF1D3}. 
The Telegraph (2011), ‘Head of Libyan "Think Tank" Outlines Human Development 
Strategy’, 31st January, available at: {http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-
files/libya-wikileaks/8294558/HEAD-OF-LIBYAN-THINK-TANK-OUTLINES-
HUMAN-DEVELOPMENT-STRATEGY.html}. 
The White House (1919), American Troops in Siberia – Message from the President of the United 
States, in Response to a Resolution of the Senate Agreed to June 23, 1919, Informing the Senate 
of the Reasons for Sending United States Soldiers to and Maintaining them in Siberia, 
Document No.60, Senate, 66th Congress, 1st Session (read: 25th July 1919). 
Thelen, Kathleen; Steinmo, Sven (1992), ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics’, in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (eds.), Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press): 1-32. 
Theoharis, Athan G. (1971), Seeds of Repression: Harry Truman and the Origins of 
McCarthyism (Chicago: Quadrangle Books). 
Thomas, Caroline (1985), New States, Sovereignty and Intervention (Aldershot: Gower). 
Thomas, Hugh (1986), The Spanish Civil War, third edition (London: Hamish Hamiltons). 
Thucydides (1972), History of the Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin Books). 
Tierney, Dominic (2007), FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the 
Struggle That Divided America (Durham and London: Duke University Press).  
Tillema, Herbert K. (1973), Appeal to Force: American Military Intervention in the Era of 
Containment (New York: T.Y. Crowell).  
Tillema, Herbert K. (1989), ‘Foreign Overt Military Intervention in the Nuclear Age’, 
Journal of Peace Research 26(2): 179-196. 
Tillema, Herbert K.; Van Wingen, John R. (1982), ‘Law and Power in Military Intervention: 
Major States after World War II’, International Studies Quarterly 26(2): 220-250. 
Tilly, Charles (1978), From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading: Addison-Wesley). 
Tilly, Charles (1991), ‘Changing Forms of Revolution’, in Ellen E. Rice (ed.), Revolution 
and Counter-Revolution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell): 1-25. 
Tilly, Charles (1993), European Revolutions, 1492-1992 (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Tilly, Charles (2005), ‘Regimes and Contention’, in Thomas Janoski, Robert R. Aldford, 
Alexander M. Hicks and Mildred Schwartz (eds.), The Handbook of Political Sociology: 
                     337 
States, Civil Societies, and Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 423-
440. 
Tir, Jaroslav (2010), ‘Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial 
Conflict’, Journal of Politics 72(2): 413-425. 
Tone, John Lawrence (2006), War and Genocide, 1895-1898 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press). 
Townson, Nigel (2000), The Crisis of Democracy in Spain: Centrist Politics under the Second 
Republic, 1931-1936 (Brighton and Portland: Sussex Academic Press). 
Townson, Nigel (2012), ‘A Third Way? Centrist Politics under the Republic’, in Manuel 
Alvarez Tardio and Fernando Del Rey Reguillo (eds.), The Spanish Second Republic 
Revisited: From Democratic Hopes to Civil War (1931-1936) (Brighton, Portland, Toronto: 
Sussex Academic Press): 97-113. 
Trachtenberg, Marc (1993), ‘Intervention in Historical Perspective’, in Carl Kaysen and 
Laura Reed (eds.), Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention (Cambridge: American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences), available at: 
{http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/trachtenberg/cv/INTERVEN.doc}.  
Traina, Richard P. (1968), American Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press). 
Trask, David F. (1981), The War with Spain in 1898 (London and New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Co and Collier Macmillan Publishers). 
Trimberger, Ellen Kay (1978), Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and 
Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick: Transaction Books) 
Tripp, Charles (2000), ‘States, Elites and the “Management of Change”’, in Hassan 
Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver (eds.), The State and Global Change: The Political Economy 
of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa (Richmond: Curzon): 211-231. 
Trolliet, Pierre (1940), Essai sur l’Intervention en Droit International Public (Lausanne: 
Imprimerie La Concorde). 
Trubowitz, Peter (1998), Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American 
Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Trubowitz, Peter (2011), Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Tures, John A. (2001), ‘Democracies as Intervening States: A Critique of Kegley & 
Hermann’, Journal of Peace Research 38(2): 227-235. 
U.S. Democratic Party (1896), Party Platform of 1896, 7th July, available at: 
{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29586}. 
U.S. Democratic Party (1900), Party Platform of 1900, 4th July, available at: 
{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29587}. 
U.S. Democratic Party (1936), Party Platform of 1936, 23rd June, available at: 
{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29596}.  
U.S. Department of State (1896), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
                     338 
with the Annual message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 7, 1896, and the 
Annual Report of the Secretary of State (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1897), Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 6, 1897 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1898), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
with the Annual Message of the President Transmitted to Congress December 5, 1898 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1918a), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1918. Russia, Volume I (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1918b), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1918. Russia, Volume II (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1919a), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1919. Russia (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1919b), Bolshevist Movement in Russia – Letter from the Secretary of 
State transmitting to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A Memorandum on Certain 
Aspects of the Bolshevist Movement in Russia, Document No.172, Senate, 66th Congress, 2nd 
Session, 27th October 1919. 
U.S. Department of State (1920), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1920, Volume III (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1931), Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1931, Volume II (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1932), Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1932. 
The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, Volume II (Washington DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1933), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1933. The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, Volume II (Washington DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1933), Papers Relating Foreign Relations of the United States. The 
Soviet Union, 1933-1939 (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1934), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1934, Europe, Near East and Africa, Volume II (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1935), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1935 (in four volumes). The British Commonwealth, Europe, Volume II (Washington DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1936), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1936. Europe, Volume II (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1937), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1937. General, Volume I (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
                     339 
U.S. Department of State (1938), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1938. General, Volume I (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Department of State (1939), Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 
1939. General, the British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume II (Washington DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office). 
U.S. Republican Party (1896), Party Platform of 1896, 16th June, available at: 
{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29629}. 
U.S. Republican Party (1900), Party Platform of 1900, 19th June, available at: 
{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29630}. 
U.S. Republican Party (1936), Party Platform of 1936, 9th June, available at: 
{http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29639}.  
U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (2013), Syrian Transition Support Act of 2013, 
113th Cong., 1st session, 15th May, available at: 
{http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113s960rs/pdf/BILLS-113s960rs.pdf}.  
Ullman, Richard H. (1961), Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Vol.1: Intervention and the War 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Unterberger, Betty M. (1956), America’ s Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920 (Durham: Duke 
University Press).  
Van der Pijl, Kees (1998), Transnational Class and International Relations (London and New 
York: Routledge). 
Van Wingen, John; Tillema, Herbert K. (1980), ‘British Military Intervention after World 
War II: Militance in a Second-Rank Power’, Journal of Peace Research 17(4): 291-303. 
Vanderbush, Walt (2009), ‘Exiles and the Marketing of U.S. Foreign Policy toward Cuba 
and Iraq’, Foreign Policy Analysis 5(3): 287-306. 
Varouxakis, Georgios (1997), ‘John Stuart Mill on Intervention and Non-Intervention’, 
Millennium, 26(1): 57-76  
Venkataramani, M.S. (1961), ‘American Socialists, the Roosevelt Administration and the 
Spanish Civil War’, International Studies 3(4): 395-424. 
Vinas, Angel (1984), ‘The Financing of the Spanish Civil War’, in Paul Preston (ed.), 
Revolution and War in Spain, 1931-1939 (London and New York: Routledge): 266-283. 
Vincent, Raymond John (1974), Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
Vinci, Anthony (2008), ‘Anarchy, Failed States, and Armed Groups: Reconsidering 
Conventional Analysis’, International Studies Quarterly 52(2): 295-314. 
Waley, Daniel Philips (1988), The Italian City-Republics, third edition (London: Longman). 
Walker, Thomas C. (2000), ‘The Forgotten Prophet: Tom Paine’s Cosmopolitanism and 
International Relations ’, International Studies Quarterly 44(1): 51-72. 
Walker, Thomas C. (2008), ‘Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of 
Intervention’, International Studies Quarterly 52(3): 449-468. 
                     340 
Walt, Stephen M. (1987), The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornel University Press). 
Walt, Stephen M. (1996), Revolution and War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Walt, Stephen M. (2013), ‘The Dearth of Strategy on Syria’, Foreign Policy, posted on 21st 
March, available at: 
{http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/21/the_dearth_of_strategy_on_syria?}
.  
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1967a), Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British 
Experience (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown Company). 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1967b), ‘The Politics of Peace’, International Studies Quarterly 11(3): 199-
211. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979), Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill). 
Watson, Adam (1992), The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical 
Analysis (London and New York: Routledge). 
Weart, Spencer R. (1994), ‘Peace among Democratic and Oligarchic Republics’, Journal of 
Peace Research 31(3): 299-316. 
Weber, Cynthia (1992), ‘Reconsidering Statehood: Examining the 
Sovereignty/Intervention Boundary’, Review of International Studies 18(3): 199-216. 
Weber, Cynthia (1995), Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, and Symbolic Exchange 
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press).  
Weber, Max (1978), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol.I and II, 
edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, translated by E.Fischoff et al. (Berkeley: 
University California Press). 
Weede, Erich (1978), ‘U.S. Support of Foreign Governments: Or Domestic Disorder and 
Imperial Intervention, 1958-1965’, Comparative Political Studies 10(4): 497-527.  
Weinberger, Naomi Joy (1986), Syrian Intervention in Lebanon: The 1975-76 Civil War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Weiss, Thomas (2007), Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas in Action (New York: Polity).  
Weissman, Benjamin M. (1969), ‘Herbert Hoover’s “Treaty” with Soviet Russia: August 
20, 1921’, Slavic Review 28(2): 276-288. 
Welch, David A. (1992), ‘The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: 
Retrospect and Prospect’, International Security 17(2): 112-146. 
Werner, Suzanne (1996), 'Absolute and Limited War: The Possibility of Foreign-Imposed 
Regime Change', International Interactions 22(1): 67-88. 
Werner, Suzanne; Lemke, Douglas. (1997), ‘Opposites do not Attract: The Impact of 
Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices’, 
International Studies Quarterly 41(3): 529-546. 
Westad, Odd Arne (2000), ‘The New International History of the Cold War: Three 
(Possible) Paradigms’, Diplomatic History 24(4): 551-565. 
                     341 
Westad, Odd Arne (2005), The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making 
of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Westad, Odd Arne (2012), Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750 (London: 
Bodley Head). 
Western, Jon (2005), Selling Intervention and War: the Presidency, the Media and the American 
Public (The Johns Hopkins University Press). 
Whealey, Robert (1977), ‘How Franco Financed the War – Reconsidered’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 12(1): 133-152. 
Whealey, Robert (1983), ‘Economic Influence of the Great Powers in the Spanish Civil 
War: From the Popular Front to the Second World War’, International History Review 
5(2): 229-254. 
Wheatley, Steven (1993), ‘The Non-Intervention Doctrine and the Protection of the 
Basic Needs of the Human Person in Contemporary International Law’, The 
Liverpool Law Review 15(2): 189-199. 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (1992), ‘Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: 
Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention’, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 17(2): 463-487. 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2000), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Wheeler Nicholas J.; Bellamy, Alex J. (2005), ‘Humanitarian Intervention in World 
Politics’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, third 
edition (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press): 555-578. 
White, John Albert (1950), The Siberian Intervention (Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Wight, Martin (1966), ‘Western Values in International Relations’, in Herbert Butterfield 
and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International 
Politics (London: Allen and Unwin): 89-131. 
Wight, Martin (1978), Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad 
(London: Leicester University Press). 
Wilkerson, Marcus M. (1932), Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War: A Study in War 
Propaganda (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press). 
Williams, Bernard (2005), In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political 
Argument, selected, edited, and with an introduction by Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
Williams, Michael C. (2004), ‘Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans 
Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics’, 
International Organization 58(4): 633-665. 
Williams, Williams A. (1963), ‘American Intervention in Russia, 1917-1920’, Studies on the 
Left 3(4): 24-48; 4(1): 39-57. 
Williams, William A. (1988), The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, new edition (New York 
and London: W.W. Norton). 
                     342 
Wilson, Scott; Warrick, Joby (2011), ‘Syria’s Assad Must go, Obama Says’, The Washington 
Post, 18th August, available at: {http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-
18/politics/35271355_1_syrian-government-assets-syrian-president-bashar-al-assad-
syrian-people}. 
Wilson, Woodrow (1919a), ‘Food Relief Appropriation’, 11th January, Woodrow Wilson 
Press Statements, The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at: 
{http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=29357}. 
Wilson, Woodrow (1919b), ‘Address on the League of Nations’, 28th February, Cary T. 
Grayson Papers, The Woodrow Wilson Presidential Library, available at: 
{http://wwl2.dataformat.com/Document.aspx?doc=30755}. 
Windsor, Philip (1984), ‘Superpower Intervention’, in Hedley Bull (ed.), Intervention in 
World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press): 45-65. 
Winfield, P.H. (1922-23), ‘The History of Intervention in International Law’, British 
Yearbook of International Law 3: 130-149. 
Wintrop, Norman (1992) 'Elite Theory and Neo-elite Theory Understandings of 
Democracy: An Analysis and Criticism', Australian Journal of Political Science 27(3): 462-
477. 
Wippman, David (1998), ‘Introduction: Ethnic Claims and International Law’, in David 
Wippman (ed.), International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 
Wisan, Joseph E. (1934), The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, 1895-1898 (New 
York: Columbia University Press). 
Wohlforth, William C.; Little, Richiard; Kaufman, Stuart J.; Kang, David; Jones, Charles 
A.; Tin-Bor Hui, Victoria; Eckstein, Arthur; Deudney, Daniel; Brenner, William L. 
(2007), ‘Testing Balance-of-Power Theory in World History’, European Journal of 
International Relations 13(2): 155-185. 
Wolfe, Alan (1974), ‘New Directions in the Marxist Theory of Politics’, Politics and Society 
4(2): 131-159.  
Woodward, Susan L. (2007), ‘Do the Root Causes of Civil War Matter? On Using 
Knowledge to Improve Peacebuilding Interventions’, Journal of Intervention and 
Statebuilding 1(2): 143-170. 
Woodward, Susan L. (2013), ‘The Long Intervention: Continuity in the Balkan Theatre’, 
Review of International Studies 39(5): In Press. 
Wright, Theodore P. Jr. (1959), ‘United States Electoral Intervention in Cuba’, Inter-
American Economic Affairs 13(3): 50-71. 
Wyllie, James H. (1984), The Influence of British Arms: An Analysis of British Military 
Intervention Since 1956 (London: Allen and Unwin). 
Yoon, Mi Yung (1997), ‘Explaining US Intervention in Third World Internal Wars, 1945-
1989’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(4): 580-602. 
Young, Oran R. (1968), ‘Intervention and International Systems’, Journal of International 
Affairs 22(2): 177-187. 
                     343 
Young, Oran R. (1974), ‘Systemic Bases of Intervention’, in John N. Moore (ed.), Law and 
Civil War in the Modern World (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press): 111-126. 
Younger, Kenneth (1971), ‘Intervention: The Historical Development I’, in Louis Jaquet 
(ed.), Intervention in International Politics (The Hague: Nijhoff). 
Zakaria, Fareed (1992), ‘Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay’, International 
Security 17(1): 177-198. 
Zakaria, Fareed (1998), From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America’s World Role 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press). 
Zartman, I. William (1993), ‘The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts’, in 
Roy Licklider (ed.), Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End (New York: New York 
University Press): 20-36. 
Zimmerman, Walter (2002), First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made their Country a 
World Power (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux). 
Zinn, Howard (2003), A People’ s History of the United States: 1492-present (Harlow: 
Pearson). 
Zuckerman, Alan (1977), ‘The Concept “Political Elite”: Lessons from Mosca and Pareto’, 
Journal of Politics 39(2): 324-344. 
Zuñiga, Luis Guillermo (1991), El Principio de No Intervención (Prologo: Mauro Zuniga). 
 
 
 
